RESULTS OF DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 2(d) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

March 2, 2022

The FBI has identified seven (7) documents that pertain to a classified investigation, method, or technique and are withheld in the entirety from public disclosure under the following redaction codes:

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

RESULTS OF DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 2(d) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

March 2, 2022

The FBI has identified one (1) document that is withheld from public disclosure at this time. This document is withheld in the entirety under the following redaction code:

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.

C-2 INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT''S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

(F)

(S)

On 04/20/2004 the following investigation was conducted by (S) (S) and (S) and (S) (S) in Los Angeles, CA:

Caysan Bin Don, also known as (P) (P), with telephone number (P-1) (P-1) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents. (P) (P)

(P)

Mr. Bin Don was asked if he could recall traveling with Omar al-Bayoumi to Los Angeles from San Diego, CA during January 2000 to visit the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA and other business. Mr. Bin Don stated that he did remember this trip with al-Bayoumi. (P) (P)

(P)
[redacted]

(P)
[redacted]

As for the trip to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi asked Bin Don either one or two days before the two of them actually traveled to Los Angeles if Bin Don would accompany al-Bayoumi to the Saudi Arabian (Saudi) Consulate. Mr. Bin Don told the present interviewers that al-Bayoumi specifically asked for assistance with his (al-Bayoumi's) "I-94."

The I-94 is Immigration and Naturalization form that specifies the type of visa and length of time the holder (al-Bayoumi) is allowed to remain in the United States. Mr. Bin Don said that the trip to Los Angeles occurred on a "regular workday" and was not on Friday or the weekend. At this time, Bin Don had known al-Bayoumi about one month..

Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi drove his (al-Bayoumi's) automobile to the consulate in Los Angeles. Before arriving at the consulate, al-Bayoumi stopped at a photographic shop on Sepulveda Boulevard, in Los Angeles to get photographs of him suitable for a passport. Mr. Bin Don recalls that al-Bayoumi pulled his vehicle up to a gated entrance to a parking garage that was under the Saudi Consulate. Al-Bayoumi spoke in Arabic on the intercom microphone at the gate and the gate was opened and al-Bayoumi drove into the garage and parked. They parked in a normal parking place and walked towards a reception area. Both Bin Don and al-Bayoumi were dressed in Islamic clothing, i.e. a "thobe." The reception area was accessible from the garage. As they approached this area, three men dressed in western business suits, walked out of the reception area and greeted al-Bayoumi. The conversation was in Arabic and only lasted for a brief period of time. Mr. Bin Don stated that he considered this a happenstance meeting and that the three men from the consulate were only being polite to another "brother." Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then entered the reception area. There was no receptionist present and al-Bayoumi used a telephone in the reception area to announce his presence. Mr. Bin Don described the reception area as plain, with a few seats, an airport type metal detector and an airport type X-ray machine.

Mr. Bin Don said that shortly after the call was placed by al-Bayoumi a mid-eastern male, dressed in a western business suit, with a full beard, "two fists length" came out to the reception room and greeted al-Bayoumi in English. Al-Bayoumi introduced the consular employee to Bin Don, but Mr. Bin Don no longer recalls the employee's name. Al-Bayoumi and the employee spoke briefly about al-Bayoumi's interest in obtaining religious materials, including Korans from the consulate. Also mentioned in Mr. Bin Don's presence was the fact that al-Bayoumi had not been at the consulate for at least three months. On the drive up to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi told Mr. Bin Don that he, that is al-Bayoumi routinely traveled to the consulate to obtain Islamic religious materials.

Mr. Bin Don then stated that he "ran in to" the consular employee at a shopping mall in Anaheim, CA within the last six months. (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

(P)

[redacted]

(P)

[redacted]

Mr. Bin Don was asked about the rest of the visit to the Saudi Consulate. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi followed the consulate employee into the offices of the consulate while Bin Don waited in the reception area. After some period of time, al-Bayoumi reappeared carrying a box of Korans and other religious materials. Mr. Bin Don said that the religious literature was to be used at the El Cajon, CA mosque. Al-Bayoumi, with the sponsorship of a well-to-do Muslim, was helping to establish that mosque. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left the consulate by returning to al-Bayoumi's automobile. At Mr. Bin Don's suggestion they drove to the King Fahad Mosque, in Culver City, CA, which was not far from the Saudi Consulate's location in west Los Angeles. Mr. Bin Don explained that they prayed at the "*masjid*" (mosque). After their prayers, al-Bayoumi suggested that they both go to a near by *halal* restaurant. Al-Bayoumi drove from the King Fahad Mosque to the restaurant, which Bin Don recalls as being located on Venice Boulevard in Culver City. They found a parking place in front of what al-Bayoumi stated was the restaurant. They went inside and determine that this business was not a restaurant but a *halal* meat market. The proprietor of the market told al-Bayoumi that there was a *halal* restaurant a short walk from the market. Al-Bayoumi and Bin Don left the market and walked to the restaurant which is named the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don noted that they did not have to move the automobile. Mr. Bin Don is now very familiar with the Mediterranean Café and had patronized the establishment on the day of this interview. Mr. Bin Don said that he showed FBI agents both businesses during a previous interview.

Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi ordered their food over a counter, in a fashion similar to a fast food restaurant. Mr. Bin Don stated that they then sat in an "alcove" to wait while their food was prepared. While waiting at the table, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar walked into the restaurant. They were speaking Arabic and ordering coffee. Al-Bayoumi overheard them. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi is "very friendly" and immediately addressed the two in Arabic, and invited them to sit with Bin Don and al-Bayoumi. Al-Bayoumi asked al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar their names and where they were from. They told al-Bayoumi that they were from Saudi Arabia. The conversation was in Arabic, but al-Bayoumi occasionally translated the responses of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar into English. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi offered to buy a meal for the two in the "Islamic tradition." Al-Hazmi told al-Bayoumi and Bin Don that he was from Mecca, (P) (P) (P) When brought back to the subject at hand, Mr. Bin Don said that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi that they were living in an apartment "near by." Al-Hazmi went on to tell al-Bayoumi that they had just arrived in the United States and were studying English. Mr. Bin Don said that the exchange was vague to him, since he only spoke limited Arabic. Mr. Bin Don recalls at this late date that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi they were unhappy in Los Angeles. Al-Bayoumi invited them to visit San Diego to see if they would want to move to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi and al-Hazmi apparently exchanged telephone numbers. Mr. Bin Don was asked if he specifically recalls that al-Hazmi had a telephone, or whether al-Bayoumi only provided his telephone number. Mr. Bin Don could not recall the exact sequence. After about thirty minutes al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar left the restaurant. Mr. Bin Don said that they did not have a motor vehicle. He does not recall the direction that they walked after leaving the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don stated emphatically, that he had no information from al-Bayoumi in advance that they would meet al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the Mediterranean Café. He further said that the meeting was "purely a coincidence" and that al-Bayoumi's friendly nature was the reason that al-Bayoumi showed an interest in the situation of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then left the restaurant and returned to the King Fahad Mosque for the sunset prayer. Al-Bayoumi did not offer to take al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the mosque, nor did Bin Don see them at the mosque for the sunset prayer. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left Los Angeles before the evening prayer.

(P)

The next contact with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was at the party that al-Bayoumi organized. The party was held in the apartment occupied by al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don described the attendees at the party as, "many people from the community." Mr. Bin Don described the behavior of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar as normal and that they both appeared to be at ease. Mr. Bin Don videotaped the party at the request of al-Bayoumi, using al-Bayoumi's video camera. Some of the guests at the party did not want to be videotaped and Bin Don assumed that this was for religious reasons. Mr. Bin Don said that for most of the party, he remained in the kitchen area. During the party, based on what little conversation Bin Don could understand, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told the others that they were students. Mr. Bin Don said that everyone at the party was a "brother" that he recognized from attending prayer services at the ICSD.

(P)

Mr. Bin Don's statement to the 9-11 Commission and the Commissioners which has been paraphrased in part is as follows:

(P)

(P)

OPERATION ENCORE

(F)

Multiple Subjects:

Fahad al-Thumairy
(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi
(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah
(F)

Iyad al-Rababah
(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani
(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi
(F)

(G)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Update (as of 20 March 2014):

- **19 March 2014 – Interview of (P), Iyad Al-Rababah's (P) at her place of employment (P) in Paramus, NJ. (P) advised that she has been in contact with Al-Rababah, currently in Jordan, as recently as one month ago, and maintains regular contact with him by telephone. (P) agreed to a future interview to provide additional details on her relationship with Al-Rababah, her knowledge of Al-Rababah's former roommate (P) and Al-Rababah's current living situation in Jordan.**

- **17 March 2014 – Fox News provided internet link to a 28 minute interview of (P) in (P), NJ in September 2011. Interview will be reviewed (D), (P) (D), (P)**

- **06 March 2014 - Case team meeting with FBI Newark regarding Encore subject (P) Several leads pertaining to (D), (P) were discussed to include, (P) relatives in PA, (P) Iyad Al-Rababah. and (P)**

- **28 February 2014 – SVTC with San Diego case team re Encore background regarding significance of San Diego subject Mohdar Abdullah, and San Diego based connections to Encore.**

- **26 February 2014 - Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA (S) (D), (P)**

- **24 January 2014 – Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA** (S) (D) (D)
- 19-20 December 2013 – (G), FBI LA, FBI WFO interview Mohdar Abdullah (F) (F) (G)
- December 2013 – SDNY advised that defense counsel (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 05 November 2013 – (G) advised they would seek to arrange an interview with Al-Mansoori at the US Embassy in (G)
- 14 October 2013 – (J-3)
- October 2013 – (A), (G), (J-1)
- 19 August 2013 (C-1)
- 13 August 2013 – SDNY advised that (P), (D) (P), (D)
- 09 July 2013 - (P), (D)
- May/June 2013 - Coordination with USAO SDNY regarding (P), (D)
- 13 May 2013 – SDNY advised that (P) is represented by counsel and that discussions are under way for a proffer of (P) at SDNY in June 2013.
- 1 May 2013 - (J-3) (J-3)
- 18 April 2013 FBI Newark agrees to turn over (F) (P) to New York for investigation under Operation Encore.
- 11 April 2013 SDNY confirmed positive contact made with a defense attorney (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 08 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting provided by Al-Rababah.
- 05 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting and background of Al-Rababah.
- 20 March 2013 meeting with SDNY, was held regarding investigative approach on (P) DHS's appeal of the U.S. Immigration judge's order granting asylum to (P) was issued a final denial.
- March 2013 - (D) (D)

[redacted]

- February 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) to conduct an interview of Mohamed Al-Mansoori (A), (G), (J-1)

- 25 January 2013 - Encore Case team met with SDNY AUSA (S) SDNY AUSA (S) and DOJ main attorney (S) During the meeting, SDNY and DOJ were advised of case developments.

- 30 November 2012 - (C-2)

- [redacted] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA (S) and DOJ attorney (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request of (G) AUSA (S) will explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah (G)

- [redacted] 10 September 2012 - (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to (C-2) (C-2) advised on 10 September 2012 that (C-2) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, (G) will coordinate with SDNY (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

- [redacted] (P) her mother (P) father (P) and mother's sister (P) were sentenced on (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a $2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases agains (P) and (P) (G) including (P) Upon successful denaturalization, (P) (G) will be served with Notice to Appears (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.

- (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012 (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer, (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) investigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.

- [redacted] In August 2012 (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) an (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed Mana's current residence. (G) is planning to approach (P) for an interview of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.

[redacted]

- (P) (F) an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. (P) s reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists (G), in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of (P)

- [redacted] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard's procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of documentation with potential probative value. (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy (F) and Adel al Sadhan (F) as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.

- [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, (F) and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is to (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[redacted] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

(C-2) In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO, (C-2) The FBI has also provided [redacted] with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[redacted] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdar to a young woman named (P) (P) and her family are (P) although they claimed to be (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

[redacted] On (P) 2012, (P) her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that (P)s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing (P)s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on (P), 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[redacted] Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

OPERATION ENCORE

(F)

Multiple Subjects:

Fahad al-Thumairy
(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi
(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah
(F)

Iyad al-Rababah
(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani
(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi
(F)

(G)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Updates and Initiatives (as of 5 October 2012):

- [redacted] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA (S) and DOJ attorne (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request o (G) AUSA (S) ill explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah in (G)

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- [redacted] (P) her mother (P) father Aiderous (P) and mother's sister (P) were sentenced on (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a $2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases against (P) (G) ncluding (P) Upon successful denaturalization (P) (G) will be served with Notice to Appears (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.

- [redacted] (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012, (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) nvestigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.

- [redacted] In August 2012, (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) an (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed (P) s current residence. (G) s planning to approach (P) for an inter of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with a (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.

- [redacted] (P), (F), an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. (P) is reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists. (G) in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of (P)

- [redacted] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard's procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of documentation with potential probative value. (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy (F) and Adel al Sadhan (F), as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.

- [redacted]) (A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, (F) nd currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[redacted] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

[redacted] (C-2) (C-2) In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO, (C-2) The FBI has also provided (C-2) with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[redacted] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdar to a young woman named (P). (P) and her family are (P) although they claimed to be (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

[redacted] On (P), 2012, (P), her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that (P) s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing (P) s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on (P) 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[redacted]Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
October 26, 2001

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA , OMAR KHADIB
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Date Full Field Investigation (FFI) authorized: (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] The purpose of this communication is to set forth justification for renewal of a Full Field Investigation (FFI) of Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib, a United States Person (USPER), San Diego, CA.

[redacted] Office of Origin: San Diego Division of the FBI is the office of origin in this investigation.

[redacted] Date investigative summary prepared: October 26, 2001.

[redacted] Basis for Investigation: A Full Field Investigation has been authorized by San Diego Division on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that Omar Abdi Mohamed is or may be engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aiding and abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[redacted] Previous Investigation:

[redacted] (G) advised that Omar Abdi Mohamed was born on (P-1) in Somalia. Mohamed was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) Mohamed was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P-1) On April 11, 2000, Mohamed submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G) has reported that AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[redacted] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on (G) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

[redacted] In December 1998 (C-2) advised the (O-1) (O-1) that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) pledged financial support to AIAI and, in turn, the group is to work with UBL against Western interests and facilities.

[redacted] UBL has purchased shares in the Al-Barakaat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Gassim (or Qasim), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and Shaykh Muhammad Utham, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakaat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakaat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in

Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. Omar Khadib and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. Khadib is a close associate of (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) sponsored Mohamed when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including

fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] Current Investigation:

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) a prominent Somali community leader, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must be providing information to the FBI.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] On 09/14/2001 (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P-1). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] In (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's

Degree and is working on his Ph.D in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU as another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[redacted] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend of (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues KAHDIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding Omar Abdi Mohamed:

Name: Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P) La Mesa, CA 91941
(P)
Occupation: Director, Western Somali Relief Agency 4979 University Avenue., #C San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-6013
(619) 563-9443
President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted] Objectives: The objectives of this investigation are to: (1) develop additional facts demonstrating that Omar Mohamed continues to be a leader of the AIAI or a splinter terrorist group in the United States, (2) determine if Mohamed is a member of AL-QAEDA, (3) identify other AIAI and AL-QAEDA members and associates of Mohamed and neutralize their support of terrorist activities.

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/24/2005

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San (G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Submission of (A), (G), (J-1) LHM

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Enclosed for (G) for dissemination is (A), (G), (J-1) LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject.

Details: **Previous Investigation**:

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by Imam (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED

[redacted]

submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed an financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

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[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [redacted] (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] On 09/14/2001, (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was iden K (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P) . (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movem (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] In (O-1) (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB (O-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[redacted] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[redacted] Mohamed's wife (P) born (P-1) (P) in (P) California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1) telephone number (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[redacted] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[redacted] In July or August 1998 (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[redacted] According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[redacted] (C-1)
(C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P) encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F) According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islami African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license numbe (P) La Mesa, California, (P) and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) 315N-SD-67075), born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number B4284713, (P) San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P) San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of (P) (P)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

To: C unt From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) , 01/24/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGONT, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/25/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San (G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Submission of (A), (G), (J-1) LHM

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted** (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) LHM for (G) (G)

Details: **Previous Investigation**

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/25/2007

(O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND (P) (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] On 09/14/2001, (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR K (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [redacted] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] In [redacted] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to [redacted] (O-1) and told [redacted] (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, [redacted] (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: [redacted] (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [redacted] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[redacted] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[redacted] Mohamed's wife (P) born (P-1) (P) in (P) California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1), telephone number (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[redacted] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[redacted] In July or August 1998 (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[redacted] According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P) encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F) According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) s itted declarations from (P) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number, (P) La Mesa, California, (P) and (P) ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), born (P-1) / (P) California drivers license number (P) San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P), San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of (P) (P)

(C-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/25/2007

(C-1)
(C-1)

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(C-1)

(C-1)
(C-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/25/2007

(C-1)

Trial results

[redacted] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[redacted] In late 2006, AUSA (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[redacted] (G)
(G)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes:
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/25/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] (G) disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 05/17/2007

To: San Diego Attn: [redacted] (G) [redacted] (S)

From: San Diego
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Reassign case and all subfiles.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Details: [redacted] Request case and all subfiles be reassigned go [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

Previous Investigation

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by [redacted] (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

[redacted] (O-1)

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[redacted]

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[redacted] (C-1)

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[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) (P-1) (P), California drivers license numbe (P) La Mesa, California, (P), and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number (P-1) (P), San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P), Suite I, San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) the Kilimanjaro Cafe was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi ed is associated as a board member or officer of the (P) (P)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: ([redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

(C-1)

(C-1)
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(C-1)
(C-1)

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 05/17/2007

(C-1)

(C-1)

Trial results

[redacted] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[redacted] In late 2006, AUSA (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[redacted] (G) (G)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

◆◆

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File # Date dictated

by

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07/24/2002

On July 16 2002, (P) Voluntarily appeared at the N fice (NYO (P) e white date of birth (P-1) ss# (P-1) address (P) St. Clair Michigan. was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. (P) volunteered the following information:

(P) stated Avco Overseas, a Houston based company purchased its contracts with The Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) through contacts with Sheik Salih Kamel. Kamel is the principal of Dallah Al Baraka and his son Abdullah Kamel runs the Los Angeles office of Al Baraka. (P) is sure Al Bayoumi was receiving monies from Avco but was unaware of the vehicle for transferring these monies to Al Bayoumi. (P) could not remember the name of the individual at Avco who was familiar with the payments to Al Bayoumi.

(P) was present at seven meetings in the United States related to the negotiations of the award of the default Avco overseas contracts. The first meeting was held at the Avco offices in Texas during the month of February 1995. (P) explained that the representatives for Avco had an unexplained interest in the awarding of the new contracts. (P) speculated that this was the result of the corrupt relationship that existed between Salih Kamel and the Avco representatives. The second was also held during the month of February 1995, at the offices of (P) in Newport Beach California. The third meeting was held at (P) during the month of April 1995, at this meeting (P) remembers a letter being issued by Mohammed Al-Salmi of PCA to (P) (P) Of (P) outlining the financial support of Omar Al Bayoumi by Ercan and guaranteed by PCA/AE ANSS project account. (note: this document, dated 2/5/95 is recovered from Al Bayoumi's effects during the search of his residence conducted by New Scotland Ya The additional four meetings all ace at the offices of (P) during the spring and summer of 1995. (P) usually traveled to these meetings in the U.S. with Hamid Al Rashid and Salaam Al Colie. During one of the summer meetings (P) met Al Bayoumi for the first time. (P) ht it possible that Al Bayoumi could have picked up cash from (P) (P) at that meeting.

(P) believes Sheik Salih Kamel is a Saudi national with Pakistani origins, Kamel is also extremely wealthy and has many business interests around the world To include Dallah Al-Baraka Investment and Development. (P) was not aware of any Kamel connection to the non

July 16 2002 NYO/FBI

(F)

(S)

fit organization Sana-Bell Inc. located in Falls Church VA. (P) was not aware of other individuals who were involved in funding Al Bayoumi.

(P) indicated that (P) would have specific details with respect to the payments made to Al Bayoumi by PCA, Avco, (P) and at times (P) ed as the "bag man" for the PCA. (P) often comp o (P) his roll. (P) provided a phone number for (P): (P)

(P) didn't possess any information relating to Al Bayoumi's connection to the Culver City or the purchase Madina Mosque other than that Al Bayoumi was involved with a Mosque in some manner.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S) [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2025
DATE: 10-05-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) [redacted]

OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI

(F) [redacted]

Telephone Numbers:

(U) The following information was obtained from Telephone Applications (TA) and pertains to toll records loaded in connection with telephones subscribed or utilized by Omar Al-BAYOUMI or his wife, Manal BAGADER.

U.S.

(P)		
[redacted]	Tolls	01/17/2000-06/23/2001
[redacted]	Tolls	01/09/2000-06/07/2000
[redacted]	Tolls	11/20/1998-09/20/2000
[redacted]	Tolls	12/30/1999-04/02/2001
[redacted]	No Tolls	
[redacted]	No Tolls	
[redacted]	No Tolls	
[redacted]	Tolls	09/13/2000-07/24/2001
[redacted]	Tolls	12/21/1999-01/09/2001

England

(G) [redacted]

(U) A review of the following calls indicate a total of 141 calls made by telephone numbers associated with Omar Al-BAYOUMI to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Washington, D.C. Area.

(U) In connection with calls made to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Los Angeles, California area, there were 34 calls made.

Jan 2000

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

Area Code 202
Washington, D.C.

202-298-8722
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 7 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 03/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes, with one exception of an 11 minute call.

(U) In addition, one call was made to telephone number from (P), subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, DBA MASJEDALMADIANAH 20, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California and billing address of 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. This call was made on 08/08/1999 and was for a duration of one minute.

(P)
UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 1.6 minutes.

202-298-8806
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

USERS (P) - 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 74009

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) This number was called 4 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 11/24/1999 to 12/07/1998. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

?

202-298-8809
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 07/08/1999 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8813
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 28 times from (P), subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 03/09/2000 to 03/29/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

(P)
UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 5 times from (P), subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 02/03/2000 to 03/22/2000. The average duration of calls was 2minutes.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 2.3 minutes.

(P)

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 08/24/2000 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) This number was called once from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/03/1998 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8861

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 4 times from (619) 227-7623, subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-298-8862

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 8 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-337-2978

SAUDI ARABIA EDUCATION MISSION
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called once from (619) 227-7623, subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 03/21/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

202-337-9450

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number is the main billing number. One call was made from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P). San Diego, California. This call was made on 03/09/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) This number was called 10 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 10/27/1998 to 12/01/1998. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes with the exception of a 24 minute call on 10/27/1998.

202-342-3700

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 30 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/19/2000 to 03/24/2000. The average duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 21 times from (P) (P), also subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made from 07/21/1998 to 07/08/1999. The average duration of these calls was 5 minutes with the longest call being 32 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation of Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-342-3800

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
SUITE 1000
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from (P), subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 01/28/2000 and was for a duration of 7 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 3 times from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made from 07/15/1998 to 12/03/1998. The average duration of these calls were 2 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

[redacted]

[redacted]

202-494-2777
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 2 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 02/18/2000 to 02/19/2000. The average duration of calls was 4 minutes.

(U) In addition, 1 call was made to this number from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was 14 minutes in duration.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Khalid ASSWAILEM (202) 944-3140 and C (202) 494-2777. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-3344
NATIONAL GUARD OF SAUDI
3050 K ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from (P), subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/08/1999 and were for a duration of 13 and 2 minutes, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Dr. Jameel Al-Shami. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-5982
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA CHANCERY
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from (P), subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/27/1999 and were for a duration of 2 and 1 minute, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a

[redacted]

[redacted]

notation to Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

[redacted] (P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to the
Saudi Arabian Embassy

(U) This number was called once from [redacted] (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/18/1998 and was for a duration of 15 minutes.

Area Code 310

Los Angeles Area

310-479-2752
SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

FACSIMILE LINE

(U) This number was called once from [redacted] (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/02/1998 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate F. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

310-479-6000
SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

USERS - Abdullah Ext 245
[redacted] (P)

(U) This number was called 11 times from [redacted] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment [redacted] (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 02/10/2000. The average

[redacted]

[redacted]

duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, 13 calls were made from telephone number (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 07/11/2000 to 12/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 3 minutes with the longest call being 7 minutes.

(U) This number was called 7 times from (P), subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made from 11/08/1998 to 01/26/1999 and the average duration was 8 minutes with the longest call being 22 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

Islamic Affairs	X240
Abdullah AWAAD	X241
Sami ASSADHAN	X246
Saad Al-JEBREEN	

(P)
YOSEF M. AL-SUMAIRY
(P)
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

BILLING NEXTEL
SSN (P-1)
US DEPT OF STATE DIPLOMAT

USER (U) ~~(S)~~ Fahad

(U) There were 3 calls made to this telephone from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. The calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) According to ECF, Al-SUMAIRY is a Consular Officer in the office of the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(P)

SALAH AL-HATLANI
(P)
LONG BEACH, CA

(U) There were 2 calls made to this telephone from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 12/14/2000 and 12/20/2000 and were 1 minute and 2 minute calls. calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) ChoicePoint indicates Salah ALHATLANI, SSN (P-1) works as the Vice Counsel for the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA.

(U) For information, telephone number (P) is subscribed by Faisal Al-MUHANA at the same address. This number was called 6 times from Al-BAYOUMI during the period of 12/19/1999 to 01/24/2000.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ECF Searches

(U) The following are chronological summaries of Electronic Case File (ECF) references regarding possible ties of Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Arabian Government, Embassies or Consulates.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7792**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1103
FD302 dated 09/17/01

(U) (P) birth date (P-1) 58, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) identified Omar Al-BAYOUMI as a person who may know Nawaf Al-HAZMI. (P) described Al-BAYOUMI as influential among Saudi Arabian members of the ICSD and provided needed assistance to various students and families who needed his help. He also advised Al-BAYOUMI was a frequent traveler to Saudi Arabia. Lastly, he stated Al-BAYOUMI had moved to England several months ago to attend school in England.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7785**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1101
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7790
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1102
FD302 dated 09/19/01

(U) On 09/18/2001, (P) birth date (P-1) 9, was interviewed by SA (S) (P) serves on the Board of Trustees at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD). (P) provided the following information on Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) stated Al-BAYOUMI lived in San Diego for approximately four or five years, and left to attend college in England. (P) stated some people at the ICSD believed Al-BAYOUMI was associated with the Saudi Arabian government. Al-BAYOUMI never had a steady job, though he may have worked a short time for the Saudi Arabian Airlines. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was well connected with the consulate, and seemed to get things done for others. Al-BAYOUMI was involved with funding Al Medina mosque in El Cajon. He acted as an intermediary between the Kurdish community and an

[redacted]

unknown wealthy Saudi Arabian man who donated funds to create the mosque. Some members of the ICSD believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque, no one has taken Al-BAYOUMI's place.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 10044**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1424
FD302 dated 09/19/2001

(U) On 09/18/2001, Mohdar M. Abdullah, (identity requested confidential) birth date [redacted] (P-1) 78, was interviewed by SA [redacted] (S) Abdullah advised that Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI was the Manager/Leader of a Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon and was a member of the Aviation Board for Saudi Arabia. Omar introduced Abdullah to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR at the Islam Mosque on Saranac Street, Lemon Grove, California. Abdullah stated Omar was now in London, England, pursuing a Doctorate degree from an unknown university.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1111**
EC dated 09/19/2001

(U) An EC prepared by SA [redacted] (S) set leads for various field offices to interview former neighbors of Nawaf Al-HAZMI, Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **The EC stated that interviews of Muslims indicated that Al-BAYOUMI had been involved in aviation when he lived in Saudi Arabia and that he did not work while in the U.S., but had more money than he knew what to do with.**

(U) **The EC also provided information from an interview of a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego who identified Al-BAYOUMI as being employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.**

[redacted]

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24879
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2302
FD-302 dated 09/21/2001

(U) On 09/21/2001, SA (S) interviewed (P) (protect identity) who provided information regarding his knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **Information pertaining to his relationship with the Saudi Arabian government were that he often furnished the Islamic Center with copies of the Qu'ran which had been provided to him by the Saudi Arabian Consulate. He also stated that Al-BAYOUMI appeared to have regular contact with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California. Al-BAYOUMI made frequent trips to the consulate during the six years he was known to live in San Diego.**

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 23351
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2117
FD302 dated 09/21/01

(U) On 09/20/2001, SA (S) interviewed Dilek (P), birth date (P-1) (P) (P) provided the following information regarding (P) Hashin Moshen Alattas. When shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, (P) recognized him and said she had seen him many times. Al-BAYOUMI attended USIU to get his master's degree and wanted to move to London to receive a PHD from a business school. Al-BAYOUMI and his family were from Saudi Arabia and possibly lived in the Clairemont Mesa area of San Diego, California. (P) **reported Alattas did not like Al-BAYOUMI and believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi government to watch the actions of Saudis in the United States.**

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 28999
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2546
265A-SD-63930-302 serial 5
FD302 dated 09/22/01

(U) On 09/20/01, (P) birth date (P-1) (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and

[redacted]

[redacted]

shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) recognized Al-BAYOUMI and said he knew him as "Abuemad", father of Emad. Previously, (P) was living in an apartment off Balboa Avenue with Saudi Arabian students (P). (P) believed the Saudi students received tuition money from the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would visit the two students at their apartment. Al-BAYOUMI asked (P) to be an Iman, at the mosque. When (P) was alone Al-BAYOUMI would inquire about (P).

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 18085**
FD-302 dated 09/22/2001
Interview of (P)
(interviewing agent not identified in ECF)

(U) (P) birth date (P-1) (P) owns two businesses (P) (P) Approximately 1995, (P) contracted with the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia, which according to (P), has connections with Ministry of Defense. A company called Dallah of Saudi Arabia had the contract for operations maintenance and (P) supplied the parts. **The CAA asked (P) to provide financial support to Al-BAYOUMI, when (P) refused he was told his contract may be jeopardized.** (P) did write sponsor letters to universities for Al-BAYOUMI, but stated he never provided Al-BAYOUMI financial support. (P) advised he wrote the last letter approximately two years ago.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 1663**
EC dated 09/22/2001

(U) In a EC prepared by SA (S) a lead was sent to Legat Riyahd to obtain information regarding Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI. The following information was furnished to the Legat:

lds to Saudia Arabian re Al Bayoumi

- Al-BAYOUMI's claim that he was on a financial scholarship and received support from his government.
- Information pertaining to his employment in the aviation management/financial services of the

[redacted]

[redacted]

Saudi government.

- Interviewees claims that Al-BAYOUMI as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government that he traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1801**
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 16180
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1802
FD302 dated 09/23/01 and 09/24/2001

(U) According to an EC prepared by SA (S) (P) birth date (P-1) (P) (P) California, was interviewed and provided information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) had met Al-BAYOUMI at the Islamic Center mosque (ICSD) in the early 1990s.

(U) Approximately six months ago Al-BAYOUMI announced to members of the ICSD he was moving to the United Kingdom (UK) to pursue his PHD. (P) has not had any contact with Al-BAYOUMI subsequent to his departure for the UK. (P) recalled Al-BAYOUMI lived in an apartment on Beadnell Way in San Diego even though he never went to his home. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was on a scholarship and was financially supported by the Saudi government. (P) did not know what form Al-BAYOUMI received his funding. **Al-BAYOUMI maintained he had friends at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California. Because of Al-BAYOUMI's comments regarding his business, (P) believed he may have worked for Saudi princes.** While living in San Diego Al-BAYOUMI attended the University of Phoenix. (P) remembered Al-BAYOUMI may have also received a scholarship from Saudi Airlines and worked for them as well.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24631**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2239
FD302 dated 09/24/01

(U) On 09/24/01, Abdussattar Shaikh was interviewed by SA [redacted] (S) Shaikh advised that he is one of the founders of the Islamic Center of San Diego, (ICSD). Shaikh identified a photo of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, whom he became acquainted with in 1994 when Shaikh was teaching at the American Commonwealth University. Shaikh described Al-BAYOUMI as follows: Al-BAYOUMI was in the U.S. using a Saudi Arabian passport, because of his facial features, he is possibly of Egyptian descent. Al-BAYOUMI appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years old. Shaikh believed Al-BAYOUMI always had a significant source of supply of money and observed him driving a new Toyota. **Al-BAYOUMI was charismatic, charming and didn't conceal his attempts to attain leadership roles within the San Diego Muslim community. Al-BAYOUMI had expressed an interest in becoming a citizen, which may have been just a ploy. Al-BAYOUMI socialized with Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR. Al-HAZMI disclosed to Shaikh, Al-BAYOUMI was a spy for the Saudi Government and directed Shaikh not to socialize too much with him.** Al-BAYOUMI attended business classes at the United States International University and was believed to be President of a Saudi Arabian club at the university. Al-BAYOUMI had an office at the Kurish mosque in El Cajon, California, where the leadership neither liked or trusted him and asked him to leave approximately three years ago. Shaikh did not trust Al-BAYOUMI as well and believes he possibly was involved with 09/11/01.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 25718**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2396
FD-302 dated 09/30/01

(U) [redacted] (P) DOB [redacted] (P-1) (P) was interviewed by SA [redacted] (S) on 09/28/2001. [redacted] (P) stated he first met Omar Al-BAYOUMI about two years ago at the mosque located near Balboa Avenue and the 805 freeway in San Diego, California. [redacted] (P) thought Al-BAYOUMI may be of Egyptian extraction but moved to Jeddeh, Saudi Arabia, prior to moving to the United States. [redacted] (P) believed

[redacted]

[redacted]

Al-BAYOUMI was deceptive and did not trust him. He described Al-BAYOUMI as lacking in formal education and lacking in intellectual capability. Al-BAYOUMI was well known at the mosque near Balboa Avenue and 805 freeway and frequently surrounded himself with men in their twenties. **Al-BAYOUMI would promise to help visiting Islamic students, but his assistance never evolved.** (P) concluded Al-BAYOUMI was asked to leave his position at the Al Medina mosque after irregularities were found in association with his collection and distribution of funds.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3039**
EC dated 10/03/01

(U) On 10/03/2001, SA (S) prepared an EC providing information on (P) (P) was the emergency contact listed on Omar Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement for (P-1) at the Parkwood Apartment Complex. Al-BAYOUMI moved into (P-1) on approximately 09/01/99, and lived there with his wife Manal Bagader and their three children. Rental records indicated Al-BAYOUMI was a student and received financial support from his family.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI had co-signed for highjackers Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR when they rented an apartment at Parkwood and paid their rent occasionally as well. Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR lived with Omar Al-BAYOUMI prior to them renting their own apartment. (P) did not like Al-BAYOUMI personally and was unaware he (P) was listed as an emergency reference on Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement. **Al-BAYOUMI revealed to (P) he received financial support the Saudi Arabian Government or Saudi Airlines. An individual who requested confidentiality (PC1) reported he believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service and reported on dissident Saudis in the United States.**

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-CD serial 8789**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3396
EC dated 10/05/2001

(U) An EC dated 10/05/2001, prepared by SA (S)

[redacted]

provided a summary of information furnished by the Metropolitan Police Services of the United Kingdom. This information was obtained through their interviews of Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI stated that he was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration. Al-BAYOUMI claimed that this company pays him $5,000.00 per month to study for his PHD.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 64787**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 4763
FD-302 dated 10/07/01

(U) On 10/03/01, (P) (protect identity) was interviewed by SA (P-1), (S) and SA (P-1), (S) (P) described Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI as a "braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia." (P) **stated Al-BAYOUMI would videotape when he went to mosque which led individuals from the Muslim community to believe he was a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer. According to (P), Al-BAYOUMI's social associates included the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate, and known criminals. Al-BAYOUMI has also hosted Saudi visitors. Al-BAYOUMI's character is suspect and he was accused of keeping a $10,000 donation from a Saudi visitor intended for the Kurdish Mosque.**

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 55234**
FD-302 dated 10/07/2001

(U) On 10/06/2001, SA (P-1), (S) interviewed Isamu Alva DYSON, birth name Clayton (P) MORGAN, date of birth (P-1) (P) DYSON stated he knew Khalid Al-MIHDHAR, Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI during his period of residing in San Diego, approximately December 1999 to February 2000. DYSON stated he never heard Al-BAYOUMI speak about politics or against the U.S. DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI shared company often. Al-BAYOUMI had indicated to DYSON that he was some type of engineer for the Saudi Arabian government. He even showed DYSON some type of paperwork indicating same. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was being paid to learn English. Al-BAYOUMI's company, or the Saudi government through his company, was paying for the education. DYSON did not know how much Al-BAYOUMI was being paid. DYSON understood that Al-BAYOUMI had to learn English or he was not going to be promoted any higher in his company.

(U) DYSON said that Al-BAYOUMI's student visa was expired, or ready to expire and was considering crossing into Tijuana, Mexico to get the paper work done. DYSON encouraged Al-BAYOUMI to call the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. **DYSON accompanied Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Consulate where Al-BAYOUMI got his visa paperwork straightened out.**

(U) After the consulate, DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI proceeded to a Mediterranean restaurant near the Culver City mosque. Al-BAYOUMI stated that the Culver City mosque was built by the Saudi Government. DYSON stated that other than when Al-BAYOUMI was meeting behind closed doors at the consulate, Dyson was with Al-BAYOUMI the entire time during the trip.

(U) Information was also furnished regarding the building of the El Cajon mosque. A wealthy man from Saudi Arabia donated the money to build the Kurdish mosque. Al-BAYOUMI did all of the administrative work at the mosque and was the director.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI has introduced DYSON to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and that the resided in an apartment co-signed by Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) DYSON was told by Al-BAYOUMI that his wife was Saudi and came from a rich family.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332**
EC dated 10/09/2001

(U) In an EC prepared by SD [redacted] (S), a request was made to obtain information from officials

[redacted]

at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the Embassy in Washington, D.C. regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) A summary of information extracted from this EC regarding Al-BAYOUMI's association with the Saudi Arabian government indicated (P), President (P) California wrote a letter on 01/22/1997, stating that (P) was supporting Al-BAYOUMI by providing $4,000.00 a month.

(U) (P) was subsequently interviewed, and as a result of that interview advised that even though (P) was requested by an unknown representative of the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia to provide a $4,000 per month stipend, (P) refused to do so. (P) did, however, furnish letters to numerous schools, on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf, stating that he and his company were subsidizing Al-BAYOUMI. As a direct result of the above information, a Criminal Complaint was filed on or about 09/27/2001, in the Southern District of California, charging Al-BAYOUMI with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

(U) In May 1998, Al-BAYOUMI applied for an Executive Doctorate in the Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-BAYOUMI stated that he has been employed by the CAA for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering.

(U) In reviewing the documents obtained from CWRU a letter, dated May 20, 1998 from Dr. Jamil Shami, Director, Academic Affairs, **Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, National Guard Office, 3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 207, Washington, D.C., was sent on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf. The letter stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a candidate for a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia.**

(U) On September 21, 2001, a representative from United Parcel Service advised that their records indicate that

[redacted]

[redacted]

on January 18, 2001 a delivery was made to [redacted] [redacted] San Diego, California, where Al-BAYOUMI resided, from the **Saudi Arabian Embassy, 601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.**

(U) On 09/25/2001, [redacted] [redacted] of the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, 2675 Fletcher Parkway, El Cajon, California, was interviewed and [redacted] **advised that he was shown a copy of a check Al-BAYOUMI provided for $500 to the mosque drawn from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia**, dated December 14, 2000. Written on the check was a notation in Arabic that [redacted] said indicted the check was for food. Al-Bayoumi stated he received the check from Los Angeles, California.

(U) On 09/27/2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-BAYOUMI as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Medina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-BAYOUMI's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

(U) Listed in Al-BAYOUMI's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

(U) Dr. Jameel Al-Shami (202) 944-3344;

(U) Saudi Embassy WA. (202) 342-3800, AbdulAziz Assaleh (202) 342-3700 and F (202) 944-5982; Khalid Asswailem (202) 944-3140 and C [redacted]. **Saudi Consulate** (310) 479-479-6000 F (310) 479-2752, Islamic Affairs x240, Abdullah Awaad x241, Sami Assadhan x246, and Saad Al Jebreen, 2045 Sawtelle Blv., LA, CA 90025.

(U) Additionally, seized during the search were various personal and business documents, business cards and scraps of paper with names and telephone numbers of individuals. Included in this information were names and telephone numbers associated with the **Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C.** and are as follows: Mohammad Al-Sheik and Abed Al-Sulieman with the following telephone numbers (202) 298-8869, 8817, 8850 and 8738.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Also obtained was a notation for the **Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles**, telephone number (310) 479-6000 and the name [redacted]. (U) From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-BAYOUMI showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the **Consulate in Los Angeles** and 37 calls placed to the **Cultural Mission.**

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3331**
LHM dated 10/10/01
(Authoring agent not identified in ECF)

(U) Omar AHMED Al-BAYOUMI, aka Omar Al-BAYOUMI, Omar A. Al-BAYOUMI, ABUEMAD, Omar A. M. Al-BAYOUMI, Omar AL-BAYOUMI, birth date [redacted]57, had contact with the following individuals at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C., and the Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California.

Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington, D.C.:
Adbulaziz Assaleh
Khalid Asswailem
Jamil Shami

Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington D.C.:
Mohammad Al-Sheik
Abed Al-Sulieman

Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California
[redacted]
Abdullah Awaad
Sami Assadhan
Saad Al Jebreen

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3562**
265A-NY-280350-BA serial 4557
EC dated 10/11/2001

(U) On 10/11/2001, SA [redacted] prepared and EC regarding new information reported on Osama

[redacted]

[redacted]

Abouibakor Nooh. Telephone toll record analysis indicated Nooh was in contact with Omar Al-BAYOUMI, Osama Bassnan and (P) . **It is believed Al-BAYOUMI was financially supported by the Saudi Arabian Government and was suspected to be an Intelligence Officer for the Saudi Government as well. It appears Osama Bassnan is to be the replacement for Al-BAYOUMI.**

Reference:

(S) 199N-SD-63929 serial 24
(S) 199N-SD-63949 serial 9
(S) FFI - (A), (J-1), (G)
EC dated 10/17/2001

[redacted] On (A), (J-1), (G) information was provided to SA (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) **Al-BAYOUMI almost daily taking telephone calls from Saudi Arabia. The Emir from the Ministry of Defense, who was in charge of the Air Traffic Control would frequently call Al-BAYOUMI. Al-BAYOUMI registered in school for immigration purposes and to meet new students from the Middle East.**

[redacted] Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) was going to Los Angeles to pickup some visitors. Within a day or two *after returning from Los Angeles Al-BAYOUMI introduced* (A), (J-1), (G) Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR . (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G) . Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) he had met Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR in a restaurant on his way back from Los Angeles. Al-BAYOUMI invited the two to come to San Diego and they accepted. Al-BAYOUMI did not tell (A), (J-1), (G) if Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR were the visitors he was expecting. Subsequently, Al-BAYOUMI hosted a dinner to welcome Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR to the San Diego Muslim community, Al-BAYOUMI videotaped the event as well.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Reference **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 69403**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 5616
FD-302 dated 10/15/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA (S) interviewed Talal Al-HAMDAN, date of birth (P-1) 1979, the brother of Faisal Al-HAMDAN. Talal stated that his family is from a bedouin tribe once located in Western Saudi Arabia and that the family is not part of the royal family. The family is fairly well known and wealthy. His father, Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN, is one of three Finance Ministry officials employed under the Deputy Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia and is responsible for the Western region of Saudi Arabia.

(U) Talal Al-HAMDAN is subsidized in the U.S. by his father and by scholarship money from the government of Saudi Arabia. While attending George Washington University in Washington, D.C. he resided with a sponsor who was an employee of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C.

(U) In May 1999, Talal moved to San Diego where he resided in a hotel. During his stay he had an argument regarding his bill and an outstanding balance. Talal directed Al-BAYOUMI to pay the bill and Al-BAYOUMI paid the outstanding debt.

Analyst Note - During the period of ... telephone number (P) was subscribed by Talal Al-HAMDAN, (P) San Diego, California 92124.

Reference: [redacted] **199N-SD-63929 serial 23**
199N-SD-63949 serial 8
FFI - (A), (J-1), (G) (S)
EC dated 10/17/2001 (S)

[redacted] On (A), (J-1), (G) information was provided to SA (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) believed that Al-BAYOUMI made friends with [redacted] for the purpose of gaining control, rather than friendship's sake. **Al-BAYOUMI was considered by most in the community some type of intelligence agent for the Saudi Arabian government reporting on the**

[redacted]

activities of Muslims (particularly Saudis) in the San Diego area. The feeling that Al-BAYOUMI was an agent for the Saudi government was further reenforced by the fact that he held no regular job, but always had plenty of money to prepare lavish dinners at his apartment or apartments of friends. The purpose of the dinners was usually to introduce and welcome newcomers to the local Muslim community or to bid farewell to those leaving. AL-BAYOUMI would always videotape these dinners.

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI told (A), (J-1), (G) that he had traveled up to Los Angeles to pick up someone coming into the country, when by chance he met Al-MIHDHAR and Al-HAZMI. [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] Al-BAYOUMI frequently traveled to the Los Angeles airport to drop off or pickup Saudis visiting southern California.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) that Al-BAYOUMI was a person know to have connections with the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would travel to Washington, D.C. every one to two months and had a contact in the Dawa (ph) who was related to the civil aviation office of the Saudi Arabian Consulate on Wyoming Street, in Washington D.C. Through this contact, Al-BAYOUMI would be able to items such as Qu'rans or robes much faster than if done through regular request.

(~~S~~) Al-BAYOUMI traveled back to Saudi Arabia approximately one a year for approximately two to three weeks. Al-BAYOUMI's stay in the U.S. seemed to be decided on a yearly basis. (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted] Al-BAYOUMI learned that he would be leaving San Diego, but did not know where he would go next. Approximately seven to eight months ago, he knew he would be moving to England (information dated (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 72758**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 6477
FD-302 dated 10/19/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA (S), interviewed Faisal Ahmed Al-HAMDAN, date of birth 12/12/1975, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. **Faisal's father is Ahmed Abdulazziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN and is a high-ranking Saudi official who works as a Director within the Ministry of Finance.**

(U) While attending school in San Diego, Faisal Al-HAMDAN listed Omar Al-BAYOUMI as the emergency point-of-contact on his ELS and ALI applications. Faisal identified Al-BAYOUMI as a business associate of his father.

Reference **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3984**
EC dated 10/20/2001

(U) On 10/20/2001, SA (S) requested (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G) to conduct an interview of Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN regarding his contact with and knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **Al-HAMDAN is an official under the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia.** This request was made as the result of San Diego interviews of Faisal and Talal Al-HAMDAN.

(U) The EC noted that Al-BAYOUMI is an employee of the Ministry of Finance, or works under a separate department which answers to the Ministry of Finance. Talal Al-HAMDAN described the relationship between Al-BAYOUMI and his father:

- **Al-BAYOUMI had to get Al-HAMDAN's signature on various documents.**
- **On one of these documents, Al-BAYOUMI requested Al-HAMDAN to provide a reference sponsorship for Al-BAYOUMI's application to the Saudi Government to travel to the U.S. to pursue post graduate**

[redacted]

[redacted]

studies. Al-HAMDAN's father provided this reference or sponsorship.

- At some point in 1998, Faisal and Talal's father instructed Talal to contact Al-BAYOUMI. The Al-HAMDAN brothers met with Al-BAYOUMI at the Abu Baker mosque on numerous occasions from late 1998 to July 2001.
- **Al-BAYOUMI's bank records revealed that on 02/18/1999, a $20,000.00 wire transfer was made from Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN to Al-BAYOUMI.**
- **On 12/16/1999, Al-BAYOUMI paid an outstanding hotel bill for Talal in the amount of $1,349.00.**
- **On at least one other occasion Al-BAYOUMI generated a check to Talal in the amount of $1,450.00.**
- Faisal and Talal were in the process of selling Al-BAYOUMI's vehicle and were instructed to forward the sale proceeds to Al-BAYOUMI's address in England.

Reference **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 98127**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 14097
FD-302 dated 11/21/2001

265A-NY-280350-302 serial 36130
FD-302 dated 10/02/2001

(U) On 11/19/2001, SA (S) interviewed (P), born in (P). The EC provides extensive education and employment background on (P) (P) was employed at PCA / Dallah and stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a representative that PCA personnel wished to keep in America. (P) was **requested to provide a stipend to Al-BAYOUMI in an amount of $3,500.00 per month.** According to (P), Al-BAYOUMI was already drawing a salary from PCA / Dallah. The PCA person hinted that (P) should pay for Al-

[redacted]

[redacted]

BAYOUMI because Al-BAYOUMI would be in a position to assist (P) in the future. In addition, (P) was requested to furnish Al-BAYOUMI with reference letters.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 12014**
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 85936
FD-302 dated 11/27/01

(U) On 11/15/2001, (P), birth date (P), was interviewed by SA (S) (S) and provided the following information. (P) **once heard Omar Al-BAYOUMI disclosing to others at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) he had friends or contacts at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California.** (P) advised Al-BAYOUMI was extremely close to other ICSD Saudis. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was in the United States on scholarship from the Saudi Airport Authority of Saudi Airlines and Al-BAYOUMI would eventually return to his former job.

Reference (U) ~~(S)~~ **265A-NY-282573-SEC serial 28**
EC dated 01/11/2002

(C-2)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(C-2)

[redacted]

Reference **265A-NY-280350-SD Serial 14812**
LHM dated 04/15/2002

(U) An LHM dated 05/15/2002. from San Diego to New York furnished information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI and his employment with Dallah Al Baraka. The

[redacted]

information was received from an interview of (P) (P).

(U) (P) identified Al-BAYOUMI as a "ghost employee" of AVCO Oversees. (P) estimated that there were approximately fifty (50) individuals carried on the books and PCA or Dallah and being paid for doing nothing.

[redacted]

Reference [redacted] 199N-SD-64028 serial 23, 72

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G) (S) (S) [redacted]

International Operations **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

Riyadh **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

San Diego **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

New York **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

From: New York
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] (F) -OPERATION ENCORE, (F)
(F) - FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

[redacted]

plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** (A), (G), (J-1) other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1) AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F) At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F)). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation (C-1)

((F) . AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers , and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) social security account number (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F) [redacted] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[redacted] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F)).

[redacted] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P), 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. (C-2)

(C-2) [redacted]

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F) [redacted]. AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

[redacted] FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # P-1 [redacted] On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) [redacted] using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) [redacted] with an intended address of (P) [redacted] Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) [redacted], San Diego, California (reference (F) [redacted]. AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) [redacted] Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) [redacted] San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) [redacted] (P) [redacted] Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[redacted] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference (F) In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference (F). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[redacted] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[redacted] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, (P), owner of (P), advised that (P) had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[redacted] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P)

[redacted] (P), was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference [redacted] (F) A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

[redacted] [redacted] (C-1) reference [redacted] (F)

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[redacted] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[redacted] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [redacted] 08/12/2009

[redacted] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[redacted] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[redacted] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's." [redacted] (P)

[redacted] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[redacted] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'" AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[redacted] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[redacted] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[redacted] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[redacted] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[redacted] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[redacted] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account #09000-05839 with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR’s account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference (F)

[redacted] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment (P)) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[redacted] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[redacted] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and

AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. [redacted] (P) (P) however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. [redacted] (P) (P) (P) (P)

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	[redacted] (P)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	12:42
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	23:36

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(P)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone

number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate ((F) [redacted]).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ((F) [redacted] (F)

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) [redacted]. In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F) [redacted]. In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [redacted] The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his

post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

> (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1), reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted]

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) (F) Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: Saudi Arabia
SOC: (P-1)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: O
Middle: A
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (G)

LEAD(s):

[redacted]

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to process (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G) (S)

International Operations **Attn:** (G)

Riyadh **Attn:** (G)

San Diego **Attn:** (S)

New York **Attn:** (S)

From: New York

(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

[redacted]

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] (F)-OPERATION ENCORE, (F).

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple (A)(G)(J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F)). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial [redacted]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from (C-1) [redacted] (C-1) [redacted] ([redacted] (F)). AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [redacted] (F). According to the closing EC [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) and supplemental closing EC [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	[redacted] (P)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	12:42
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	23:36
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/27	23:36

Islamic Affairs of SAE	(P), (P-1)	12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

([redacted]) Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at

[redacted]

the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [redacted] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [redacted] (F).

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([redacted] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([redacted] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1) (O-1)

> "(O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

> "(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A),(G),(J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [redacted]

[redacted] Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment**: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ((F) (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Miscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] The (G) is requested to process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) (G) and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:**
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Intelligence Directorate **Attn:**
Attn: [redacted] (G)

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)
[redacted] [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To open captioned Full Investigation, document transmission of [redacted] (G) and request a [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (1)the electronic [redacted] (F)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details: [redacted] New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

[redacted] By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A)(G)(J-1) AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F)

[redacted] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) (F). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [redacted]

[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # [redacted] (F). Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ([redacted] (F)). Additional documentation from the [redacted] (C-1) ([redacted] (F)). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ([redacted] (F)) and supplemental closing EC [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36
(P)		12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F)). (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ((F) .

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM [redacted] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([redacted] (F) (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [redacted] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

> [redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (F) had five additional telephonic contacts with (F) (F), the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (F) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (F) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F)).

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

[redacted] Not Applicable

[redacted] (G)

Number of Subjects: 1

[redacted] (G) **Code:**

[redacted] (G)

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -

Last:	AL-JARRAH
First:	MUSAED
Middle:	A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	[redacted] (P-1) 1960
POB:	Saudi Arabia
Phone #:	Previous - 202-342-3700, 202-944-3192, [redacted] (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

Current - [redacted] (P-1)

Current Location:	Malaysia
Miscellaneous - [redacted] (G)	Subject is a non-USPER. [redacted] (F)
E-mail Addresses:	[redacted] (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[redacted] Not Applicable

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Coordinate [redacted] (G) as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) (G) [redacted] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G): Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Read and clear.

◆◆

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 11/26/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S)

From: San (G)
(S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB; (A), (J-1), (G)

: [redacted] San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (J-1), (G)

Details: [redacted] Request Of Bureau:

[redacted] Bureau is requested (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1), advised that Omar Mohamed of San Diego as selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 11/26/2001

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] On 09/14/2001 (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah ement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January

25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community [redacted]ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this matter.

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 11/26/2001

[redacted] FBIHQ is requested (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for credit informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of birth, (P-1) 1960, SSAN (P-1), (P-1) La Mesa, CA. 91941

♦♦

[redacted]

(01/26/1998)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/16/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S) (G)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, aka
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1) for toll records for captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Administrative: [redacted] Bureau is requested to direct responses to (F)

Details: [redacted] Request of the Bureau:

[redacted] Bureau is requested to (A), (G), (J-1) requests for telephone toll records for the following telephone numbers and associated addresses for the period of 09/01/2000 to the present:

1. (P)
Subject's residence: (P)
La Mesa, CA. 91941

2. (P)
Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA)
4979 University Avenue, Suite C, San Diego, CA. 92105. Subject is the Director of WESRA.

[redacted]

3. (P)
Somali and East African Youth Center,
4979 University Avenue, Suite D, San Diego
CA. 92105. Subject is President of the
Youth Center.

[redacted] **NOTE:** (A), (G), (J-1) and public source information indicates that KHADIB is in charge of both WESRA and the Youth Center. The request should include language which would request tolls for any and all telephone lines at the above addresses in anticipation of other telephone numbers being present at the addresses.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the above numbers should be directed to :

(P)

[redacted] Khadib's pager number is (P) (A), (G), (J-1) request for the pager number records from 09/01/2000 to the present should be directed to:

(P)

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Is (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] On 09/14/2001 (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was ide
(phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah move (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

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[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this matter.

♦♦

[redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Investigative Summary: (G) G, advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on (P-1), in Mogadishu, Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident is last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P). On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorist organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G), has reported that

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[redacted]

AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[redacted] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on (A), (G), (J-1) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

(O-1) In December 1998, (C-2) advised the that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) pledged financial support to AIAI and, in turn, the group is to work with UBL against Western interests and facilities.

[redacted] UBL purchased shares in the Al-Barakat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AHMAD GASSIM (OR QASIM), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and SHAYKH MUHAMMAD UTHAM, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

(O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB and (P) (P) among others attende he meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB was a close associate of (P) A), (G), (J-1) advised that (P) sponsored MOHAMED when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an

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[redacted]

enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) advised that a prominent Somali community leader, (P) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing fin support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must

(O-1)

[redacted] On 09/14/2001 (C-2) (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda movem (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] In (O-1) (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year

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[redacted]

in places such as Mecca and Nairo Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[redacted] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P), which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) advised that KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown to (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1) has indicated that KHADIB closed the Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] Investigation at San Die determined that MOHAMED has a wife and child in Australia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) the possible name of MOHAMED's wife as Reisa Bannerman. During a recent interview with MOHAMED, he admitted to having family in Australia. MOHAMED also stated that he often traveled to Australia, and most recently, used Australia as a stop-over point while he applied for travel Visa's to Africa. (MOHAMED did not state which African countries he was attempting to visit.)

[redacted] Financial investigation into any possible financial transactions between MOHAMED and Australia are currently ongoing and have not been fully analyzed.

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	(P-1)
INS A#:	(P-1)
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	
Residence:	(P), La Mesa, CA 91941 (P)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/17/2002

To: General Counsel **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

San Diego

Los Angeles

From: San Diego
[redacted] (S)
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAM
OMAR KHADIB; [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Instituted:** [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for Los Angeles is an original and a copy of a letter dated 01/17/2002, addressed to [redacted] (P) Regulatory Compliance, Experian, 505 City Parkway West, Orange,

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/17/2002

California, requesting consumer identifying information limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment and the names and addresses of all financial institutions at which the subject maintains or has maintained an account.

Details: [redacted] A full international terrorism investigation of subject, a U.S. person, was authorized in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines because subject was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. The AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization closely linked to Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.

[redacted] In September 2001, (C-2) (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes was in the U.S. The male was identified as OMA ATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number was (P) (C-2) advised that KHATIB was the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The consumer identifying information and identity of financial institutions information are being requested to determine subject's associates at current and former places of employment and determine subject's financial activity and his link to other terrorism subjects in the United States and overseas.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] A representative of the Los Angeles office who has liaison with the consumer reporting agency should deliver [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) to [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Los Angeles should remind Experian that, [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) it is prohibited from disclosing that the FBI has made this request. In addition, Experian is prohibited from including in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the FBI has sought or obtained such information.

[redacted] Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide the records personally to a representative of your office. Experian should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.

[redacted] Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.

[redacted] Any questions regarding the above can be directed to San Diego Division, Attention: (S).

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

Los Angeles Division

AT SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] Deliver the attached (G) as indicated above. Upon receipt of information from the carrier, Los Angeles Division is requested to submit results to San Diego Division.

Set Lead 2:

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G)

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/23/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)
(S)

(G) **Attn:** (G)
(S)

(G) **Attn:** (G)

Riyadh **Attn:** (G)

Sanaa **Attn:** (G)

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ottawa	**Attn:**	(G)
San Diego	**Attn:**	(S)
Los Angeles	**Attn:**	(S)
Washington Field	**Attn:**	(G)
New York	**Attn:**	(G)

From: New (G)

ct: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE (A),(G),(J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the below-described group.

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM
1 - (G) submitted under separate cover

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: ([redacted] (F) 10/23/2007

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.

[redacted] Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two months, writers interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple San Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, as the above sources described, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in (F) AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F). Additional documentation (C-1) (F). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) According to the closing EC (F) and supplemental closing EC (F), the FI was closed due to: (A), (G), (J-1) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	[redacted] (P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	12:42
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	23:36
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/27	23:36
s of SAE	[redacted]	12/28	11:43
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/28	13:57
	[redacted]	12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/28	23:05
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE	[redacted]	12/29	00:20
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/29	00:35
	[redacted]	12/29	00:39
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	12:54
[redacted] (P)	[redacted]	12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from (P) to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a (P) student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P), which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact ephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ((F).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the

Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [redacted] (F) .

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([redacted] (F). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE [redacted] (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [redacted] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

> "[redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) AL-JARRAH

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)
(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not [redacted]e reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"

(F) . The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P), had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) (F) . NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED, (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A),(G),(J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) Based on some of the above (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A)(G)(J-1) interviewed on (A),(G),(J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A),(G),(J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government ((A)(G)(J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) .

[redacted] Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number (P-1) is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment:** AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ((F) (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

[redacted] **Newly Identified Additional Individuals:** Through the intelligence collection effort under the (G) (F) as well as additional analysis of telephone and financial activity and source reporting, some additional individuals, who's involvement with the above described group is still not fully understood, have been identified:

[redacted] **MOHAMMED BIN SULEIMAN AL-MUHANNA** (F) (F) - POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1974 or (P-1) 1974; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUHANNA was previously a Consular Official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with AL-THUMARY, the KFM. [redacted] (O-1) "AL-MUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" (F). AL-MUHANNA had numerous

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

phone connections with AL-THUMARY, as would be expected, and with AL-JARRAH. In late March, 2003, FBI Los Angeles was directed to (A)(G)(J-1) plan (A)(G)(J-1)(D) (A)(G)(J-1)(D) (A)(G)(J-1)(D) he and his family left the United States for gland. (C-1) (C-1) (F).

[redacted] **FAISAL AL-MUHANNA** (F) - POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1976; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. FAISAL AL-MUHANNA is the brother of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA. On 01/06/2000, telephone numbers bed to by FAISAL AL-MUHANNA placed calls to both AULAQI and (P-1) According to TA, between 01/01/2000 and 08/09/2001, FAISAL AL-MUHANNA placed 327 calls, an average of over one call per day to telephone numbers subscribed to by ALTHUMARY.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into" what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

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[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

[redacted] A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-THUMARY
First:	FAHAD
Middle:	I. A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1971
POB:	(P-1)
PNO:	
SOC:	
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-THUMAIRY
First:	FN
Middle:	
Phone #:	(P)
Current Location:	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
(A)(G)(J-1)	(A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED MUSTAFA
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Phone #: (P)
(P)
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.

(A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: MOHAMMED
Middle: BIN SULEIMAN
Race: W
Sex:
DOB: (P-1) 1974, (P-1) 1974
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA
Middle: S.
Phone #: (P)
(P)
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER and brother of FAISAL AL-MUHANNA

(A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: FAISAL
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1)
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA, ALMUHALKA
Phone #: (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER and (A)(G)(J-1) UHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case # (F)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: (P)
First:
Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: (P-1)
PNO:

SOC:
Address(es) -
House #: (P-1)
Street Name:
City:
State:
Postal Code: (P-1)
Country: Canada
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous - Subject is an USPER.

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1960

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

POB: (P-1)
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
(A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] The (G) is requested to process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) case to the (G) and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File # Date dictated

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

01/29/2002

A Federal Grand Jury Subpoena, [redacted] from the United States District Court, Southern District of California, was served to Verizon Wireless, Cellco Partnership, 51 Chubb Way, Branchberg, NJ requesting subscriber and toll record information for cellular telephone [redacted]

Telephone billing records of Mohdar Abdullah reflected 105 phone calls to an unknown telephone number in Italy. Abdullah was arrested by agents of the San Diego Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 9/26/01 and currently is held in custody as a Material Witness.

FBI San Diego Division requested the assistance of Italian law enforcement in identifying the subscriber to Italian telephone number [redacted] Investigation by Italian law enforcement determined that this Italian number had contacted San Diego telephone number [redacted]

The subscriber of cellular telephone [redacted] is [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]. [redacted] is an [redacted] Mohdar Abdullah after his arrest.

1/29/02 San Diego, CA

[redacted] n/a

SA [redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 10/22/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
Los Angeles
New York

Attn: (G)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S), (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOMB;
MAJOR CASE 182;
ACTS OF TERRORISM

Synopsis: [redacted] Lead for Los Angeles to conduct interview of (P) (P) Reference FBI control number (F).

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for Los Angeles are the following:

(1) One copy of FD-302 from interview of (P) on October 16, 2001.

(2) One copy of FD-302 from interview of (P) on October 16, 2001.

(3) One copy of insert regarding (P) and records checks.

(4) One copy of 28 photographs; including 19 known hijackers and 9 San Diego associates.

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(5) One copy of California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) photograph of Soliman Ali Elay.

Details: [redacted] On October 14, 2001, a U-Haul rental truck number DC6639A, bearing Arizona license plate AA92718, was observed at the Islamic Center of San Diego, 7050 Eckstrom, San Diego, California. Due to the threat of possible terrorist attacks utilizing rental panel vans or trucks, San Diego initiated an investigation into the rented U-Haul truck.

[redacted] San Diego contacted (P), U-Haul, who advised that (P), date of birth (P-1), Social Security Account Number (P-1), (P), apartment (P) San Diego, California rented U-Haul truck number DC6639A, bearing Arizona license plate AA92718, on October 14, 2001 in San Diego, California and returned the truck in Inglewood, California on October 16, 2001.

[redacted] San Diego contacted (P), Balboa Plaza Apartments, (P) San Diego, California, who advised (P) (P) lived with her daughter, (P) date of birth (P-1) (P-1), at (P), apartment (P), San Diego, California from September 21, 2000 to October 14, 2001. (P) recently married an unknown male (UM) who resides in the Los Angeles, California area.

[redacted] (P) was previously employed as an (P) (P) at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), (P) San Diego, California. (P) supervisor was (P) During the inception and construction of the ICSD it is believed that founding members embezzled funds for construction costs for personal gain.

[redacted] Records checks were conducted on (P) which revealed (P) is listed as a reference in (F) (F) Subsequent contact with Chicago determined that (P) vehicle, Illinois license plate (P-1), was observed on June 16, 1997 at a store in (P), Illinois during a FBI surveillance. (P) address at the time was (P) Illinois.

[redacted] Choice Point records checks confirmed that (P), Social Security Account Number (P-1), previously resided at (P) (P) Illinois.

[redacted] (P) currently resides at (P), apartment (P) Hawthorne, California, telephone (P).

[redacted]

[redacted] Investigation at San Diego has determined that subjects from Flight 77, Khalid M. Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf M. Al-Hazmi, lived at the Parkwood Apartments, (P), San Diego, California, from approximately February 5, 2000 to May 31, 2000. Witnesses have placed subject Hani Hanjour, also from Flight 77, visiting the apartment of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi. But, no residence has been identified for Hanjour in San Diego. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi received flight training in San Diego and Hanjour received flight training in Phoenix.

[redacted] Rental records indicate that Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national, who lived at the Parkwood Apartments, (P), (P) San Diego, California, had signed as a guarantor on Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi's apartment lease and he occasionally paid their rent. Interviews of Muslims have revealed that Al-Bayoumi had been involved in aviation when he lived in Saudi Arabia and he did not work while in the United States (U.S.), but he had "more money than he knew what to do with."

[redacted] An interview of a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego identified Al-Bayoumi as being employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S. According to the Parkwood Apartment (P) Al-Bayoumi traveled out of the country on numerous occasions and sometimes he did not return for 2 to 5 months at a time.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi is known to have frequented the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom, San Diego, California.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi vacated his apartment on June 23, 2001, and is currently living in England with his wife, Manal Bagadar, and their four children. On September 20, 2001, at the request of the FBI, New Scotland Yard (NSY) detained Al-Bayoumi in England on suspicion of terrorist activities. (C-2) (C-2)

[redacted] San Diego is attempting to obtain information to produce an arrest warrant for Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] Omar Al-Bayoumi is associated with Soliman Elay, date of birth (P-1) Elay wire transferred $2,000 into Al-Bayoumi's bank account. Elay resided in both San Diego, California and Falls Church, Virginia and is now believed to be in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Elay is known to have received deposits into his bank account from two companies, Sana-Bell company and BMI Real Estate Development (BMI). Sana-Bell company has deposited approximately $127,000 to Elay's bank account. BMI has deposited $10,000 into Elay's bank account.

(G) in (F) and Sana-Bell company is related to (F).

[redacted] Los Angeles is requested to determine (P) knowledge in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, illegal activities at the ICSD, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 10/22/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information, read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

To make (G) aware of San Diego investigation and resulting leads set forth for other divisions.

Set Lead 3:

LOS ANGELES

AT HAWTHORNE, CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles will interview (P) apartment (P) Hawthorne, California, telephone (P) date of birth (P-1) Social Security Account Number (P-1), regarding her knowledge of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Islamic Center of San Diego, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.

Set Lead 4: (Adm)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

For information, read and clear.

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 10/22/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
New York
San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)

From: (G)
Contact: SSA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis: To report results of investigation in obtaining subscriber information at Legat, (G)

Reference: San Diego EC dated 10/04/2001 captioned as above.

Details: Referenced San Diego EC requested (G) obtain subscriber information for the following numbers, in conjunction with the San Diego investigation of Omar Al-Bayoumi. By letter dated 10/17/2001, the Philippine National Police, (C-2) provided the following subscriber information:

1. (P-1)

This number is subscribed to by International Synthetic Industry, 389 Quirino Hiway, Brgy. Baesa, Quezon City, Philippines.

2. (P)

This number is subscribed to by the Commission on Audit, 2/F COA Building, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.

3. (P)

This number is subscribed to by Fiber Development Authority, Asiatrust Annex Building, 1424 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.

4. (P)

This number is subscribed to by Baynatel Telephone Booth, on Roosevelt Street, Quezon City, Philippines.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and Clear.

◆◆

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 01/25/2002

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
Investigative Services **Attn:** (G)
New York
New Haven **Attn:** SSA (S)

From: (G)
Legat Office
Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) (Pending)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: [redacted] To set lead for (G) New York, and New Haven regarding (A),(G),(J-1) request for information on IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH and to cover (F)

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Enclosures: [redacted] Enclosed for New York Division is the original cable from (O-1) Enclosed for (G) is a copy of New York enclosures.

Details: [redacted] Referenced EC requested that Legat (G) conduct logical investigation with (A), (G), (J-1) to include determining if EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH has ever been associated with extremist groups in Kuwait.

[redacted] On November 5, 2001, Legat (G) submitted a request to the (A),(G),(J-1). On January 13, 2002, (O-1) advised that they had no security information regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA AL-RABABAH. It was discovered that there was a similar name, IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH, who is a Jordanian national, date of birth (P-1), holding a Jordanian passport number (P-1), issued on 05/11/1986, expiration date 05/11/1991.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/25/2002

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) requests any security related information regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH.

[redacted] It should be noted that although (O-1) query provided negative results regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH, AL-RABABAH’s name was also queried spelling his first name as Eyad.

[redacted] Inasmuch as no further information is available through liaison contacts or (O-1) Legat (G) considers (F) covered.

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

[redacted] Request Counterterrorism to provide any security related information releasable to the (A) (G) (J-1) on (O-1) (O-1), (P-1)

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

[redacted] Read and clear

Set Lead 3:

NEW HAVEN

AT NEW HAVEN

[redacted] Request New Haven provide any security related information releasable to the (A) (G) (J-1) on (O-1) (O-1), (P-1)

Set Lead 4:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

[redacted] Request New York provide any security related information releasable to the (A), (G), (J-1) on (O-1), (P-1) (O-1), (P-1)

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 10/10/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services

National Security

Attn: (G), (S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis: [redacted] Request to pass (O-1) information to foreign and domestic intelligence and criminal sources.

[redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] Re telcalls from Special Agent (S) San Diego Division, to Assistant General Counsel (AGC) (S) National Security Law Unit (NSLU), FBIHQ, dated October 4, 2001 and October 5, 2001.

Details: [redacted] As a result of the investigation being conducted at San Diego it has been determined that Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi played an important role in helping terrorists, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar assimilate into San Diego. Al-Bayoumi allowed them to stay at his apartment at the Parkwood Apartment Complex, prior to obtaining their apartment at the same complex approximately two weeks after they entered into the United States through Los Angeles, California. Since the terrorists did not have credit history or bank accounts Al-Bayoumi was listed as the guarantor and co-signer on their apartment, and on at least one occasion paid for their rent. Additionally, he helped set up a bank account for Al-Mihdhar.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/10/2001

[redacted] While Al-Bayoumi resided in the United States he attended numerous schools and in December 1997 he graduated from Alliant International University (AIU), formerly United States International University, San Diego, California, with a Master's Degree in International Business Administration. In May 1998, Al-Bayoumi applied for an Executive Doctorate In Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-Bayoumi stated that he has been employed by the Civil Aviation Administration of Saudi Arabia (CAA) for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company (DATA) as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering. Additionally, a letter dated May 16, 1998, from Al-Bayoumi to Case Western Reserve University, disclosed that in 1995 (and it is understood through the present) that Al-Bayoumi is Assistant Director of CFC at DATA.

[redacted] As a result of reviewing the documents from AIU, a letter from (P) Incorporated, (P) (P) Newport Beach, California, dated January 22, 1997 was noted. The letter stated that (P) was sponsoring Al-Bayoumi from January 1997 through the year 2000, by providing $4,000 a month to support his educational program in the San Diego area. This information was incorporated on an Immigration and Naturalization (INS) Form I-20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant (F-1) Student Status - For Academic and Language Students. A subsequent lead was sent to the Los Angeles Division to interview (P) (See Los Angeles FD-302s dated September 22, and October 1, 2001 sent under separate cover from the Los Angeles Division).

[redacted] During the September 22, 2001 interview, (P) initially advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents that he had a contract, from 1995 through 1997, with the CAA to provide Dallah/Avco of Saudia Arabia, who allegedly has the operations maintenance contract with CAA, with parts used to equip control towers at airports, from radars to navigation, transistors, diodes, etc. (P) alleges that he was asked by someone at CAA to provide a $4,000 a month sponsorship to Al-Bayoumi while he was going to school. (P) declined, but advised that he would provide a letter stating that he was furnishing $4,000, however would not provide the money. As a direct result of that statement and the I-20 signed by Al-Bayoumi, on September 27, 2001, INS was able to file a Criminal Complaint, in the Southern District of California, and obtain a federal arrest warrant, charging Al-Bayoumi with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

[redacted] In a second interview of (P) on October 1, 2001, (P) alleges that (P) entered into formal contract with Dallah/Avco to supply parts to Airways Engineering, CAA, no date given, however (P) advised that negotiations between (P) Dallah/Avco and the CAA began in 1994.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On or about September 19, 2001, a request was made to (O-1) (O-1) to conduct a trace on (P) (P) CAA and Dallah/Avco of Saudia Arabia. On October 10, 2001, a response was received advising of the following:

"We note that Avco and Dallah appear to be under the same umbrella company, (O-1) on a company, Avco Dallah Trans Arab, that was linked to UBL. (P) and (P) (P): as of December 1992, (P) was located in the U.S. and was reportedly attempting to purchase military equipment for shipment to Saudi Arabia without obtaining U.S. Export Licenses. He was described as possibly of Egyptian descent. (P) aka (P) (P) was located at (P) Newport Beach, CA. Avco Company/Dallah: As of 1998, Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Ltd was reportedly a subsidiary of the Al Baraka Investment and Development Company in Jeddah. It has reportedly held the contacts for the cleaning and maintenance of the three major airports in Saudi Arabia for a long period of time. Avco Dallah Trans Arab aka Avco Dallah Company aka Dallah Avco Company was linked to UBL. (O-1) UBL was instructed to contact the company in June of 1998." The above quoted paragraph is [redacted] according to the CIA.

[redacted] It is requested that (O-1) provide specific information pertaining to the above reference to DATA, which would include type of reporting, location to location, identities of the parties involved, date(s), transcript, if it is a conversation and any additional pertinent information.

[redacted] Due to the relationship of Al-Bayoumi and the terrorists, Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and the interviews and documentation showing the relationship between Al-Bayoumi, (P), DATA and CAA, it is critical to be able to determine if this is an actual link to the above mentioned terrorists, Al-Bayoumi, (P) DATA and the UBL or not. If it is determined that there is a direct link, it is essential that this information be used, in conjunction with the facts obtained to date, by the FBI and New Scotland Yard, to charge Al-Bayoumi in a criminal conspiracy and implicate (P)

Descriptive Data:

Reference
Name -
Last: (P)
First:
Middle:
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
DBA: (P)
Newport Beach, California
92660
DBA: (P)
(P)
(P)
SOC: (P-1)
Address(es) -
House #: (P)
Street Name:
City:
State: California
Phone #: (P) Home
Phone #: Cellular
Phone #: Business
Miscellaneous - (P-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/10/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) to be able to pass specific information regarding links between Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company and UBL to New Scotland Yard and utilize same for the FBI prosecution of Al-Bayoumi.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 10/05/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
Investigative Services
New York
(G)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis: [redacted] Information regarding (P), aka (P) [redacted], currently residing in (G), Saudi Arabia. Request Legat (G) interview (P). Coverage of San Diego investigation set forth (G).

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for receiving offices is: 1) A two (2) page (G) dated 10/04/2001 of (P). 2) (O-1) query history for (P) DOB (P-1) 3) Eleven (11) page photo spread numbered 1 through 28.

Details: [redacted] Suspected hijacker Khalid Al-Mihdhar (listed as subject #15) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (listed as subject #19) were passengers on Flight #77, which was used in the attack on the Pentagon. Additional description information regarding Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hazmi (subject #19) can be obtained from EC dated 09/27/2001 to all field offices from Counterterrorism, captioned as above, which provides extensive information regarding all nineteen hijackers.

[redacted] Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi resided at the Parkwood Apartments located at (P), San Diego,

[redacted]

California, from February 5, 2000 to May 31, 2000. Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi was a co-signer and guarantor on a lease agreement for this apartment. Al-Bayoumi resided at the Parkwood Apartments, [redacted] Apartment [redacted] San Diego, California, from September 1, 1999 through June 23, 2001.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi relocated to the United Kingdom and is enrolled in a doctorate program at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Wales, United Kingdom.

[redacted] On 09/21/2001, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detained Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi under the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorist Act. Al Bayoumi's residence, automobile, and office was searched incident to this detention. On 09/24/2001, Legat [redacted] with the assistance of Special Agent (SA) [redacted], New York Division, and SA [redacted] (San Diego Division) provided the MPS with background information to aid in the interview of Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] Between 09/23/2001 and 09/28/2001, Al-Bayoumi, in the presence of his solicitor, was interviewed by law enforcement officials of the MPS concerning Al-Bayoumi's activities in the United Kingdom and his association with subjects of this investigation. FBI agents were not allowed to be present during the interviewed. The MPS asked for, and was granted, an extension of the initial 48 hour period allowed by law for such detention.

[redacted] During the course of the interviews, Al-Bayoumi stated that he traveled to Los Angeles, California, in January 2000 and had a chance meeting with Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hazmi (subject #19). During this chance meeting, Al-Bayoumi claims he was accompanied an Islamic convert named [redacted] Investigation determined [redacted] is in fact [redacted] [redacted] residing in [redacted].

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi confirmed that he assisted the hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi in renting an apartment and signing a lease as a guarantor and actually paying the hijacker's rent. Al-Bayoumi admitted facilitating the opening of a bank account for one of the hijackers. Al-Bayoumi stated he was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is affiliated with the Saudi Arabian Government. Al-Bayoumi described this company as the equivalent of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Al-Bayoumi claims that this company pays him $5,000.00 per month to study for his PhD.

[redacted] On 10/04/2001, [redacted] San Diego, California, telephone [redacted] was contacted regarding her son [redacted] [redacted] is [redacted] who has resided in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia since 1996.

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 10/05/2001

[redacted] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) a San Diego (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1) his association with Mohammad Anwar Zaky (deceased). Zaky was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Zaky was identified as an International Radical Fundamentalist (IRF) leader in the United States with significant regional, national, and international contacts. Zaky traveled extensively to Bosnia and Chechyna in the 1990s. Zaky was president of an organization entitled "Save Bosnia Now", and in this capacity he traveled extensively in the United States on fund raising missions. In the Spring of 1995, Zaky was killed in Chechyna fighting with the Mujahadeen.

[redacted] On 08/24/1995, (P) was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (G) this interview was based upon the recent death of Mohammad Zaky, and (P) as the (P) for the organization "Save Bosnia Now." (P) advised that (P) in approximately 1992 while attending the (P) From May 1993 to November 1993, (P) resided in Cairo, Egypt with (P). (P) became associated with (P) when he was a PhD candidate at (P) (P) stated the purpose of his trip to Egypt was to (P) and to learn to speak Arabic.

[redacted] (P) stated that he met Mohammad Zaky in 1992 at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California.

[redacted] (P) advised that her son, (P) graduated from (P) in June 1996. In September 1996, (P) received a scholarship to attend a religious university in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (P) receives free room and board and a stipend of approximately $270.00 per month. (P) also receives free return trips to the United States paid for by the Saudi Government. Omar Al-Bayoumi was instrumental in (P) obtaining this scholarship in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] From 1993 through 1996, (P) to the Saudi Arabian community in San Diego at the Islamic Center of San Diego. Many of (P) were alleged to be Saudi Arabian military personnel. (P) was involved in a car accident, exact date unknown, in Saudi Arabia. (P) solicited the assistance of his former students in the United States, including Saudi military personnel, in order not to be prosecuted for this accident.

[redacted] (P) main contact in Saudi Arabia is Saad Al- Habib, Al-Habib Investment Company, P.O. Box 9249, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 10/05/2001

(P) can be reached at (P-1). (P) mother could provide no further address for (P) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, except that he is enrolled in a religious university and the program is called the (P).

[redacted] (P) advised that her son, (P) has returned to the United States approximately three or four times since relocating to Saudi Arabia in September 1996. A (O-1) inquiry confirms that (P) has returned to the United States four times since 1997. The date of arrivals are 06/27/1997, 08/13/1998, 01/03/1999, and 06/25/2000 (copy attached). When (P) returned to the United States in June 2000, he spent about three or four weeks in the San Diego area. During this time, San Diego hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar (subject #15) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (subject #19) prayed at the ICSD in San Diego, California. (P) confirmed that (P) met with Al-Bayoumi and that it is possible (P) met the hijackers.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 10/05/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information only. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information only. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

(G)

AT (G)

[redacted] 1) Locate and interview (P) (P) telephone (P-1) 2) Display enclosed eleven (11) page photo spread which includes the nineteen (19) hijackers and nine (9) San Diego associates. 3) Determine if (P) recalls hijacker Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hamzi (subject #19) and the hijacker's association with Al-Bayoumi (subject #20).

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 09/22/2001

To: All Field Offices
All Legats
Attn: Personal Attention SACs
Personal Attention LEGATs

From: Counterterrorism
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (G), (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE - 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: [redacted] SUMMARY 11: This communication provides recipients with the current daily summary of information gleaned from the PENTTBOMB investigation.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] **ALL OFFICES SHOULD MAINTAIN EVIDENCE, TO INCLUDE ORIGINAL NOTES, AT THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELD OFFICES/LEGATS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED OTHERWISE. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE ITEMS WHICH REQUIRE LABORATORY PROCESSING.**

Details: [redacted] The following provides recipients with information obtained, to date, from the PENTTBOMB investigation. Recipients are advised that this communication contains information previously provided,

[redacted]

as well as information recently obtained, in the course of this investigation.

Headquarters Related Information

[redacted] Former Special Agent in Charge (SAC) John P. O'Neill has been positively identified among the victims found at the World Trade Center site. There has been no new developments pertaining to Special Agent Bomb Technician Leonard W. Hatton.

[redacted] (G) now has a mechanism to review credit cards. If there is a "hit" on the credit card, (G) will notify the affected field office where the credit card has been utilized.

[redacted] All field offices are requested to review parking lot and surveillance camera records for 9/10/2001. Some of the subjects or associates may have been at the airport on the day before the incidents.

Field Office Related Information

Atlanta

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the toll-free hotline has received 12,723 calls.

Baltimore

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] AHMED EL-KHEIR (G) (G) an Egyptian with (J-3) has been identified as an individual who abandoned his luggage at a College Park, MD, motel on 9/11/2001 and who had reportedly been seen in the company of ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93). On 9/18/2001, EL-KHEIR was arrested by Prince George's County PD for trespassing. During the initial interview with FBI Baltimore (FBI BA), EL-KHEIR denied knowing or ever having seen ZIAD JARRAH or any of the hijackers displayed to him in a photo array. On 9/20/2001, EL-KHEIR was re-interviewed and identified a photograph of ZIAD JARRAH as a Pakistani who had assisted him in the past. On 9/21/2001, FBI BA administered EL-KHEIR a polygraph examination. In response to being asked whether he played any part in the planning or execution of the events of 9/11/2001, EL-KHEIR showed strong deception. EL-KHEIR is currently incarcerated in the Prince George's County Jail for trespassing. EL-KHEIR has telephonically contacted the Egyptian Embassy, where he alleges his cousin is the Embassy's Third Secretary.

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/22/2001

FBI BA expects that EL-KHEIR's cousin will arrive on 9/22/2001 to post bail for EL-KHEIR. FBI BA will interview the cousin if he appears. In the event that EL-KHEIR is released from jail on bond, the INS detainer is still in effect. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI BA consensually recorded a conversation between a Cooperating Witness and (P) (P) the Ayay Islamic Prayer Center in Laurel, MD, a location where it is known that KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) dropped off his personal belongings. (P) and the CW had a conversation regarding (P), (P) and the recent terrorist attacks. Computer hard drives provided by (P) had been erased on or before 9/11/2001. Future consensually monitored calls will be attempted. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI BA has determined that (P) may be traveling in the near future (NFI).

[redacted] FBI BA reported three incidents wherein males of Middle Eastern descent were in possession of, or attempting to gain possession of, vehicles bearing Department of Defense parking stickers. FBI BA will attempt to identify these individuals. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

[redacted] Previous FBI BA investigation identified a female who was allegedly observed dining on two occasions with MOHAMMAD ATTA (AA Flt. #11) at the Olive Garden restaurant in Laurel, MD. Based on photo identification, FBI BA tentatively identified this female as (P) (P) (DOB (P-1), (P), Silver Spring, MD, employed at the (P). (P) was further identified by employees at Caton Auto Body Shop in Laurel, MD, as the woman who accompanied several Middle Eastern males when they brought a 2001 Honda in for repairs. (P) translated for the males and furnished the shop a telephone number for contact purposes. (P) was also positively identified by a former employee of the ezStorage facility in Jessup, MD. That employee said that on or about 8/27/2001, (P) appeared at the ezStorage location with three Middle Eastern males, and the employee identified one of the men as ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93). Investigation by Legat (G) determined that, according to Israeli records, (P) is a U. S. citizen who visited Israel from 5/15/2001 - 5/25/2001. FBI BA currently has (P) under physical surveillance and will attempt to interview her on 9/22/2001 to determine any nexus to this investigation.

[redacted] FBI BA has placed (P) under surveillance. On 9/21/2001, (P) traveled to the Crystal City area in Northern Virginia and visited a Kinko's copy store there for two hours and 20 minutes. (P) spent most of that time duplicating blank pages of a day planner book. (P) also met with several Middle Eastern individuals in the morning. On 9/21/2001 (P) was observed at a Dennys restaurant depositing a keyless remote vehicle entry device, which was wrapped in two plastic bags inside of a third bag, into a trash receptacle and then remaining in the vicinity of the receptacle for several hours. The device was eventually recovered and transported to (G) for analysis. (P) is currently wanted for felony vehicle theft (local warrant) for the taking of a vehicle from Dar Cars, Rockville, MD, in January 2001. Previous investigation determined that (P) resided in various Laurel/College Park, MD, motels since June 2001, as well as being tentatively identified by a motel manager as a possible associate of HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77). Due to the fact that (P) has been exhibiting unusual behavior (visiting Kinkos, performing ATM transactions, moving from motel to motel in the Laurel/College Park area, etc.) (P) is remaining under surveillance until thorough financial, cellular telephone and other records checks are completed. He will then be arrested and interviewed. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, FBI BA was advised of suspicious activity in the vicinity of the Newcastle County (Delaware) Airport. Investigation was conducted that resulted in arrests by local law enforcement of four Middle Eastern males, identified as MUSTAFA CAMCI (DPOB (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. counterfeit passport purported to be of exceptional quality. employed as painter. jumped ship in Houston, TX on 4/23/2000); SADULLAH SAKA (DPOB (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. arrived on (J-3) at New York City in 11/1996. Employed as painter); SEYKAN KEMAL (DPOB (P-1) in Turkey. out of status arrived (J-3) in 9/2000 through New York City. employed as pizza delivery man.); and ALI TUNC (DPOB (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. arrived (J-3) . These individuals have been interviewed by FBI BA. Their stories appear to be legitimate and their employment has been corroborated by their employers. All four (G) are currently under detention by INS Philadelphia for being out of status. Investigation continuing.

Boston

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] On 09/22/2001, INS Detroit advised that a Northwest Airlines Flight #345 en route to Logan International Airport (LIA) in Boston was deplaned because the cockpit door strike plate was missing. Initial investigation determined that the strike plate was in place prior to landing in Detroit. One theory is that the plane was prepared for a terrorist takeover at some point on 9/22/2001 in Boston. That plane was scheduled on 9/22/2001 to fly to San Francisco via Detroit. FBI Boston (FBI BS) is obtaining the manifest of the flight to review it (G) Results of investigation will be provided to (G) and appropriate field offices.

[redacted] Investigation by FBI BS has determined that a photograph obtained from the vehicle of NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) appears to be identical with Flight 175 subject AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175). The photograph, which was obtained by FBI WFO, was superimposed over a known photograph of ALGHAMDI and it appears to be a positive match. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] A maid at the Park Inn Hotel in Newton, MA, advised FBI BS that an Arabic male answered the door of the room at approximately 11:00 a.m. on the morning of 9/11/2001. The male asked her to come back later to clean because someone in the room was sleeping. This hotel is where WALEED ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11) and WAIL ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11) stayed the night before the attack. FBI BS has initiated logical investigation to identify the unknown Arab male. Results will be provided to (G) and appropriate field offices.

[redacted] FBI BS tentatively identified the Charles Hotel as the place where AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) and HAMZA ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) stayed while in Boston. This preliminary determination is based upon telephone records, ATM records, and a taxi driver who reportedly drove them from the Charles Hotel to the Days Inn Hotel. FBI BS is currently reviewing hotel records to confirm that these subjects stayed at this hotel. Results will be provided. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI BS has identified a credit card for MUSTAFA AHMED, who is believed to have been the person who received the Western Union wire transfers from the subjects in the week prior to 9/11/2001. This information was passed to the financial analysis team.

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, at approximately 6:00 pm, (P) (P), a travel agent from Providence, RI, reported that a customer named (P) purchased a ticket on a Virgin Atlantic flight to Johannesburg via London. Following his purchase, he made several pro-terrorist statements. Since the initial purchase, (P) has changed his flight two times. The flight now leaves from JFK on 9/24/2001. FBI NYO has been made aware of the potential threat and will interview (P) prior to takeoff. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, FBI BS received information that Delta Flight #1479 will be hijacked on 9/22/2001. Information was originally provided by US Customs Service from a 9/17 interview of a walk-in source. This source was on Delta Flight #1479 on 9/6/2001 and claims to have observed Arab passengers allegedly conducting ''pre-operational surveillance.'' FBI BS obtained a manifest for this flight. A review of this manifest showed a possible individual (G) (G) on this flight. The manifest shows a (P) (P) (P) is (G) (P) was interviewed and polygraphed by FBI BA with negative results. Based on these results, FBI BA recommends that (P) be (G) (G). However, FBI BS will conduct all logical investigation to insure the safety of the FL #1479 passengers.

Chicago

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As previously reported, (P) (DOB (P-1)) was identified as (G) and was arrested by FBI Chicago (FBI CG) and local authorities. On 9/21/2001, (P) failed a polygraph examination. He was deceptive for the two key questions: "Were you involved in the planning of the events on 9/11/2001?" and "Did you participate in the planning of the events on 9/11/2001?". After the failed polygraph, (P) became cooperative and started providing information regarding his roles in training camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. Interviews of (P) will continue on 9/22/2001. Analysis of cellular and home telephone records is continuing. It is anticipated that (P) will be removed to New York upon (D) (D). Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI CG has identified an associate of (P) that is currently in fugitive status. (P) (P)) is being sought on an outstanding warrant for credit card fraud. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI CG has identified approximately 1,100 names of individuals who were scheduled to fly on United Airlines flights on 9/11/2001. Each name is being checked through appropriate databases and results will be provided to (G) and appropriate offices.

Dallas

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI Dallas (FBI DL) investigation has determined that known terrorists may have been traveling under non-Arabic names to conduct reconnaissance runs in preparation for the attacks. Specifically, an American Airlines pilot has identified MARWAN AL-SHEHHI (UA Flt. #175) as a passenger of AA Flight #59 on 6/7/2001. Just prior to flight's departure, AL-SHEHHI requested a tour of the cockpit. AL-SHEHHI presented his pilot's license and boarding pass to the pilot during this tour. AL-SHEHHI was seated in First Class and is believed to have been traveling with another party. An analysis of the flight manifest suggests that AL-SHEHHI may have been flying under the name of MATTHEW COHEN. Investigation continuing.

Detroit

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As previously reported, [redacted], [redacted] [redacted], and [redacted] were arrested in [redacted] apartment on 9/18/2001 for identity fraud and fraudulent use of a visa. On 9/21/2001, these three individuals were ordered detained during a hearing before a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. The judge has subsequently received threatening telephone calls and is receiving protection from the U.S. Marshals. On 09/20/2001, a ``JOHN DOE" (aka [redacted]) arrest warrant was issued as possibly being the fourth occupant of [redacted] apartment. This warrant charges identity fraud, fraud and misuse of visas, and misuse of social security card. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] Federal Protective Service Officer (FPSO) [redacted] [redacted] while providing security at the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, was shot and killed on 9/21/2001 by [redacted] ([redacted]). [redacted] was providing security at the U.S. Courthouse in Detroit, MI. [redacted] while waiting to pass through the metal-detector, was determined by FPSO [redacted], to possess a bag containing a nickel-plated revolver. Before [redacted] could be disarmed, he shot and killed FPSO [redacted] [redacted] was shot and wounded by other officers present. He is currently in a hospital bed under guard by FBI Detroit (FBI DE). Based upon information and physical evidence found in his car, [redacted] appears to be a mentally-deranged person who was under the influence of drugs at the time of the shooting. The shooting does not appear to be related to the investigation. When able, [redacted] will be interviewed by FBI DE to determine if there is any nexus to the PENTTBOM investigation.

[redacted] FBIHQ received a [redacted] # [redacted] from the FBI Internet Tip Line. The report advised as follows: "I believe I have information on an attack on the Golden Gate Bridge on the 22nd of this month, which is tomorrow. Please have an official call me so that I can give this entire message to a person who can choose weather to act upon it or not,,,,.Thankyou Mrs [redacted]" The report was furnished from Mrs. [redacted] on 9/21/01 at 2:43:49 p.m. from e-mail [redacted]. The tipster was identified as [redacted] [redacted] ([redacted], MI 48881, telephone number [redacted]). A copy of the [redacted] was provided to FBI DE, who will interview [redacted]

(P) FBI SF also provided copy of (G) Results will be provided to SIOC.

Houston

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI HO was contacted by an apartment manager who reported suspicious activity involving an apartment unit abandoned by AHMAD ABDUL AL-TURAYIF and AMMAR FARRAJ ALJUHANI, who recently completed flight engineer training in Houston. Pursuant to a consent search, FBI Houston (FBI HO) recovered a computer, unopened letters, a Rolodex, and miscellaneous items from the abandoned apartment. A mirror copy of the computer hard drive was forwarded to FBI WFO, with a request to conduct a forensic analysis. FBI HO (G) analysis of the computer revealed JPEG images of the World Trade Towers and Usama Bin Laden, and other documents written in Arabic possibly using encryption. A hotmail email address for AL-TURURAYIF (P) was identified. A 2703(f) preservation letter was sent to Hotmail to preserve all email records/content relevant to this account. FBI HO continues efforts to locate and interview ALTURAYIF and ALJUHANI. FBI HO requested that these two (2) individuals be (G) (G) Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI HO has (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). This asset reported that Usama Bin Laden arrived in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan in a 12 car motorcade on 09/21/2001. This information was corroborated by the source through contact with a Tribal Chief within the Paktia Province region.

Louisville

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] Information previously provided in Summary 10 indicated that HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) had resided in the Louisville area. FBI Louisville (FBI LS) investigation revealed no links between individuals in Kentucky and the suspected hijackers. However, it now appears the individuals identified were look-alikes. Six persons are in INS custody, including five Mauritanians and one Syrian.

Miami

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/22/2001

[redacted] Investigation has determined that a number of the hijackers attempted to obtain USAID identifications in the Summer of 2001. FBI MM interviewed (P), the (P) of USAID in Miami Beach, FL. (P) conducted record queries and determined that the majority of these applications had been forwarded through (P) at APPOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL in Patterson, NJ. (P) was able to determine that the following hijackers attempted to acquire USAID identifications: SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); KHALID ALMIHDAR (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) (on/about 7/7/2001); MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) (on/about 7/4/2001); NAWAF ALHAMZI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 07/10/2001); MAJED MOQED (AA Flt. #77) (date unknown); and AHMAD ALHAZNAWI (UA Flt. #93) (date unknown). USAID card applications and color photocopies of the identifications are being disseminated to appropriate offices. Investigation being coordinated with FBI MM, FBI NK, and FBI WFO. Results will be forwarded to (G) and all appropriate offices.

[redacted] Previous FBI MM investigation determined that, on 5/2/2001, MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) and ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) obtained Florida drivers licenses at the same south Florida location. DMV queries revealed that five Arab individuals, including (P) (P) also obtained Florida drivers licenses on that date. FBI MM located and interviewed (P). (P) identified a photograph of (P) (P) (DOB (P-1)) as the individual who assisted (P) in obtaining his driver's license. (P) was polygraphed on 9/18/2001 and determined to be inconclusive. He will be re-polygraphed on 9/21/2001. (P) has been identified through INS records as a naturalized United States Citizen who was born in Haiti. Efforts by FBI MM are underway to fully identify (P) and to determine his role, if any, in assisting ATTA, JARRAH, and others in obtaining fraudulent Florida driver's licenses. Results of investigation will be forwarded to (G) and appropriate offices. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 08/27/2001, six purported Pakistani nationals arrived in Miami from (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) This (O-1) information was uncorroborated not only by the review of audio tapes by FBI Language Specialists, but also by a negative physical search from the hotel rooms of the individuals (O-1) On 09/20/2001, three of the six individuals were polygraphed. Two subjects passed the polygraph, and one was found to be inconclusive. One requested an attorney and will not be polygraphed. The remaining two polygraphs are being conducted on 09/21/2001. Investigative results will be provided to (G) and appropriate offices.

[redacted]

[redacted] (O-1) (O-1) identified as (A), (G), (J-1), reported that, while at a mosque in Bronx, NY, in approximately August 2001, he prayed with a Pakistani lawyer/grocery store manager from Newark, NJ. This individual inquired about the willingness of (A), (G), (J-1) to engage in Jihad. FBI MM has obtained authorization to (A), (G), (J-1) and is coordinating with FBI NK to conduct consensually monitored calls between (A), (G), (J-1) and the Pakistani national. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

Newark

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI NK investigation determined that (P) (P) is an associate of MARWAN ALSHEHHI (UA Flt. #175). Reportedly, (P) owns a gas station at which ALSHEHHI would "hang out." (P) (P) has been identified as an associate of (P) Further investigation confirmed a relationship between ALSHEHHI and (P) Based on these associations and relationships, FBI NK intends to obtain a search warrant for (P) residence. (P) is currently under arrest on a Material Witness warrant based on his link to ALSHEHHI. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI NK initiated a pen register on the telephone of (P) predicated on the possibility that (P) may be the UNSUB in a photograph that FBI WFO secured from an abandoned rental vehicle at Dulles Airport linked to AA Flight #77. A consensual search of the digital information on a university computer used by (P) continues. Investigation determined that both of (P) email addresses both contained a reference to number ''93.''

Philadelphia

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI PH developed information that (P) and (P) are associated with an address in Jersey City, NJ, that has been used by (P) ((D) (D) , (P) ((D) (D) , and (P) ((D) . (P) are associates of (F) (G) (G)). (P) are students at a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Truck Driver School in Allentown, PA. FBI PH is currently conducting surveillance on (P) . (P) has a Michigan issued HAZMAT trucker driver's license. It is anticipated that a [redacted] (D) will be issued for [redacted] (P) on 9/22/2001.

Pittsburgh

Recovery / Evidence Collection:

[redacted] FBI Pittsburgh (FBI PG) Evidence Response Team (ERT) activity at the Somerset crash site may be completed sometime on 9/22/2001 or 9/23/2001. The raking and sifting of the dirt has resulted in the recovery of a great deal of human remains. On 9/22/2001, it is anticipated that the pumping of the two acre pond near the crash site will be completed. After the pumping of the pond, FBI PG ERT will man two boats to visually look for items of potential evidentiary value in the pond. Once this is completed, FBI PG ERT and other law enforcement personnel will conduct a final "walk through" the woods in the vicinity of the crash site in an effort to locate items of value that may have been missed. This ''walk through'' may take place as early as 9/23/2001 or 9/24/2001. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the morgue is in possession of [redacted] (P-1) human remains, which are comprised of 914 separate items. The morgue has dental records for 37 individuals. Efforts are underway to identify the remains.

[redacted] Six specimens of human remains will be flown to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Dover Air Force Base to verify or rule out possible knife wounds. To date, all such submissions have been negative.

[redacted] Human remains not of evidentiary value and which are not being sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Dover Air Force Base, will be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Human remains sent to AFIP and returned thereafter will also be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Personal effects not of evidentiary value will be turned over to United Air Lines (UAL) for subsequent return to families of passengers and crew.

[redacted] All ante-mortem interview of family members have been completed, except for the four hijackers.

San Antonio

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI SA continues to conduct investigation into [redacted] (P) who has been detained by INS in Fort Worth, TX, and who may be related to NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77).

* Investigation determined that (P) utilized the Internet account of (P), whom FBI DL believes to be NAWAF ALHAZMI.
* A cellular phone utilized by (P) (AT&T Wireless # (P-1) FBI DL is (D) (D). Results will be provided to (G) and other field offices upon receipt and analysis.
* FBI SA continues to document (P) activities through research and analysis of financial, email, travel, telephone, etc. and his associates. A review of (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
* Investigation continuing regarding items from search of residence and vehicle.
* FBI SA investigating an unconfirmed report that (P) children did not report for school on 9/11/2001.
* This search disclosed two passports, neither of which were damaged. (Previous investigation indicated that (P) reported to ARAMCO that his passport had been damaged and ARAMCO arranged for a new one to issued to him.)

[redacted] FBI DL identified (P) as an associate of (P) In 6/1997 or 7/1997, (P) received a $10,000 wire transfer from (P) who opened an account but closed it in November 1997. (P) made at trip to Boston in August of 2001 and made two telephone calls to (P) in Boston. FBI DL is working to fully identify (P).

San Diego

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, British authorities arrested OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, who is linked to KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AA Flt. #77) via lease agreement. AL-BAYOUMI is a close associate of (P) A computer was seized from AL-BAYOUMI at the time of his arrest. (P) received an email response from AL-BAYOUMI which contained an address for AL-BAYOUMI in Birmingham, United Kingdom. FBI San Diego (SD) is preparing a (D) and is investigating financial transactions to support a criminal complaint for extradition. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] As previously reported, (P)'s telephone number was found in NAWAF ALHAZMI's (AA Flt. #77) car, which was left at Washington-Dulles Airport. (P) has admitted to being the roommate of OMAR BAKARBASHAT and that he knew ALHAZMI. On 09/21/2001, (P) failed a polygraph. (P) was found deceptive on two key questions: "Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" and, "Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks on U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" (P) was subsequently (D) Investigation continuing.

[redacted] During interview, (P) (supra) stated that NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) lived with YAZID SALMI. SALMI was interviewed on 9/20/2001 and 9/21/2001. On 9/22/2001, he will be polygraphed and his car searched pursuant to consent being granted. SALMI was reportedly one of ALHAZMI's closest friends in San Diego. Interview, polygraph, and search results will be provided to (G) and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI SD investigation identified OSAMA BASSNAN as an associate OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI (supra) and voiced his support of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. A source met with BASSNAN (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). During the meeting, BASSNAN indicated he knew AL-BAYOUMI very well and also knew NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) when they lived in San Diego. BASSNAN told the source that he knew of terrorist attack in advance, but source says that BASSNAN implied he had inside information. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Investigation continuing.

San Francisco

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] On 5/21/2001, INS Officials arrested (P) (P) (aka (P), upon his arrival in San Francisco. At the time of his arrest, (P) (O-1) (O-1) (P) has been in the custody of the INS since 05/21/2001. On 5/24/2001 and 9/20/2001, FBI SF interviewed (P) (P) arrived in the US during the same time frame as many of the hijackers. When (P) boarded a plane bound for San Francisco, he identified himself as (P). A review of the manifest revealed that there was a (P) on the flight, but no one on the flight who used the name (P) (P) is a military pilot, trained in Iran and the U.S. San Francisco, (D) (D) [redacted] (D) Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, FBI SF received information from FBI DL regarding [redacted] (P) ([redacted] (P), Danville, CA). Investigation determined that [redacted] (P) applied $200 of time towards a prepaid calling card on 9/9/2001 to a calling card that was subsequently used by WALEED SHEHRI (AA Flt. #11). FBI SF has begun preliminary surveillance of [redacted] (P) as well as initiating extensive background and database checks on [redacted] (P) and any associates identified within the San Francisco Bay Area. Investigation on-going.

[redacted] FBI SF has been contacted by three local financial institutions with information that account holders at their businesses may be the same as individuals [redacted] (G) The Bank of the West advised that they have three accounts matching names [redacted] (G) furnished to them on 9/17/2001. FBI SF has requested a [redacted] (D) World Savings Bank noted one account in the name of [redacted] (P), which was opened in their Mission Viejo, CA, branch. This is believed to be a different name, and identifying information, than that on the [redacted] (G) (MOHAMAD G. ATTA). However, FBI SF investigation continues to fully identify [redacted] (P). Charles Schwab reported that a [redacted] (P) from Florida had placed "Put Options" on airline stock, in an account he opened in July, 2001. Additional information is forthcoming and a subpoena will be issued. SIOC and appropriate offices will be advised of investigative results. Investigations continuing.

[redacted] FBI SF received information from the US Postal Service (USPS) that the Daly City Post Office (2650 Bayshore Blvd, Daly City, CA) has in its possession approximately 200 suspicious-looking letters. One letter is addressed to SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93), and a second addressed to [redacted] (P) (possibly related to ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI - AA Flt. #11). Both letters are date-stamped 9/11/2001. FBI SF is assisting the USPS with the examination of these parcels. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

Washington Field

Recovery / Evidence Collection:

[redacted] As of 12:21 pm on 9/22/2001, [redacted] (P-1) and [redacted] (P-1) have been recovered at the Pentagon.

[redacted] FBI WFO has recovered the Virginia DMV identification of HANI HANJOUR from the Pentagon crime scene. Also recovered was a wallet from SALEM ALHAZMI. This wallet contained contained a couple of addresses, including one for (P) LNU (last name was illegible) with an address of ??? (P) Wayne, New Jersey, phone number (P). FBI WFO coordinating investigation with FBI NK and results will be provided to SIOC. Investigation continuing.

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI Washington Field Office (FBI WFO) reported on a situation involving a Saudi Arabian pilot aboard a United Airlines flight from Dulles to Heathrow. Prior to take-off, the flight crew became suspicious of one passenger. This passenger claimed to be a Saudi Arabian pilot, and asked to ride in the jump seat. The crew asked the FBI to interview him, and two other Middle Eastern travelers. These individuals were interviewed by the FBI, US Customs Service (USCS) and INS. They were cleared to fly, but the pilot refused to fly with them on board. No further investigation.

[redacted] (P) was interviewed by FBI WFO concerning his assistance to AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) in obtaining a Virginia ID card. (P) described himself as a ''Professional ID Provider.'' He identified three of the hijackers and is being detained by INS on immigration charges. According to (P) HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77), NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and AHMED ALGHAMDI followed (P) and another ID broker to lawyer (P)'S office. (P) secretary provided DMV forms presigned by (P) Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI WFO investigation identified EYAD M. ALRABABAH and (P) (DOB (P-1)) as possible associates of the hijackers. These identifications were made through FBI WFO's analysis of Virginia Driver's Licenses with addresses provided by (P) (supra). ALRABABAH and (P) are currently located in FBI NK's territory. FBI WFO is coordinating with FBI NK to arrest both subjects on INS charges. The association of ALRABABAH and (P) has been further strengthened by (P) purchase of ALRABABAH's vehicle, and their arrival in the WFO area within the year 2000. Investigation continuing and being coordinated with FBI NK.

[redacted] A continuing review of Dulles security camera videos indicates that two of the hijackers may have visited Dulles on 9/10/2001. It appears that they passed through the security checkpoints and baggage claim areas. Review of security cameras on-going.

[redacted] American Airlines reports that only five victim families have not contacted AA concerning victims on Flight #77, and are those of the suspected hijackers. This lends credence to other information that there appears to be only five hijackers on Flight #77, and not six as previously considered.

[redacted] Investigation by FBI WFO of associates and employers of [redacted] have discerned no ties to any of the hijackers. No links have been developed from the address book of 75 phone numbers seized as part of a consensual search of his residence. However, he will be arrested on 9/23/2001 on forgery charges that were uncovered incidental to this investigation. This warrant is being pursued out of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (USAO EDVA).

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, FBI WFO arrested [redacted] on Title 18, Section 1028 (False Identity Documentation) on 9/21/01. A consensual search was conducted of his residence ([redacted], Washington, D.C.) with negative results. [redacted] was identified as assisting ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) obtain a VA Identification card. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 9/20/2001, [redacted] (DOB [redacted]), [redacted], was contacted by FBI WFO and agreed to be interviewed. [redacted] was subsequently arrested by the INS [redacted] [redacted] had reportedly been scheduled to return to Saudi Arabia by air on 09/20/01. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] On 9/21/2001, the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center advised that they had received a threat of an impending release of anthrax on Washington D.C., on 9/22/2001. Although FBI WFO does not consider this a credible threat, appropriate notifications have been made.

[redacted]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 09/22/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Receiving offices are requested to continue to conduct all logical investigations. Relay any pertinent information back to FBIHQ, SIOC, FBI NY CP, FBI WFO, and other relevant field offices. LEGATs are requested to share new information [redacted] (O-1).

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 06/03/2002

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)
New York **Attn:**

Minneapolis **Attn:**

Washington Field **Attn:**
Phoenix **Attn:**
San Diego

From: Newark
(G)
Contact: SA (S)
SA
SA

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182

[redacted] **GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(e)**

Synopsis: [redacted] To provide investigative summary information and set leads.

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] (F)

[redacted]

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for the Minneapolis Division is a copy of the toll records for the (P) cellular telephone, (P). Enclosed for the Washington Field Office is a copy of the toll records for the cellular telephone used by FAYEZ ABUTALEB, (P) subscriber name (P)

Details: [redacted] Previous investigation has revealed that EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH, also known as EYAD ALRABABAH, and his former roommate, (P), also known as (P) were associated with known hijackers, MOJED MOQED, HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. ALRABABAH and (P) lived at (P), Apartment (P) Falls Church, Virginia from approximately 03/2001 to 06/2001. The aforementioned hijackers visited ALRABABAH and (P) at this apartment during 04/2001-05/2001.

[redacted] (P) and ALRABABAH rented this apartment from a woman by the name of (P) and the lease was in her name. The telephone number for (P), Apartment (P) was (P) and was listed to (P). Investigation has revealed that (P) and ALRABABAH both utilized telephone number (P) during their stay in Virginia.

[redacted]

[redacted] On 05/07/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers from Falls Church, Virginia to the FAIRFIELD INN, Fairfield, Connecticut. On 05/09/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers to Paterson, New Jersey.

[redacted] Prior to living in the aforementioned apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, (P) resided at (P), Paterson, New Jersey, telephone number (P). While (P) resided in Paterson, he met ALRABABAH and eventually left New Jersey to (P) in Falls Church, Virginia, with ALRABABAH. (P) met the four hijackers in Virginia while he resided there. (P) was evicted from the (P) (P) apartment in 06/2001 and returned to reside at (P) (P) Paterson, New Jersey.

[redacted] Upon his return to (P), (P) lived with two men named (P), date of birth (P-1), and FAYEZ IBRAHIM ALI ABUTALEB, also known as FAYEZ ABU-TALEB, date of birth (P-1). (P) maintained contact with ALRABABAH who was working and residing in Connecticut.

[redacted] The past activities of (P) and FAYEZ IBRAHIM ALI ABUTALEB have raised questions as to whether they were associated with the known hijackers, as well as (P) FBI Phoenix had conducted an investigation into the automatic teller transactions of known hijacker HANI HANJOUR and the investigation revealed the following:

[redacted] On 06/19/2001, at 23:03:29 hours, HANI HANJOUR conducted an automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank, 1152 Main Street, Paterson, New Jersey. A review conducted by the Phoenix Division of all transactions conducted 30 minutes before and after HANJOUR'S transaction revealed four individuals who made transactions at the same ATM just prior to HANJOUR. Two of the four individuals identified were FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, date of birth (P-1) and (P) date of birth (P-1) At present, it has not been determined if ABUTALEB and (P) knew HANJOUR or made some financial transaction for him, but the aforementioned transaction illustrates the possibility.

[redacted] Additionally, (P) had two telephones in his name; a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, (P), and the main hardline number for his residence at (P), Paterson, New Jersey, (P). Investigation by the Newark Division revealed that ABUTALEB was in possession of the aforementioned VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, (P).

[redacted] The Newark Division has reviewed the toll records for these two telephone numbers. The review produced the following:

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

[redacted] A review of the toll records pertaining to the telephone number, (P) revealed contact with a telephone number, (P) The telephone number (P) is subscribed to by (P) SSN: (P-1), (P), Brigantine, NJ 08203. This cellular telephone is referred to hereafter as the (P) cell phone.

[redacted] During the time period of 07/14/2001 to 10/17/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the (P) number, (P), a 5 times as well as the telephone utilized by FAYEZ ABUTALEB, (P), 1 time. (P) currently resides at (P) Atlantic City, New Jersey. While most of (P) (P) call activity is in the southern New Jersey area, the following calls are to be noted:

[redacted] ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was arrested on 08/16/2001 in Minnesota and held in federal custody at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota. A review of the telephone calls on the tolls records of the (P) cell phone reveal that, subsequent 08/16/2001, (P) was attempting to locate and speak with (P) (P) also known as (P), date of birth (P-1), (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The aforementioned call activity was confirmed by (P) in a interview of (P) (P) conducted by the Newark Division on 06/05/2002.

[redacted] In the aforementioned interview, (P) advised that he lived with his friend, (P), sometime during 1991 or 1992 at a location on (P) in Paterson, New Jersey. (P) also advised the interviewing agents that he has a single engine pilot's license and that some point in time in the 1980's he had taken flight lessons in New Jersey. (P) advised that he had taken flight lessons at AIR FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS, TETERBORO AIRPORT, Teterboro, New Jersey, and CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY, Essex County Airport, Fairfield, New Jersey. It should be noted that known hijackers HANI HANJOUR and SAEED ALGHAMDI took flight lessons at FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS and HANI HANJOUR took flight lessons at CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY. ((F) Serial (F)

[redacted] On 08/16/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number 973-483-2464 twice. The telephone number 973-483-2464 is subscribed to the MIDTOWN EXXON, 481 Central Avenue, Newark, NJ. (J-2), (P) (J-2), (P)

(J-2), (P)

[redacted] On 08/17/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number 973-256-7033 once. The telephone number 973-256-7033 is listed to the GREAT NOTCH EXXON, 1299 Route 46 East, Little Falls, NJ. The GREAT NOTCH EXXON was previously owned by (P) (P) (P) and (P). (P) provided information about the prior ownership of the GREAT NOTCH EXXON during his interview with the FBI on 05/21/2002. ((F), Serial (F) The GREAT NOTCH EXXON was also a location where a number of the hijackers were observed in the past. ((F) Serial (F)

[redacted] The (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number 201-567-7276 on 08/17/2001. The telephone number 201-567-7276 is listed to GETTY, Route 4 East, Englewood, New Jersey. (P) is also part owner in the aforementioned GETTY gas station with (P) and (P). ((F), Serial (F)

[redacted] On 08/18/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the MIDTOWN EXXON, 973-483-2464, twice. The (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number (P) twice. The telephone number (P) is the number of (P) cellular telephone. During 09/2001 (P) was interviewed by the Minneapolis Division and he advised the interviewing agents that his VOICESTREAM cellular telephone number was (P). (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] On 08/18/2001, the (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number (P) once. (P) listed (P) as his home telephone number on his VOICESTREAM subscriber paperwork. ((F) Serial (F)

[redacted] On 08/19/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number (P) once and the telephone number (P) once. In the aforementioned interview of (P), (P) had advised the interviewing agents that his home telephone number was (P) and his cellular telephone number was (P). The aforementioned call to (P) home number, (P), was approximately 25 minutes in duration. It should be noted that (P) resided in Minnesota when (P) was arrested and that the aforementioned attempts to reach him were in the time period of 08/16/2001 to 08/19/2001.

[redacted] (P) was (A), (G), (J-1) the Newark Division, in the past, for (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) ((F)) During the aforementioned interview of (P) by the Minneapolis Division, (P) advised that he currently lives at (P), Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. telephone number (P), cell phone number (P). ((F) Serial (F)

[redacted] In the referenced full field investigation (F), (P) was found to be an associate of (P) is a (P) for (P) and the (P) for the (P) (P) was the (P) of the (P) when he resided in New Jersey. (P) presently resides in San Diego, California and he is the subject of an investigation by the San Diego Division, (F). (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was held in federal custody in the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota, subsequent his arrest on 08/16/2001. Toll analysis of calls placed from the Sherburne Jail during the time period of 09/11/2001 to 09/14/2001 revealed numerous calls from the S2 and S2-A locations in the jail to the AL-ALMAL ISLAMIC SCHOOL, also known as, ISLAMIC CENTER OF MINNESOTA, 1401 Gardena Avenue, N.E., Fridley, MN 55432, at telephone (P). It should be noted, the Minneapolis Division has directly linked (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) in Minneapolis, MN. (referenced in (F) Serial (F)) The Newark Division has not yet determined if (P) has any ties to the (P), even though both (A), (G), (J-1), (P) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] The (P) cellular telephone was also in contact with the main telephone number to (P), Paterson, NJ, (P). As previously indicated, (P) lived at this address and was associated with four of the known hijackers. In his interview with the FBI on 06/05/2001, (P) advised the writer that he is the cousin of (P), who also resided at the 1 Montclair Avenue address.

[redacted] (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (P) is an avid supporter of convicted terrorist, SHEIKH OMAR ABDUL RAHMAN, and RAHMAN's terrorist organization, AL GAMA

AL ISLAMIYYA (AGAI). (P) holds a key position in AGAI, whereby he willingly has acted as a communications conduit between AGAI leaders overseas and in the U.S. ((F) Serial (F)

(S) The BEACH EXXON is associated with (P) DOB (P-1) (P) DOB (P-1) (P) (P) 26 years old, (P) and (P) spouse, (P) (P) who is believed to be the owner/operator of (P) (P) owned or operated the (P) prior to (P) ((F))

[redacted] (P) was born in (P-1) and entered the United States on (P-1), on a (J-3) to attend the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL, 46-12 Queens Boulevard, STE 204, Sunnyside, New York, telephone (P). A reveal of the Telephone Application of ACS revealed that the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL was contacted by known hijacker MOHAMMED ATTA, cell phone number (P), on 06/21/2000. (P) (P) denied knowing how to fly an aircraft during an interview conducted by the Newark Division. (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] During the aforementioned interview, (P) advised that in late 1996 to early 1997, he became business partners with (P), place of birth, (P-1) and purchased the (P) (P), Toms River, New Jersey.

[redacted] The Newark Division has not yet ascertained if (P) (P) partner, (P), was in fact (P) who was (A), (G), (J-1) by the Newark Division, (F). (P) was a Palestinian businessman and the (P) of the (P) in 1996. (P) was also an active HAMAS leader and the close friend of (P).

[redacted] (P) brother, (P), lives at (P) (P) Clifton, New Jersey, telephone number (P) A query of the Telephone Application of ACS, revealed that (P) telephone number, (P), has had past contact with the ICPC, telephone number 973-223-5211, and (P), telephone numbers (P) and (P).

[redacted] Previous investigation by the Newark Division has identified the (P) as a place where, among legitimate Islamic worship, HAMAS supporters meet to raise funds and conduct business. (referenced in (F)) As stated previously, (P) was the (P) of (P) at one time. (F)

(S) (P), (P), (P) and (P) are currently under investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) due to the fact that they currently appear to be illegal aliens. Additionally, Special Agents of the INS believe that [redacted] and [redacted] may have entered into a fraudulent marriage to obtain U.S. citizenship for [redacted] ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] cellular telephone was also in contact with [redacted] which was utilized by FAYEZ ABUTALEB. As stated previously, ABUTALEB conducted an ATM transaction in close proximity to known hijacker HANI HANJOUR. ABUTALEB is currently in custody due to the fact that he was in the U.S. illegally. ABUTALEB has been previously interviewed by the Newark Division. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] In the aforementioned interview conducted by the Newark Division, ABUTALEB advised that he attended a mosque located in Falls Church, Virginia while he was staying with a friend named [redacted] in Maryland. The mosque that ABUTALEB referred to could possibly be the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, 3159 Row Street, Falls Church, Virginia.

It should be noted that ALRABABAH and [redacted] advised that they had met the four known hijackers at the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE in Falls Church, Virginia. The DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE is known to be attended by members of HAMAS. (referenced in [redacted] Also, a telephone number associated with the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE was found during a search of the belongings of ZAKARIYA ESSABAR and RAMZI BINALSHIBH in Germany. [redacted]

[redacted] As indicated previously, ABUTALEB utilized a cellular telephone, [redacted] subscribed to by [redacted] who left the United States and has recently returned from Jordan. The telephone assigned telephone number [redacted] will be hereafter referred to as the ABUTALEB cellular telephone. A review of the toll records for this cellular telephone revealed the following:

[redacted] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone was in contact with [redacted] [redacted] which is probably due to the fact that ABUTALEB [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted].

[redacted] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone was also in contact with [redacted] which, as previously indicated, was the number of [redacted] [redacted], Apartment [redacted] where ALRABABAH and [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]. Additionally, it should be noted that four known hijackers visited [redacted], Apartment [redacted] Falls Church, Virginia. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone has contacted telephone number 201-612-8414, listed to EXXON, Route 17, Paramus, New Jersey. The [redacted] is currently owned by [redacted], date of birth [redacted]. [redacted] is possibly linked to RAMZI BINALSHIBH in that the telephone number [redacted] was found during a search of the belongings of ZAKARIYA ESSABAR and RAMZI BINALSHIBH by the authorities in Germany. The telephone number [redacted] was subscribed to by [redacted] at [redacted], Clifton, New Jersey. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone has contacted the telephone numbers [redacted] and [redacted] The telephone number [redacted] is the home telephone number of [redacted], Arlington, Virginia. The telephone number [redacted] is subscribed to [redacted] Hyattsville, Maryland 20783, but the telephone is utilized by [redacted] Apartment [redacted] Falls Church, Virginia. ABUTALEB contacted [redacted] and [redacted] numerous times, but there are two dates that should be noted. On 09/10/2001, ABUTALEB contacted [redacted] at [redacted] and on 09/13/2001 ABUTALEB contacted [redacted] home number [redacted].

[redacted] [redacted] was interviewed by the Washington Field Office in 10/2001. [redacted] and [redacted] lived at [redacted], Apartment [redacted] Falls Church, Virginia, which was next door to the apartment of ALRABABAH and [redacted] when they lived in Virginia. In fact, [redacted] claimed to have met ALRABABAH and [redacted] in the street and brought them to [redacted] to rent her apartment that was next door to his. [redacted] then claimed to not have had any other interaction with ALRABABAH and/or [redacted] ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] claimed that a friend of his, [redacted] knew that ALRABABAH lived in New Jersey. The call activity from ABUTALEB to [redacted] would suggest that [redacted] may not have been truthful when discussing his knowledge of ALRABABAH and/or [redacted] It should also be noted that he lived next door to where several of the known hijackers are known to have visited.

[redacted] [redacted] was a friend of [redacted] and his family and lived with his family for a period of time. The facts surrounding [redacted] association with [redacted] would also suggest that [redacted] would have known the individuals that he brought to [redacted] apartment. Additionally, [redacted] advised in her interview by the Washington Field Office, that [redacted] told [redacted] that ALRABABAH and [redacted] were friends of his when he brought them to her apartment. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] (P) friend and former roommate, (P), currently lives with his wife in a house located at (P), Clifton, New Jersey. (P) has been interviewed by the Washington Field Office and advised that he splits his time between Clifton, New Jersey and Langley Park, Maryland, where he stays with a friend. (P) advised the interviewing agents that he met ALRABABAH in the Paterson, New Jersey area and that he never saw ALRABABAH in Virginia or Maryland. (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] Due to the fact that ALRABABAH and (P) knew each other from the Paterson area and lived in addresses that were next door to each other in Falls Church, Virginia, it is possible that (P) has not been truthful with the FBI when he discussed his knowledge of ALRABABAH. It should be noted that ALRABABAH, (P) and several of the known hijackers have all been in, Falls Church, Virginia, and Paterson, New Jersey, at one time or another. ALRABABAH, (P) and several of the known hijackers were in Falls Church, Virginia basically during the time period of 03/2001 to 07/2001.

[redacted] (P) resided at (P), Paterson, New Jersey, before and after he resided at (P), apt. (P) Falls Church, Virginia. ALRABABAH visited (P) at the (P) Avenue address. ((F) Serial (F)) Previous investigation has placed the hijackers in Paterson, New Jersey at various times during 2001, such as the confirmed sighting of 7 of the hijackers at APOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, 1009 Main Street,2nd floor, Paterson, New Jersey in 07/2001. ((F) Serial (F) Serial (F) The Newark Division has not ascertained whether (P) has come into contact with any of the known hijackers.

[redacted] The Newark Division has not ascertained why (P) is utilizing a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone subscribed to the name (P) (P) However, there are calls from (P) to (P), which is the home telephone number listed by (P) on the VOICESTREAM paperwork. A (G) check revealed a (P), SSN (P-1), current address of (P), Apartment (P) Clinton, New Jersey, and a past address of (P), Paterson, New Jersey. An Internet search on the telephone number (P) revealed a listing of (P), Paterson, New Jersey. The telephone facility assigned the number 3(P) will hereafter be referred to as the (P) cellular telephone. Additional analysis of the toll records of the (P) cellular telephone, (P), revealed the following:

[redacted] The (P) cellular phone contacted (P) home telephone, (P), numerous times, but it should be noted that (P) contacted (P) number on (P) and on (P).

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

The Newark Division has not ascertained the significance of the contact between [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P).

[redacted] The [redacted] (P) cellular telephone contacted 7[redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P)8. The telephone number [redacted] (P) is the cellular telephone number utilized by [redacted] (P), who is the [redacted] (P) of the [redacted] (P), N.W., Washington, D.C. The telephone number [redacted] (P) is the main telephone number of the [redacted] (P). ([redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F)

[redacted] As documented in [redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) [redacted] (P) came to the attention of the FBI due to his purchase of the [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) Washington, D.C. Apparently, the former owner, [redacted] (P), was offered a large sum of money to get him to sell the [redacted] (P). The FAYEZ ABUTALEB cell phone has also contacted the [redacted] (P),[redacted] (P).

[redacted] A [redacted] (G) check on the name [redacted] (P) revealed a [redacted] (P), date of birth [redacted] (F-1), Social Security Number (SSN) [redacted] (F-1), [redacted] (P) Washington, D.C. The address [redacted] (P) Washington, D.C. is also listed as the address of an [redacted] (P) gas station. The employer of [redacted] (P) was listed as [redacted] (P) Arlington, Virginia. [redacted] (G) listed [redacted] (P) Annandale, Virginia, as the [redacted] (P) of [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) as the [redacted] (P).

[redacted] [redacted] (P) appears to be the same person as [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) of the aforementioned [redacted] (P), due to the fact that [redacted] (P) contacts the [redacted] (P), on his cellular telephone, [redacted] (P). ([redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) The [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P), is also contacted by the FAYEZ ABUTALEB cellular telephone and, as indicated previously, the [redacted] (P) cellular telephone. (review of the toll records of ABUTALEB and [redacted] (P) cellular telephones)

[redacted] As documented in the [redacted] (G), [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) appear to be [redacted] (P) of a number of [redacted] (P) located in the Virginia and Washington, D.C. area. The following gas stations appear to be associated with [redacted] (P) and/or [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)
Arlington, Virginia
[redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

Arlington, Virginia
[redacted]
contacted by: [redacted] (secure case); and [redacted] (payphone); all three of these numbers were in contact with hijacker phone [redacted], believed to have been used by known hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI.

[redacted]
Washington, D.C.
[redacted]
contacted by: FAYEZ ABUTALEB and [redacted].

[redacted]
Falls Church, Virginia
[redacted]
contacted by: [redacted] and [redacted] (secure case).

[redacted]
Fairfax, Virginia
[redacted]
Washington, D.C.
[redacted]

[redacted]
Washington, D.C.
[redacted]
contacted by: [redacted] (secure case); this number contacted hijacker cellular telephone [redacted] believed to have been used by known hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] came to the attention of the FBI in captioned case concerning [redacted] involvement with his nephew, [redacted] [redacted], the known hijackers, and the HOLIDAY INN, Route 46 West, Totowa, New Jersey. Known hijacker KHALID M. AL-MIDHAR was positively identified by a hotel housekeeper who worked for the aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. ([redacted] Serial [redacted]

[redacted] AL-MIDHAR was registered under [redacted] nephew's name, [redacted] Apt. [redacted] Fairfax, Virginia, during the first week of 09/2001. A number of the known hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey at this time. ((F) Serial (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] On 10/11/2001, (P), date of birth, (F-1) was interviewed by the Washington Field Office concerning his stay at the aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. (P) advised the interviewing agents that (P) drove him to New Jersey to visit his wife, (P), and he had stayed at the HOLIDAY INN during the first week of 09/2001. (P) made two calls from the HOLIDAY INN to (P) cellular telephone, (P). (P) denied seeing or knowing any of the known hijackers. ((F) Serial (F)

[redacted] It should be noted that the hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey, at the same time as (P). There is contact between (P) and FAYEZ ABUTALEB, (P), and telephones that were in contact with the known hijackers. (P) is employed at the (P) which is in FALLS CHURCH, Virginia, where known hijackers resided for a period of time.

[redacted] Along with the aforementioned telephonic contact, the (P) cellular telephone and the ABUTALEB cellular telephone both contacted telephone number (P). (review of toll records of (P) and ABUTALEB cellular telephones) The subscriber for the telephone number (P) is (P), date of birth (P-1), (P) [redacted], Heightsville, Maryland. The telephone facility assigned number (P) will hereafter be referred to as the (P) cellular telephone.

[redacted] There are significant contacts in the toll records pertaining to (P). A preliminary review of the (P) cellular telephone toll records revealed the following:

[redacted] The (P) cellular telephone contacted (P) on 09/11/2001, at approximately 11:44pm, for a 4 minute time period. The telephone number (P) has also been in contact with the telephone number 972-680-0761, which is subscribed to the HLFRD, 525 International Parkway, Richardson, Texas.

[redacted] The (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number (P). The telephone number (P) is the main number of (P)Jamaica Queens, New York. (referenced in (F) Serial (F) Serial (F) [redacted] The number to (A), (G), (J-1), has appeared in a number of investigations to include the (F) and (F) investigations. (A), (G), (J-1) is owned or co-owned by (A), (G), (J-1) a New York Division investigation (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1) has a number of relatives in the New York area that are involved in the (A), (G), (J-1) business with him. (referenced in (F) Serial (F) (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] (P) an employee of (P), participated in shotgun and rifle target practice with three people associated with the WORLD TRADE CENTER bombing case, (F) (F), (P) and (P) (P) was also a subject in the (F) investigation. (referenced in (F) Serial (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] The telephone number (P) also appeared in the telephone records of (P) was 1 of 4 individuals convicted in the (F) investigation. (referenced in (F) Serial (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] The telephone number (P) appeared on a pen register conducted on the telephone associated with (P). The telephone number (P) was the home telephone number of (P), also known as, (P). In 1992, (P) arranged for firearms and explosives training in Pennsylvania for (P), aka (P) (P) was convicted and sentenced to life in the TERRSTOP investigation. (referenced in (F) Serial (F) (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] (P) has been in contact with (P), who was the subject of a HAMAS investigation by FBI New York, (F). (P) teaches at the (P) in Jersey City, New Jersey, and was linked to TRADEBOM subjects (P) and (P). The address for the (P) was utilized by (P) and (P) for various bank accounts and insurance policies. ((F) Serial (F) Serial (F)

[redacted] The ALGHAZALY SCHOOL is located at 17 Park Street in Jersey City, New Jersey. The telephone number 201-433-5002 is subscribed to the ALGHAZALY SCHOOL and was contacted by (P). (review of ACS Telephone Application) As stated previously, (P) was (P) telephone number for EYAD ALRABABAH and (P) at (P) (P) Apartment (P) Falls Church, Virginia. Several of the known hijackers visited ALRABABAH and (P) at (P), Apartment (P) Falls Church, Virginia.

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

[redacted] The writer recommends that EYAD ALRABABAH, (P) (P) FAYEZ ABUTALEB, (P) (P) (P), and (P) be interviewed concerning the aforementioned information. The interviews should involve the following topics:

[redacted] Interviewees should be questioned about their association with or knowledge of HAMAS, HLFRD, ICPC, DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, (P) (P) ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, and RAMZI BINALSHIBH.

[redacted] ALRABABAH, (P) and (P) should be questioned at length about their knowledge of each other, the known hijackers, the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the (P), overseas travel, e-mail addresses, and HAMAS.

[redacted] ALRABABAH and (P) should be questioned about the (P) and the (P) and who they have been in contact with at these locations.

[redacted] ZAKARIA, (P), and (P) should be questioned about any knowledge of the known hijackers when they resided in Falls Church or overseas, the aforementioned (P) ABUTALEB, and (P) possible contact with the known hijackers in Totowa, New Jersey.

[redacted] (P) should be questioned at length on his knowledge and/or involvement with HAMAS, HLFRD, AL-ALMAL SCHOOL, (P) (P) GREAT NOTCH EXXON, (P) any of the aforementioned (P) family members, and the MIDTOWN EXXON.

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] Provide copies of this communication to SA (S) (S) and SA (S). Newark Division requests that New York Division review the content of this communication and facilitate logical investigation as appropriate.

Set Lead 3:

MINNEAPOLIS

AT BROOKLYN PARK, MINNESOTA

[redacted] Locate and re-interview (P) (P) Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. telephone number (P), cell phone number (P), concerning his knowledge of (P), (P), HAMAS, and the rest of the information provided in this communication.

Set Lead 4:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

[redacted] Locate and re-interview (P) (P) Arlington, Virginia, telephone (P), concerning his knowledge of (P), FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the known hijackers and his previous residence, ALRABABAH, (P) and the rest of the information provided in this communication.

Set Lead 5:

NEWARK

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/03/2002

AT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

[redacted] Locate and interview (P) (P-1) FAYEZ ABUTALEB, and the (P-1) family members mentioned in this communication.

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 11/05/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Investigative Services

New York

San Diego
Legat [redacted] (G)

From: San Diego
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MC 182

Synopsis: Details of a liaison meeting of New Scotland Yard detectives and FBI special agents in San Diego, October 21 through October 28, 2001, concerning **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.** Lead set to Legat [redacted] (G) for dissemination of enclosed FD-302s to New Scotland Yard.

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Administrative: **Information concerning OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI is carried by Legat** [redacted] (G) **as** [redacted] (F). **This communication is referenced to** [redacted] (F).

Enclosure(s): For New York, copies of FD-302s prepared by San Diego concerning the investigation of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** for review by SA [redacted] (S) for Legat [redacted] (G) a duplicate set of FD-302s for dissemination to New Scotland Yard.

Details: Referenced serial was a lead set to (G) by San Diego to locate and interview **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.** The subject was located and interviewed on September 21, 2001, by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS,) also known as New Scotland Yard in London. Legat (G) provided liaison service between the FBI and the MPS, arranging for Special Agents from New York and San Diego to travel to (G) while Omar Al-Bayoumi was in the custody of NSY.

Subsequent to this, NSY detectives familiar with the captioned investigation traveled to San Diego with New York SA (S) on October 21, 2001. The purpose of the travel was to provide FBI special agents with evidence obtained in the course of the New Scotland Yard (NSY) interview and attendant investigation of OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

The following is a summary of the detention and interview of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** in (G)

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detained OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI under the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act on Friday, 09/21/2001. AL-BAYOUMI's residence, automobile and office were searched incident to his detention. On 09/24/2001, Legat (G), with the assistance of SA (S) (New York Division, TDY to Legat (G) and SA (S) (San Diego Field Office, TDY to Legat (G)) provided the MPS with background information to aid in an interview of AL-BAYOUMI. SA (S) and SA (S) were assigned TDY to (G) Legat from 09/23/2001 to 09/30/2001. The purpose of the travel was to provide the MPS with information concerning what was known about the relationship between OMAR AHMAD AL-BAYOUMI and KHALID M. AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAMZI and other subjects of this investigation. The MPS did not allege any criminal activity on the part of OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI carried out in the U.K. that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. For these reasons, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges on Friday, September 28, 2001.

Search results of AL-BAYOUMI's home and office were previously furnished to San Diego and the receiving offices. Original documents and electronic data files are maintained by FBI New York.

The following is a summary of evidence items seized during the search of **OMAR AL-BAYOUMI's** home, office and vehicle in London by the MPS:

- A number of banking documents and evidence of travel between the United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. A business card was found linking him to the Al-Medina mosque located in El Cajon, California.

- Several videos were recovered from the search of AL-BAYOUMI's residence. One video revealed the party at the hijackers' apartment.

- Computers and diskettes were recovered from his residence.

The following is a summary of investigative steps taken during the visit by MPS detectives to San Diego FBI, October 21, 2001 to October 28, 2001:

(C-2)

- Between 10/19/2001 and 10/28/2001, the MPS officers attended various briefings of aspects of the Omar Al-Bayoumi investigation. The briefings were overseen by San Diego SA (S) Individual briefings were given by SA (S) (S) financial matters; SA (S), telephone records; SA (S), (P) Isamu Dyson; SA (S) computer evidence; SA (S), Al-Bayoumi's affiliation with various university enrollment and alleged employment.

- (S) and (S) disseminated information and evidence that had been collected as a result of the arrest of Omar Al-Bayoumi and the subsequent searches conducted in England.

- (S) and (S) participated in investigative strategy meetings conducted by SA (S) and attended by SA (S) and other San Diego agents involved in the investigation. These strategy meetings proved valuable for both the FBI and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of NSY.

- As a result of the meetings, developments have been made in the following areas:

Financial

New Scotland Yard was made aware of financial dealings that Omar Al-Bayoumi had with the Al-Medina Mosque, El Cajon, California, and Al-Bayoumi's association with Soliman Elay and Elay's association with Sana Bell and BMI Real Estate companies. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The FBI is now examining documentation relating to this Mosque that was seized from Al-Bayoumi's Birmingham address and from Bayoumi's office in the Mosque. Additionally, an arrest warrant has been issued for Al-Bayoumi for visa fraud in connection with financial false statements made on documents relating to his education status and his alleged employment by ERCAN Engineering, Newport Beach, California. An interview with (P) (P) (P), revealed that Al-Bayoumi coerced him into writing a letter indicating his company would be supporting Al-Bayoumi financially.

The FBI has been made aware of Al-Bayoumi's stated employer in Saudi Arabia, Dallah/Avco. New Scotland Yard was made aware that in most financial documents in the U.S., Al-Bayoumi did not divulge any employment with Dallah/Avco. This is significant because Dallah/Avco is suspected of having links with UBL. FBI is currently trying to verify these alleged links. The investigation has revealed that Al-Bayoumi routinely failed to list Dallah/Avco or the CAA as a source of income or financial support. NSY has reported that during their interview of Al-Bayoumi, Al-Bayoumi stated that he was receiving $4,000.00 per month from Dallah/Avco while in the U.S.

FBI provided NSY with schedules of U.S. financial accounts of Al-Bayoumi, Manal Bagader, Soliman Elay and (A), (G), (J-1) Additionally, link charts of significant financial activity that has occurred were provided to NSY.

Computer/Telephone

New Scotland Yard provided FBI with e-mail addresses recovered from Al-Bayoumi's computer. This lead to the FBI resulted in a link with Osama Bassnan in September 2001 being produced. The link chart of significant e-mail activity has been provided to NSY. FBI has linked Bassnan via telephone analysis with Al-Bayoumi and Bayoumi's wife, Manal Bagader, on at least 200 occasions while living in the U.S. FBI has provided NSY with link charts of telephone toll records for related individuals. The significance of Bassnan is that he hosted a party for Sheik Omar Rahman, who was later convicted for masterminding the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Bassnan is also a known supporter of UBL and he is opposed to the Israeli/Palestinian peace efforts. FBI is currently conducting further investigation into the links between Al-Bayoumi and Bassnan.

Interview-Isamu (P) Dyson

As a result of Al-Bayoumi's interview, Bayoumi had stated that he had a chance meeting with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar while in the company of a Caucasian Muslim named Ossma LNU. The meeting took place in Los Angeles, California.

Investigative efforts on the part of San Diego FBI resulted in locating and correctly identifying Ossma LNU as Isamu (P) Dyson who was now living in (P). Dyson was interviewed by SA (S). That interview is covered under a separate FD-302. Dyson provided a statement confirming his association with Al-Bayoumi. As a result of a meeting between (S), the interviewer of Al-Bayoumi in London, and SA (S) it became apparent that inconsistencies existed between Al-Bayoumi's and Dyson's account of the chance meeting with the hijackers.

The inconsistencies in the statements of (P) and Al-Bayoumi are of importance to the investigation. For that reason, the FBI arranged for Dyson (P) (P) to retrace the events of the February 01, 2000, which is the presumed date that Al-Bayoumi and Dyson had the alleged chance meeting with the hijackers. (P) (P) Dyson was interviewed regarding his knowledge of other meetings/social functions hosted by Al-Bayoumi in which the hijackers may have been present as there are several witnesses that have placed Al-Bayoumi with the hijackers. NSY advised that Al-Bayoumi did not disclose additional meetings with the hijackers during their interview. (P)

- NSY requested copies of all FD-302's related to the investigation of Omar Al-Bayoumi. NSY agreed to provide San Diego FBI with a copy of a particular video tape which was obtained in their search of Omar Al-Bayoumi's property in London. NSY maintained a copy of that tape which was made an item of evidence at FBI New York. The copy will be sent to San Diego FBI by NSY for review. The video, as described by NSY, has images of Omar Al-Bayoumi at a party he hosted in San Diego. San Diego will review this tape when it is made available. It is anticipated that a review of the tape will help investigating agents develop other leads to be carried out in San Diego.

- On October 28, 2001, (S) and SA (S) left the San Diego Division.

On November 03, 2001, SA (S) copied San Diego's FD-302 reports known to concern the investigation of OMAR EMHED AL-BAYOUMI. Two sets of copies were produced. One set was sent to Legat (G) under the cover of this electronic communication for dissemination to NSY. The second copy was sent under this communication to New York FBI for review by SA (S).

San Diego's investigation of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** continues.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

Counterterrorism

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Adm)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

Read and clear, provide SA [redacted] (S) with enclosed FD-302s.

Set Lead 4: (Adm)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO

Read and Clear.

Set Lead 5: (Adm)

[redacted] (G)

AT [redacted] (G)

Read, clear, and disseminate enclosed FD-302s to New Scotland Yard in a manner prescribed by the Bureau.

◆◆

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the Attacks of September 11, 2001

Date: 07/23/2021

From: (G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(F) PENTTBOMB
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(F)
[redacted] PENTBOMB (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR CASE (MC) 182 (A), (G), (J-1)

(F)

[redacted]

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: (F) 07/23/2021

(F)

Synopsis: [redacted] To file. To provide summary and historical information for subsequent agents of (G)

(G)

Administrative Notes: [redacted] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
Thos replaces Serial (F) which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. [redacted] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: (F) 07/23/2021

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

(A), (G), (J-1) there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[redacted] (G) was originally formed as (G) in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of (G) there was (A), (G), (J-1) a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been previously established. (G) was quickly transferred to the new (G) and changed to (G) and then subsequently (G) During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the (G) (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in (G) the program was again transferred to (G) (G) before returning to (G) (G)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) and (F) These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[redacted] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[redacted] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, (A), (G), (J-1)

◆◆

(F)
[redacted]

The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support network for the attacks of September 11, 2001; and the SAG creation of and support and direction for a network of offices and personnel involved with militant Salafi Islamic activities and proselytization within the United States.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

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(G) before returning to (G)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

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[redacted]

Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through 2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to enter the U.S. and the "muscle hijackers", although recruited in 2000, were the last – not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers involved in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation and the 9/11 Commission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appeared to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihdar's difficulties may have resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi alone in California except for elements of his support network. Almihdar would not return to the US as a "muscle hijacker" until July 2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.

It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members. After Almihdar departed the U.S. Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000. The second primary group of hijackers were the "Hamburg Group"

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their need for a support network would be minimal.

Due to the lack of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the existence of a support network would make operational sense. Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government.

[redacted]

Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO) (Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi Arabian Intelligence

[redacted] **Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Arabian diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The Islamic Affairs Offices worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in supporting the Saudi Arabian Government's objective to be perceived as the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi Arabia's religious and political competition with Shia Iran.** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)**, the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) **and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to provide cover for the movement of** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)**. Saudi Arabian "non-governmental organizations" (NGO), ie. "charities", supplemented this activity with large funding streams as well as cover for personnel.**

One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (O-1) FBI Serial (F) (F)) reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with approximately 50 MIA officers. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) Many Saudi Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section, Majid Aljashaihan (SA (S) NOTE: This would be **Majed Alghesheyan**), was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the GIP. The same opinions were held about **Khalil Khalil**, the deputy chief of the MIA section. Musaid Aljarrah (**Musaed Aljarrah**) was one of the known GIP officers in the MIA section.

[SA (S) note: Presumably the above number of "approximately 50" would include both Saudi and non-Saudi personnel (non-diplomatic) in both Islamic Affairs and Dawa. It is unknown if personnel assigned to other offices such as **Muslim World League (MWL), World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)** would be included (G) [The large number of employees in a national not pre-dominantly Muslim signaled the significance of the activities of this office in the U.S. to overall Saudi Arabian policies and objectives.]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) On (A), (G), (J-1) 2009 (O-1) Sahal Ergesous was the head of the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA. (O-1) the Islamic Affairs Office is active and is charged with monitoring Indian, Iranian and Egyptian Islamic societies primarily. Ergesous is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F) On 08/20/2010 (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] Various serials in indices notes that (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the EKSA as the (A), (G), (J-1) the (A), (G), (J-1) Office and that Musaed Aljarrah was assigned to work (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) Serial (F)). According to (F) Serial (F) that in February 2005 Aljarrah met with (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah stated that (A), (G), (J-1); however, (A), (G), (J-1) insisted that Aljarrah return to head the Islamic Affairs Office and Aljarrah returned in March 2005.

[redacted] Per the above and information on visas noted below it is known that (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (J-3) (J-3) (J-3). (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah's replacement was Abdullah Alajroush (F) (F)). Alajroush was a suspected Intelligence Officer (SIO) who had previously served in Pakistan (O-1) (O-1). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and had attempted to (A), (G), (J-1) Alajroush's replacement was Sahal Ergesous (Sahl Ergesous)((G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) discussed (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) ((F) Serial (F)).

The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within the MIA offices. (A), (G), (J-1) and Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence officer (A), (G), (J-1). This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.

[redacted]

Use of MIA/Dawa Offices to Obtain Intelligence

The purpose of the MIA/Dawa offices is also of relevance. The information below clearly indicates that one of the purposes of the offices was to obtain intelligence on individuals and communities of value to Saudi Arabian intelligence or government purposes. Thus at least some individuals assigned to these offices would be working at least partially for Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) This serial provided excellent information related to one of the purposes of the Dawa/MIA offices and is particularly interesting as it provides information regarding taskings as well as names of personnel during the crucial years before 9/11.

[redacted] The communication reported the arrest of Omar Abdi Mohammed (aka Omar Alkhatib) (F) in San Diego, California on 01/20/2004 and documents obtained during a subsequent search. Omar Abdi Mohamed had been identified (A), (G), (J-1) as the leader of the Al-Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. Mohamed was selected as the AIAI leader of the U.S. approximately nine months ago. AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). WFO had previously obtained a list of 50 US based clerics who were supported by the EKSA IFTA (Dawa) office. Alkhatib was one of those listed. On January 20, 2004, he was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" which was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization

[redacted]

interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from the Global Relief Foundation (GRF). The United States Treasury Department has frozen the assets of the Global Relief Foundation and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism.

(O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] [redacted] (F) Documents located during searches of Muslim World League identified efforts to recruit within the U.S. military.

[redacted] The above documents (there are others within FBI indices) help confirm [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) reporting regarding the functions of the MIA/Dawa offices.

Personnel Assigned to the MIA/Dawa Offices:

[redacted] Multiple individuals were employed inside the MIA/Dawa offices within the EKSA. The following is summary information on the most pertinent individuals within these offices that are associated with the 9/11 support network.

(A), (G), (J-1)

DOB: (P-1)

Passport: (P-1)

(J-3)

Memo on (J-3)

Employer: **Prince Bandar bin Sultan**

Telephone: (P-1)

POC: (A), (G), (J-1) (P)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] Possible USPER (P) DOB: (P-1) /
(P-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Summary: (A), (G), (J-1) was an official diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1) has been

(O-1) known to have been employed by Bandar bin Sultan's National Security Council. (O-1)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) As noted above, (A), (G), (J-1) was (A), (G), (J-1) to be a GIP (A), (G), (J-1) at the (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (F) (J-3), (O-1) (J-3), (O-1)

(J-3), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Musaed A Al Jarrah (Musaed Aljrarrah)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Occupation: Accountant

Address: (P) McLean, Va

Telephone: (P) (home) (P) (cell)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1) and was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.

[redacted] Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the 9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government involvement. Per investigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had a "controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of

[redacted]

Sunni extremist activity in Southern California." Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of **Almuhanna** (herein) and **Althumairy** (herein) who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. After Almuhanna and Althumairy were expelled for from the King Fahd Mosque, they and their followers created an "underground" mosque near the King Fahd Mosque. After their departure, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) Communication dated November 2000 requesting (A), (G), (J-1) reported that (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) dated 11/14/2003] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar "Wahhabi line of thinking" as Mohammed Almohanna (see herein). (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was last in LA two years prior.

[redacted] (F) Dated 2009] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) In 1995, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). It was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the **ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA), (see herein)** a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) of the Islamic Affairs department. (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] (F) Dated 2007] According to multiple sources, Al-Jarrah returned to Riyadh, **Saudi Arabia where he works for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., in the Saudi National Security Ministry.** However, Al-Jarrah returned to the U.S. on July 11, 2006 using (J-3) departed on September 19, 2006, and has not returned since. Al-Jarrah reportedly traveled to several U.S. cities and has been associating with (A), (G), (J-1) assigned to the EKSA. Over the past several months, Al-Jarrah has traveled to Cairo, Egypt; San Paulo, Brazil; Beirut, Lebanon; Demascus, Syria; Tokyo, Japan; and Hong Kong, China. It is unknown what Al-Jarrah is doing during his travel. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (G) that Al-Jarrah (A), (G), (J-1) actually works for Prince Bandar's National Security Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Southern California Based Investigations

[redacted] A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation Encore. During the [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be involved. The individuals in these locations were known to have contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the EKSA Dawa office. The following additional persons of interest were working at the Consulate:

[redacted]

Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy

Fahad I A Al Thumairy (Fahad Althumairy)

DOB: (P-1) [redacted]

(J-3) [redacted]

Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: (P-1) [redacted], believed to be Althumairy's son, was initially (J-3) [redacted] to visit California (google was listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.

(F) [redacted]

(J-3) [redacted]

Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or arranged for their meeting key members of the support network. Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.

[redacted] Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under (F) [redacted].

[redacted] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.

[redacted]

FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[redacted] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., (J-3) (J-3) ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 (C-1) in Riyadh, (C-1) (C-1) ALTHUMAIRY's (A), (G), (J-1) because he was no longer in the United States, although he (G).

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] A communication from Legat (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles (F) dated 12/17/2001 (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (F) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F) On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents interviewed (P) regarding any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between (P) and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). (P) stated that he was told by (P) that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. (P) did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other then to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. (P) did request (P) to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. (P) would see (P) with the two men at the mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

[redacted] (P) states he was told by (P) that the two men were living at his house on (P). (P) stated to (P) that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with (P) other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. (P) was unaware when (P) had requested that of his sister.

[redacted] (P) recalls a conversation that he had with (P) shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A. regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that (P) told (P) that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. (P) asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. (P) stated to (P) that he just needed to take them there. (P) did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings. [See **Bayoumi**]

Mohammed S Almuhanna (Mohammed Almuhanna / Mohammed Almohanna)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Phone #: (P), (P),
(P)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Almuhanna was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanna was known to be a leader and spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King Fahd Mosque. Almuhanna was a close associate of Althumairy.

[redacted] Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, a Sunni Salafi extremist with ties to 9/11 (subject of (F)). ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque. (O-1) (O-1) "ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" (F) (F).

[redacted] Almuhanna is the son of prominent Saudi judge – Sulaiman Almuhanna (DOB: (P-1) (J-3). (J-3) (J-3) A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB: (P-1)).

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] [(F) dated 11/13/2003] (A), (G), (J-1) that Almuhanna had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.

[redacted] (F) Per interview of **Mohammed Alqudhaieen** (see herein) Almuhannad was invited by Alqudhaieen to provide sermons while in Tucson. (F) Interviewee stated that al-Muhanna was a virulent critic of America and American society. According to (P) al-Muhanna was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non-Muslims and Muslims who did not meet al-Muhannas religious standards. (P) (P) stated that many people in the Muslim community were surprised when al-Thumairy was not allowed to re-enter the United States, but no one was surprised that al-Muhanna was excluded.

Sultan Mehmas Sultan Alkahtani (Sultan Alkahtani)

(F)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Summary: Alkahtani was a Saudi Arabian diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Alkahtani was a close associate of Almuhanna. Alkahtani's brother was identified as having been killed fighting for ISIS.

Relevant Serials:

(F) : (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Muhanna is the subject of Los Angeles (A), (G), (J-1) (F) based on the extremist ideology which he has preached at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles and a smaller mosque/madrassa school Al-Muhanna helped create known as the Dar Al Quran Education Center. Al-Muhanna has been associated with **Fahad Althumairy**, another religious mullah from the Consulate, who is the subject of Los Angeles FFI (G). Al-Muhanna also gives religious guidance to the Islamic Center of Long Beach where he is in contact with Hamad Al-Badr, [redacted] (G) (G).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Prior FBI investigation has determined that Alkahtani's brother - Fahad Mihmas Alqahtani - [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) prior to traveling to Syria to join ISIS where he subsequently was killed. [redacted] (F)

[redacted]

Mutaib Alsudairi (Mutaib Alsudairy)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

(P-1)

[redacted] Asudairi's Virginia DMV photo that lists place of residence of (P) Falls Church, Va in September 1999.

[redacted] **Summary: Mutaib Alsudairy and Adel Alsadhan were two Saudi clerics and Saudi Arabian officials who entered the U.S. in 1999 and met with Omar Albayoumi. These individuals later attempted to reenter the U.S. Alsudairy is known to have lived with AQ facilitator Ziyad Khaleel.**

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] (O-1)
(O-1) (O-1)

[redacted]

(O-1) [redacted]

DC and had (J-3) [redacted]. (FBI Comment: This was the same arrival date as al-Sadhan and both men listed (J-3) [redacted]. Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. He assumed duty on 14 June 1999. Al-Sudairy's position was terminated on 11 April 2001. Prior to this he worked at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from March 1998 to June 1999. Al-Sudairy was reported to be the nephew of Doctor Abdullah bin Turki, former head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League president.

(J-3) [redacted]

(F) [redacted] [redacted] FBI TA shows that al-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[redacted] Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with **Ziyad Khaleel** (see herein) for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice. (FBI Comment: Khaleel was reportedly killed in a car accident in Saudi Arabia in March 2002)

[redacted]

(J-3)

[redacted] SA (S) note: Mutaib Alsudairy is the brother of long term LA Saudi Consulate employee Faisal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1))(confirmed via review of applications that confirmed same father and mother). (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted] [(F)] Faisal Alsudairy was the subject of an LHM to (J-3) (J-3) as well as (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (J-3) (J-3) Another brother, Saud Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) was a brother assigned as a diplomat at the EKSA. Another brother, Turki Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1) is noted in early New York Saudi investigative file and in PENTTBOMB files for unknown reasons. Another brother Ahmad Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)), an MOI officer, (J-3) (J-3) Ahmad was the (G) communication is unclear. Another brother Mishaal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) appears to have been (G) (G). Another brother Bandar Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1) is an MOD police officer.

(J-3)

[redacted] Faisal Alsudairy , Mutaib Alsudairy's possible brother, (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted]

Adel Alsadhan

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) Captioned investigation was opened based on [redacted] (O-1) AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject **MUSAED AL-JARRAH** [redacted] (F)) at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL-JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN [redacted] (O-1) a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor Abdussattar Shaikh: **Omar Albayoumi** introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia. They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven weeks. [NOTE: Alhazmi and Almihdar also lived at Shaikh's residence at a later date. (F) This serial also noted that both Alsudairy and Alsadhan were imams at the Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon (San Diego)(See Albayoumi).

(J-3) Attempted to enter the US in 2013 as (J-3) but was refused. (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

DOB: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: [redacted] (LA) / [redacted]

Possible present address:

[redacted]

Anaheim, CA

May be USPER of [redacted] origin

Summary: [redacted] was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. [redacted] was a close associate of Alhtumairy and may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with [redacted] later had contact with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] Listed employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed [redacted] as a translator with a US arrival date of 10/23/1991 although the biographical section noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from 1979-1983.

[redacted] In February of 2000, **Omar Al-Bayoumi** and Kaysan Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi. When later interviewed, Al-Bayoumi and Bindon characterized this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon identified a photograph of [redacted] as the person at the Consulate who gave religious materials to Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted]

[redacted] During the investigation of the 9/11 attacks by FBI personnel an associate of the hijackers identified as Isamu Dyson was interviewed and advised that he knew Omar Albayoumi from 1999. Dyson indicated that he once visited the Saudi Consulate in LA with Albayoumi and while there Albayoumi met separately with an unknown individual. [During an interview on 08/18/2003 Albayoumi described this person as follows: a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia. After this meeting they traveled to a cafe in Culver City where Albayoumi met with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdar. At the time, investigators believed this meeting occurred in February 2000.

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] This serial details investigation of (P) as part of Operation Encore. Contrary to (P) claims of not discussing 9/11, a source reported that after the attacks (P) (O-1) stated "Isn't it great that our brothers are fighting?"

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] (P) known telephone number ((P)) was also known to have one contact (06/14/2001) with telephone (P) which was registered to an apartment used by Eyad Alrababah and (P) who both also provided significant logistic support to Mihdar, Hanjour and two additional hijackers. According to Alrababah, he met Hanjour and Hamzi at a 7-11 store "by chance" (similar to the story made by Albayoumi). In May 2001, Alrababah drove four of the hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. (D) (D)

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] (P) was a close associate of **Althumairy** and led prayers and handled administration at the King Fahad Mosque. Althumairy also served as an admin officer at the Saudi LA Consulate and held an office at that location.

[redacted]

Omar Albayoumi

Alternate names found: Omar Al Bayoumi / Omar A M Al Bayoumi / Omer Bayoumi / Omar Bayoumi / Omar Bayayoomi / Umar Albayoumi

Omar Abu Emad)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-3) It is known that Albayoumi, a Saudi national, had entered the US in the decade before 9/11 and remained.

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (J-3)

Summary: [redacted] **Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar.** [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a "ghost employee" while in the U.S. After Almihdar departed the U.S. in June 2000, a nephew of Albayoumi's supposed employer moved into the home.

Relevant Serials:

Omar Albayoumi was originally opened as [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) Provided synopsis of Saudi official links to Albayoumi:

[redacted] Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi intelligence; however, could not locate any evidence and Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on a chance meeting. Information contained herein, (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) This is significant as Albayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately available to Hazmi and Mihdar upon entry into the U.S. during a time period that both of these ill-prepared operatives were most vulnerable to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a "ghost employee" of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of Albayoumi's boss within this company would later move in to the same apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar's departure.

[redacted] (F) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by writer were from 1998.

[redacted] [(F) Serial (F)] On (A), (G), (J-1) 1998, (F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) new property has been purchased for a mosque, located at (P) (P) in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is (P), Bayoumi's residential number is (P) and his cellular phone is (P). The property cost $580,000.00 and is going to be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the property was bought and renovated.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (F) Date 04/01/1999] In this communication an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) had delivered $400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob [redacted] (P-1), [redacted] (P-1) address [redacted] (P) San Diego, CA (Villa Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone [redacted] (P), may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"

[redacted] [[redacted] (F)] An interview of an employee of Dallah Al Baraka in Saudi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the Director General of PCA at that time, [redacted] (P) (DOB [redacted] (P-1) , had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses related to these individuals. Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN [redacted] (P) assured the interviewee that he [redacted] (P) wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [redacted] (P). These purchase orders were controlled by Mohammed Basharil (Mohamed Basharahil)(PCA). Basharil and a Hamid Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to Albayoumi's account.

[redacted] [9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi) DOB: [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (J-3) was the [redacted] (P).

[redacted] (F)] [redacted] Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each other, as would be expected since each was a well-known member of the local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the

[redacted]

hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi, Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated with the hijackers while in San Diego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque) at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in Yemen while a part of AQAP.] [redacted]

[[redacted] Serial [redacted] dated 10/03/2001 Interview of [redacted]] [redacted] noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi has access to Saudi money, more than $800,000, to build Mosques and Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would come to the Mosque and video tape everything. [redacted] noted that Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate and even with known crooks.

[redacted] [[redacted] Dated 04/2016] Operation Encore analysis: [redacted] described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a “very high status” when he entered the building. Bayoumi’s status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.

[redacted] [[redacted]] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[redacted] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[redacted] Dr. Jameel Alshami [redacted]; Saudi Embassy WA. [redacted], AbdulAziz Assaleh [redacted] and F [redacted] **Khalid Asswailem** [redacted] and C [redacted]. **Saudi Consulate** [redacted] F [redacted], **Islamic Affairs** [redacted] Abdullah Awaad [redacted] Sami Assadhan [redacted] and Saad Al Jebreen, [redacted] LA, CA

90025. [redacted] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] Al-Bayoumi is also linked to **Abdolrahman Barzanjee.** Barzanjee is a possible Al-Qaida associate, (O-1) (O-1)

[SA (S) Note: Bayoumi's association with the Kurdish Mosque, reportedly paid for with Saudi money, and his association with Barzanjee may be of interest. According to open source reporting, AQ was exploring its associations with Iraq during this same time period which resulted in the organization of Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq's Kurdish areas. See (F)

[SA (S) note: Possible brother Ahmed Albayoumi has a more recent (J-3).]

Osama Basnan (Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan)

DOB: (P-1)

SSN: (P-1)

(P)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also known to have connections to the "Blind Sheikh." Basnan and his wife were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan's wife, who was known to have sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar's wife.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) This serial noted (A), (G), (J-1)

[(F)] [redacted] This investigation was predicated based on interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation. Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as having a very close relationship with **Omar Al-Bayoumi**, who provided support to hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal

[redacted]

mayor, of the Saudi Arabian Community in San Diego. Individuals in the Middle Eastern community opined that Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi Intelligence Officer and that Basnan came to San Diego to take his place. Basnan was living in the same apartment complex on 09/11/2001 where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers had resided and Al-Bayoumi's mail was being forwarded to Basnan's apartment. Basnan harbors anti-American sentiments and espouses pro-UBL opinions.

[redacted] Basnan entered the U.S. in 1980 (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) believed to be associated with the Saudi Embassy. Also in 1992, he hosted a party for the blind Sheik Omar Rahman in Washington, D.C. prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1998, he moved to San Diego and became the Omad. **In January of 1999, he began to receive $2,000 per month in his wife's name from the Princess Haifa Bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar. The checks were endorsed by Basnan and Al-Bayoumi's wife.** In April of 2001, Al-Bayoumi's wife and Basnan's wife were arrested together for shoplifting. In June of 2001, Al-Bayoumi and his wife claimed to leave the U.S. to return to Saudi, but actually went to London.

[redacted] **In July of 2001, Basnan moved into the same apartment complex where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers lived.** In August of 2001, the U.S. Post Office began to forward Al-Bayoumi's mail to Basnan's residence. On (A), (G), (J-1) was (A), (G), (J-1) who has provided extensive (A), (G), (J-1) of Basnan and his associates (A), (G), (J-1) . (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[(F) Serial (F) [redacted] According to a witness, on October 17, 1992, **BASNAN hosted a party at the (P) (P) Washington D.C. for the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman.** The party was hosted in a common area party room located in the (P) complex where BASNAN lived. BASNAN's name was the tenant name on the reservation sheet for the party room the night the party was held. The witness identified Sheik Rahman from television photos. Sheikh Rahman attended the party along with a large entourage.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) he hosted a party at his house for Sheik Omar Rahman. After Rahman was jailed, Rahman dispatched a

[redacted]

messenger to Basnan to instruct him not to contact Rahman in jail. Basnan stated [redacted] came to interview Basnan regarding his association with Rahman. Basnan lied to [redacted] about his association with Rahman and acted like he didn't speak any English.

[redacted] 2001, [redacted] Basnan [redacted] was questioned about Omar Abdel Rahman and the first World Trade Center bombing. Basnan acted like he did not understand the questions by [redacted] and the he played stupid putting on a production. Basnan stated .. [redacted] Basnan was told by another [redacted]

[[redacted] Serial [redacted]] In 1980, BASSNAN, a Saudi Arabian citizen, enters the United States [redacted] BASSNAN may be an operative for Saudi Arabian government and is in the United States illegally.

2. [redacted] On October 17, 1992, BASSNAN hosts party for Sheik Omar Rahman, mastermind of 1993 bombing of World Trade Towers. [SA [redacted] Note: [redacted] noted the specific date to be 10/17/1992]

3. [redacted] Since 1998, BASSNAN is considered the "Omad," or informal mayor of Saudi Arabian's living in San Diego, California.

Payments from Princess Haifa to Majeda Dweikat (Basnans wife), 1999-2001. Manal Bagader (Al-Bayoumis wife) co-endorsed three of the checks. Of the three co-endorsed checks, one check was deposited by Yasser Hijazi (Basnans associate) in Maryland; an attempt was made to deposit one check into Bagaders account, but the check was returned as payee not verified; and one check was deposited into an unknown account. FBI information indicated that from at least April 1999 through at least September 2001 Princess Haifa, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, provided $2,000 monthly payments totaling $40,000 in checks and wire transfers to the wives of al-Bayumi and Basnan. Note: There is no indication of direct payments to Manal Bagader, the wife of Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] [redacted] On February 10, 2002, ABDULRAZAQ ALI A. ALTURKI, Managing Director, Namma Cargo Services was interviewed in Riyadh. ALTURKI worked as an assistant to Ambassador PRINCE BANDAR at the Saudi Embassy in DC and while working there in about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional status. ALTURKI's relationship with the Saudi government is very strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI travels to Houston, Texas where (P-1) (P-1) In August 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [(F), Serial (F) and (F), Serial (F)

[redacted] On May 14, 1992, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] For financial activity: (F) Serial (F). For summary see (F) Serial (F)

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, (A), (G), (J-1) (F), (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN recently obtained a large unspecific amount of money during his recent travel to Houston, Texas. BASNAN's friend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN received money in excess of $10,000. BASNAN (A), (G), (J-1) gave a large portion of the money to his wife to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel. (F), Serial (F). [SA (S) note: (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Alsaud (A), (G), (J-1) may have been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]

(F) [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, Basnan asked (G) specific questions about how Anthrax and Small Pox are transmitted and what affects infection has on the human body. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, Basnan asked (G) specific questions about how Small Pox infection advances through the human body. Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) was true that just prior to dying a Small Pox victim suffers extreme abdominal pain. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (G) (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan's wife, Majeda Dweikat, in possession of a book titled "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Anthrax and Sarin." The book was in Basnan's residence. (G) (A), (G), (J-1) Dweikat had tabbed a section of the book that showed the skin coming off the body.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Abdullah A S Al Jraithen (Abdullah Aljraithen)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Relevant Serials:

(F) [redacted] As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with **OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI** on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[redacted] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) (S) (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on (F) ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers (P-1) and C (cell) (P-1). (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[redacted] ECF searches on (P-1) and (P-1) both yielded a hit on (F) (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers

[redacted]

appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN (P-1) and cell (P-1) An IDW search on (P-1) yielded additional other government service information (O-1): "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN (P-1)" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in (O-1)

[redacted] According to a (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Also according to the (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source: (O-1) (O-1) AITHREAT@00001 NON-RELEASABLE)

Islamic Foundation of Sheikh Ibn Taimmiyyah

11004 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

(King Fahd Mosque)

10980 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

[redacted] Ibn Taimmiyyah was a medieval Islamic jurist who's teachings formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine (Ibn Al Wahhab). Ibn Taimmiyyah's teachings included the believe that Muslims could kill other Muslims (Takfir) which is utilized by AQ to justify attacks. The Saudi Arabian foundation that supports the King Fahd Mosque is named for Ibn Taimmiyyah.

[redacted] The associations between Saudi Arabian diplomats who worked at the King Fahd Mosque and the hijacker support group are otherwise noted above. An additional person of interest is listed Chairman of the Ibn Taimiyyah Foundation Khalil Alkhalil.

Khalil Alkhalil (aka Khalil Khalil / Khalil Alkhaleel)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[(F) Serial (F) [redacted] For the information of Los Angeles, (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) KHALIL al-KHALIL, who was head of the Islamic Affairs Section at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (SAEMB), Washington, D.C. about ten years ago, resides in California (O-1) al-KHALIL set up the BIN (possibly IBN) TAIMIYAH mosque in Los Angeles. (O-1) al-KHALIL had access to a lot of money.

(F) Serial (F) [redacted] On December 6, 1999, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P-1) at 22:05:00 for 2 minutes. (This number is KHALIL ALKHALIL's cell phone according to an FBI interview with FAHAD ALQAHTANI.) At 22:58:00, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P) (ALBAYOUMI), duration 1 minute (note: this is believed to be the first call between ALTHUMAIRY and ALBAYOUMI since the previous year).

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Other Offices Associated with EKSA

[redacted] Investigation of (A), (G), (J-1) activities within the US prior to and especially after 9/11 identified numerous "charities" and "non-governmental organizations" (NGO). Several of these organizations were (A), (G), (J-1) prior to 9/11. Although the (A), (G), (J-1) as an element many were (A), (G), (J-1) due to suspected funding of association with HAMAS. The connections of these "charities" and "NGOs" to terrorism is well documented both in open source and within (A), (G), (J-1) communications.

[redacted] The primary NGO of Saudi Arabia was MWL under which operated the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Sana Bell (Sanabel Alkheer "Seeds of Charity")(an investment arm), Alharamain and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The Saudi charities such as MWL and IIRO were also affiliated with the Virginia based offices of the "Herndon charities" of which Sanabell (Sana Bell Alkheer) was a part as well as the SAAR Foundation. These were collectively run out of of offices at (P) in Herndon, Va. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[See (F)] This serial documents the extensive ties to the Saudi Arabian government as well as extensive ties to terrorism - specifically AQ. AQ members were employed within these organizations and utilized funding for terrorism support and used the offices for cover for movement of personnel. Extensive open source information and court documents are also available detailing this same information.

(F) A telephone directory obtained by the FBI in 2002 listed the following additional offices under the title " Saudi Arabian Offices":

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)
(P)
Falls Church

[redacted]

Muslim World League (MWL)
134 West 26th Street
New York, NY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
4516 Old Columbia Pike
PO Box 8096
Falls Church, Va
Telephone: (P)

The Islamic Center
2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)
8500 Hilltop Road
Fairfax, Va

[redacted]

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S. subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primary administrators and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.


Royal Highness
Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan Ibn Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud
الأمير بندر بن سلطان بن عبد العزيز آل سعود
IIASA
معهد العلوم الإسلامية والعربية في أمريكا
Ceremony of the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America
OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC SCIENCES IN

Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud on right (seated).

Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) as hating

America); Abdullah Alnoshan (see herein) and Salah Albakhit (Saleh Albakheet - PhD student).

[redacted] [(F) Serial (F)]According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI (O-1) (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in (O-1) (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

(A), (G), (J-1) the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and (P) **with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA** (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. (A), (G), (J-1) not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

(D)
(D)

(D) Information provided by (G) (O-1
(O-1)

(O-1) NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[redacted] In 2003, NADWI's (P-1) in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN (A), (G), (J-1), (D) and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F) (F)). ALNOSHAN was "employed at the IIASA as (J-3)" with the SAE and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) (F)

[redacted] During January 2004, (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

(D)

[redacted] (D)

Below are some observations supporting the above:

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

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(D)

(D)

(D)

(D)

(D)

(O-1)

(D)

[redacted] [(F) (A), (G), (J-1) that between (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) 2003 the IIASA deposited approximately $23,318,623 into its accounts. The primary source of these funds was the Saudi Embassy and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Association (SAMA).

(O-1)

A review of Virginia Corporation and Limited Partnership Records indicates that the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America was incorporated on 10/26/1993 and voluntarily terminated on 08/18/1995. According to public source information, the President of this corporation was listed as His Excellency PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN and the Executive Director was SULAIMAN ALJARALLAH.

[redacted] (F) Those requested to be removed from the U.S. by USDS were the following who were listed as Saudi Arabian diplomats:

(O-1)

(O-1), (J-3)

[redacted]

Muslim World League (MWL)

(F)

Abdullah Alnoshan (Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)

(Director) (G)



[redacted] The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in order to gain leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under which the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an international level.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan, were extensively connected to (A), (G), (J-1) See (F) [redacted] (F) for connections to [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) - the connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoshan was known to have been a “purchasing agent” for the EKSA (see [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Alnoshan was an associate of Musaed Aljarrah.

[redacted] The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above, the New York address, was formed into a sub-office by the time of the creation of [redacted] (F). The main office had been moved to 360 South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster – however, by this same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a “Herndon Charity”) and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum mosque which hosted many of the convicted “Northern Virginia Jihad Group.” (see more below)

[redacted] (F) During the search of MWL's office space in New York in
2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was from Tehreek-E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and included sign-up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad on an international and inter-Islamic level."

[redacted] The [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed within [redacted] (F)

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[redacted] (F)

Abdullah Bin Laden

[redacted] (G)

Related: [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F)]: [redacted] Analysis revealed that the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya lil Shabab al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number [redacted] (P) WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane, Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family services organization and youth center. Additional analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.

[redacted] Also, analysis has revealed that [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] WAMY is believed to be a subsidiary or affiliate of the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, aka Rabitat al'Alam al-Islami, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, aka Hay'at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyah, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CHARITY COMMITTEE, aka Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; AL-WAIF FOUNDATION, aka al-Waif al-Islami, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; and, the KUWAITI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE, headquartered in Kuwait.

WAMY first appears in FBI electronic indices as a lead to FBI from Legat (G) from 1995/1996:

(F) : [redacted] The French National Police Renseignements Generaux (RG)
has established that Mokhtar Jaballah, a Tunisian national residing in France, member of the Ennahda, and president of the G.I.F.--an association RG describes as supporting the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood--has been in contact with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. This organization has an office in the U.S., at the address: WAMY Regional Office in VA--America, P.O. Box 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041-8096; telephone (P) and (P); fax (P)

(F) (4) The translation of a publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH", which gives information of the methods and teachings on terrorism.

[redacted] The publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH" lays out in great detail the fundamentals, tactics, and logistics of waging a war on ones enemies through acts of terrorism.

[redacted] In particular, the publication lists duties, requirements, and responsibilities including: (1) collecting information on the enemy and his neighborhood, (2) removing soldiers from the enemy; taking its documents, secrets and weapons, (3) killing the enemy's personnel as well as foreign tourists, (4) releasing our brothers imprisoned by the enemy, (5) spreading rumors and communiques to turn the population against the enemy, and (6) causing the explosion, the destruction and the sabotage of entertainment spots, immoral and debauched areas.

[redacted] Other sections in the document refer to members' essential and typical qualities, methods of communication, travel, security measures, meetings, and the purchase and transport of weapons.

(A),(G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) (G) (G) (G). According to ACS/TA, BINLADEN has been in contact with the telephone number for (P) (G). One of the telephone numbers used by (P) at his current address is registered to the AOU. THE AOU is a correspondence school for Islamic studies which may be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. (C-1) that the AOU allegedly arranges paramilitary training in Pakistan and is partially funded by the Saudi Club (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[SA (S) Note: (G) ((G)). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) (F)

(F) (G) Mohammed Harunani]

[See page 432 of 9/11 Commission Report – " 28 pages "]

[redacted]

(O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] FBI toll records indicate that on June 21, 2000, TRANSCOM INTERNATIONAL was in telephonic with a telephone number in Hamburg, Germany. This German telephone number was listed in FBI telephone applications (ACS) from toll records taken from the PENTTBOMB investigation. (C-1) (C-1) (C-1) (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] On 10/12/2001, (P) who is a Teacher's Assistant at (P) School, told the FBI she recognized one of the 09/11/2001 hijackers after his picture was displayed on television. (P) was introduced (in early June 2001) to Marwan Al-Shehhi by Harunani. Harunani's children had been enrolled at the school. MARWAN Al-Shehhi had accompanied Harunani as he was picking his children up from school. (P) stated she remembered the name because the name was so unusual.

[redacted] On 10/15/2001, (P) was shown a photographic lineup which consisted of only the photographs of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI, HAMZA S. ALGHAMDI, MOHAND AL-SHERRI, and AHMED AL-GHAMDI from United Flight 175 with no names or any other identifying data. (P) immediately, and without hesitation, pointed to the photograph of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI as being with the man she saw with Mohammed Harunani at the (P) Falls Church, Virginia in early June 2001.

[redacted]

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

(G)

[redacted] **Summary: The IIRO office (G) morphed into an (G) into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish) which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that this organization was originally created as IIRO within the same offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as an office of the EKSA (G). The history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.**

[redacted] IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or "operating arm" of the Muslim World League. The Secretary General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT-G)

[redacted] As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as being located at the (P) address which was later assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s and prior to its move to the (P) address (G) Mohamed Salem Omeish (G) appeared to alter IIRO into the Success Foundation (G). Thereafter it appeared to be primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared office space with Abdulrahman Alamoudi who was convicted of attempting to assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.

Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti writer, historian , businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al-Suwaidan was listed by the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development which was convicted along with its leaders of financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti-Semitic remarks, hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.

[redacted] AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization' (IRO) (G) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in (F) (an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least $11,000 from the IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an officer, provided $60,000 to the IRO.

[redacted] Finally, (F) indicates potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh (G) incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and other targets in New York. "Umar Al-Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan" (believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found (during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a document in Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number (P) beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the documents with telephone number (P).

[redacted] Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB (P-1) is of Kuwaitian nationality and is a non-US person. His SSAN is (P-1). According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood." He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which the Tulsa mosque and school now stand. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AlSuwaidan currently provides $50,000 per month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is taken off the top for the benefit of HAMAS.

[redacted]

[redacted] It is known from (A), (G), (J-1) that IIRO was located for a period of time at (P) (P) Washington, D.C. During this time it was co-located with the organization Solidarity International for Kuwait that was started by Tareq Al-Suwaidan.

1. Incorporation Records:

[redacted] A 1992 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al Ali President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi VP (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaidan S/T (P) Alex, Va.

Principal Address: (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] A 1993 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaiden S/T (P) Alex, Va.

Abdul Al-Moslah Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

Freed Qurash Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

Salah Badahdh Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993 report except listing all addresses as (P) (P), Falls Church, Va.

[redacted]

[redacted] A 1995 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President (P)
Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President

Tareq M. Al-Mahdi S/T

Abdul Al-Moslah Director

Salah Badahdh Director

Freed Qurashdi Director

Principal Address: (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to Chicago FBI's (G) with which IRO had invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.

[redacted] The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.

[redacted] On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID (P-1), primary address (P) Falls Church, Va., was ordered re-instated. The new officers were listed as follows:

Sulaiman Al Ali Removed (P)
(P) Falls Church, Va.

Mohamed S. Omeish President (P)
Alexandria, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President (P)
(P) Falls Church,
Va.

Tareq M. Al-Suwaiden S/T (P)

Abdul Al-Moslah Director (P)

Salah Badahdah Director (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO (P-1) listed the primary address as (P) and the only officer as Mohamed S. Omeish, (P).

[redacted]

Sulaiman Alali (Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3) Va ID and two SSNs.

Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.

Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali

Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.

(F)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other "charities" and global investment entities such as Global Chemical (G) (G). Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali returned to Saudi

Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined Alqaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali's son Amro is a known AQAP member.

[[redacted] (F) dated 05/23/1997] [redacted] Reference Butel advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al-Ali, who is the Director of the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al-Ali is believed to be a friend of Al-Gama al-Islamiyya supporter Zahir 'Abd Al-'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist circles throughout the Balkans. Al-Ali reportedly maintains a telephone number of [redacted] (P), which is subscribed to by the "International Relief Organization," [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046-4417.

[[redacted] (F)] [redacted] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., at [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22041 with [redacted] (G) (Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia, status is active. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046, Telephone number [redacted] (P) This organization provides humanitarian aid.

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) Dated 11/02/2001] [redacted] Alali used an address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi (Omar Baymi) as his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address Albayoumi was listed on Alali's rental application as a co-tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial] [redacted] Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over $128,000. Sanabell also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali paid Albayoumi almost $7000.

[redacted] Alali has multiple children who were (J-3) Alali's son Amro Syliman Alali (Amro Alali) was a known AQAP member (see (F)). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was released by Saudi authorities.

(J-3)

Amro Alali – AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali

[redacted]

U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia

Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIASA).

[redacted] [(F) [redacted] Serial (F) [redacted]] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] [(F) [redacted] dated 2003] The original list provided the following names:

[redacted] Names Salary

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] At the time this list was provided (G) had (G) Abuelgasim Osman Ramadan (G), KHALED I. Al-SOWEILEM (G) (G) Abdel-Moniem M. El-Hillali (G), Abdullah Arafa (G), Nasser F. Almogbel (G), and Fareed S. Ajlan (G) (G) were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on (G) to better identify their function at the EKSAB. All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State Department of State list of Embassy employees. (G) has (G) (G) (G) (G) will continue with (G) (G)

[redacted] The list of individuals were all queried through ACS revealing (G) (G). The following are possible matches with individuals (G): Ali Sulaiman Ali (G), Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif (G) (G), Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib (G)

(G), Omar Abdi Mohamed (G) Nizam A. Rouf Zaman (G) Salah Al-Rashood (G) Monir Yasin Al Farra (G) Jameel A. Ahmen (G) Mohammed Al Mohanna (G) and Abdulaziz Ahmed (G) (G) Omar Al-Khatab (G) Ridwan Aremu Yussuf (G) Mohamed Munaf Mohamed (G) (G) Sulaiman Al-Bali (G)

[redacted] (G) revealed the following additional names of interest as receiving a stipend from the EKSA (only relevant individuals are noted herein):

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY departed the USA for Saudi Arabia on 02/14/2002. While in the USA he resided at (P) (P) Culver City, CA. In 1998, per direction of the Da'wa Office of EKSA, AL-THUMAIRY owned and operated a bookstore near the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, CA, in an effort to oversee Islamic propagators in California. AL-THUMAIRY was also a member of the KFM.

Name: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
Aliases: Fahd Ibrahim Abdullah Althumairy,
Sheikh Fahd Bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3);
(J-3)
Case #: (F)
IFTA funds: $4,837.31 (2002)
$4,305.13 (2003)

[redacted] (P), (P) San Diego, CA, (P) Islamic Center of San Diego and (P) the Islamic Services Foundation. (P) is a member (P) of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA, and (P) the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (HLF). The HLF was shut down by the US government on 12/04/2001 due to its fund-raising connections to Harakat Al-Mugawamat Al-Islamayya (HAMAS). (P) (P) for HLF, traveling throughout the US for this purpose. (P) was interviewed on 7/8/04, prior to the arrest of several HLF leaders for material support to terrorism ((F) (F)). (P) has received various checks from FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and is (P) in the San Diego (P) system.

[redacted]

Name: [redacted] (P)
Aliases: [redacted] (P)
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
DOB: [redacted] (P-1)
[redacted] (P-1)
POB: [redacted] (P-1)
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #: [redacted] (F)
IFTA funds: $533.33 (2002)

[redacted] ADEL M. AL-SADHAN departed the USA on

10/25/01. While in the USA, AL-SADHAN resided at [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box address with MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, [redacted] (P) Columbia, MO. AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until [redacted] (J-3) Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as [redacted] (P) JERSEY CITY, NJ.

Name: ADEL M. AL-SADHAN
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
DOB: [redacted] (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: [redacted] (J-3) Departed USA (?)
Case # [redacted] (F)
IFTA funds: $100.55 (2002)

[redacted] MUTAIB A. AL-SUDAIRY resided at [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an Administrative Officer for EKSA until [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re-entered on 6/6/01. AL-SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant without documents subject to deportation. AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 10/25/01. [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) and has since been linked to suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia.

Name: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairi
Muteb Al-Sudairy
Moteb Al-Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted]

Other Saudi Arabian entities and personnel who formed the core of the Saudi proselytizing and intelligence gathering community during the time period leading to 9/11.

Islamic Foundation of America (IFA)

Ibrahim Binkulaib (Ibrahim Almogherah)

(J-3)

(F)

Abdullah Alkhwyter

(G)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] The IFA was first known as the GLORIOUS KORAN, originally located on George Mason Drive, Falls Church, VA, was established in 1996 in order to teach the Koran in the

Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Drive, Springfield, VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for $6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which is synonymous with the IFA. Source further reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the EKSA.

[redacted] The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib) who also operated alongside of (A), (G), (J-1) Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be associated with the address of Alelm (Al Elm Research and Development) in Norfolk, Virginia – (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also listed as an officer of Alelm. (The uses (A), (G), (J-1) may be similar to Albayoumi's use of a (A), (G), (J-1) for his expenses/payments during his time in California.) (F) (F)

[redacted] IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: (P-1), was listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an Administrative Officer of the Embassy of the Government of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but was named (by the names of AL-KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL-MOGHERAH) (A), (G), (J-1) was (J-3) (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) the primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad Alsaud. (F) Abdulaziz bin Fahad was known to support the funding of students at the IIASA.

[redacted] In March, 2006, (A), (G), (J-1) BINKULAIB and AL SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA, however, AL-SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL-SUWELIM, head of Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA, ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) who runs Friday prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL HURAISHI (aka SAID AL-HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during prayers. AL-HURAISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A-HURAISHI is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

[redacted] [(F)] On 01/08/2013 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) weets for Alsaud (using (G) account) in which he spoke with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest pinnacle of Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) Ayed Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.

American Open University (AOU)

[redacted] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris

[redacted] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris (Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had [redacted] (J-3) (J-3)

Sons Yousef Idris [redacted] (G) **and Abdulrahman Idris and Abdulmoneim Idris.**

Associated with MWL and Ali Altimimi.

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdulmoneim Idris. Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris, [redacted] (J-3) (J-3) was a close associate of jihadi groups operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the "Northern Virginia Jihad Group."

(S) [(F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) according to an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) American Open University, 3400 Payne Street, Suite 200, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041; telephone (P) (P), fax (P), is connected to the Moslem Brotherhood and arranges for paramilitary training in Pakistan. At the time, Salah El-Sawi, PHD, was the President of American Open University.

[redacted] In 1998, a group of individuals began attending lectures provided by Sheikh Jaafar Idris (hereinafter Sheikh Jaafar). These lectures were typically provided at the residence of Sheikh Jaafar and occasionally featured a guest lecturer named Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi (Al-Timimi). Over time these lectures attracted large crowds and were eventually moved to a more accommodating location, American Open University (AOU), located in Falls Church, Virginia. After the lectures were moved to AOU, Sheikh Al-Timimi started offering more frequent and regular lectures. Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures became so popular and so well attended that in 1999, some of Al-Timimi's followers opened the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center. Once at the Dar al Arqam, Sheikh Al-Timimi assumed the role of the primary lecturer. Al-Timimi became very popular and was well-respected for his knowledge about the topic of jihad and his outspoken views. Al-Timimi was willing to discuss the topic of jihad openly while other speakers were not. Once the lectures were moved to the Dar al Arqam, a smaller core group of followers emerged. After Al-Timimi's lectures, typically delivered on Friday nights at the Dar al Arqam, this small group of individuals would meet for hours into the night to discuss various topics with Sheikh Al-Timimi.

During these closed discussions, Sheikh Al-Timimi frequently would provide his personal opinions on the topic of jihad, particularly the need for his followers to prepare themselves so that they would be ready for the day when their service in support of jihad would be needed.

In response to Sheikh Al-Timimi's guidance on the topic of jihad, a few members from the core group decided to organize regular para-military training using the cover of apparently innocuous endeavor, recreational paint-ball activities. The organizers of the jihad training group (Yong Kwon, Nabil Gharbieh, Ibrahim Hamdi, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem) established rules and procedures to ensure operational security and secrecy. Members of the group were well versed on the rules, and new members were required to acknowledge their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The weekly training consisted of physical para-military training using paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad training sessions, many of the group's members purchased AK-47 type rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world, and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The group also kept abreast of the current events related to ongoing jihad, in areas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed these events during their weekly training sessions.

Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad training group would often meet at members’ homes and watch video tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya.

Soon after Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al-Timimi's lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al-Timimi. Royer became well known for his experiences fighting jihad in Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, Royer traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp. As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al-Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to facilitate his travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp. Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11, 2001. Travel records indicate that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with several others from the jihad training group. Chapman indicated to some that he had purchased some land near the camp so that he and his family could move there. In August, 2002, Chapman left the United States for Saudi Arabia, apparently at the guidance of Sheikh Al-Timimi. Chapman is a current resident of Saudi Arabia and is believed to be working for the Saudi Ministry of Education as an English teacher. As a result of his activities in this investigation, Chapman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25, 2003. Chapman has been detained by the Saudi government. During the year 2000, the paint-ball group used to meet in the parking lot of the **INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC STUDIES IN AMERICA (IIASA), aka THE MAHAD.**

[redacted] [(F) (A), (G), (J-1)
IDRIS is of Sudanese origin who came to the U.S. in the 1980's as a student when Dr. HASSAN TURABI, an Islamic fundamentalist, became Minister of Justice in Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic state abolishing the Constitution and implementing Sharia (Islamic) laws. He was sent to the U.S. along with 14 other individuals for post-graduate studies in Islam. They joined the Islamic center in Houston, Texas, which later was transferred to Fairfax, Virginia (A), (G), (J-1) this is the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America). These students were a back-up for TURABI who had dreams of becoming a leader in the Islamic world. The 15 obeyed TURABI blindly as he gave them the scholarships in the U.S. Many of the 15 worked in the Saudi embassy as the Saudis trusted the Sudanese.

[redacted] (G) had contact with OMAR AHMED ALI ABDEL RAHMAN (aka: the blind Sheikh) who was found guilty of being involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. (G) was in contact with a Sudanese intelligence officer under (A), (G), (J-1)
NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1) that revealed that several (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) were involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center as well as a plot to bomb several prominent New York City landmarks (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] IDRIS and ALI AL-TIMIMI (G) (G) co founded the DAR AL-ARQAM mosque which grew out of Muslim Student's Association at George Mason University and Northern Virginia Community College. This mosque now operates out of 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, Virginia which is also the home of several Hamas front organizations as well as the Muslim World League (MWL) the subject of another FBI full investigation. This building is also owned by Sanabel Al-Kheer which is the investment arm of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (G) (G) AL-TIMIMI is a known radical Islamist (G) supporting several individuals who are believed to have left the U.S. shortly after 09/11/2001 to fight for the Taliban against the U.S.

[redacted] Al-Timimi started weekly Islamic study sessions Friday evenings after general prayer at Dar Al Archem. The study sessions evolved into in depth discussions of jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers. The sessions, were originally held at the Dar al Arqam, 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, VA (a two-story office building) and began around 8:00 PM. The study session would meet after the general session, after most of the congregation had left, around 11:30 PM. The study sessions were not open to the public and only certain members were invited. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The meetings are now even more private and held at the individual residences of the members, not at the mosque.

[redacted] This group/study session identify themselves as "wahabi's", though they do not state that publically. The 'wahabi" group is lead by Ali Al-Timimi, Yousef Idris and Mohamed Al-Kahtani. Other members of the group include: (P) (P) (P) Select members of this group have also participated in Jihad training exercises. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) chart depicting the primary leadership and participants in jihad training exercises which included the following:

ADMINISTRATORS:
(P)

VISITOR:
(P)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Alharamain)

Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman Albutti)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(G)

Related: (F)
(F) herein)

(J-3)

Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic "NGO" or "charity" who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its primary operator Suliman Albouthe.

(G) [redacted]The Al Haramayn or Al Haramain Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has been utilized as a front organization for supporting and facilitating

[redacted]

the movement of Islamic Mujahadin into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia. A French National Police report about Islamic humanitarian organizations described the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as having ties to the members of extremist Islamic organizations (Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt and I.S.F. in Algeria) and as serving as a cover/point of logistical support for the Arab Mujahadin in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

[redacted] In (P) (P) (P) is identified as (P) of the Al Haramain Foundation. It is further stated in (P) that "an African chapter of the Jedda, based group was identified in a 1999 State Department report as one of the suspect terrorist groups operating in Nairobi, Kenya, before the bombing of the U.S. Embassy there in 1998." (P) also states the group has a chapter in Ashland, Oregon and has an account at the Bank of America.

[redacted] An inquiry through the Oregon Secretary of State Corporate Records database revealed the Al Haramain Foundation, 1257 Siskiyou Blvd, #224, Ashland, Oregon, Business Identification Number, 60062388, is an assumed business name with an active status. The original filing date for the entity was 10/22/97.The business license was renewed on 10/18/99 and changed with renewal on 10/27/99. (P) is listed as (P) and (P) using the same address as the foundation. Soliman H. Albut'he was (P) as a (P) using the same address.

[redacted] On 12/31/97, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation purchased the residence at (P) Ashland, Oregon, for $190,162 in cash. Review of documents obtained from Jackson County Title pursuant to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena revealed the registered agent signing on behalf of the foundation was Soliman Al Buthe.

[redacted] For information, as described in referenced (F) (F) Soliman H. Albut'he is further identified in (F) as being Soliman Albut'he, aka Soliman H. S. Albut'he, date of birth (P-1) citizen of Saudi Arabia, passport number (P-1) using (P) 's mail drop address of (P) (P) and the address of (P) 's residence and local mosque at (P) . This serial referenced a (O-1) document identifying Albut'he as a Saudi national entering the United States with $200,000 in U.S. Currency in 1997.

[redacted] Soliman H. Albut'he is believed to currently be in Saudi

Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with (P) Based on source information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia cellular telephone number (P-1) and is associated with (P-1) (P-1) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation, (P) (P) Albut'he is further believed to be involved with (P) an ISP with access to a high speed data line. Albut'he has been identified with website (P-1) Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to (P) (P) which was co-owned by (P) and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan indicated in a recent interview that (P) is now in complete control of (P).

Other Individuals Associated with Saudi Arabia as well as the 9/11 Investigation:

Saleh Alhussayen (Saleh A A Al Husayen / Saleh Alhusayen)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Summary: Saudi cleric and Saudi government official Saleh Alhussayen entered the U.S. prior to the 9/11 attacks. According to statements by he and his wife, Alhussayen was in the U.S. to visit mosques and Islamic organizations who were provided funding from Saudi Arabia. According to an interview of Alhussayen's wife, Alhussayen was invited by and visited Mohammed Alahmari. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Alhussayen was staying at the same Northern Virginia hotel as Nawaf Alhazmi on the evening prior to the attacks. Alhussayen's nephew, Sami Alhussayen, was a Saudi Arabian student arrested for providing material support to AQ.

Relevant Serials:

(F) dated 2002] [redacted] As a matter of background, FBI Seattle has identified

SALEH ALHUSSAYEN as an official or employee of the Saudi (government). SALEH ALHUSSAYEN and his wife, FADDIAH PETERSEN, traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia in August, 2001 and remained in the U.S. until mid-September. On 9/17/2001, both ALHUSSAYEN and his wife were interviewed by FBI WFO. This interview and (A), (G), (J-1) was prompted by the fact that hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI had checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia on 9/10/2001 in which SALEH ALHUSSAYEN was staying. During said interview, SALEH ALHUSSAYEN advised that he had only traveled to the U.S. on one other occasion approximately twenty two (22) years ago. **He claimed no knowledge of the hijackers and stated that he had come to the U.S. via JFK IA on 8/20/2001 at the request of his friend IANA leader MOHAMMED AL-AHMARI. (See below Salah Alrashood)**

[redacted] As part of our investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001 FBI Agents from Washington Field Office interviewed SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN. The interview was conducted due to the fact that he was a registered guest in the same hotel the hijackers from Flight 77 stayed in on September 10, 2001, the night before the attacks. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was a retired Saudi Government Official and currently worked at fund raising for charity organizations. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was in the United States to visit some Mosques that had been built with charity funds. He stated he did not know the hijackers and was only staying at that hotel because it had a kitchen which allowed him to make his own food.

(F) An interview was conducted of Alhussayan's wife (Faddiah Peterson) after Alhussayan experienced the medical emergency. Peterson advised that Alhussaysn had visited while in the US the offices/personnel of IANA, Global Relief Foundation and IIIT. Peterson advised that they visited Michigan, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Canada prior to Virginia.

[redacted] (F) (The above mentioned) Mohamed Al-Ahmari, the leader of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) in Ypsilanti Twp., Michigan, is a leading Salafi figure and Saudi dissident. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a Saudi student living in the U.S.

Sami Alhussayen

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Related: islamtoday

(J-3)

[redacted]FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al-Hussayen as a citizen of Saudi Arabia and a non-USPER currently enrolled in the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] It is also important to note that a connection between Al-Timimi and **Mohammed Al-Ahmari** has been established (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Al-Ahmari is a close associate of Al-Hussayen. Al-Ahmari is a leading Salafist and former president of the IANA. Al-Ahmari is very supportive of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) that actively support Jihad against the United States. AL-AHMARI recently departed the United States for Qatar in an effort to start an IANA branch there.

[redacted] On September 24, 2001, the Washington Field Office (WFO) received documents from a search related to a visit to the U.S. of Saleh Al-Husayen. The documents indicate that Al-Husayen is promoting the use of the media to present the Arab world in a favorable view. He is also promoting the formation of Islamic organizations in the U.S. to pursue political agendas.

[redacted] On page 1 of the document, under Page 3, the name Saleh Al Husayen appears. A review of ACS indicates one reference to Al Husayen, indexed on 9/27/01. He was born on 1/1/31 in Sharqua, Saudi Arabia and has Saudi Arabian passport number (P-1) (P-1) Special/Official passport. A review of serial (F), an FD-302, indicates Al-Husayen was interviewed by the FBI in Herndon, Vi(S) The next name on the document is Shaikh Khalid Al-Swailim, Washington, D.C.,work telephone (P), mobile (P) and fax number (P). A review of ACS was negative on Al-Swailim. A review of Telephone FOIMS indicates
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] The second name on page 78 of the document is (P) (P) (P) Springfield, Virginia, work telephone (P), fax number (P) and mobile number (P). A review of ACS indicates an (P) (G) (G) indexed on 10/13/98.

Salah Alrashood

Name: Salah Alrashood
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

Phone: [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] (J-3)

Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (G) SALAH AL-RASHOOD, dob [redacted] (P-1), the Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his association with many individuals who have been the subjects of FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) After the September 11, 2001, attacks, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] SALAH AL-RASHOOD departed the USA on 12/15/2002; he later attempted to return but was denied re-entry into the USA. While in the USA, AL-RASHOOD resided at (P) Pittsburgh, PA, and was the head of the AL-TAWHEED ISLAMIC CENTER, a/k/a ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION, which provided financial support to the Mujhadeen in Chechneya. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Alrashood was paid approximately $55,000 in 2002 by the EKSA.

[redacted] The number (P) is subscribed to Salah AL-RASHOOD, (P) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. AL-RASHOOD is (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The word "marriage" is a word used by terrorists to denote martyrdom or attack. FBIHQ reported that an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) ALRASHOOD (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) which has had (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Ahmed Kattan (Ahmed Qattan / Ahmad Kattan / Ahmed Khattan)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Summary: Ahmed Kattan was** (J-3) **and high level official at the EKSA. Presently he is the Minister of African Affairs.** (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F) : [redacted] KATTAN has been identified as a (O-1) (O-1) who works closely with Ambassador Prince BANDAR. KATTAN, (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F): Kattan was from a poor family but had been with Prince Bandar for 20 years (as of 2003). (O-1) Kattan was responsible for the departure of the Bin Laden family members following 9/11.

[redacted]

[(F)] (O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)

(O-1) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(D)

(D)

[redacted]

(D)

[redacted] (F) Hassan Noor Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his residence. (C-1) (C-1) (C-1)

(C-1)

[redacted] According to (F) a Ali Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Omar, is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.

[redacted] According to (F) a Shaykh Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to Afghanistan.

[redacted] According to (F) Shaykh Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al-Haramain organization.

[redacted] The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL and IIRO (see (F) which provides more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Khaled Alsowailem (Khaled Al Sowailem)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

Memo: works at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Telephone: [redacted] (P-1)

Email: [redacted] (P-1) [NOTE: In the past writer has noted the use of 911 in various emails of [redacted] (J-3) Writer cannot confirm if this is a reference to the 9/11 attacks.]

Wife: Bushra Alkhamais

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

Telephone [redacted] (P) Mobile [redacted] (P) Fax [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (J-3)

Summary: Alsowailem was a high level employee of the Saudi Dawa office as a diplomat at the EKSA.

[redacted] Alsowailem was interviewed by FBI on 10/08/2001 but claimed diplomatic immunity.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] In November, 2004 FBIHQ requested that a (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AL-SOWAILEM left Washington, DC in June 2003 to take a position as the General Director of Da'wa Abroad in Saudi Arabia effective 8/30/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) detail that DA'WA is an Arabic word which means "the calling" as in the preaching of Islam, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) head of the DA'WA office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a posting which he held until June 2003 at which time he departed for Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) the DA'WA office, one of their responsibilities was to handle the logistics for the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. DA'WA was also responsible for the salaries of Islamic preachers in the United States and for the shipment of religious books and copies of the Koran to those that request them. The majority of those requesting copies of the Koran were affiliated with the prison chaplain program. Investigation has shown that the DA'WA responsibilities are now handled by the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA.

[redacted] From the time AL-SOWAILEM left the EKSA until March 2005, he kept in contact with MUSAED AL-JARRAH (G) who began handling the business previously handled by AL-SOWAILEM at the EKSA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security

Muhammmad Alqudhieen

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Hamdan Alshalawi

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi nationals and (J-3) who conducted activities on a U.S. based flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.**

[redacted] [(F) [redacted] Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Qudhaieen, DOB: (P-1), (P) Tucson, Arizona; (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen is (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) on 11/19/1999, Al-Qudhaieen and his associate Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi, address (P) Tempe, Arizona

[redacted]

85283, telephone (P), were aboard America West Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen, according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant (P) (P) advised Al-Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on two occasions." The pilot, Captain (P) ordered an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus airport. In accordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al-Qudhaieen said he believed he never touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al-Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al-Qudhaieen did ask him where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al-Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom. However, Al-Qudhaieen disappeared from Al-Shalawi's view toward the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.

[redacted] U.S. District Court transcripts revealed the following information: Al-Qudhaieen and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the President of Imam University in Ridyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, (P-1) (P-1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone: (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's assistant.

[redacted] On 10/22/2001, the (O-1) following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah Al-Shalawi, DOB (P-1), POB (P-1) Saudi Arabia, married with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. **Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in Afghan terrorist camps and intended to conduct Al-Khobar type bombings.** No further specifics were available (O-1) Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August 2001. (J-3) (J-3) Based upon this information received on Al-Shalawi, he was designated (G) (G) In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, this incident is being re-examined to determine whether Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of

[redacted]

America West Airlines in-flight security procedures. (A), (G), (J-1) Based on analysis of reporting that AL-QAEDA operatives do extensive research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al-Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.

[redacted]

[redacted] **Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel (J-3) continued post 9/11.**

[redacted] (G) identified extremist Saudi clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite open social media posts advocating jihadi activity (J-3) (J-3) (G) were forwarded to (J-3) - thus eliminating the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.

Mohammed Mousa

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] WFO identified Mousa based (A), (G), (J-1) and subsequent review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO (J-3) (J-3) and forwarded requests for information to various foreign governments.

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] One of the attendees to the ABAAD organized event was Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who uses the name Alshareef to denote a possible relation to Mohammed). Mousa is a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot but also a religious scholar who has openly advocated jihad in Mali/Israel/Iraq and has eulogized UBL. (J-3) (J-3)

(F)

[redacted] Saudi cleric named Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who utilizes Internet name Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef)(NOTE: Alshareef is a term utilized by descendants of Mohammed and may or may not be an official last name utilized on a passport)(DOB: (P-1)), a Saudi airlines pilot who had studied in Florida (according to article "Days in America"), had entered the US and had attended the Dar Alhijra as well as a Saudi student meeting in Chicago. Mousa supports jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Mali and other countries against "Crusaders" and claimed to have wanted to go to fight in Iraq but was persuaded by Iraqi fighters not to go but to raise money in Saudi Arabia instead. Mousa was once in WAMY magazine stating that he would not return to the US as the US was an enemy of Islam. [NOTE: Based on an initial review of the websites (A), (G), (J-1) identified Mousa as Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef but writer was able to later determine that name Mohammed Mousa and DOB of (P-1).]

[redacted] (O-1)

(O-1) INFORMATION INDICATING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TRAINING OF THE TERRORIST AIRPLANE HIJACKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 11 SEPTEMBER

ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA. MOUSSA, AGE 35-38, DOB [redacted] (P-1), A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO [redacted] (O-1) COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN 2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFUSED TO FLY HEAVY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS" WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM. PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000), [redacted] (O-1) MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT (747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.

[redacted] A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.

Ayid Alqarni

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] (F) On (A), (G), (J-1)2012 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a known extremist Saudi cleric named Ayid Abdullah Alqarni (ph) would be traveling to the US to attend the ICNA/MSA Conference in Chicago in December 2012. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni had a DOB (P-1) On 12/12/2012 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)Alqarni could be located on the following youtube videos:

http://youtu.be/wrEEu-Fjzqk

http://youtu.be/L2Q3A5XaTxE

[redacted] The first video is titled "Ayid Alqarni - Jihad the Path to Victory" and is dated 2004. In this video Alqarni - recognizable as the individual (J-3) - laments the death of Abdalaziz Alrantisi and Ahmad Yassin and praises jihad in Iraq against the "occupiers".

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) open source information found on the ICNA website, exact matches of biographical information as well as a review of the available video writer concludes that the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) is the same as the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against American soldiers in Iraq and the “slitting of throats”. In addition, the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism investigations.

[redacted] According to [redacted] (G) Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]

[redacted]

Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials – Known or Suspected AQ Members

[redacted] Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S. for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (Pensacola). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi Arabian (J-3) who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: (P-1)) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB: (P-1))((F)) were in contact were in contact with Alhazmi and Almihdar.

Mustafa Alshehri

(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi)

DOB: (P-1)

Entered US on (J-3) July 2001

(G)

(J-3)

[redacted] Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office. (C-1) (C-1) Alshehri entered the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.

[redacted]

[redacted] (F) and other serials] Mustafa Alshehri was a Ministry of Interior employee in the passport section and (C-1) (C-1) Subsequently he was utilized to transfer large sums of money to other AQ members. (C-1) (C-1) (C-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) Yousef was subsequently released and became a leader of AQAP before being killed in 2009.) According to records and Alshehri's statements he traveled to the US for medical reasons (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) and actually entered on 09/01/2001 with intended stay (J-3) (C-1) (C-1) (C-1) Alshehri had several associates in the EKSA to include Yousef Zakri (G) who was a long term EKSA employee who had a close relationship with known AQI member Shawki Omar (G) who was subsequently arrested in Iraq. Another associate was believed to be Fahad Alotaibi (DOB: (P-1)) of the Military Attache office. While in the DC area Alshehri lived with Mohammed Ali Alqahtani (G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Amer Alshehri (G) a diplomat at the EKSA, is a known relative and (A), (G), (J-1) noted his association with multiple (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and that he was involved with retrieving Yousef Alshehri's body. Ali Al Nafisah (G) , another EKSA diplomat, was a close associate of both Omar, Zakri and Alshehri.

Faisal Ahmed Alshehri

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] On May 9, 2003, FBIHQ notified the Dallas Division [redacted] (A), (G). (J-1)

Initial investigation revealed that the user of the email address was located at Sheppard Air force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas. Soon thereafter, this individual was identified as Faisal Ahmed Al-Shehri. [redacted] (A), (G). (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G). (J-1) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (A), (G). (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G). (J-1)

[redacted] At approximately 6:00 p.m., Al-Shehri was approached by Dallas FBI agents. The agents advised Al-Shehri that there was a possible security issue with his luggage and wanted to talk to him for a couple of minutes. Al-Shehri and the interviewing agents went to the business lounge area and began to question Al-Shehri. After a short time, the interviewing agents questioned Al-Shehri regarding his knowledge of Al-Yari. Al-Shehri denied any knowledge of Al-Yari and advised the interviewing agents that he had never met or seen him before. Al-Shehri was told by the interviewing agents that his phone number had been found on Al-Yari's body after he had been killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities. Al-Shehri continued to deny his knowledge of Al-Yari. During this time, Al-Shehri provided biographical information and consented to a search of all his carry-on items. After approximately six hours, Al-Shehri finally admitted that he had designed and built a computer for Al-Yari several years ago. Also, Al-Shehri advised that he had a long standing and close relationship with Al-Yari. Al-Shehri explained how he was recruited by Al-Qa'ida and eventually became a financial supporter and recruiter for the organization. Also, Al-Shehri explained how he frequently communicated with Al-Yari and had traveled to meet him on many occasions. Al-Shehri was debriefed from June 5, 2003 until July 8, 2003. During this time, Al-Shehri provided invaluable intelligence information regarding Al-Qa'ida members, Al-Qa'ida trade craft, and Al-Qa'ida recruitment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] (F) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] On December 8, 2001 a search was conducted of AlMari's apartment which revealed photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters". Many documents were discovered during the search of the apartment to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts, hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [[redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) noted some secondary connections between phone numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Albayoumi.]

Mohammad Alkahtani

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL-QAEDA. Furthermore AL-KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL-KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the propagation of Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) Virginia home, AL-KAHTANI has been vocal about his support for AL-QAEDA and UBL.

[redacted]

[redacted] Investigation has revealed Al-Kahtani, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States (J-3) and is working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably sometime before the end of this year.

[redacted] Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation for participation in jihad and/or jihad training overseas. Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar-E Taiba jihad training camp. Among those involved in the jihad group are (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Ali Al-Timimi, a former lecturer at Dar al Arqam, has been a spiritual advisor to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad. The activities of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (G) (G) two of Al-Kahtani's sons attended the paintball training, however they were not part of the core jihad group. Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al-Timimi was asked to leave Dar al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash, Jaf'far Idris and AL-Kahtani) because Al-Timimi openly supported the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result, Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al Arqam.

[redacted] Alkahtani (J-3) despite the above information. Alkahtani noted that he was traveling with a “prince” and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is a state owned (J-3) (J-3) defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and Military Industries Corporation (MIC) per Wiki which is lead by Mohamed Almady. (J-3).

[redacted]

Abdullah Mohamed Alshehri

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(G)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the** (A), (G), (J-1) **officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was conducting this business while a student.**

[redacted] (G)

(G) ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB (G) (G). While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.

[redacted] On 03/18/2002, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a young Yemeni immigrant to Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA" (or ABU NORA)(determined (G) to be (G) ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering, the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL). When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of September 11th were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the Yemeni.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (G)

Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS, ELTAYEB gave a forwarding address of [redacted] (P) Pittsburgh, telephone [redacted] (P). Follow-up investigation at the GREENBRIAR APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure, [redacted] (P) was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALSHEHRI, with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Portland believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell operating in the Portland area.

Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)

King Abdullah Academy

(G)

[redacted] The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy, is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Arabian government and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative planning to assassinate President George Bush. (P) was a teacher at the Islamic education department.

(F) [redacted] Since 2001 there have been many independent analysis conducted of the teaching curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the Freedom House report and the recent report from the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In addition, reports have been written on similar schools in foreign nations such as a report in Britain on the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled "The Hijacking of British Islam".

[redacted] All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. The specific statements listed in these reports have been well documented in the press and need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these multiple and independent analysis have been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages in question were Saudi interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar to the interpretation provided by Elyacoubi mentioned above.

[redacted] According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign

Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal stated that "our schools and our faith teach peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince Turki Al-Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the inflammatory content in their school textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time after the Freedom House report. Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have denied the existence of derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.

[redacted] The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been completed. An FBI review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also revealed the continuing use of passages that are considered to be defamatory to other religions and that could be construed to encourage violence.

Saudi Arabian Student Population

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (F)

Serials with LHMs to USDS:

[redacted] (F) (2014/2017/2018)

[redacted] (F)

Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the years but increased greatly after 2005 but has recently sharply declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior to and following the 9/11 attacks such as [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) ([redacted] (F) and [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (F). Following the creation and growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.

[redacted] (J-3)

Homaidan Alturki Saudi [redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals - 15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian

[redacted]

perception management campaigns have worked to convince Americans that UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the interrogations of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed that the true reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for Saudi Arabian citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to 9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express program. (See 9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232-233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Pages 116-130.)

[redacted] Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material utilized in Saudi K-12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after 9/11. An unclassified report [redacted] (O-1) regarding Saudi education and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle school curriculum 2009-2010) revealed that - despite claims to the contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non-Muslims. This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of religious violence". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate some of the offending passages in the higher-grade textbooks, the youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and violence, and many will have already internalized these teachings." This analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in December 2013 a large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out to Saudi society – in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within these clerical establishments.

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) This was highlighted by the recent death in Saudi Arabia of an ISIS bomb maker who was a student in New Zealand. Additional Saudi Arabian students are voicing encouragement and support and multiple Saudi Arabian students are under terrorism investigation by the FBI. In addition, it is known via FBI investigation, that radical Saudi based clerics and religious authorities are traveling to the U.S. to visit with the U.S. based Saudi population. In December 2012 a Saudi cleric who had openly called for jihad against the U.S. was granted a visa to enter the U.S. FBI investigation prevented his entry and his intended destination was an Islamic conference in Chicago. In December 2013 investigation revealed a large student gathering in Chicago that included a presentation by a Saudi cleric who has openly supported jihad activities and who eulogized Osama Bin Laden. This cleric is also a Saudi Airlines pilot and wrote of meeting Saudi Arabian students in various locations in the United States. In December 2016 a Saudi Arabian national who was a professor for a Saudi military academy and a supporter of militant ideology was granted a visa to the U.S. (J-3).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an Islamic bookstore (Albasheer Publications) while on (J-3) status; his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq)((F) (see (F) (see herein)’ Mohammed Alahmari (IANA)(see herein); and the EKSA’s/SAG’s attempts to obtain his release from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an (J-3) holder.

[redacted] (A),(G), (J-1) is noted herein due to the (A),(G), (J-1) centering on a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing (J-3) fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters".

[redacted]

Ziyad Khaleel (Ziyad Sadaqa)

(G)

Summary: Noted herein due to references above.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The above referenced serial (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Investigation by Phoenix has indicated that all of these individuals may have a current or former association with Michigan State University (MSU).

[redacted] Al-Shalawi (G)

[redacted]

[redacted] (G) and is believed by Phoenix to be an operative of Al Qaeda. Al-Shalawi obtained a PhD in Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU).

[redacted] Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) were involved in an incident aboard an America West airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were traveling from Phoenix to Washington, DC via Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen was observed by the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the flight landed in Columbus, Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewed [redacted] (F). No charges were filed against Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen.

[redacted] Based on [redacted] (G) regarding the association of Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has developed an investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations. [redacted] (O-1) Al-Shalawi obtained training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.

C-2 INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT''S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 04/20/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

Los Angeles **Attn:**

From: New York
PENTTBOM Investigative Team / FBIHQ
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: Request Los Angeles conduct investigation in regards to information obtained during the interview of FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY.

Reference: (F) [redacted]

Details: On 02/23-24/2004, FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY was interviewed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by (P) [redacted] and (P) [redacted] of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission (reference (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted]. The interview was conducted in the presence of writer and NYPD (S) [redacted] of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team, as well as representatives of the Saudi Mabahith. Later in the day on 02/24/2004, AL-THUMAIRY telephonically contacted the Saudi Mabahith and advised that he had recalled additional information regarding his rental of apartments at the Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, about which he had been questioned. AL-THUMAIRY then returned for a second interview on the night of 02/24/2004, again conducted in the presence of the representatives of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team and the Saudi Mabahith.

As FBI Los Angeles is aware, investigation is ongoing in order to determine the location of residence and activities of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) during their apparent stay in the Los Angeles area from 01/15/2000 to approximately 02/04/2000. Of predominant interest throughout this investigation are the "two Saudi males" that were introduced to OUALID MONCEF BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY ((F) (F)).

For background information, BENOMRANE advised that he had heard that the two Saudi males had arrived at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them. The apartment was identified by BENOMRANE as having been at the Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments. According to BENOMRANE, AL-THUMAIRY asked BENOMRANE to assist the two Saudi males during their time in Los Angeles because they could not speak English. BENOMRANE agreed and gave his taxicab business card to the two Saudi males. BENOMRANE advised that over the next few days after meeting the two Saudi males, he drove them on two separate occasions around the Los Angeles area and to Sea World in San Diego. BENOMRANE was not able to provide a specific date or time period of when he met the two Saudi males, other than advising that it happened before 09/11/2001. BENOMRANE also advised that the two Saudi males spent approximately one month in Los Angeles.

BENOMRANE advised that he had been told by AL-THUMAIRY that the two Saudi males were in Los Angeles to visit their sick father. BENOMRANE first advised that their father was in a local hospital; BENOMRANE later stated that their father stayed in their apartment and that their father had accompanied them on the day that BENOMRANE drove the two Saudi males around the Los Angeles area. [Note: To date, there is no evidence or intelligence indicating that the father of either KHALID AL-MIHDHAR or NAWAF AL-HAZMI, or another elder male individual, accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to Los Angeles].

In order to assist in the identification of the two Saudi Arabian males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY, and to confirm or deny if they were in fact KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, additional investigation was conducted in Los Angeles. Due to BENOMRANE's reporting that the Saudi males were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them, there has been speculation that AL-THUMAIRY had been the individual responsible for having rented their apartment at the Avalon Terrace Westside. Investigation thus determined that AL-THUMAIRY simultaneously rented two apartments at the Avalon Terrace Westside during the summer of 2001; specifically, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001.

When interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, among other areas of questioning, AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any individuals whom he knew to have traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment and any individuals whom he may have assisted with lodging or other necessities while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY advised that as a result of his positions at the Saudi Arabian Consulate and at the King Fahad Mosque, he sometimes was asked for guidance in such matters (i.e. lodging) for visiting Saudi Arabian citizens. AL-THUMAIRY recalled that [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] traveled with his ill father [NFI] from Saudi Arabia to Los Angeles in approximately 1999 to receive treatment at the UCLA Medical Center. [redacted] (P-1) and his father had visited the King Fahad Mosque and had asked AL-THUMAIRY for advice regarding where to reside while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY made recommendations to [redacted] (P-1) and his father regarding geographic areas in which they could reside. AL-THUMAIRY did not know where [redacted] (P-1) and his father ultimately resided, but knew that they had stayed near UCLA Medical Center. AL-THUMAIRY advised that [redacted] (P-1) and his father stayed in Los Angeles for approximately three months.

AL-THUMAIRY also recalled that [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment at UCLA Medical Center, although AL-THUMAIRY could not provide any date of [redacted] (P-1)'s visit. [redacted] (P-1) resided at the Avalon Terrace Westside with his family, to include his four or five children. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he did not assist [redacted] (P-1) in obtaining the apartment lease at Avalon Terrace Westside.

AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any individuals for whom he rented apartments at Avalon Terrace Westside, specifically, during the summer of 2001 when AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and apartment 120 from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001. AL-THUMAIRY initially did not recall having arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for anyone other than himself during the summer of 2001; however, AL-THUMAIRY telephonically contacted the Saudi Mabahith on the day following his interview and advised that he had recalled more information regarding his rental of apartments during the summer of 2001. AL-THUMAIRY was asked to return in order to provide this information, which he did on the night of 02/24/2004.

AL-THUMAIRY advised that he received a telephone call during the summer of 2001 from (P-1) [phonetic] in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (P-1) informed AL-THUMAIRY that he was traveling to Los Angeles to receive a liver transplant at UCLA Medical Center and needed a place to stay, preferably with a kitchen, with his son. AL-THUMAIRY recalled the name of (P-1) (P-1)'s son to be either (P-1) or (P-1). (P-1) and his son arrived in Los Angeles approximately one week after the telephone call.

AL-THUMAIRY stated that he arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for (P-1) and his son [Writer's Note: as stated above, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment 120 from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001]. AL-THUMAIRY signed the rental contract and wrote a check to pay for the initial rent payment, and informed the leasing office that someone else would be residing in the apartment. [redacted] (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY by depositing either cash or traveler's check into AL-THUMAIRY's Wells Fargo Bank account.

A search of ACS, conducted by writer, revealed two accounts held by AL-THUMAIRY at Wells Fargo Bank. A summary of Wells Fargo Bank account number [redacted] (P-1) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 did not appear to reflect any transactions that could be attributed to either the rental check paid by AL-THUMAIRY to Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments or the reimbursement by [redacted] (P-1) and his son ([redacted] (F) [redacted] (F)). A financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account number 0372-419960 was submitted to the case file as an attachment and could not be viewed through ACS ([redacted] (F) .

[redacted] (P-1) visited UCLA Medical Center and was told by the medical staff to return to Saudi Arabia because he was not ready for the liver transplant. [redacted] (P-1) and his son resided in the apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for approximately one and one-half months. Before they returned to Saudi Arabia, [redacted] (P-1) and his son accompanied AL-THUMAIRY to the leasing office to terminate the lease. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he also returned to Saudi Arabia soon after, on approximately 08/20/2001. He subsequently learned that [redacted] (P-1) passed away before returning to UCLA Medical Center for the liver transplant.

While the above information is being forwarded for the information of recipients, there is certain information that necessitates follow-up investigation to determine the veracity of AL-THUMAIRY, as well as to determine the identity of the Saudi males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE and any association between the Saudi males and AL-THUMAIRY.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if an individual named [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] resided there with his family of four or five children.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY rented an apartment for [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] and his son during the summer of 2001 (specifically, determine if AL-THUMAIRY's rental of either apartment [redacted] (P-1) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 or apartment [redacted] (P-1) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001 was actually for [redacted] (P-1) and his son).

Set Lead 4: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center to determine if [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] visited from Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2001 for a liver transplant consultation.

Set Lead 5: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct a review of the records of Wells Fargo Bank account #[redacted] (P-1) to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY paid the rental fees of [redacted] (P-1) and his son via check to the Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments in the summer of 2001, and to determine if [redacted] (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY via deposit of cash or traveler's check to the same bank account ([redacted] (F) which includes a financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account #[redacted] (P-1).

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S) [redacted]

International Operations **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

Riyadh **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

San Diego **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

New York **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

From: New York
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F) OPERATION ENCORE, [redacted] (F)
[redacted] (F) FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) [redacted] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) [redacted]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) [redacted] AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [redacted] Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" ((F) [redacted] . AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers , and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) social security account number (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F) [redacted] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[redacted] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F)).

[redacted] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P), 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. (C-2)

(C-2)

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F) . AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

[redacted] FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # P-1 On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F) . AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[redacted] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference (F) In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference (F). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[redacted] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[redacted] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, (P) owner of (P), advised that (P) had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[redacted] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P)

(P), was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference (F) A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

[redacted] A copy of AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi Arabian passport (P-1), recovered during the search of his residence in England, revealed that the passport was issued on 02/01/2000 in Los Angeles, California (reference (F)

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[redacted] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[redacted] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

[redacted] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[redacted] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[redacted] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's." (P) [redacted]

[redacted] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[redacted] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'" AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[redacted] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[redacted] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[redacted] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[redacted] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[redacted] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[redacted] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account #09000-05839 with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR’s account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference (F)

[redacted] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment (P)) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[redacted] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[redacted] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and

AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P) (P) however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. (P) (P) [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	12:42
(P)	[redacted]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	23:36

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(P)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE	[redacted]	12/28	11:43
(P)	[redacted]	12/28	13:57
	[redacted]	12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/28	23:05
(P)	[redacted]	12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE	[redacted]	12/29	00:20
(P)	[redacted]	12/29	00:35
	[redacted]	12/29	00:39
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	12:54
(P)	[redacted]	12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone

number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate ((F) [redacted]).

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[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) [redacted]. In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F) [redacted]. In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [redacted] The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his

post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1) (O-1)

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(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F) .

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1), reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1)did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted] Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [redacted] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: Saudi Arabia
SOC: (P-1)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: O
Middle: A
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (G)

LEAD(s):

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to process (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G) (S)

International Operations **Attn:** (G)

Riyadh **Attn:** (G)

San Diego **Attn:** (S)

New York **Attn:** (S)

From: New York
(G) **Contact:** (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)-OPERATION ENCORE, [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple (A), (G), (J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F)). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial [redacted]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S

Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" ((F). AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F). According to the closing EC (F) (F) and supplemental closing EC (F) (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

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"(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A),(G),(J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [redacted]

[redacted] Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment**: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F) [redacted] (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project [redacted] (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous: (G) Subject is a non-USPER. (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] The [redacted] (G) is requested to process the [redacted] (G) which is being submitted via email to the [redacted] (G) mailbox at [redacted] (G) (G) [redacted] (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Intelligence Directorate **Attn:**
Attn:

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH (A)(G)(J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To open captioned Full Investigation, document transmission of (G) and request a (G) (G)

(G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (1)the electronic (F)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details: [redacted] New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

[redacted] By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1) AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F)

[redacted] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) (F). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # [redacted] (F). Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ([redacted] (F)). Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" ([redacted] (F)). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ([redacted] (F)) and supplemental closing EC [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	12:42
(P)	[redacted]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[redacted]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/27	23:36
(P)	[redacted]	12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE	[redacted]	12/28	11:43
(P)	[redacted]	12/28	13:57
	[redacted]	12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[redacted]	12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/28	23:05
(P)	[redacted]	12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE	[redacted]	12/29	00:20
(P)	[redacted]	12/29	00:35
	[redacted]	12/29	00:39
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	12:54
(P)	[redacted]	12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI	[redacted]	12/29	13:07
Unknown	[redacted]	12/29	13:48

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F)). (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ((F) .

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM [redacted] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([redacted] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [redacted] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

> [redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list. [redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. [redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of [redacted] (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" [redacted] (F).

[redacted] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of [redacted] (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with [redacted] (P), the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone [redacted] (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone [redacted] (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F)).

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

[redacted] Not Applicable

(G)

Number of Subjects: 1

(G) Code:

(G)

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-JARRAH
First:	MUSAED
Middle:	A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1960
POB:	Saudi Arabia
Phone #:	Previous - 202-342-3700, 202-944-3192, (P)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

Current - (P-1)
Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (F)
E-mail Addresses: (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[redacted] Not Applicable

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Coordinate [redacted] (G) as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Process the [redacted] (G) which is being submitted via email to the [redacted] (G) mailbox at [redacted] (G) (G) [redacted] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G): Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/24/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
SSA (S)
IA (S)

Denver **Attn:** Colorado Springs RA
(G)
SSA (S)
SA (S)

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: [redacted] To request Denver SAC Concurrence for two Los Angeles agents to travel to Colorado Springs and interview (P) on 10/15/2007.

[redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] 08/24/2007 Email between SA (S) and SA (S) on the procedures to interview (P). 09/18/2007 Telcal with (P).

Details: [redacted] By way of background, in 2004, in order to determine if FBI-San Diego subject MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) immigration cell mates' allegations that ABDULLAH had advance knowledge of 9/11, FBI-LA began reviewing ABDULLAH's connections in Los Angeles, because 1) it was known that he had driven 9/11 hijacker's Khaled AL-MIHDHAR and Nawaf AL-HAZMI (American Airlines #77 that crashed into the Pentagon) to Los Angeles on

[redacted]

06/09/2000 and 2) AL-MIHDHAR's and ALHAZMI's whereabouts in Los Angeles for a two week period between 01/15/2000 and 02/04/2000 were still unknown.

[redacted] During the investigation, FBI-LA identified video surveillance footage from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) security cameras for 06/10/2000. The video surveillance footage is believed to show ABDULLAH and AL-HAZMI walking with AL-MIHDHAR at LAX before AL-MIHDHAR's return trip to Yemen to visit his family. More importantly, this footage also shows one additional unknown male subject (UNSUB) who appears to be accompanying ABDULLAH, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR through LAX security. The UNSUB appears to be holding a camera and may have been conducting reconnaissance of LAX. To date, FBI-LA investigation has not identified the UNSUB.

[redacted] 09/11/2006, NBC Today and MSNBC ran a news story on ABDULLAH that stated, "the FBI has now renewed its investigation of a man the 9/11 Commission said was perfectly suited to help the hijackers with their mission. . .NBC News has learned that the renewed FBI investigation was triggered in part by surveillance videotapes inside the Los Angeles Airport shot in June 2000 - a year before 9/11. Law Enforcement officials tell NBC the grainy tapes show terrorist Nawaf al-Hazmi with Abdullah and an unidentified man. Sources say the men appear to be scouting out the airport. Some FBI agents believe that one of the men may be holding a video camera and rotates in a circle while secretly videotaping the security area. . . Why didn't they find these tapes until 2004 isn't known - especially since the FBI knew that on the day the tapes were shot in June 2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to Yemen. Critics are certain to questions whether the FBI again missed an important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away."

[redacted] Per (F), on approximately 09/29/2006, San Diego AUSA (S) advised he received an unsolicited telephone call from (P), a reporter for the San Diego Union Tribune. During their conversation, which centered on the upcoming sentencing of an individual convicted of a terrorism hoax, (P) advised she had recently been in e-mail contact with ABDULLAH (currently believed to be in Yemen.) (P) advised she asked ABDULLAH about the recent NBC news article published on 09/11/2006 regarding ABDULLAH's role in helping 9/11 hijackers Nawaf AL-HAZMI and Khalid AL-MIHDHAR. (Note - (P) has reported extensively on San Diego 9/11 subjects and associates.)

[redacted] (P) advised that ABDULLAH did not answer any of her specific questions but related the following points:

- the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- (P) should contact (P) if she wants to interview him (ABDULLAH.)

[redacted] On 10/03/2006, AUSA (S) was again contacted by (P). (P) advised that she had received a second e-mail from ABDULLAH. (P) advised that ABUDALLAH related the following points:

- regarding this notorious story, the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- the other individual in the video was either a friend of AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR and was residing in Los Angeles at the time (06/10/2000).

- ABDULLAH was introduced to this individual on a previous occasion when this individual traveled down to San Diego to visit.

- this individual was residing in Los Angeles and the two hijackers knew the individual prior to going to San Diego.

[redacted] Los Angeles initiated the (A), (G), (J-1) investigation to determine if there was a possible Yemeni cell in Los Angeles that assisted the 9/11 hijackers while they were in California. Los Angeles identified Yemeni students were holding meetings during 2000/2001 on Friday evenings in Long Beach, California. 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Al-Hazmi had attended at least one of these meetings, as well as MOHDAR ABDULLAH, RAMEZ NOAMAN (A), (G), (J-1), (P) (A), (G), (J-1), WALID ALHUSSAINI (A), (G), (J-1) and (P) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] The 9/11 investigation and related investigations have identified many Yemeni nationals with links to known Al-Qaeda operatives or individuals who are suspected of being associated with terrorists and/or terrorist activities, including: AL-MIHDHAR (a Saudi of Yemeni descent); Ramzi Binalshib (Binalshib); Tawfiz Mohammed Bin Saleh Bin Rasyayd Bin Attash aka Khallad (Bin Atash); Abu Bara Al-Taizi aka Suhail Shurabi aka Baraka; and Anwar Aulaqi (AULAQI) (F). Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) stated during interviews that at least 20% of the people in Al-Qaeda training camps were Yemeni.

[redacted] As the LAX UNSUB is still unidentified, FBI-Los Angeles wishes to show the LAX "still" photographs of the UNSUB to [redacted], in the hopes he can identify the subject. This belief is based on the following:

-[redacted] traveled to [redacted] on a couple of occasions to attend various Islamic schools. During his studies in [redacted], [redacted] became acquainted with individuals who had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980's conflict with the Soviets.

-[redacted] was a close associate of KHALID JBAIHI, aka KHALID AL-BULUWI aka ABU MU'AZ. JBAIHI is currently in Saudi Arabian custody for his participation in the 2003 Riyadh bombings. Investigations have determined that JBAIHI, while in the United States, was an Al-Qaeda recruiter. JBAIHI attempted to recruit at least one individual in Los Angeles to attend the AL-FAROOQ terrorist training camp. In addition, JBAIHI attended the AL-FAROOQ terrorist training camp.

-[redacted] attended the [redacted] terrorist training camp and assisted DoD [redacted] in identifying many other terrorist members. It has been documented that [redacted] has a [redacted].

-[redacted] is originally from [redacted]. To date, he has never been questioned on his associates in Southern California nor questioned on individuals that he has come across overseas that have connections to Southern California.

[redacted] [redacted] was contacted on 09/18/2007 and a date was scheduled to conduct an interview with [redacted] on 10/15/2007. Request Denver SAC provide concurrence for two Los Angeles Agents (SA [redacted] and LAPD Detective [redacted]) to travel to Colorado Springs [redacted] and interview [redacted] on 10/15/2007.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 09/24/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

DENVER

AT COLORADO SPRINGS RA

[redacted] Provide SAC concurrence for two Los Angeles Agents (SA [redacted] (S) and LAPD Detective [redacted] (S)) to travel [redacted] (P) and interview [redacted] (P) on 10/15/2007.

◆◆

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 11/22/2002

To: International Operations **Attn:** [redacted] (S), (G)
Counterterrorism
[redacted] (G)
New York

San Diego

From: [redacted] (G)
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: Cover lead [redacted] (F). Mabahith provided information re Omar Ahmad Al-Bayoumi.

Reference: [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F)

Administrative: Lead [redacted] (F) covered.

Reference Mabahith letter M/B/88/261F/423, dated 11/03/2002, providing information to [redacted] (G).

It should be noted that the statement [redacted] (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for New York and San Diego:

(1) one copy of original response from the Saudi Mabahith (in Arabic) bearing number M/B/88/261F/423, dated 11/03/2002; and

(2) one English translation of same.

Details: Per referenced serial (F) San Diego requested (G) to locate and interview Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman AL-HAMDAN re his contact with Omar Ahmad AL-BAYOUMI. (F) dated 12/02/2001 is (G) initial request of the Mabahith. (F) dated 06/09/2002, is (G) second request. (F) dated 06/05/2002, is the Mabahith's response to (F) and (F)

On 11/3/2002, the Mabahith provided further information re Omar Ahmad Al-Bayoumi, via the enclosed letter (written in Arabic). That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for recipients:

--------------Begin Translation---------------------------------

(F)

LS. Note: All the following names are spelled phonetically.
Number: M/B/88/261F/423
Date: 8/28/1423H 11/3/2002
Subject: **Omar Ahmed Mostafa El-Bayomi**- Saudi National
Reference: Our Memo Number M/B/88/148F/423 Dated 5/25/1423H and Your Memo (F) Dated 3/23/2002

This memo is addressed to Mr. (S) Legal Attache at US Embassy in (G)

Greetings,

In addition to what we provided to you before about the above mentioned individual, We would like to inform you that he stated the following during his interview:

First- Statistical Information:
Name: **Omar Ahmed El-Bayomi**
Nationality: **Saudi**
Place and Date of Birth: (P-1) **Al-Hijra village**
Marital Status: **Married**
Passport Number: (P-1) **on 10/25/1420H (Feb 1, 2000) Issued in (Los Angeles)**

Second/ Interview:
1. He (El-Bayomi) stated that he was born in 1377H (1957) - Al-Hijra village where he grew up and went AlTabari Elementary school...After he finished elementary school...Then he moved to Jeddah where he finished middle school and high school...Then he joined The Financial Studies Institute...After graduation, he joined King Abd El-Aziz University in Jeddah where he obtained a Bachelor degree in General Management...He joined The Civil Aviation Administration in 1397H where he currently works.

2. He stated that he traveled to several arab and foreign countries...He traveled to Egypt and Turkey almost twenty years ago for tourism...He traveled to Britain approximately three times to study English...He resided in Birmingham, Britain with his family from 10/5/2000 till 7/31/2002 where he obtained a master degree (Market efficiency in Management) from Austin University in Birmingham...He's currently working on his PH.D in the subject of (International Companies and Ethics)...He previously traveled to The United States of America to study English...He visited America approximately five times with his family between 93-94 where he stayed in California.

3. **As for what happened to him in Britain**: He stated that on Friday 9/21/2001and while he was watching a match between the Saudi team and Bahraini team, The Britain police raided his house...They asked him about his name and he told them (**Omar Bayomi**)...One of the officers (S) told him that he has some questions about September 11th incident in America...They asked him to go with them to the main center in London where they asked him about his autobiography and why did he study in Britain...They also showed him photographs of Saudi individuals and Arabs from different nationalities as well as their names and aliases but he denied knowing any of them...They asked him if he traveled before to Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaysia but he denied ever traveling to any of these countries.

4. He stated that he was detained for almost seven days at the main center in London...His interrogation usually lasted from one and half hour to two hours...He asked the British authorities to contact the Saudi Embassador in London to notify him of his arrest, but the British police apologized to him saying that they tried to contact the Embassy and the embassador but they didn't get any respond.

5. He asked one of his friends in London (P) to contact the Saudi Embassy and notify them about the situation he was in.. (P) nformed him that he contacted (C-2) (C-2) an embassy employee, who told him to let the investigation continue specially since an attorney was appointed to him by the British police...He continued answering all the questions till one of the officers told him that he was not guilty of anything and he asked him to wait outside, in a special car, to take him back to his house...He then contacted (C-2) o let him that the matter has ended...

6. He also stated that some of the Saudi individuals that the British police were asking about: (**Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi**) and he told them that he met them in the complex where he stayed in America...He added that: they came from Saudi Arabia to study English in one of San Diego's institute, they attended the mosque there and they were looking for a place to stay because the complex was very expensive and they couldn't afford it...He also said that the house was a student housing for the institute's students and since the new students have to write their name in an acquaintance list, so he put his name on the same list with Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and he introduced them as new students.

7. He persistently denied any previous knowledge of, or having any connection with, Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and that he only introduced them as new students.

8. He denied being arrested by any government authority whether inside or outside The Kingdom even when he was in America or Britain for study except for that time when he was arrested by the British police...He also denied being deported by the British police and he said that he was treated well during his detention.
This is for your information and we are interested in your comments about the truthfulness of the above mentioned individual.

(LS. Note: **Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi** were among the hijackers of flight AA # 77 (Pentagon)...The spelling of an Arabic name can vary...However, the above mentioned spelling seems more likely than what's listed in the hijackers list).

(F)

--------------End Translation-----------------------------------

Based on the foregoing, (G) considers lead (F) covered. (G) will forward any further information provided by the Mabahith upon receipt.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

◆◆

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/21/2002

To: International Operations
Criminal Investigative

New York
San Diego
Counterterrorism
Washington Field

Pittsburgh

Newark

Attn: (G),(S)

From: (G)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: Cover lead (F) re Saudi bank accounts for Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Enclose translated Mabahith response.

Reference: (F)

Administrative: Lead (F) covered.

(F) Reference English translation of the Mabahith response to M/B/88/148F/423, dated 08/04/2002.

Note that the statement (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for FBIHQ and New York is one copy of the English translated Mabahith response, M/B/88/148F/423, dated 08/04/2002, to referenced (F)

Details: Referenced serial (F) set a lead for (G) to:

(1) Identify and obtain any and all records for Saudi American Bank account numbers (P-1) and (P-1) in the name of Omar Ahmed AL-BAYOUMI;

(2) Obtain account information re AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi American Bank card number (P-1); and

(3) Obtain Saudi American Bank records for AL-BAYOUMI's wife, Manal A. BAGADER.

Per referenced (F) letter dated 12/16/2001, (G) forwarded lead (F) to the Mabahith. On 08/04/2002, the Saudi Mabahith provided its response. That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for recipients:

--------------Begin Translation-------------------------------

1. Account No. (P-1) is with the Saudi American Bank. [Attached is a copy of account statements + a copy of the documents for establishing the account].

- Date of starting the account is 5/28/2000, with a customer's direct cash deposit of (53, 273.67), fifty-three thousand, two hundred, seventy-three dollars and sixty cents.
- The last transaction on this account had occurred on 9/18/2001.
- The total credit transactions are (54,281/69), fifty-four thousand, two hundred, eighty-one American dollars, and sixty-nine cents. It was conducted through two transactions.
- The total debit transactions are (40,563/07), forty thousand, five hundred, sixty-three dollars, and seven cents.
- The balance on 9/18/2001 is a credit of (13,718/62), thirteen thousand, seven hundred, eighteen dollars, and sixty-two cents.

2. Account No. (P-1) with the Saudi American Bank in Jeddah / Al-Andalus Branch. [Attached is a copy of account statements + a copy of the documents for establishing the account].

- This account was opened on 11/13/1999 by transferring the amount of (66,456/45), sixty-six thousand, four hundred, fifty-six riyal, and forty-five hilleh, to the above-mentioned individual's account.

- The last transaction on this account had occurred on 3/27/2002, which was represented by transferring the amount of (11,967), eleven thousand, nine hundred, and sixty-seven riyal, into this account.
- Account balance on 7/03/2002 had reached (300,611/58), three hundred thousand, six hundred, eleven riyal, and fifty-eight hilleh. [Credit]
- In regards to the credit card No. (P-1) we observed that it is connected with account No. (P-1) which was mentioned above.
- In regards to the above-mentioned individual's wife / MANAL AHMAD BAQDAR - Saudi citizen, we determined that she didn't have any accounts in our local banks.

--------------End Translation-----------------------------------

Based on the foregoing, (G) considers lead (F) covered. Reporting agent notes there were no attachments enclosed with this letter.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/28/2003

To: International Operations **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Counterterrorism **Attn:**

From: [redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (G), (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MC 182

Synopsis: Lead #2 and #3 covered in referenced serial.

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for Counterterrorism is the original and one copy of the FD-302 documenting the interview of Omar Al-Bayoumi on 10/16/2003.

Details: On October 9, 2003, [redacted] (G) prepared a letter for passage to the Mabahith to request interviews be arranged and documents obtained in reference to Omar Al-Bayoumi's allowance and salary.

[redacted] (G) has sent the original request to the Mabahith via a letter dated 10/09/2003. Reference [redacted] (F) for details.

On 10/16/2003, Omar Al-Bayoumi was interviewed by [redacted] (S) Executive Director, and [redacted] (S) Senior Counsel, both of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 301 7th Street SW, Room 5125, Washington, DC, 20407, [redacted] (S) Present during the interview was [redacted] (S)

Following the interview of Omar Al-Bayoumi, the Saudi Mabahith, members of the National Commission, and representatives of the FBI discussed the investigation concerning Al-Bayoumi. In light of the recent interview, results of past PENTTBOM interviews of Al-Bayoumi, and investigation regarding Al-Bayoumi, Counterterrorism is advised that unless additional information is developed involving Al-Bayoumi, the Saudi Mabahith are inclined not to pursue contact with Al-Bayoumi's employer or request documentation as requested in referenced serial. Legat (G) will show referenced lead covered. If additional information is developed by the PENTTBOM Team, and the documents and interviews previously requested are necessary, it is requested that a new lead be set to Legat (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 07/15/2003

To: International Operations **Attn:** (G)
(G) **Attn:** LEGAT

From: Counterterrorism
PENTTBOM Investigative Team
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To request that Legat (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make available OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI for an interview by PENTTBOM Team personnel.

Reference: (F)

Details: Investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI after their arrival in San Diego in approximately 02/2000. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI assisted the hijackers in securing an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and by signing as a guarantor on the lease application. AL-BAYOUMI also assisted AL-MIHDHAR in opening a bank account.

AL-BAYOUMI has been charged in San Diego with visa fraud. AL-BAYOUMI was detained in 09/2001 by authorities in the United Kingdom, but was released due to the lack of an extraditable charge against him. AL-BAYOUMI relocated to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2002 and currently remains in Saudi Arabia with his wife MANAL BAGADER and their children.

In approximately 10/2002, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith (F), as detailed in Mabahith memo number M/B/88/261F/423. During the interview, AL-BAYOUMI discussed his detention in the United Kingdom as a result of his association with 09/11/2001 hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR.

Present in the statements made by AL-BAYOUMI to the Mabaith are some discrepancies, such as the fact that he had met the hijackers in the apartment complex in San Diego in which he resided. However, FBI investigation, to include interviews of other individuals present at the time, has determined that AL-BAYOUMI met the hijackers for the first time in a restaurant in Los Angeles, California. Furthermore, AL-BAYOUMI stated during his interview with the Mabahith that the complex was student housing for a local school. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he listed his name as an acquaintance of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI in order for them to obtain housing as new students. To the contrary, the apartment complex in which AL-BAYOUMI resided is a privately owned residential property in which individual units are available for rent. AL-BAYOUMI signed the lease of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI as a guarantor because neither had a credit history.

With the concurrence of FBI Director Robert Mueller, the PENTTBOM Team therefore requests to interview AL-BAYOUMI in Saudi Arabia in order to clarify any discrepancies apparent in his interview.

Descriptive Data:

Reference
Name -
  Last: Al-Bayoumi
  First: Omar
  Middle: Ahmed
Sex: M
DOB: [redacted] (P-1)
PNO:

The information set forth above can be disseminated to the Mabahith.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [redacted] (G), WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[redacted] (G)

AT [redacted] (G)

The PENTTBOM Team respectfully requests that Legat [redacted] (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make available OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI for an interview by FBI PENTTBOM Team personnel.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 07/17/2003

To: International Operations **Attn:** (G)
(G) **Attn:** Legat

From: Counterterrorism
PENTTBOM Investigative Team
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To request Legat (G) to obtain further information regarding the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED, and to confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation.

Reference: (F)

Details: Investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI after their arrival in San Diego in approximately 02/2000. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI assisted the hijackers in securing an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and by signing as a guarantor on the lease application. AL-BAYOUMI also assisted AL-MIHDHAR in opening a bank account.

Further investigation into AL-BAYOUMI determined that AL-BAYOUMI has been employed by the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) since 1975. An individual interviewed by the FBI advised that PCA employee HAMID AL-RASHID, business telephone number (P-1), was involved in the payment of salary to AL-BAYOUMI (reference (F) (F)). Furthermore, this individual identified HAMID AL-RASHID as the father of SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED (reference (F)). At the time of this identification, the photograph of SAUD AL-RASHEED was being broadcast in the news media as a result of the issuance of an international Be On The Lookout (BOLO). The BOLO had been issued for SAUD AL-RASHEED after an image of his passport had been found on a CD-ROM along with images of the passports of 09/11/2001 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, SALEM AL-HAZMI, and ABDULAZIZ AL-OMARI.

Since that time, SAUD AL-RASHEED has been located and interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith (reference (F) (F)). Media reports regarding SAUD AL-RASHEED have identified his father to be ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, an employee of Saudi Red Crescent in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

This information clearly differs than the information previously obtained by the FBI. In order to clarify that the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED is not the same individual who was associated with AL-BAYOUMI, it is requested that Legat (G) confirm the identity of the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED and determine if he was ever employed at PCA. Additionally, it is requested that Legat (G) confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at PCA.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT (G), WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

(G)

AT (G)

The PENTTBOM Team requests that Legat (G) confirm the identity of the father of SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, date of birth (P-1), Saudi passport (P-1), and determine if the father was ever employed at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

(G)

AT (G)

The PENTTBOM Team requests that Legat (G) confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA).

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/21/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)
Investigative Services **Attn:**
San Diego **Attn:**

From: (G)
Legat
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTBOMB;
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: To report coverage of SD (F)

Reference: (F)

Administrative: The attached Mabahith memo (M/B/88/247F/247), dated 11/13/2001, is noted (F) Such notation is made on all Mabahith memos. It has no bearing on FBI Classification. Therefore, this EC and the enclosures are unclassified.

Enclosures: For the San Diego office is the original Mabahith letter and an English translation of same.

Details: Referenced San Diego EC advised (P) (P) was interviewed on 9/22/2001 by agents of the San Diego office of the FBI regarding his association with Omar Al-Bayoumi. Al-Bayoumi sponsored two of the deceased hijackers on AA flight 77 (Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Midhar) into a San Diego apartment complex. During the interview (P) advised both he and (P), (P) (P), knew Omar Al-Bayoumi. (P), during 1996 or 1998, resided with (P) in a San Diego apartment complex. Since that time (P) (P) was believed to have departed the United states and to be currently residing in Saudi Arabia. Referenced EC requested investigation to determine if (P) was in fact residing in Saudi Arabia, and if so, conduct an interview of him regarding his association and/or knowledge of Omar Al-Bayoumi.

As detailed in enclosed Mabahith memo it was determined (P) (P) is not at this time residing within Saudi Arabia. They further advised the telephone number provided for him, (P-1) is listed to Alalamiyah Internet Company.

Legat (G) considers San Diego (F) covered.

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and Clear.

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 11/25/2002

To: International Operations
Counterterrorism

New York
San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)

From: (G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE #182
OO:NY

Synopsis: Cover (F) by providing to San Diego the requested information.

Reference: (F)

Administrative: It should be noted that the statement (F) (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure(s): For San Diego, one copy of original response from the Saudi Mabahith (in Arabic) bearing number M/B/88/250F/423; and one English translation of same.

Details: By way of referenced Serial (F) San Diego set lead (F) for (G) to interview Khalid Abdulrab regarding his relationship with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, as well as San Diego targets Hashim Alattas; Mohdar Abdullah, aka Al-Mihdar Mohammad Al-Mihdar Zeid; Osama Al-Bayoumi, aka Abu-Emad; (P) and Omer Bakarbashat. On 05/30/2002, (G) prepared an EC to San Diego (referenced serial (F)) providing a partial response to lead 4. On

07/18/2002, (G) prepared an EC to San Diego (referenced serial (F) stating that a second request was made of the Mabahith regarding the interview of Abdulrab. That request met with another partial response. Accordingly, (G) made a third request of the Mabahith, re-requesting that an interview be performed. The third request is referenced serial (F).

On 10/23/2002, the Saudi Mabahith provided its response to the third request regarding the interview of Abdulrab. That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for San Diego:

In reference to the above mentioned memos, We would like to inform you that the above mentioned individual has revealed the following information:

First/ Statistical Information:

Name: **Khalid Abdullah Saleh AlYafai**
Nationality: Saudi National - Yemeni origin.
Place and Date of Birth: Jeddah (P-1)
Profession: Employee with Sugar United Company
Security Account: No security restrictions in the past.

Summary of his interview:

He (AlYafai) was born in Jeddah in (P-1) where he was raised...Attended Al-Falah school...After he graduated from high school he left to Jordan where he received his Bachelor Degree in Accounting then he returned to the Kingdom...He left to The United States of America to study English and to get CPA.

He stated that he left The Kingdom to The United States in 1998 where he resided in California with one of the American Families...He took an English course at the (ELS) institute for almost four months, then he transferred to (EGS) institute where he studied for almost two months...Then he was transferred to (Bccker) where he received an acceptance to study in (SDIV) University in San Diego, California.

He stated that he returned to The Kingdom almost a year and four months after he traveled to The United States of America, based on his Father's request, to get his Saudi citizenship since he had a Yemeni citizenship...After he got his Saudi citizenship, he went back to The United Sates of America on year 2000 and stayed for six months to complete his studies...He returned to The Kingdom after he got his CPA.

The above mentioned individual was interviewed about his relationship with them:

1. Omar El-Bayomi; 2. Nawaf Al-Hazmi; 3. Khaled Al-Mehdar; 4. Omar Bakr Bashet; 5. Hashem El-Attas; and 6. Mehdar Abdullah.

He (AlYafai) provided the following:

1. **Omar El-Bayomi:**
He stated that he met Omar El-Bayomi in Abu Bakr Mosque in The Islamic Center in San Diego, CA...He also visited Omar El-Bayomi who invited him to his house in the month of Ramadan...After El-Bayomi left to Britain, he e-mailed him from the United States to check on his health and such and El-Bayomi responded by a phone call...The relationship was only a friendship and the phone call was just to check on his health and such. They have not talked about any destructive or terrorism act.

2. **Nawaf Al-Hazmi:**
He stated that he has seen Nawaf Al-Hazmi in Abu Bakr Mosque in The Islamic Center in San Diego, CA specially during The Friday prayer because the people who pray at the mosque gather after the prayer to exchange conversation...He (AlYafai) denied any relationship or connection with Nawaf Al-Hazmi.

3. **Khaled Al-Mehdar:**
He totally denied any knowledge of Khaled Al-Mehdar.

4. **Omar Bakerbeshan:**
He stated that he met Omar Bakerbeshan NOT Omar Baker Bashet in the English Language Institute (ELS) in California...They were also e-mailing one another, mostly asking about how's things going...He has not met with Omar outside the institute except for the field trips that was organized by the institute for the students which included a large number of students from different nationalities.

5. **Hashem El-Attas:**
He stated that he met Hesham El-Attas in Abu Bakr Mosque in California through Omar El-Bayomi...He also e-mailed Hesham El-Attas but didn't receive any reply from him...He (AlYafai) denied having a strong relationship with Al-Attas and he said that they only met at Abu Bakr Mosque. (LS. Note: It's believed that Hashem El-Attas or Hesham El-Attas is the same individual ...Please contact the Saudi Mabahith for any further explanation).

6. **Mehdar Abdullah:**
He (AlYafai) totally denied any knowledge of Mehdar Abdullah.

He (AlYafai) also stated that he (AlYafai) has several e-mail addresses so if one goes bad, he can use the other one. His e-mail addresses are:

[redacted] (P-1)

The above mentioned individual totally denied any knowledge of any destructive or terrorism acts...He also denied hearing any of the above mentioned individuals talking about any destructive or terrorism acts emphasizing that their relationship was a normal relationship and within asking about health and such whether at the mosque or via e-mail.

This is for your information and we are awaiting what you have (about this subject)...Regards..

End translation.

Based upon the above, [redacted] (G) considers [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) lead [redacted] (F) covered.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

IO

AT (G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CA

San Diego is requested to review the above and consider a response to the Saudi Mabahith regarding any recent developments in San Diego's investigation.

◆◆

[LEGAT (G) p.1]

NUMBER: M/B/88/247 F
DATE: 11/13/2001
SUBJECT: (P) and (P)
REFERENCE: Your memo No. (F) dated 10/11/2001

This memo is addressed to (S) Legal attache at the U.S. embassy in (G)

Greetings:

Regarding your above-referenced memo on both (P) and his brother, (P), (P) nationals. They were questioned by U.S. authorities about any information they might have on Omar Ahmed ALBAYOUMI.

We would like to inform you that neither of them is living in the Kingdom. Also, the telephone number with which you provided us in your memo, (P-1), is listed under the Alalamiyah (World) Internet Company.

This is for your information. Please accept our regards.

[*document name: mab247f.01*]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/21/2004

To: Counterterrorism
New York

Attn: (G), (S)

From: New York
PENTTBOM Investigative Team, FBIHQ
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: [redacted] To summarize investigation to date of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

(F)

(F)

Details: [redacted] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1), place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian

[redacted]

passport (P-1) social security account number (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F)). The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[redacted] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F)).

[redacted] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P), 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. (C-2)
(C-2)

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

[redacted] FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. To date, however, evidence and intelligence do not indicate that AL-BAYOUMI had advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 or knowledge of AL-HAZMI's and/or AL-MIHDHAR's status as Al Qaeda operatives. Therefore, to date, the evidence and intelligence developed throughout this investigation have not indicated that the assistance provided by AL-BAYOUMI to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was witting. Furthermore, there is no evidence or intelligence that AL-BAYOUMI provided actual financial support to AL-HAZMI and/or AL-MIHDHAR. In response to previous reports to the contrary, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to 6602 Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England, where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[redacted] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference [redacted] (F)). In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference [redacted] (F)). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F). AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F)). AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[redacted] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427), and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[redacted] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from Ercan Engineering (Ercan) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. Ercan was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, [redacted] (P) advised that Ercan had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[redacted] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by ISAMU DYSON (now known as CLAYTON BIN DON), an associate from San Diego. DYSON, [redacted] (P) was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference [redacted] (F)). Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

[redacted] A copy of AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi Arabian passport [redacted] (P-1) recovered during the search of his residence in England, revealed that the passport was issued on 02/01/2000 in Los Angeles, California (reference [redacted] (F)). This information has also been confirmed by information received from the Saudi Mabahith.

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[redacted] When inviting DYSON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told DYSON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON proceeded on foot.

[redacted] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. There is no information or evidence that this initial meeting was previously arranged. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[redacted] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[redacted] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment [redacted] When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account [redacted] with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR's account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference [redacted]).

[redacted] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment [redacted] as their last address; however, there is no other information or evidence that either AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR resided with AL-BAYOUMI prior to moving into Apartment [redacted] (reference [redacted]). In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account, as detailed above) were paid by AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. There is no evidence that AL-BAYOUMI supplied any rental payment for Apartment [redacted].

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[redacted] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference [redacted] (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT [redacted] (P)

[redacted] Soon after AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR moved into the Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI held a dinner party in their apartment. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had planned to hold the dinner in his own apartment but one of the guests had brought his wife. To comply with the traditional Islamic custom of separating males and females at social gatherings, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he decided to leave the females in his own apartment with his wife and to ask AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR if the males could gather in their mainly unfurnished apartment. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR agreed that the dinner could be held in their apartment.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI advised that the dinner was in honor of a visiting sheikh who had spoken at the Al Medina mosque during Ramadan. Videotapes of the dinner, recovered during a search of AL-BAYOUMI's residence in England in 09/2001, confirm that plaques were given by AL-BAYOUMI to various individuals for their service at the mosque (reference [redacted] (F)). Furthermore, no evidence has been found to support information from ISAMU DYSON that the dinner was a welcoming party for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. AL-MIHDHAR appears for a very short time on the videotape; AL-HAZMI is not seen at all. Other individuals who were present at the dinner have advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed in a back room of the apartment during the dinner.

TRAVEL OF AL-BAYOUMI IN 2000

[redacted] When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he traveled often during the spring of 2000 and therefore seldom interacted with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR after the dinner held in their apartment. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to Washington, DC, to attend a seminar at George Washington University for approximately two weeks in 03/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then traveled to Saudi Arabia between 03/21/2000 and 05/31/2000. Review of travel records, immigration records, and school records has corroborated this information. When AL-BAYOUMI returned from Saudi Arabia, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had vacated their apartment and moved to another residence. After they moved out of Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he only saw AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the mosque on one or two occasions.

ALLEGATIONS THAT AL-BAYOUMI WAS A SAUDI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

[redacted] Multiple individuals in the San Diego area, to reportedly include NAWAF AL-HAZMI, suspected AL-BAYOUMI to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer because he was frequently observed videotaping events at the local Islamic center. To date, the FBI has not received any information corroborating this assertion.

CONCLUSION

[redacted] In conclusion, the intelligence information and evidence acquired during the investigation to date do not indicate that the assistance provided by AL-BAYOUMI to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was witting. There is no indication to date that AL-BAYOUMI had advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 or knowledge of AL-HAZMI's and/or AL-MIHDHAR's status as Al Qaeda operatives. Furthermore, the investigation has determined that AL-BAYOUMI did not provide any monetary support to AL-HAZMI and/or AL-MIHDHAR.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] For information.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/29/2005

To: New York **Attn:** (S)

Washington Field **Attn:**
Los Angeles **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE - 182

Synopsis: Review telephone records obtained by San Diego Division in regard to Omar Al-Bayoumi.

Details: In connection with an effort by the Penttbom Team, Los Angeles Division and San Diego Division to review Penttbom investigation in Southern California, San Diego recently (D) (D) (D) Los Angeles obtained subscriber information for Los Angeles telephone numbers in contact with Al-Bayoumi telephone numbers and provided analysis under EC dated April 18, 2005.

This report is an analysis of FBI Telephone Application records on toll records received by San Diego Division for the time period November 1, 1999 through March 1, 2001. This analysis will cover three topics: the historical review of toll records received by San Diego Division, the analysis of calls on significant dates, and associates identified through toll analysis. Also attached is a time line showing significant dates regarding Al-Bayoumi.

A. Historical Review of Telephone Records

During the fall of 2001, San Diego Division obtained Grand Jury toll records for the following telephone numbers associated with Omar Al-Bayoumi:

1. Pacific Bell home telephone number (P)/formerly (P) tolls received January 17, 2000 through June 30, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California. Note: An area code change from 619 to 858 began in approximately June 1999 and was mandatory by December 1999.

2. Sprint cellular telephone number (P), tolls received January 9, 2000 through June 7, 2000, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California, from September 27, 1998 to June 8, 2000.

3. Sprint cellular telephone number (P), tolls received June 8, 2000 to April 2, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California.

4. Airtouch cellular telephone number (P), tolls received November 20, 1998 through September 20, 2000, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, C/O Manal Bagader, (P), San Diego, California. From Al-Bayoumi's records found at the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (KCIC), (P) is referred as Manal's phone number, (F).

5. Pacific Bell Wireless telephone number (P), tolls received September 1, 2000 through July 28, 2001, subscribed to Manal Bagader.

6. Pacific Bell telephone number (P) tolls received July 1, 1998 through April 22, 2001, service disconnected April 22, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, dba Masjed Al Madianah, 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, CA. This is the telephone number used in Al-Bayoumi's office at the KCIC. Al-Bayoumi was given power of attorney for (P) (P) to purchase a building in June 1998 for the KCIC.

7. Pacific Bell telephone number (P), tolls received December 15, 1999 through January 17, 2001, subscribed to Manal A. Bagader, (P) San Diego, California, installed September 1, 1999 and disconnected on May 14, 2001. This telephone line was primarily used to connect with Internet Service provider UUNET TECH.

During the time period when Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were in San Diego, California (February 4, 2000 through June 10, 2000 and Al-Hazmi's continued residence through December 11, 2000) records indicate Omar Al-Bayoumi left San Diego during the time periods January 9, 2000 (Culver City); February 4, 2000 (Los Angeles); March

30, 2000 through May 31, 2000 (Saudi Arabia); July 12, 2000 (Culver City); July 31, 2000 through August 3, 2000 (Las Vegas); and October 9, 2000 through November 30, 2000 (Great Britain). When interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi advised that he attended a two to three week seminar in Washington D.C. a couple of weeks after Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego. Review of Al-Bayoumi's financial records from February to March 30, 2000 do not show evidence of this travel or exactly when it occurred.

B. Analysis of Significant Dates

1. January 15, 2000: Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar arrived at Los Angeles International Airport on United Flight 2 from Bangkok arriving at 13:27.

The first call activity on Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) for January 15, 2000, was with his wife Manal's cellular telephone number (P) at 13:41 and 13:42. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone records show two unknown incoming calls at 13:41 and 13:43, which are believed to be the two calls from Manal's cellular telephone. The next call noted on Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), was a call made at 21:12 to (P), subscribed to Hashim Moshen AlAttas. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number then called (P), subscribed to Broadway Pizza, known employer of Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called AlAttas' telephone number again at 21:42 and 22:10.

The first call activity shown between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and AlAttas' telephone number (P), was on January 12, 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had twenty calls to (P) from January 12, 2000 to February 14, 2000. The first call activity shown between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and telephone numbers associated with Khalid Abdulrab was on July 16, 1999. Hashim AlAttas and Khalid Abdulrab will be discussed below.

On January 17, 2000 at 22:59, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number received a six minute call from (P), subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy. A detailed analysis of Al-Thumairy, former Imam of the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California is discussed below.

2. February 1, 2000: Al-Bayoumi's trip with Isamu Dyson to Los Angeles, meeting with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

Telephone records show that beginning January 19, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had contacts with telephone numbers associated with the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C. Beginning on January 26, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California, (P). (Note: Telephone records show that

Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, (P) had numerous contacts with both Saudi Embassy telephone numbers in Washington D.C. and the Saudi Consulate number in Los Angeles in 1998 and 1999.)

From searches conducted by New Scotland Yard and interview of Al-Bayoumi by the Saudi Mabahith, it was determined that Al-Bayoumi was issued a Saudi Passport at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California on February 1, 2000. During the trip to Los Angeles when Al-Bayoumi received his passport, Al-Bayoumi and Isamu Dyson have stated they met Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar by chance at the Mediterranean Gourmet Restaurant, 10863 Venice Boulevard, Los Angeles, California.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone call activity is consistent with the trip to Los Angeles as described by Dyson and Al-Bayoumi. On January 31, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), had two contacts with the Saudi Embassy, (P) three contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, (P) and two contacts with Isamu Dyson's cellular telephone number, (P).

On February 1, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), had three contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, 310-479-6000, 9:32, 9:53 and 12:09; one contact with Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number at 19:11; and one call with Dyson's cellular telephone number at 21:50.

Between (P) and (P) Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had (P) calls to (P), subscribed to Isamu A. Dyson. Dyson, now known as Clayton Bin Don, is a (P-1) who has been interviewed by the FBI numerous times. Dyson advised that during the trip to Los Angeles, he and Al-Bayoumi stopped at the Saudi Consulate; met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and then went to the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, 10980 W. Washington Boulevard, (P-1) When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, he stated they did not visit the King Fahad Mosque during the trip to Los Angeles.

3. February 4, 2000: Evidence that Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar are in San Diego, California.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records for February 2-3, 2000, do not provide any information in regard to exactly when Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar first arrived in San Diego. The toll records from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), show the most activity with calls made to the Saudi Consulate, Saudi Embassy, various travel agencies, Keller Graduate School, Delaware College of Business, (P), and Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai.

Parkwood Apartment rental agreements and financial records show that on February 4, 2000, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were in San Diego. Financial records show Al-Bayoumi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were in the Bank of America on Balboa Avenue from approximately 15:30-15:40. Parkwood Apartment records show Omar Al-Bayoumi, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar each signed rental agreements for apartment 6401 Mt. Ada, apartment #150 dated February 4, 2000. One document, Apartment Move-in/Move-Out List is signed and dated February 3, 2000, [redacted] attachments.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone activity for February 4, 2000 can be summarized as follows:

TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	11:21	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	12:08	1:00
BAYOUMI AT BANK OF AMERICA		**15:30-15:40**	
BAYOUMI Cell	WIFE Cell	15:58	2:00
BAYOUMI Cell	WIFE Cell	16:04	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:04	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:10	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	16:14	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:30	1:00
AULAQI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:40	1:00
AR-RIBAT PAYPHONE	BAYOUMI Cell	16:42	1:00
AR-RIBAT FAX	BAYOUMI Cell	16:43	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	ALTHUMAIRY(CBR)	16:52	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	BAYOUMI Cell	16:54	1:00
ALTHUMAIRY (CBR)	BAYOUMI Cell	16:55	2:00
[redacted] (ABDULRAB Home)	BAYOUMI Cell	17:03	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	BAYOUMI Cell	20:07	2:00
[redacted]	BAYOUMI Cell	20:54	1:00
[redacted]	BAYOUMI Cell	20:56	1:00

After leaving the Bank of America, Al-Bayoumi, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar most likely returned to the Parkwood Apartments to give the apartment manager the cashier's check for apartment [redacted] and a copy of Al-Mihdhar's opening bank account deposit. When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he did not recall if he accompanied Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar back to the manager's office. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone made calls to Anwar Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque an hour after the bank transactions. The telephone activity for February 4, 2000, could suggest that Al-Bayoumi may have introduced Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Anwar Aulaqi and individuals at the ar-Ribat mosque. When interviewed in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi denied making introductions. Also of note are the calls from and to Al-Thumairy, received and made after Al-Bayoumi called Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat telephone numbers.

4. February 15, 2000: Khalid Al-Mihdhar signed lease agreement for Hashim AlAttas apartment.

Hashim AlAttas, date of birth (P-1), assisted Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in trying to lease his apartment in February/March 2000. On or about February 15, 2000, Al-Mihdhar signed a lease agreement and agreed to move into AlAttas apartment on March 1, 2000. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar never actually moved into the apartment, interview of apartment manager (P), (F) (F). AlAttas was said to have returned to Saudi Arabia at the end of February/early March 2000. Checks with Immigration databases failed to reveal information on when AlAttas left the United States.

On February 14, 2000 at 20:27, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), made a five minute call to (P), subscribed to Hashim AlAttas. The next call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number was made at 20:32 to (P), subscribed to (P) and given by (P) when he was interviewed in 2001 as his pager number, (F). Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had previously called (P) pager number on February 9, 2000 at 10:44, three minutes after receiving an unknown in coming call at 10:41. The next call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number on February 14, 2000 at 20:40, was a six minute call to AlAttas.

During an interview with (P) on October 31, 2001, (P) did not recognize the name or photograph of Omar Al-Bayoumi. (P) recalled being paged before Al-Mihdhar signed the lease agreement and when (P) returned the page he spoke with Nawaf Al-Hazmi. (P) s office telephone records did not record calls to local numbers, (F) When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he did not recognize the name (P) and he thought AlAttas may have used his telephone to contact (P) Al-Bayoumi stated he never let Al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdhar use his cellular or home telephones. Al-Bayoumi denied assisting Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar move into AlAttas' apartment and knowing how AlAttas met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al-Bayoumi acknowledged that he knew Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were planning to moved into AlAttas apartment, as AlAttas was returning to Saudi Arabia. Al-Bayoumi had known AlAttas for a long time and would see and call him often, (F).

The call activity between Al-Bayoumi, Hashim AlAttas and (P) (P) could indicate that Al-Bayoumi may have assisted in facilitating the arrangements for Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to move into AlAttas' apartment and most likely introduced AlAttas to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.

5. February 17-19, 2000: Party in Parkwood Apartments

A videotape seized by New Scotland Yard during searches of Omar Al-Bayoumi in England, labeled (S) 14, shows Khalid Abdulrab receiving a plaque from Omar Al-Bayoumi. There is a group of people depicted in the video which is believed to have been taken in Parkwood Apartment number (P), residence of Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Ahmad Mustafa. An individual who looks like Khalid Al-Mihdhar is shown. The plaque to Abdulrab is from the Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara mosque, known as the KCIC, and gives thanks to Abdulrab for his assistance during Ramadan 2000. Ramadan occurred twice in 2000, from December 9, 1999 to January 7, 2000 and from November 28, 2000 to December 27, 2000. Records received from Awards Designers Scriber, 7736 Clairemont Mesa Boulevard, San Diego, California, show that the plaque for Khalid Abdulrab was made there and paid for by Omar Al-Bayoumi on February 17, 2000. Immigration records show that Khalid Abdulrab departed Los Angeles, California on February 20, 2000. From this information it can be determined that the party held in the hijackers apartment occurred sometime between February 17-19, 2000. During an interview of Al-Bayoumi, he advised that he planned a party for a visiting Sheikh from Norway who had provided services at the Kurdish mosque. Al-Bayoumi decided to hold the dinner at the Parkwood Apartments and he used Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment for the men to gather, (F). Others present at the dinner were individuals from the Kurdish mosque-KCIC, Sheikh (P) (P) individuals from the Islamic Center of San Diego to include (P) Isamu Dyson and (P).

On February 16, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) shows a five minute call at 9:33 to (P) subscribed to Near East Foods. A one minute call and a four minute call are then made to the KCIC fax number at 9:44 and 9:45. A six minute call was made to a phone number subscribed to Anwar Aulaqi, (P) at 16:43 and a two minute call was made to (P), (P) at 17:03.

On February 17, 2000 at 13:55, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had a three minute call with (P), subscribed to Near East Foods. At 19:08, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had a two minute call with (P), subscribed to the KCIC. At 19:28, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P), subscribed to (P). At 19:47 and 19:48 there were two calls from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number to (P), subscribed to (P). (P) is associated with Near East Foods. At 20:07, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P), subscribed to the Islamic Center of San Diego. The last call recorded on Al-Bayoumi's cellular phone was an unknown incoming call at 20:50. Telephone number (P) was used on a lease application for Khalid Al-Mihdhar as a personal reference, (F) On January 31, 2005, (P) was interviewed by Seattle division and he denied knowing or meeting Khalid Al-Mihdhar. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F) (P) was not asked about Omar Al-Bayoumi when he was interviewed by Seattle. There is only one call to (P) found in Al-Bayoumi's toll records.

Another number listed on Al-Mihdhar's lease application for AlAttas' apartment was (P), telephone number of (P) (co-worker of AlAttas). When interviewed, (P) stated that he went with AlAttas and two males to an RV park in order for the two males to take over AlAttas' apartment lease. (P) thought AlAttas was doing Khalid LNU, who worked at Broadway Pizza (believed to be Khalid Abdulrab), a favor by assisting the two males. (P) was shown a photograph of Al-Bayoumi and advised that he knew Al-Bayoumi from the mosque, (F) In a later interview, (P) advised the he did not provide his telephone number for the two men to use on the lease agreement.

On February 18, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P) twice, once at 17:12 and again at 17:13; the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (P) for two minutes at 19:58; a phone number subscribed to (P) a well known individual in the Kurdish community, for five minutes at 20:07; and a three minute call to Anwar Aulaqi at 21:56.

On February 19, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (P) for six minutes at 10:56; and a number associated with Khalid Abdulrab twice at 17:58 and 19:49.

The telephone activity would suggest that the party held at the Parkwood Apartments took place on February 17, 2000, based on the calls to the KCIC, ICSD and Near East Foods.

6. March 17, 2000: Call from Parkwood Apt. 150

On March 17, 2000 at 13:47, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) received a one minute call from (P), home telephone number of Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Ahmed Mustafa. The next call made from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number at 13:57 was a one minute call to (P), subscribed to Southwestern Communications. Al-Bayoumi had rented a room at Residence Inn by Marriott, 5400 Kearny Mesa Road, San Diego, California from March 10, 2000 through March 16, 2000. The room was rented for one person for the purpose of tourism, (F), Serial (F) Several calls were place from this room to a number subscribed to AOL, (P) and the (P) number.

In regard to calls made to/from the apartment (P) telephone number (P) on March 17, 2000, only one other call is shown on the toll records, a call to (P) subscribed to (P) Tailoring at 17:23. From interviews of Ahmad Mustafa, Mustafa advised that (P) (P) was a friend of his uncle who offered Ahmad a place to stay in San Diego, (F), Serials (F).

7. June 10, 2000: Khalid Al-Mihdhar leaves United States on flight from Los Angeles International Airport.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records do not show any significant contacts made on or around June 10, 2000.

8. December 8-11, 2000: Hani Hanjour arrives in San Diego on December 8, 2000 and leaves with Nawaf Al-Hazmi on December 11, 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records during this time period do not show any contact with the one phone number associated with Nawaf Al-Hazmi during this time period, Abdussattar Shaikh's telephone number, (P) On December 9, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's home and cellular telephone numbers had contacts with (P), subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, the longest call being five to six minutes at 16:20.

As noted above, only one call was made from the Parkwood Apartment (P) home telephone number to Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers. During the time Nawaf Al-Hazmi resided with Abdussattar Shaikh, there were four one minute calls in August 2000 from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) to Abdussattar Shaikh's home telephone number (P). The calls occurred on August 8, 2000 at 21:09; August 10, 2000 at 12:51 and 12:52; and August 23, 2000 at 13:24. Al-Hazmi resided at Abdussattar Shaikh's home from the time he left the Parkwood Apartments until he left San Diego in December 2000. Al-Hazmi used (P) as his daytime telephone phone on California Department of Motor Vehicles records filled out on June 2, 2000, (F), (F).

C. Other Telephone Associates/Connections in 2000

1. Saudi Embassy/Saudi Consulate

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers had approximately 104 contacts with telephone numbers associated with the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Embassy of Saudi Arabia Islamic Affairs Office Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, and Saudi Arabia Education Mission located in Washington D.C. during the year 2000. Al-Bayoumi's telephones also had approximately twenty-four contacts with (P) subscribed to the Saudi Arabia

Royal Consulate in Los Angeles, California, during the year 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had eleven calls with (P) subscribed to the Saudi Arabia Royal Consulate from January 26, 2000 through February 10, 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had thirteen calls with (P) from July 11, 2000 through December 20, 2000. Documents taken from Al-Bayoumi's office at the KCIC show (P) was associated with (P). Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers to include his home telephone number, cellular telephone numbers, and office telephone number at the KCIC, had contacts with Saudi Embassy/Mission telephones numbers and Saudi Consulate telephone and fax numbers in 1998 and 1999.

2. Los Angeles Connections: Fahad Al-Thumairy, (P) (P), and the King Fahad Mosque

Between December 16, 1998 and December 20, 2000, telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi (home #1 (P); #2 cell (P); #3 cell (P); #4 KCIC (P)) had sixty-seven contacts with telephone numbers associated with Fahad Al-Thumairy, date of birth (P-1) (#1 home (P); #2 a can be reached (CBR) number used by Al-Thumairy, but subscribed to (P), (P) and #3 a cell number subscribed to (P), but used by Al-Thumairy, (P)).

DATE	TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
12/16/98	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	19:27	1:00
11/15/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	14:23	4:00
12/6/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:58	1:00
12/7/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	19:17	2:00
12/8/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	11:24	1:00
12/15/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	14:23	4:00
12/18/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	16:08	2:00
12/19/99	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	21:10	1:00
12/19/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:17	3:00
12/20/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	15:35	3:00
12/20/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:04	9:00
12/21/99	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	17:43	1:00
12/21/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:50	3:00
12/27/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	18:27	9:00
12/27/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:36	6:00
12/28/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:02	1:00
1/2/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	05:06	3:00
1/6/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	00:53	5:00
1/6/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:15	1:00
1/6/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	18:21	1:00
1/6/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:30	4:00
1/9/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	12:21	1:00

1/17/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:59	6:00
1/19/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	20:20	1:00
1/19/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#2	20:23	1:00
1/19/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	22:13	5:00
1/24/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:09	1:00
2/4/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	16:52	1:00
2/4/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	16:55	2:00
7/11/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	14:04	1:00
8/4/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	17:27	2:00

DATE	TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
8/6/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	11:49	6:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	19:10	2:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	19:41	1:00
8/8/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	22:44	2:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	23:12	1:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	23:13	13:00
9/10/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	11:31	1:00
9/14/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	18:00	4:00
9/14/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	20:19	2:00
9/15/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	12:09	2:00
9/17/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	14:40	2:00
9/17/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	14:53	5:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	12:27	1:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	12:28	1:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	12:29	1:00
12/2/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	20:53	:37
12/2/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	20:53:42	1:00
12/3/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	14:36	3:29
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	11:10	:14
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:18	:10
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:19	:00
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:19:58	:27
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	16:20	4:55
12/10/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	19:16	:46
12/10/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	21:39	4:00
12/10/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	23:25	2:00
12/11/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	11:51	:43
12/14/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#4	17:35	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	15:30	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	15:57	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	16:01	1:00
12/17/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	13:52	:36
12/17/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	14:04	6:00
12/17/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	14:30	1:29
12/20/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	16:08	:51

12/20/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#4	16:08:52	2:38

When interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi identified Fahad Al-Thumairy as the Imam of the King Fahad mosque and stated that he had visited the King Fahad mosque once or twice a year, but not on the day he went to Los Angles with Isamu Dyson. It is apparent from the telephone activity noted above that Al-Bayoumi had substantial contacts with Al-Thumairy. Of interest are the calls made during significant time periods when Al-Mihdhar and/or Al-Hazmi were in Los Angeles, California and San Diego, California: January 17-24, 2000; February 4, 2000; December 9-11, 2000. The significance of these calls is unknown due to the lack of content for the calls and the frequency of calls during 1999 and 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers also had contacts with telephone numbers associated with the King Fahad mosque, Culver City, California. During the September 26, 2001 search of Al-Bayoumi's office in the KCIC, telephone numbers (P), (P), and (P) were found for the King Fahad mosque, 10980 Washington Boulevard, Culver City, California. The name (P) was also related to telephone number (P). Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, (P), had a seven minute call to (P) on July 8, 1999. On September 8, 2000 and September 13, 2000, the fax number at the KCIC, (P), received two calls from 310-204-1260, the fax number at the King Fahad Mosque. On December 16, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) contacted (P) and (P), both numbers associated with the King Fahad Mosque.

3. Anwar Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers show eight contacts with telephone numbers associated with former Imam of the ar-Ribat mosque, Anwar Aulaqi, date of birth (P-1), and the ar-Ribat mosque, 7173 Saranac Street, La Mesa, California from February 4, 2000 through December 25, 2000. As stated above, the calls on February 4, 2000 occurred an hour after Al-Bayoumi was in the Bank of America branch on Balboa Avenue with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

A cellular telephone number subscribed to Al-Bayoumi and believed to be used by his wife Manal (see above under historical review), (P) made five calls to telephone number (P) (Aulaqi's home telephone number). The calls were made on November 20, 1998; February 26, 1999; May 7, 1999; October 3, 1999; and April 19, 2000. Travel records and interview reports show that Al-Bayoumi was in Saudi Arabia on April 19, 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), called Aulaqi's home telephone number (P), three more times, all in February 2000: a one minute call on February 10, 2000 at 20:42; a six minute call on February 16, 2000 at 16:43; and a three minute call on February 18, 2000 at 21:56. On December 18, 2000 at 19:37, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) made a one minute call to (P) the office number to the ar-Ribat mosque. One minute later, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) made a two minute call to (P), the pay phone at the ar-Ribat mosque. On December 25, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone makes a three minute call to the ar-Ribat pay phone. In January 2001, Aulaqi moved to Falls Church, Virginia, (F)

4. Mohdar Abdullah (P)

Mohdar Abdullah, date of birth (P-1), was a close associate of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during time they spent in San Diego, California. During an interview of Abdullah on September 18, 2001, Abdullah advised that Al-Bayoumi brought Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to the mosque on Saranac (ar-Ribat mosque) and introduced them to Abdullah. According to Abdullah, Al-Bayoumi asked Abdullah to become acquainted with them, acclimate them to San Diego and assist them in any way, (F). The phone analysis above regarding Aulaqi shows Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers had contacts with Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque at a time when Al-Bayoumi was with or had just been with Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar on February 4, 2000. During Al-Bayoumi's August 2003 interview in Saudi Arabia, Al-Bayoumi denied introducing Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Mohdar Abdullah or asking Abdullah to assist them. Al-Bayoumi's telephone records could indicate Al-Bayoumi may have introduced Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Aulaqi, Abdullah and to the ar-Ribat mosque.

Telephone records show contacts between two cellular telephone numbers subscribed to Al-Bayoumi and a telephone number at the residence of Mohdar Abdullah, (P), subscribed to Samir Karawia, (P) (P), La Mesa, California. On March 15, 2000 at 9:08, there was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone (P); on July 11, 2000 at 14:06 there was one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P); and on October 1, 2000 at 18:05 there was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P). Mohdar Abdullah also worked at the Texaco station on Spring Street in La Mesa, California. On June 23, 2000, there were two one minute calls to a telephone number subscribed to this Texaco station, (P), from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), at 18:11 and 19:47.

Another telephone number, (P), was associated with the (P) address during the year 2000. Between July 22, 2000 and November 11, 2000, telephone number (P) had twenty-nine calls to (P), Abdussattar Shaikh's home telephone number where Al-Hazmi resided from approximately June 2000 until he left San Diego in December 2000. There was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), to (P) on September 6, 1999.

Penttbom (D) (P), date of birth (P-1) (P-1), was an associate of Mohdar Abdullah. According to (P) he met Abdullah while they both worked at the Texaco station in La Mesa, California. (P) was interviewed in September 2001. He knew Al-Bayoumi and interacted with him at the mosque on Balboa and while living with other Saudi students in an apartment located off Balboa. (P) said he was introduced to Nawaf Al-Hazmi by Mohdar Abdullah at the Texaco station on Spring Street. (P) observed Al-Hazmi at the Texaco station and interacted with him. When (P) was confronted with information that his phone number was in Al-Hazmi's vehicle which had been found in the Dulles National Airport after September 11, 2001, (P) admitted he gave Al-Hazmi his phone number and that they were friends. (F) Telephone number (P) with the name (P) was found in Al-Hazmi's vehicle in the Dulles National Airport, (F). Telephone number (P) is associated with (P) residence located at (P) San Diego, California. It appears (P) resided at this address from June 2000 through the first of August 2000, (F) (P) then moved to (P) San Diego, California, telephone number (P) from approximately August 8, 2000 through January 1, 2001, (F) No telephone contacts were found between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and (P) From August 18, 2000 through October 1, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number made thirteen calls to (P), the phone number for (P) apartment on (P).

5. Hashim AlAttas

See above under February 15, 2000 lease agreement.

6. Khalid Abdulrab

Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai, date of birth (P-1), was a Saudi student who lived in San Diego from November 1998 to February 2000 and again from September 2000 through December 2000, according to his foreign exchange student host (P), (F) (F) Abdulrab briefly attended English Language School, a business school and he worked at Broadway Pizza. Abdulrab is believed to have assisted Al-Bayoumi at the KCIC mosque in El Cajon, California and was given a plaque from Al-Bayoumi at the party held in the hijackers apartment in February 2000 referenced above. During the time period January 9, 2000 through August 16, 2000, Abdulrab's home telephone number at (P)'s residence, (P) had thirty-eight calls with three telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi, (P), (P) and (P). On July 16, 1999, Al-Bayoumi's KCIC telephone number had one call to the (P) residence. On September 17, 2000, (P) subscribed to (P) had one call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P). Abdulrab was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in 2002 and the FBI in February 2004. Abdulrab stated he knew Al-Bayoumi from the Islamic Center of San Diego and had seen Nawaf Al-Hazmi at the Islamic Center. Abdulrab denied any knowledge of destructive or terrorism acts or talking with Al-Bayoumi or Al-Hamzi about destructive or terrorism acts, (F), (F).

7. Talal Al-Hamdan

Telephone records show that from January 22, 2000 to August 11, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone numbers, (P) and (P), had twenty-three calls to (P), subscribed to Talal Al-Hamdan. Al-Hamdan, date of birth (P-1), was interviewed in October 2001 and advised that his father, Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-Hamdan, told Talal to contact Al-Bayoumi at the Abu Bakr mosque in San Diego when Talal moved to San Diego. At the time of the interview, Al-Hamdan said his father was a Finance Ministry official for the Saudi government and at one time he helped Al-Bayoumi obtain a scholarship. Al-Hamdan advised their family was wealthy and well known in Saudi Arabia. Al-Hamdan did not provide any information regarding his involvement with terrorism and stated he was in disagreement with the attacks of September 11, 2001, (F), Serial (F)

8. (P)

Between March 27, 2000 and September 15, 2000, thirty-one calls were made from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone numbers (P) and (P) to (P), a telephone number used by Luwam Nour, date of birth (P-1). Al-Bayoumi listed (P) as a personal reference and emergency contact on his Parkwood apartment rental application signed July 28, 1999, (F) When interviewed in Saudi Arabia, Al-Bayoumi said that he assisted Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to fill out the Parkwood apartment rental application and was instructed by the apartment manager to use his friend Luwam as a reference because (P) had been a long time resident at the Parkwood Apartments. (P) is listed as both a personal reference and an emergency contact, (F)

9. Osama Basnan

Allegation were received that Osama Basnan, date of birth (P-1) (P-1), was a supporter of Osama bin Laden; considered the "mayor" of the San Diego Saudi community; and would have known the Saudi pilots from San Diego involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, (F) Investigation determined significant telephone contacts between telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi and his wife and telephone numbers associated with Basnan and his wife. Reviewing Al-Bayoumi's and Basnan's telephone records for the year 2000, there are approximately thirty-one contacts between Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number (P) and Basnan's cellular telephone number (P). Five of these calls occurred when Al-Bayoumi was known to be overseas. One call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), was made to Basnan's home telephone number (P) on July 30, 2000. Seventy-four out of eighty calls recorded between Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number and Basnan's cellular telephone number in the year 2001 were made when Al-Bayoumi was overseas. When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, he acknowledged that Basnan was an acquaintance whom he did not care much for and that his wife and Basnan's wife were close friends. When Basnan was interviewed, he stated he did not like Al-Bayoumi and they had little personal contact, (F)

10. Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America (IIASA)

Telephone records show that Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number (P), cellular telephone number (P), and telephone number at the KCIC, (P), had twenty-one calls with phone numbers associated with the IIASA. On December 14, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC had two calls with (P), subscribed to (P) (P) professor IIASA, Fairfax, Virginia. Between December 22, 2000 and January 13, 2001, Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC and his cellular telephone numbers (P) had sixteen calls with two telephone number, (P) and (P), subscribed to (P), staff member at IIASA, Fairfax, Virginia. On December 15, 2000, (P), subscribed to Institute for Islamic & Arabic Sciences, 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Virginia contacted Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P). On February 12, 2001, (P), subscribed to Institute for Islamic and Arabic Study, 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Virginia, made one call to Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number (P) On February 13, 2001, (P) made one call to Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, (P).

Washington Field office has an ongoing case regarding the (A), (G), (J-1) Fairfax, Virginia and (D) (D)

(D)

11. Mohammed Abd Al-Aziz Al Habib and Saad Abd Al-Aziz Al Habib, aka Al-Habeeb

When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he stated that he was contacted by Saad Al Habib, a Saudi individual who had attended school in San Diego, regarding the purchase of a mosque for the San Diego Kurdish community. Al-Bayoumi stated Al Habib gave him all the money to purchase the building. Escrow documents support the fact that Al Habib, aka Al-Habeeb, funded the purchase of the Kurdish mosque property. Financial records show that Al-Bayoumi received money from Mohammed Al Habib and Saad Al Habib for the purchase of the Kurdish mosque (KCIC); for repairs to the mosque building; and mostly likely to pay for the salary of a visiting Sheikh from Norway, Abdulrahman Barzanjee.

Checks with (O-1) and Immigration showed that (O-1) (O-1) entered the United States through (O-1) (O-1) Escrow documents show a $535,000 payment for the Kurdish mosque property was received from Saad A. S. Al Habeeb on June 18, 1998.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records show that from December 17, 1999 through December 5, 2000, the telephone number at the KCIC made 26 direct calls to various telephone numbers in Saudi Arabia. None of the telephone numbers called are known telephone numbers associated with Saad Al Habib. Al-Bayoumi's other telephone number records show calls made through calling card numbers; however, no information was obtained showing call activity between Al-Bayoumi and Al Habib.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Provided for your information.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 02/04/2004

To: International Operations **Attn:** (G), (S)
(G) **Attn:**

From: Counterterrorism
PENTTBOM Investigative Team
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To provide additional information regarding the individuals requested to be interviewed by the 9/11 Commission and FBI.

Reference: Telcall between (G) ALAT (S) and PENTTBOM SA (S) on 01/24/2004; email from (G) Legat (S) dated 02/04/2004.

Details: Legat (G) was recently requested to coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make six individuals available for interviews by the 9/11 Commission and the FBI. In response to the request of Legat (G), the following information from the PENTTBOM investigation concerning these individuals is being provided.

FAHAD I. A. AL-THUMAIRY
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
PPN:
Last Known Address: Al Takassi, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Last Known Telephone: (P-1)

From 1996 to 2003, AL-THUMAIRY resided in Los Angeles, California, where he was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Affairs, and Religious Guidance at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As such, AL-THUMAIRY was the consulate liaison to the King Fahad Mosque, Culver City, California. Investigation into the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 determined that hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI visited the King Fahad Mosque on at least one occasion in 06/2000. Furthermore, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI had arrived in the United States at Los Angeles in 01/2000 and stayed in the Los Angeles area until their relocation to San Diego, California, in 02/2000. It is not known to date where AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI stayed while in the Los Angeles area in 01/2000 and when/if AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI visited the King Fahad Mosque during 01/2000.

Prior to moving to San Diego at the end of 01/2000, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially met OMAR AL-BAYOUMI at a restaurant in Los Angeles after AL-BAYOUMI had visited the Saudi Arabian Consulate. Additionally, investigation through telephone records as well as interviews indicates that AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI were in contact through telephone calls and face-to-face contact at the King Fahad Mosque. When interviewed by the FBI in Saudi Arabia in 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI identified a photograph of AL-THUMAIRY by name and stated that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the King Fahad Mosque. However, when AL-THUMAIRY was interviewed in the United States in 05/2000, he stated that he did not know an individual named OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Though interviewed in the United States in 05/2000, AL-THUMAIRY has never been interviewed regarding any potential association with KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and/or NAWAF AL-HAZMI.

KHALIL AL-KHALIL

AL-KHALIL was a co-founder of the King Fahad Mosque, Culver City, California (see above information regarding the King Fahad Mosque). The PENTTBOM Team does not hold any additional information regarding AL-KHALIL, and refers Legat to the Los Angeles Division if additional information is necessary.

SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED
DOB:
POB:
PPN:
(P-1) [redacted]

Information regarding AL-RASHEED has been previously passed to the Mabahith, and multiple requests have been made to conduct an interview of AL-RASHEED. AL-RASHEED came to the attention of the FBI when the (O-1) [redacted]

(O-1) [redacted]

(O-1)

AL-RASHEED was detained by the Mabahith from approximately 08/2002 to 02/2003. During interviews conducted by the Mabahith, AL-RASHEED denied any involvement with the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001. Since that time, however, additional intelligence has been received to the contrary. To date, AL-RASHEED has not been interviewed regarding this new information.

LAFI HUSSAIN SAIFI AL-JABIRI Al-HARBI
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
PPN:

Between 03/11/2000 and 03/27/2000, approximately eleven calls were made between a telephone number subscribed by NAWAF AL-HAZMI and a cellular telephone subscribed by LAFI AL-HARBI. Investigation has determined that AL-HARBI is a Saudi Naval officer who was attending training in the United States. From 10/1999 to 03/2000, AL-HARBI attended training in Coronado, California. AL-HARBI then attended training in Newport, Rhode Island, from 04/2000 to 09/2000, after which time he returned to Saudi Arabia. Investigation to date has not determined any additional contact or association between the 09/11/2001 hijackers and AL-HARBI.

To date, AL-HARBI has not been interviewed regarding his telephonic contact with the telephone number subscribed by NAWAF AL-HAZMI.

YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
PPN:

YAZEED AL-SALMI and NAWAF AL-HAZMI rented rooms at the same residence in the San Diego, California, area during the same time period in 2000. AL-HAZMI was already residing at the residence when AL-SALMI began renting a room and, when AL-SALMI moved out approximately one month later, AL-HAZMI continued to reside at the residence. AL-SALMI and AL-HAZMI also shared an automobile insurance policy in San Diego.

On 07/16/2000, AL-SALMI purchased USD 4,000 of American Express Traveler's Checks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, prior to his arrival in the United States on 08/08/2001. On 09/05/2001, USD

1,900 of these Traveler's Checks were deposited into the Bank of America account of AL-HAZMI.

On 09/23/2001, AL-SALMI was arrested pursuant to a Material Witness warrant for his association with participants in the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001. AL-SALMI was subsequently deported to Saudi Arabia after being charged with immigration violations. To date, AL-SALMI has not been interviewed concerning the financial transaction between himself and AL-HAZMI.

KHALID ABDULLAH SALEH AL-YAFAI, aka KHALID ABDULRAB
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
PPN:
Last Known Address: (P) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Last Known Telephone: Home (P-1); Work
(P-1)

ABDULRAB, a Saudi national of Yemeni origin, previously resided in San Diego where he attended school. Before returning home to Saudi Arabia, ABDULRAB received a plaque from OMAR AL-BAYOUMI at the videotaped dinner held at the apartment of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI. Furthermore, an individual named MOHDAR ABDULLAH who was introduced in San Diego to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI by AL-BAYOUMI stated that he was first introduced to ABDULRAB at the same time.

ABDULRAB was interviewed by the Mabahith in approximately 10/2002, but to date has not been interviewed by the FBI.

The information set forth above can be disseminated to the Mabahith.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT (G) WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

(G)

(G)

As requested, Legat (G) is being furnished the information contained within the Details section of this EC in order to coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, KHALIL AL-KHALIL, SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, LAFI HUSSAIN SAIFI AL-JABIRI Al-HARBI, YAZID SAAD A. AL-SALMI, and KHALID ABDULLAH SALEH AL-YAFAI, aka KHALID ABDULRAB available for interviews by the 9/11 Commission and the FBI.

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 03/02/2004

To: International Operations
[redacted] (G)
Attn: [redacted] (G), (S)
Attn:

From: New York
PENTTBOM Investigative Team
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To request Legat [redacted] (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to (1) obtain current contact information of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI; and (2) allow the FBI to conduct a polygraph examination of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI.

Administrative: Reference Memo [redacted] (F) and Memo [redacted] (F) written and provided by writer to ALAT [redacted] (S) on 02/26/2004 to pass to Saudi Mabahith.

Details: From 02/19/2004 to 02/26/2004, writer was TDY in Legat [redacted] (G) to participate in interviews with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. During that time, two requests emerged in regards to the PENTTBOM investigation. On 02/26/2004, writer provided ALAT [redacted] (S) with two memos [redacted] (F) and [redacted] (F) to pass to the Saudi Mabahith. These requests are detailed as follows:

1) Pursuant to our request for an interview of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI, date of birth [redacted] (P-1), [redacted] (P-1) passport # [redacted] (P-1), by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Saudi Mabahith provided information that AL-SALMI had departed the Kingdom to study abroad in the Czech Republic. In order to pursue the interview of AL-SALMI, the PENTTBOM Investigative Team requests any additional information regarding the current location of AL-SALMI ([redacted] (F)). Such information, to include address, telephone number, and name of school at which he is studying, will facilitate our ability to locate and interview him.

By way of background, AL-SALMI was a housemate of NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijacker of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) while in San Diego in 2000. AL-SALMI and AL-HAZMI also shared an automobile insurance policy while in San Diego.

On 07/16/2000, AL-SALMI purchased USD 4000 of American Express Traveler's Checks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, prior to his arrival in the United States on 08/08/2000. On 09/05/2001, USD 1900 of the Traveler's Checks were deposited into the Bank of America bank account of AL-HAZMI. To date, AL-SALMI has not been interviewed regarding this financial transaction between he and AL-HAZMI.

2) In 08/2003, the PENTTBOM Investigative Team interviewed OMAR AL-BAYOUMI in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This interview provided valuable information regarding the relationship between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. However, in order to make a determination in regards to our investigation, it is requested that the Mabahith provide us the opportunity to conduct a polygraph examination of AL-BAYOUMI [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F). The polygraph examination will assist in determining the credibility of information provided by AL-BAYOUMI, and therefore allow our investigation to reach a conclusion at this time.

By way of background, AL-BAYOUMI resided in San Diego from approximately 1997 to 2001. While visiting Los Angeles in early 2000, AL-BAYOUMI met KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) in a restaurant. During their conversation, AL-BAYOUMI spoke about residing in San Diego and provided AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI with his contact information. Approximately four to five days later, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arrived in San Diego and asked AL-BAYOUMI for assistance in obtaining an apartment. AL-BAYOUMI accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to the leasing office of the Parkwood Apartment complex where he co-signed their contract as guarantor. AL-BAYOUMI also accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to a nearby branch of Bank of America where AL-MIHDHAR opened an account. While at the bank, AL-BAYOUMI secured a bank check for the rent payment of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is believed that AL-BAYOUMI was contemporaneously reimbursed for this check by AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT (G), DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

(G)

AT (G)

To obtain from the Saudi Mabahith the current contact information in the Czech Republic of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI, date of birth (P-1), Saudi passport # (P-1), as requested in Memo (F)

Set Lead 3: (Action)

(G)

AT (G)

To coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith in order for the FBI to conduct a polygraph examination of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, as requested in Memo (F)

◆◆

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Embassy
Office of the Legal Attache
(G)

February 6, 2002

(C-2)
Saudi Mabahith
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

File #: M/B/88/258F
M/B/88/331F/422
FBI #: (F)

Dear (C-2)

May God's blessings be upon you, your family, and your colleagues.

We ask for your thoughtful consideration of the following.

Your two referenced files requested information about U.S. telephone number (P) You advised that KSA telephone number (P-1) made two calls to the U.S. number, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001. The KSA telephone number, you advised, was utilized by a man with an alias of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and is listed to KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI.

Investigation in Portland, Oregon determined that telephone number (P) is subscribed to the address of (P) Portland, Oregon. Telephone number (P) has become of interest to the investigation of the 9/11/2001 attacks. It was called by ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN.

ABDULLAH ALTOWAYAN, from 4/6/2001 through 8/5/2001, lived at 6401 Mount Ada Road, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. He lived with his wife, (P), and daughter (P-1) ALTOWAYAN identified himself with an Oregon identification card, number (P-1), showing an address of (P) (P) Portland, Oregon. That address is the administration building for the University of Oregon.

Of interest is the fact that during ALTOWAYAN's residency at the Mount Ada Road address, HANI HANJOUR, KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, all hijackers of 9/11/2001, lived at the same apartment complex. Also living at the complex was OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, who was detained in London, for his potential involvement in the attacks. When AL-BAYOUMI moved from the San Diego complex, he had his mail forwarded to ALTOWAYAN's apartment.

Without a doubt, the most significant information obtained from the U.S. investigation in San Diego, relevant to the interest in ALTOWAYAN, is the fact that witnesses have stated ALTOWAYAN, AL-BAYOUMI, HANJOUR, AL-MIHDHAR, and AL-HAZMI were often seen together. This leaves no doubt that ALTOWAYAN was well acquainted with the hijackers in the days just prior to the attacks. It is our opinion that ALTOWAYAN either knew of the planned attacks or was involved in the planning or support of those attacks.

Further investigation in Portland, based on the Oregon identification card presented at the San Diego apartment complex, determined ALTOWAYAN obtained a safe deposit box from a local Portland bank. He obtained the box in November, 2000. In December, 2000, he retrieved a passport from the box. Accompanying ALTOWAYAN was an unknown Arab male who did not speak during their time in the bank.

Records relating to ALTOWAYAN's rental of the safe deposit box revealed the following information. He provided his date of birth as (P-1) He gave his full name as TOWAYAN ABDALLAH AL-TOWAYAN, place of birth KSA, and a KSA passport number of (P-1) Relative to his safe deposit box, he stated his mother's maiden name as (P) However, and likely correct, on another bank document, he identified his mother's maiden name as (P) and gave his birth date as (P-1)

The U.S. investigation has also determined that ALTOWAYAN had made telephone calls to a cellular phone identified as belonging to SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI. It was learned that ALANAZI, at the time of the calls, was residing at (P) Portland, Oregon. That is the residence where telephone number (P) is located. The number is, of course, the one which was called by ALKHAFAJI from the KSA, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001.

Further investigation identified SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI as a white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 190 pounds. ALANAZI was issued Oregon identification card number (P-1) U.S. Immigration records revealed ALANAZI is a citizen of the KSA, was admitted into the U.S. on 10/6/2000 (J-3). His KSA passport number is (P-1)

Legat (G) finds the intersection of your investigation with the U.S. investigation to be very interesting and quite worthy of further scrutiny. There are so many coincidences regarding contacts, residences, and travel that further investigation of ALANAZI, ALTOWAYAN, and ALKHAFAJI must be conducted.

We will suggest the Portland office conduct further investigation of ALANAZI in view of the fact he has some type of connection to both the 9/11/2001 attacks and your own security investigation involving ALKHAFAJI.

We respectfully request you advise us of other connections ALKHAFAJI may have with the U.S. as well as any background information which you may believe will assist our Portland office in its attempt to further identify ALANAZI's contacts and activities as they may relate to the criminal and security interests for both of our countries. Also, it would be of very great value to determine if ALTOWAYAN and/or ALANAZI are currently in the KSA. If so, we believe it would be of significant value to have both interrogated relative to the KSA's security concerns and the investigation into the savage attacks of 9/11/2001.

As always, your generous cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

(S)

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 02/08/2002

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)
Investigative Services **Attn:**
Attn:
New York **Attn:**

Portland **Attn:**
San Diego **Attn:**

From: (G)
PENTTBOMB Team
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: Connection between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) investigation of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI with U.S. (G) ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN and SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI.

Administrative: Legat (G) had anticipated enclosing a copy of a letter to the KSA's Mabahith requesting additional information related to their investigation of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI. However, due to the significant time delay in having ''hard copies'' arrive at the various destinations from Legat (G) the text of the intended enclosure has been made a part of this EC's text.

Reference: (F)

(F)

Details: During a review of requests made by the KSA's Mabahith, Legat (A), (G) determined there to be a link, between an ongoing (and to date, not detailed) security investigation currently being conducted by the Mabahith, and the PENTTBOMB investigation.

The KSA's subjects, ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and/or KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI had been in contact with a telephone number in Portland (P). Investigation in Portland determined the number to be at the residence of SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, aka SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI.

A review of the Telephone Applications database revealed that ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN (who was a close associate of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAZMI, HANI HANJOUR and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI while living in San Diego just prior to the attacks of 9/11/2001) had called a cellular telephone subscribed by or utilized by SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI. Note: The review of ACS by Legat (G) could not determine when the calls were made from ALTOWAYAN to ALANAZI or the telephone numbers involved.

There is a possibility that the SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI who was (or is) residing in Portland may be identical or related to the KSA's subject KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI. This needs to be determined through investigation in Portland and the KSA.

Referenced serials included information identifying both ALTOWAYAN and ALANAZI as citizens of the KSA. If SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI and ALTOWAYAN are no longer in the U.S., it is likely they have returned to the KSA. The Mabahith should be able to determine if the two are in the KSA. (G) (G)

One issue that should be addressed as soon as possible is whether or not the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office will seek to have ALTOWAYAN, and possibly ALANAZI, returned to the U.S. if found in the KSA. Both would be of significant interest to the KSA's own investigation and if found by the Mabahith prior to their possible returns to the U.S., the Mabahith would likely seek to prosecute the two in the KSA.

Due to the fact that Legat (G) does not have current information regarding the investigation, as it relates to the status of ALTOWAYAN as a (D), some of the leads set by this EC may already have been covered or be unnecessary. If recipients have the information requested in any of the leads, the file and serial numbers should be provided to Legat (G) so the information can be utilized in future requests of the Mabahith.

In order for recipients to be aware of the information requested of the KSA's Mabahith, the text of the letter is set forth below. It is anticipated the Mabahith will show particular interest in this request and begin providing the requested information shortly. If recipients have other, specific requests of the Mabahith regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or ALANAZI, leads can be set for Legat (G) The text of the request letter reads as follows:

``...Your two referenced files requested information about U.S. telephone number (P) You advised that KSA telephone number (P-1) made two calls to the U.S. number, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001. The KSA telephone number, you advised, was utilized by a man with an alias of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and is listed to KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI.

Investigation in Portland, Oregon determined that telephone number (P) is subscribed to the address of (P) Portland, Oregon. Telephone number (P) has become of interest to the investigation of the 9/11/2001 attacks. It was called by ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN.

ABDULLAH ALTOWAYAN, from 4/6/2001 through 8/5/2001, lived at 6401 Mount Ada Road, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. He lived with his wife, (P) and daughter (P-1) ALTOWAYAN identified himself with an Oregon identification card, number (P-1) showing an address of 5000 North Willamette Boulevard, Portland, Oregon. That address is the administration building for the University of Oregon.

Of interest is the fact that during ALTOWAYAN's residency at the Mount Ada Road address, HANI HANJOUR, KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, all hijackers of 9/11/2001, lived at the same apartment complex. Also living at the complex was OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, who was detained in London, for his potential involvement in the attacks. When AL-BAYOUMI moved from the San Diego complex, he had his mail forwarded to ALTOWAYAN's apartment.

Without a doubt, the most significant information obtained from the U.S. investigation in San Diego, relevant to the interest in ALTOWAYAN, is the fact that witnesses have stated ALTOWAYAN, AL-BAYOUMI, HANJOUR, AL-MIHDHAR, and AL-HAZMI were often seen together. This leaves no doubt that ALTOWAYAN was well acquainted with the hijackers in the days just prior to the attacks. It is our opinion that ALTOWAYAN either knew of the planned attacks or was involved in the planning or support of those attacks.

Further investigation in Portland, based on the Oregon identification card presented at the San Diego apartment complex, determined ALTOWAYAN obtained a safe deposit box from a local Portland bank. He obtained the box in November, 2000. In December, 2000, he retrieved a passport from the box. Accompanying ALTOWAYAN was an unknown Arab male who did not speak during their time in the bank.

Records relating to ALTOWAYAN's rental of the safe deposit box revealed the following information. He provided his date of birth as (P-1) He gave his full name as TOWAYAN ABDALLAH AL-TOWAYAN, place of birth KSA, and a KSA passport number of (P-1). Relative to his safe deposit box, he stated his mother's maiden name as (P) However, and likely correct, on another bank document, he identified his mother's maiden name as (P) and gave his birth date as (P-1).

The U.S. investigation has also determined that ALTOWAYAN had made telephone calls to a cellular phone identified as belonging to SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI. It was learned that ALANAZI, at the time of the calls, was residing at (P) Portland, Oregon. That is the residence where telephone number (P) is located. The number is, of course, the one which was called by ALKHAFAJI from the KSA, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001.

Further investigation identified SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI as a white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 190 pounds. ALANAZI was issued Oregon identification card number (P-1) U.S. Immigration records revealed ALANAZI is a citizen of the KSA, was admitted into the U.S. on 10/6/2000 carrying (J-3) His KSA passport number is (P-1)

Legat (G) finds the intersection of your investigation with the U.S. investigation to be very interesting and quite worthy of further scrutiny. There are so many coincidences regarding contacts, residences, and travel that further investigation of ALANAZI, ALTOWAYAN, and ALKHAFAJI must be conducted.

We will suggest the Portland office conduct further investigation of ALANAZI in view of the fact he has some type of connection to both the 9/11/2001 attacks and your own security investigation involving ALKHAFAJI.

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It is not the intent of Legat (G) [redacted] to direct any portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation. However, in an effort to better support the investigation, appropriate information must be sought from the Saudis. By knowing what information is already possessed by the various divisions, more appropriate inquiries can be made. Additionally, if the PENTTBOMB investigation is related to the Saudis' own investigation, both can benefit greatly by sharing information of mutual use.

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Provide background and biographical information on ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN and SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, aka SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI.

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

AT SIOC: Contact appropriate U.S. Customs and U.S. Immigration liaisons to determine if ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI have departed the U.S. If so, provide details regarding flight numbers, passport numbers, and countries of destination. Also, advise Legat (G) if there are (O-1) for either mans re-entry to the U.S.

Set Lead 3:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Advise Legat (G) if there has been a (D) warrant issued for ALTOWAYAN and if so, provide (G) with a copy of the affidavit filed to obtain the warrant.

Set Lead 4:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

(G): Provide link analysis involving telephone numbers (P) (Portland) and (P-1) (KSA cellular phone).

Set Lead 5:

PORTLAND

AT PORTLAND, OREGON

Provide Legat [redacted] (G) with investigative results regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI (not contained in referenced serials).

Set Lead 6:

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Provide Legat [redacted] (G) with investigative results regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI (not contained in reference serials).

♦♦

[redacted]

COLLABORATIVE
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

[redacted] Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

December 2004

Joint Intelligence Report
Prepared by

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Central Intelligence
Agency

[redacted]

[redacted] Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

[redacted] Scope Note

[redacted] This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at (S) (S) or Section Chief (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center (O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] Executive Summary

[redacted] Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

[redacted] Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The Government of Saudi Arabia and Terrorism

[redacted] Assessment of Official Saudi Government Support to Terrorism

[redacted] A review of intelligence over the past two years indicates that the Government of Saudi Arabia (GSA) was neither complicit in nor had foreknowledge of terrorist acts perpetrated by al-Qa'ida against the United States or other Western interests. Furthermore, no information indicates that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial support to al-Qa'ida. It is difficult to discern, however, the extent to which individuals in the Saudi Government or royal family have provided donations to clerics or NGOs that funnel money to al-Qa'ida; in such cases, the donor may not be aware that al-Qa'ida is the end recipient of some of the funds.

- Given the large size of the Al Saud family—approximately 15,000 princes—and the Saudi Government, it is likely that some individuals may have provided and possibly continue to provide direct or indirect support to al-Qa'ida without detection by Saudi or US intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

[redacted] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) fears al-Qa'ida and has for years viewed the organization as a threat to the security and survival of the Al Saud. Several concurrent factors have recently put pressure on the Saudi royal family and strained its relationship with the religious community, which underwrites their legitimacy. Many Saudis perceive the royal family as increasingly corrupt, westernized, and less devoted to Islam. This is due in part to the presence of Western military, particularly American forces, in the Kingdom with the blessing of the Al Sauds.

- The deterioration of the Saudi financial situation in recent years meanwhile has disenfranchised a significant portion of the population, which appears to be turning to conservative Islamic sectors for relief.

[redacted] Saudi Arabia's primary course of action to counter al-Qa'ida prior to 11 September was to co-opt or coerce extremists in an effort to bring them into the fold, possibly with an implicit or explicit understanding that al-Qa'ida would not strike on Saudi soil. USIC reporting indicates some al-Qa'ida members sought to conduct terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, but were banned from doing so at the direction of Usama Bin Ladin. Saudi authorities continue to use cooptation and accommodation with individuals they have detained, seeking the assistance of family members and other Saudis to turn in wanted suspects. For instance, one terrorist's surrender was facilitated by a cleric and members of the terrorist's family in June 2003.

[redacted] The Saudi Government has been at war with al-Qa'ida since the May 2003 bombings against three residential housing compounds in Riyadh and the November 2003 attack on another compound, and has taken significant steps to mitigate the threat and curb support for terrorism among its population. Saudi Government action since the bombings in May underscores its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida—a commitment that has cost the lives of dozens of Saudi security officials who died at the hands of the terrorists.

- The GSA has aggressively hunted members of the Saudi-based al-Qa'ida network, stripping it of its senior ranks and disrupting plots aimed at Western targets, including the

[redacted]

US and British Embassies. Its success over the past year has created a hostile operating environment for the terrorists, forcing them to adapt and to scale back operations, as shown by their recent focus on targeting individual Westerners.

- On 18 June Saudi authorities killed the network's leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (aka Abu Hajir al-Najdi), and three other wanted operatives. Al-Muqrin was the last of the original senior cell leaders remaining in the Kingdom. This past year two other cell leaders, along with the former chief of operations, died at the hands of Saudi security services. Saudi authorities also disrupted a plot involving Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqaasi al-Ghamdi (aka Abu Bakr al-Azdi), a senior cell leader, to hijack aircraft and crash them into unspecified targets on the United States East Coast. Al-Ghamdi surrendered to Saudi authorities in June 2003 and remains in detention.

- Three clerics who provided spiritual guidance for al-Qa'ida have also been detained since May 2003, along with hundreds of foot soldiers.

[redacted] Both the FBI and CIA have noted that NGOs receiving money from the GSA and supporting Islamic extremism pose a serious threat to US interests. The GSA has provided funds to a variety of Islamic groups and NGOs in the United States and around the world. These groups are, by and large, globally networked religious organizations and NGOs involved in legitimate charitable activities. However, extremists have exploited many of these NGOs for their own purposes.

[redacted] The Saudi Government has been accused of negligent oversight of these organizations. It is likely that the KSA ignored the organizations' activities because of their close association with the religious partners of the Al Sauds, the Al Shaykhs, who control the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah (MIA) and its associated religious entities, and are committed to spreading Wahhabi Islam.

[redacted] While senior Saudi royals oppose al-Qa'ida, it is likely that at least some royal family members, government officials, or other prominent citizens share al-Qa'ida's anti-American sentiments on an individual basis and support organizations with ties to al-Qa'ida or other extremist organizations. The CIA and FBI have no information indicating that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial or other support to al-Qa'ida. The CIA has limited, fragmentary intelligence suggesting that two individuals—one senior and one minor member of the Saudi royal family—may have provided financial support to al-Qa'ida. In both cases, we have no information to suggest that other members of the Saudi Government or royal family were aware of their activities. A limited body of uncorroborated CIA reporting from (O-1) eparate sources suggests (O-1) the youngest of (O-1) full brothers, and Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, have had contact with individuals tied to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations. The specific nature of their contacts is unknown.

- According to a sensitive source, (O-1) (O-1) oro Islamic Liberation Front, the largest Islamic insurgent group in the Philippines.

- Senior al-Qa'ida detainees Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) and Walid bin 'Attash claim that (O-1) is sympathetic to the extremist cause. KSM stated that (O-1) was an al-Qa'ida sympathizer and possible fundraiser and that he maintained a close relationship with Bin Ladin at an unspecified time. Bin 'Attash has told us that (O-1) helped Bin Ladin escape the Kingdom in 1992.

- In early 2003, KSM identified an individual named Bin Jiluwi, who may be identifiable with Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, an important al-Qa'ida donor who hails from a minor line in the Saudi royal family. Separate sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Jiluwi is a key leader of the Eastern Province office of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an NGO. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Riyadh suspects Bin Jiluwi has embezzled more than $3 million from IIRO. The Mabahith has been investigating his activities.

[redacted] A variety of intelligence reporting indicates that jihad operatives with ties to al-Qa'ida continue to seek funding for their activities from private sources in Saudi Arabia. The USIC is working in conjunction with Saudi authorities to trace and stop these funds.

[redacted] Riyadh's efforts against al-Qa'ida, meanwhile, have revealed instances of sympathizers in the security services, but Mabahith is working with us to contain the problem. Limited reporting suggests that al-Qa'ida operatives have obtained information and assistance from family members or other individuals within the security services who are sympathetic to their cause.

- Sympathizers' efforts delayed but did not derail some Mabahith operations. The discovery of sympathizers spurred a major reassignment of personnel at the Ministry of Interior in mid-2003 to protect counterterrorism operations. Members of certain tribes have been removed from positions wherein they could access sensitive information that might be passed to terrorists. Mabahith is often unwilling to watchlist individuals for fear of leaks and employs strict compartmentalization to avoid compromise.

- Al-'Qa'ida's Saudi-based network has altered the appearance of trucks to resemble official vehicles and has used military or police uniforms, notably in the bombing of the al-Muhayya compound in November 2003 and in the kidnapping of American Paul Johnson, respectively. We cannot corroborate press reporting and statements by the al-Qa'ida network claiming that the uniforms used in the kidnapping were provided by sympathizers in the military. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Mabahith investigated a tailor in November 2003 who had been tasked to make 15 military jackets without trousers by an individual who fit the description of Abu Hajir.

[redacted] Various press reports suggest that Saudi authorities negotiated with or facilitated the escape of the perpetrators of the 29 May 2004 massacre at al-Khobar. The CIA is unable to corroborate these claims, and reporting on the subject has been contradictory. The Saudi Government has officially disputed this claim, but a sensitive source reported (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] The Saudi Government Cracks Down

[redacted] The KSA's efforts to crack down on al-Qa'ida's financial network and stem the flow of funds to terrorists abroad have improved dramatically since the 12 May bombings. These efforts include actions against Saudi-based al-Qa'ida fundraisers and facilitators, intelligence sharing and cooperation, and legislative and regulatory actions.

- Riyadh has neutralized more than 50 financial facilitators, and killed one of the most prominent, Yusef al-Iyari (aka Swift Sword).

- In early 2004, in response to US and international pressure for the GSA to improve oversight of Islamic charities and their activities, Riyadh announced the formation of a new commission to regulate the finances of Saudi charities with an international presence. Riyadh has since given few additional details of how and when the entity will be implemented. In October 2004 the GSA said the new commission would assume control over assets of the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi NGO [redacted] (G) but would not regulate the international activities of International Islamic Relief Organization and World Assembly of Muslim Youth, two large Saudi charities [redacted] (G)

[redacted] Demonstrating its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida in the Kingdom, Riyadh also launched a propaganda effort aimed at undercutting the legitimacy of the organization on Islamic grounds in the aftermath of the 2003 attacks. The government has publicized the names of its most wanted terrorist suspects and has offered substantial rewards to individuals who provide any information regarding the whereabouts of the suspects or possible planned operations. Riyadh has also responded immediately to and has shared threat information with the USIC regarding possible operations.

- In early April Riyadh shared detainee reporting describing a plot to target US and British diplomatic facilities. Mabahith also seized five truck bombs in early April likely associated with the operation, unilaterally disrupting what would have been a catastrophic attack.

[redacted] Riyadh's abilities and the pace of its support do not always meet the USIC's expectations. However it is the judgment of both the FBI and the CIA that in most instances Saudi security shortcomings have been failures of capability rather than will. Raids and arrests continue almost daily in Saudi Arabia and Saudi forces have lost a considerable number of men in confrontations with al-Qa'ida operatives.

[redacted] Saudi Arabia's Intelligence and Security Services and their Activities

[redacted] Saudi Intelligence Activities Inside the Kingdom

[redacted] When they operate overseas, the Saudi intelligence services tend to devote most of their resources to monitoring perceived threats to the regime, including Islamic extremists, dissidents, and critics of the royal family. As a general rule [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

- The capabilities of the three main services are sufficient (O-1) (O-1)

- The intelligence arm of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA-J2) focuses on collecting traditional military intelligence such as order of battle in neighboring countries. In January 2004 the MODA officials established a Counterintelligence Division within the Military Security Directorate. According to military reporting, this division is responsible for conducting internal MODA investigations on suspected criminals and al-Qa'ida sympathizers in addition to enhancing security within the workplace.

- The Saudi Government recently (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] Partnerships Bearing Fruit

[redacted] Since the early 1970s (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The FBI has had a Legal Attaché office in Saudi Arabia since 1996. Although legal issues continue to hamper some cooperative efforts on both sides, cooperation from Saudi authorities has increased greatly since the 12 May 2003 bombings.

- Mabahith is more frequently requesting FBI expertise or resources to assist in their investigations—Mabahith requested and received the use of a FBI hostage negotiation, FBI cadaver dogs and their handlers during the Paul Johnson, Jr. investigation and recovery efforts.

- The FBI continues to investigate major terrorist events in Saudi Arabia in which a US person or interest is a victim or target and has deployed investigative teams to the Kingdom for this purpose. The terrorist attacks in Yanbu and the Kenneth Scroggs/Paul Johnson, Jr. kidnapping and murders in Riyadh are recent examples.

[redacted] The FBI is a full partner with the IRS, the CIA and Saudi intelligence and law enforcement in the Riyadh-based US/Saudi Joint Task Force on Terrorist Finance (JTFTF) which was established in August 2003. FBI presence in the Arabian Peninsula has been expanded since 11 September 2001 by the addition of Legal Attaché offices to the US embassies in Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

[redacted]

[redacted] The FBI has a Special Agent (SA) assigned to a (O-1) t the Embassy in (O-1) Riyadh. The FB (O-1) and participates (O-1) y adding FBI subject expertise. The SA (O-1) (O-1) is also responsible for keeping the FBI's Legal Attaché (LEGAT) fully informed about intelligence pertaining to FBI investigations or US subjects as they arise in the work (O-1) (O-1) The FBI LEGAT remains the FBI representative for all investigative programs in country and is the spokesperson for the FBI in dealing with the Ambassador and the Country Team.

[redacted] Mabahith, the preeminent domestic service, and the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), which performs most foreign intelligence tasks, both share CI responsibilities. (O-1) (O-1) n the aftermath of the 12 May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi cooperation against terrorism, including willingness to share critical terrorist-related information with US counterparts, has improved (O-1) (O-1) citing the capture or death of most of the Kingdom's senior al-Qa'ida cell leaders, recovery of caches of weapons and explosives, and disruption of extremists' financial support and operational planning.

[redacted] Mabahith Cooperating More

[redacted] Deputy Interior Minister for Internal Security Affairs Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, who since 2002 has been in charge of Mabahith, has attempted to play a balanced role in his interaction with US intelligence officials. Immediately following the 12 May 2003 bombings, Crown Prince Abdallah gave Muhammad a mandate to work closely with the CIA on internal security issues and promised him the resources he needed. Muhammad has become the major player in the Saudi antiterrorism campaign, but he walks a fine line with his father, Minister of Interior Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has resisted Abdallah's efforts since 2001 to reform Saudi political and social life. (O-1) ides some of his interactions with the CIA from Nayif, according to a senior CIA officer.

- In 2003 (O-1) old a senior CIA officer that he wants to insulate Mabahith's relationship with USIC from the ups and downs of bilateral political relations. Muhammad more recently told other US officials and members of Congress that he wants to keep the fight against terrorism separate from politics.

[redacted] Using Enhanced Intercept Capabilities

[redacted] Mabahith has been expanding its technical intercept capabilities to bolster its ability to identify and track CT threats (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] Mabahith is competent in using technical surveillance equi [redacted] (O-1) surveillance and GSM tracking and monitoring. In 2001 Mabahith [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] Against a Backdrop of Problems

[redacted] Nonetheless, significant short- and long-term concerns remain, including possible penetration of the Saudi intelligence community, lingering resistance by the MOI, technical tradecraft and skills limitations, and ties to services that may be more hostile to the United States. Cultural factors, including a weak work ethic, a high premium on self-esteem that limits learning, and centralized authority, play a large part in the services' shortcomings.

[redacted] Foot-Dragging by Minister of Interior

[redacted] Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has led the MOI since 1975, has oversight over Mabahith. Nayif, a full brother of King Fahd and a member of a powerful circle of regime insiders, is a prime defender of the political status quo. In mid-April, Nayif warned a group of moderate Sau [redacted] (O-1) would not tolerate continued calls for political or social change [redacted] Nayif is deeply suspicious of US intentions and resisted cooperation with the FBI during the investigations of the 1995 Office of Program Manager/Saudi Arabia National Guard and 1996 Khobar Towers bombings that together killed 24 US military personnel. He maintained for months after 11 September 2001 that no Saudis or Arabs had been involved in the attacks, but rather that the attacks were plots by the CIA and Israel's Mossad.

- [redacted] (O-1) (O-1) he May 2003 bombings, [redacted] (O-1) Nonetheless, in an interview published on 17 June 2004 by *Le Figaro*, Nayif reiterated his view that the causes of terrorism do not lie within the Saudi system.

[redacted] Leaks and Compromises

[redacted] An immediate concern is highlighted by several instances since mid-2003 involving the compromise of impending raids against alleged terrorists and leaked information about Mabahith officers, documented in (O-1) nd open-source reporting. The intelligence services reportedly tend to recruit young men from rural areas—particularly from the relatively poor, neglected southwestern region of the country, which is also home to tribesmen who are sympathetic to al-Qa'ida and other Islamic militants. Mabahith leadership suspects that Islamist sympathizers have penetrated the security services or that Islamists take advantage of family and tribal ties to glean information from service members.

[redacted] Inadequate Training and Skills

[redacted] Saudi security officials' weak tradecraft in disciplines such as physical surveillance, and their reliance on foreign technical advice create counterintelligence problems and vulnerabilities.

- Saudis' use of technology is constrained by a lack of training, leaving the Kingdom dependent upon foreign technicians to operate and maintain the equipment. Moreover, existing capabilities are sometimes degraded when security personnel are shifted to handle new priorities. (O-1) (O-1)

- Mabahith's ability to exploit its intercepts is hampered by its lack of sophisticated data management and reluctance to rely on computer technology. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] Dangerous Liaisons

[redacted] Although the United States is probably the Kingdom's primary intelligence partner, Saudi leaders as of March 2004 had intelligence liaison relations with 48 other countries, according to sensitive special intelligence. (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1) audi leaders' efforts to balance their dependence on the United States by cultivating security and military ties to such countries as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia increase the risk to US intelligence activities.

(O-1)

- Both the GIP and Mabahith have liaison relationships with their Pakistani counterparts, [redacted] (O-1) eflecting the close military (O-1) and political ties between Riyadh and Islamabad. [redacted] (O-1)

- Both the Russians and the Chinese have intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic locations in Saudi Arabia, [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

- In part to end Iranian meddling with Saudi Shi'a, Crown Prince Abdallah initiated a rapprochement with Iran in 1997, and Interior Minister Nayif signed a security agreement covering bilateral cooperation on countering narcotics, smuggling, and extradition of criminals during a visit to Tehran in 2000. Saudi-Iranian relations took another step forward when assistant GIP director Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin Muhammad met with his Iranian counterpart in February 2004 and agreed to exchange liaison officers, according to sensitive special intelligence. In an effort to encourage better ties to the GIP, on 25 April 2004 Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security provided the GIP with copies of the passports and visa applications of four Saudis suspected of belonging to al-Qa'ida who had attempted to obtain visas to Iran, according to sensitive special intelligence. Sensitive special intelligence indicates that Iran has intelligence stations in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that actively collect on US targets in the Kingdom [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The Saudi Presence and Influence in the United States

[redacted] The overlap of public and private funds, politics and religion, and the intersection of foreign intelligence and terrorism matters make for a complex web of issues and relationships involving Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Saudi Diplomatic Presence in the United States

[redacted] The GSA currently has approximately 926 officials posted to diplomatic establishments in the United States. Saudi diplomatic and affiliated establishments are located throughout the United States. Establishments include the Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi Arabian Mission to the United Nations (UN), in New York, NY, and three Consulate Generals, in New York, NY; Houston, TX; and Los Angeles, CA. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

[redacted] The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC

[redacted] The bulk of Saudi Arabia's 926 diplomats in the United States, and their 1,093 dependents and domestics, are at its Embassy in Washington, DC. Complicating FBI

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Several NGOs are controlled and/or funded by the Embassy. Additionally, it has been determined that particular NGO leaders and "friends" of the royal family have come to the United States on Saudi diplomatic passports and visas, although they have never physically worked at Saudi diplomatic establishments. The FBI has been working closely with the US Department of State (USDS) and the USIC to identify individuals of concern who have diplomatic status.

- The USDS has directed the Embassy to review and update its diplomatic roster and made this a prerequisite to the GSA opening any new consulates. The USDS has issued new diplomatic license plates based on the updated diplomatic list to restrict abuses of the licenses. The Embassy appears to be cooperating in this effort, but it is too early to tell how long it will take to completely review and revise the Saudi diplomatic list and ensure that its citizens who are in the United States on diplomatic visas are actually serving in diplomatic capacities.

[redacted] Non-diplomatic Saudi Presence in the United States

[redacted] In addition to the significant diplomatic presence, there are a considerable number of Saudi military officials and private citizens studying, training and working in the United States. Some of these individuals are suspected of engaging in intelligence- and terrorism-related activity.

[redacted] Saudi Intelligence Activities in the United States

[redacted] The GSA conducts intelligence activities within the United States using both traditional and nontraditional methods principally to maintain the reign of the Saudi royal family in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (GSA). Toward this end, the GSA and its intelligence services are engaged in promoting US-Saudi relations, influencing public perception, and countering dissidents.

[redacted] For several decades, (O-1) (O-1)

- (O-1) the United States. The FBI (O-1) (O-1) is investigating a number of suspected IOs, cooptees, and agents operating in Washington, DC.
- At present, the FBI is investigating (A), (G), (J-1) based on suspected intelligence affiliation and/or intelligence collection. Of those, nearly half are affiliated with the Embassy's (A), (G), (J-1) which oversees proselytizing activity across the United States.

[redacted] The organizational divisions of the Embassy include Military, Congressional and Public Affairs, Political and Economic, Islamic Affairs/Da'wah, and NGOs. Each division engages in the (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

- (O-1)

- The Congressional and Public Affairs Division is responsible for perception management, public policy, and foreign relations. The Political and Economic Division is responsible for open source reporting.

- For the most part, the Islamic Affairs/Da'wah Division manages its intelligence collection activities on Saudi-Americans, dissidents and NGOs, independently from the GIP or the Mabahith.

[redacted] A primary function of Saudi Government officials in the United States has been to quiet dissident voices within the US émigré population. Investigative findings indicate that the GSA monitors local Saudi dissidents and dispenses money to various charities and individuals in exchange for halting anti-government or anti-royal family rhetoric.

- (A), (G), (J-1) Abdulaziz Aseel, an in-status, (J-3) (J-3) from Saudi Arabia who is an attaché at the Embassy to squelch the activities of at least one leading dissident by offering him a large sum of money. This appears to be a common method of influencing dissidents, while more heavy-handed methods are also used to pressure family members still in Saudi Arabia to influence dissidents.

- The GSA has repeatedly reproached the USG for providing asylum to a Saudi oppositionist but has not been able to provide the FBI with any incriminating information on him to support requests for his extradition.

(A), (G), (J-1) the GSA also uses a decentralized system of coordinators in the United States who communicate with the Saudi Services' headquarters in the Kingdom. The GSA and its coordinators use local resources to obtain information, including hiring private contractors to investigate individuals, among them US persons, believed to be dissidents or anti-Saudi. It has also been reported that the GSA utilizes (A), (G), (J-1) to report on Saudi dissidents and opposition groups.

[redacted] Military Personnel

[redacted] Due to the close alliance between the GSA and USG, especially in defense matters, Saudi military personnel are routinely assigned as foreign liaison officers at US bases and (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted]

(O-1) in the United States. Unfortunately (O-1) (O-1) and FBI investigations identified several Saudi military personnel who failed to report their military affiliation when applying for an F-1 visa, as required through US-sponsored training programs.

[redacted] Saudi foreign liaison officers (O-1) their lengthy postings to military installations in the United States—some for periods of 10 or more years. This unusual longevity, as compared to other military foreign liaison officers, and its associated familiarity with the personnel and facilities to which the officers are assigned (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The GSA places great emphasis on the identification and acquisition of cutting-edge military technology. Despite the limited capability of the Saudi Services, the FBI assesses that the GSA would take whatever steps necessary to remain on par with or exceed the military abilities of its regional neighbors.

[redacted] Extremist groups can also exploit the Saudi military presence in the United States. A recent counterterrorism investigation identified a Saudi officer who was in the United States for training who actively supported a known al-Qa'ida terrorist.

- Faisal al-Shehri, a Saudi citizen and non-commissioned officer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Air Force who worked as a data maintenance analyst, routinely communicated with al-Qa'ida propagandist and operational planner Yusef al-Iyari (aka Swift Sword), who died in a gun battle with Saudi authorities in mid-2003.

- Al-Shehri, who was detained, interrogated, and then handed over to Mabahith in July 2003, was attending maintenance data systems analysis training at Lackland Air Force Base, TX.

- Al-Shehri provided Swift Sword with information (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

- After his arrest, al-Shehri provided the FBI with the names of many of his associates, including 50 members of a Dhahran Air Force Base Da'wah (proselytizing) group, whom he identified as pilots. The GSA was alerted to al-Shehri's activity, cooperated with US authorities, and arrested 31 of those named by al-Shehri.

[redacted] **Saudi Students in the United States**

[redacted] The number of Saudi national F-1/student visa requests has (O-1) percent since 2001, and (O-1) visas were issued to Saudi students in 2002. The GSA and the Embassy financially and/or logistically support Saudi students in the United States. Historically, these students have been tasked to report back on local Saudi and Saudi-American dissidents.

[redacted]

[redacted] FBI investigations indicate that, in some instances, extremists who are troublesome to the regime in the Kingdom but not involved in punishable offenses are sent overseas on proselytizing or education missions. The GSA has begun to recognize that a number of these individuals have remained involved in anti-government activity, but it is unclear if it will change its method of dealing with extremists.

[redacted] In late 2003 the Embassy provided the FBI with a list of (O-1) Saudi students who are sponsored by various Saudi entities for study in the United States. The FBI is currently investigating a number of these students. Preliminary investigation indicates that many of the students have connections to subjects of ongoing FBI investigations.

- Ibrahim al-Zkeri, a Saudi Government–funded student in Ohio, is managing a proselytizing program aimed at federal and local correctional facilities. Al-Zkeri has been in contact with a number of extremist clerics in Saudi Arabia as well as US-based subjects of FBI investigations.

- Ibrahim S. Abdullah, until recently the director of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) US office in Annandale, VA, was a Saudi-funded graduate student at George Mason University. FBI investigation determined that Abdullah holds a Saudi passport and is associated with subjects of FBI al-Qa'ida and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) investigations through his WAMY activities and phone records. Abdullah recently departed the US following a search of WAMY's northern Virginia headquarters.

- The spouse of a Saudi scholarship student in the United States appears to have been providing computer technology support to al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorists in Saudi Arabia with whom he has been in contact, according to FBI investigation.

[redacted] The FBI is also examining the possibility that al-Qa'ida or other radical Islamic extremists are recruiting at US schools and universities. State-sponsored Islamic student organizations, such as WAMY, are specifically targeting students at universities and public schools in the United States to promote their Islamic ideology. Several of these organizations and individuals are subjects of FBI terrorism investigations. Islamic extremists or al-Qa'ida members participating in these types of organizations could recruit new members, who could then become targets for extremist recruiters.

- Since September 2001 WAMY operated what appears to be an Orlando chapter from an unmarked storefront near the University of Central Florida. While this storefront is still operational, its links to WAMY in Saudi Arabia appear to have been severed in the past year.

- Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, who is associated with WAMY and several Saudi individuals and NGOs, was working on a proselytizing plan that calls for establishing Centers for Peace (C4Ps) on major university campuses and near major mosques throughout the United States. Only one C4P is known to have been established, at a mosque in Orlando, Florida.

[redacted]

[redacted] Al-Qa'ida terrorist operative Khaled al-Buluwi, who was detained in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, was a student at universities in New Mexico and Texas in the early 1990s. Al-Buluwi made multiple attempts to force his radical views onto the student members of the local Islamic Center and repeatedly sent the director anti-Saudi literature and pro-jihad propaganda in an attempt to influence his beliefs.

[redacted] Saudi Money in the United States: Where Politics and Religion Converge

[redacted] Much of the Saudi money and energy in the United States appear to have focused on spreading the conservative form of the Wahhabi-Salafi Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. Salafism, which follows a rigid interpretation of seventh-century Islam, calls for a rigorous and literal application of Shari'ah (Islamic law) and espouses breaking with Western values and modernization.

[redacted] The Saudi Government sponsors and funds a number of NGOs operating in the United States for this purpose. (See Appendix A) Among these are the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (currently operating as the Success Foundation in the United States), WAMY, and the Muslim World League (MWL). FBI investigation of both IIRO/Success and WAMY has brought to a halt the operations of both organizations. Also, following (O-1) FBI- (O-1) search, a portion of the US branch of the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control, and its US assets were frozen. Overseas, these NGOs have wittingly or unwittingly provided support to terrorism. For example, they have provided assistance to fighters traveling to and from jihad areas, employed individuals directly involved in terrorist acts against the United States and other countries, and provided lodging and other logistical support to individuals training for or involved in jihad.

[redacted] We are encouraged by recent Saudi efforts to reorganize their international charities and regulate their activities. In 2003 the GSA ordered Al-Haramain to close all of its overseas branches. In January 2004, four branches of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation were jointly designated as terrorist organizations by the US Department of the Treasury and the Saudi Arabian government for their alleged links with terrorist groups. The branches in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan are alleged by the US to have provided financial, material and logistical support to the al-Qa'ida network and other terrorist organizations. The Saudi government announced the closing of the al-Haramain organization altogether in early June 2004, and the consolidation of its remaining overseas branches into the newly-established Commission for Relief and Charitable Work Abroad.

[redacted] The Saudi Government maintains significant financial holdings in the United States in order to fund Saudi weapons purchases from American companies, Embassy operating expenses, medical assistance to Saudi nationals, student scholarships, and select NGOs. Until recently the Saudi Embassy maintained 112 accounts at Riggs Bank in Washington, DC.

- The FBI's ability to quickly track all aspects of Saudi financial operations is hampered by the significant amount of cash transfers and withdrawals, large number of accounts, and large volume of transactions that occur.

[redacted]

[redacted] Money also appears to be used to influence business and other relationships and to support religious propagation. Largesse by royals affiliated with the Embassy toward petitioners they do not know is also common.

[redacted] Following investigation by the USG, Riggs Bank closed all Saudi Embassy accounts. The Saudi Embassy is currently seeking a new financial institution for its US holdings.

[redacted] **Religious Propagation**

[redacted] FBI investigations indicate that the GSA is providing regular financial support—every two to three months, on average—to Sunni Muslim preachers in the United States. (See Appendix B.) A number of them are either subjects of or are tied to counterterrorism investigations involving al-Qa'ida, Jama'at al-Tabligh (JT), or HAMAS.

[redacted] An FBI review indicates that the individuals receiving funds from the Embassy were being paid from accounts that receive regular deposits from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah in Saudi Arabia. All the US persons receiving payments have been or are being investigated for possible connections to terrorism. Two of these investigations are detailed below.

[redacted] Musaed al-Jarrah, an in-status, (J-3) from Saudi Arabia, is the Assistant Director for Islamic Affairs at the Embassy responsible for disbursing stipends to individuals in the United States. FBI investigations indicate that some of the stipend recipients have ties to terrorism. (O-1) Al-Jarrah's official position is listed in USDS records as embassy accountant, but his responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas for these individuals.

[redacted] In January 2004 Omar Abdi Mohamed, a legal permanent resident alien from Somalia, was arrested for lying during his naturalization interview. Mohamed had received a monthly stipend of $1,750 and was one of 50 individuals that the Saudi Embassy admitted to paying for preaching and proselytizing activity in the United States.

- A search of Mohamed's San Diego residence uncovered several letters addressed to him from the Islamic Affairs Office at the Saudi Embassy and tasking him to collect and report information on the structure of immigrant communities and their organizations, financial conditions, education levels, and religious leanings. Converting professional Americans to Islam was urged as a priority in order to help make inroads into American society and gain influence. Information on prominent American converts was also requested, most likely to help recruit individuals who might be helpful to Saudi interests.

[redacted] Saudi officials in Washington, DC, apparently were either unaware of or were turning a blind eye to the radical connections of the US-based individuals on their payroll. Recent developments indicate an effort is currently under way at the Embassy to lower the profile of the Islamic Affairs Office, indicating an awareness of the controversial nature of its activities. (O-1) ecently indicated that Embassy officials may be moving the Islamic Affairs Office, out of the Embassy altogether. If the move takes place, future payments to the employees of these offices will come directly from Saudi Arabia rather than through the Embassy's accounts. We have already seen evidence that payments that used to come from the Embassy are now originating from Saudi-based bank accounts.

[redacted] Lobbying

[redacted] The GSA is clearly concerned about maintaining US-Saudi relations and countering negative US public opinion and expends considerable effort on public relations. FBI investigations suggest that the Embassy may have overstepped the bounds of normal diplomatic activity when it retained a US public relations firm, Qorvis Communications, to mount a pro-Saudi campaign while concealing the GSA's participation and financial support.

- (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Gifts to Individuals

[redacted] FBI investigations have revealed that the Saudi Embassy receives frequent requests for financial assistance from Saudis living in the United States. These requests are often referred to the ambassador's wife, Princess Haifa. The princess and her staff make decisions as to who will receive the donations based on each individual's need. The donations are usually in the form of one-time payments but have on occasion been provided as a monthly stipend. As with religious propagation payments, there is little oversight for gifts to individuals.

- The wife of Osama Basnan, a Saudi national residing in California, received one of these stipends. Basnan's associate, Omar al-Bayoumi, had contact with two of the 11 September hijackers, and his name was discovered on their apartment lease. Basnan came to the FBI's attention (O-1) after 11 September; al-Bayoumi came to the FBI's attention through investigation into the hijackers' activity in San Diego.

- Extensive investigation by the FBI has not found any record of financial support to the hijackers from al-Bayoumi or Basnan, or that either man was aware of the hijackers' plans.

[redacted] The FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan was an intelligence officer or agents of the GSA, or that either knowingly provided support for the 11 September attacks. (See Appendix C for details of the investigation of al-Bayoumi and Basnan in support of FBI conclusions.)

[redacted] Strengths and Shortcomings in Collection and Analysis

[redacted] Following the 11 September attacks, it became apparent to the USIC that the role of Saudi Arabia and its citizens in the support of terrorism, whether direct or indirect, warranted a much closer look and a refocusing of our intelligence collection and analysis methods. Although the GSA is cooperating much more robustly with the United States on counterterrorism matters, continued strong al-Qa'ida activity in the Kingdom, sympathy for Islamic extremists among many groups in Saudi society, and the fragility of the Saudi Government will require the continued devotion of intelligence resources to the Saudi issue.

[redacted] In recognition of the complexity of Saudi issues and the closed nature of the Kingdom, (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) (O-1) particularly over the past year. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) –and USDS officers' reporting is critical on political and economic topics. (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) For example, (O-1) (O-1) Open-source exploitation continuously proves invaluable to analytic efforts. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) improve our analyses. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The CIA's Counterterrorist Center conducts analysis of terrorism overseas, including Saudi–based terrorism. CIA's Directorate of Intelligence's cadre of political, military, economic, and leadership analysts of Saudi Arabia routinely monitor the issue and contribute analysis. CIA experts on transnational issues, such as illicit financial flows, are important to the overall analytic effort. CIA has also just recently established a Political Islam Strategic Analysis program. The Defense Intelligence Agency and J-2 have a host of military analysts who emphasize the general counterterrorism issue and (O-1) USDS's Bureau of Intelligence and Research analysts similarly contribute to analysis on political developments, al-Qa'ida structures and activities, and illicit financial flows. The FBI employs a number of all-source and operational support analysts who monitor Saudi activities in the United States.

(O-1) (O-1)

(O-1) Unofficial Saudi support to terrorists by government employees but not sanctioned by the regime, for example, is difficult to uncover or measure. Even Saudi intelligence finds this to be a difficult task, because the number of individuals potentially to be targeted for collection is large, and individual support activities, such as contributing cash or passing information to someone linked to terrorism, may be small (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) analysts under the Directorate of Intelligence's Analysis for the Global Mission Initiative, (O-1) focus on Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[redacted] The FBI has enhanced its analytical and investigative capabilities in a variety of ways. Directly following 11 September 2001, the FBI created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) to investigate, prosecute, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist-related financial and fundraising activities. Much of TFOS's activity has been focused on Saudi financing of terrorism. The FBI also plays a prominent role on the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Terrorist Financing, which has been focused on joint US-Saudi cooperation issues in the area of terrorist financing.

[redacted] In 2002 the FBI formed a Saudi Task Force to undertake a comprehensive review of all Saudi-related matters. Shortly after the Saudi Task Force began its work, the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO) established a Middle East (Arabian Peninsula) Squad dedicated to the Saudi target. The WFO squad has since initiated more than 100 investigations on individuals and entities suspected of criminal, intelligence-related, and terrorism-related activity.

[redacted] In mid-2003 the Arabian Peninsula Unit (APU) was established within TFOS at Headquarters to provide program guidance to FBI field offices related to Saudi intelligence and terrorism investigations, supply technical coverage of Saudi diplomatic establishments and individuals (O-1) and coordinate with other USG [redacted] APU coordinates with TFOS's operational units, FBI Field Offices, and the USIC in order to cover the financial investigation of Saudi issues. APU also tracks requests to and from Saudi law enforcement entities to ensure the flow of information.

[redacted] Appendix A: Saudi Nongovernmental Organizations in the United States

[redacted] Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation

[redacted] The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) is a Saudi-based NGO whose stated goals are to spread Islam, aid Muslims in difficulty, propagate the faith among non-Muslims, and establish the Salafist Wahhabi fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam. Two Saudi cabinet members officially supervise HIF's activities. The Minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Bin AbdulAziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, is the titular head and superintendent of HIF. The foundation is part of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, which is headed by the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz al-Sau'd, a member of the Saudi royal family and head of Mabahith. HIF has offices and representatives in more than 50 countries, including *the United States and Canada.* (O-1) *ndicates that some HIF offices have provided* material support to the terrorist activities of al-Qa'ida around the world. HIF has been used as a front organization to support and facilitate the movement of Islamic *mujahidin* into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Furthermore, HIF offices in Tanzania and Kenya are reported to have aided the al-Qa'ida cells responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings.

[redacted] HIF opened an office in Ashland, OR, in 1997. Pirouz Sedaghaty (aka Pete Seda) is the head of the US office. Soliman al-But'he, an officer of al-Haramain US, is also a ranking official of al-Haramain international; Saudi-based individuals, including al-But'he, have provided over $700,000 to the US-based offices of HIF. Approximately $600,000 of these funds came from al-But'he's personal account at the al-Rajhi Bank and Trust.

- Portland's investigation has established no direct link between US-based HIF officials and Saudi Government officials. There are, however, financials links with extremist individuals in Saudi Arabia.
- (O-1)

[redacted] An American convert to Islam who was employed by al-Haramain as an Imam came under investigation in North Carolina after his name, phone number, and address were found on a business card recovered during a raid of the home of an al-Qa'ida operative in Pakistan.

- Deya Ud-Den Eberle (aka Abu Salman and Richard Eberle), a US person who lived in the Middle East for 12 years and obtained a Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Medina University in Saudi Arabia, is believed to have attended a Lashkar-e-Tayiba training camp in Pakistan in the late 1990s.
- Eberle currently resides in Raleigh, NC, and works for HIF as a translator. He also teaches at American Open University, which has strong ties to al-Qa'ida.

[redacted] Dar Makkah and the Islamic Center of Portland

[redacted] The investigation of six individuals in Portland who attempted to travel to Afghanistan and support Taliban and al-Qa'ida operations against the United States in late 2001 led to another investigation of the Islamic Center of Portland; its Imam, Mohammed Kariye; and Dar Makkah, an Islamic nonprofit organization headed by Ala'a Abunijem. Kariye is suspected of recruiting and funding the travel of the Portland Six. Financial investigation revealed that Abunijem, who was financing Kariye, received a significant amount of money from three Saudi citizens believed to be former students at Colorado State University who were associated with the Saudi Student House in Fort Collins, CO. A preliminary review of the Saudi Student House's finances indicates that its main source of funds is the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Culture. Investigation has also linked individuals associated with the Saudi Student House to Abdullah Bin Ladin, a relative of Usama Bin Ladin and a former longtime President of WAMY in the United States. Kariye is being prosecuted for social security fraud. The Portland Six have been indicted for material support of terrorism.

[redacted] The Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the Success Foundation

[redacted] The GSA created the Muslim World League (MWL) in 1962. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread Wahhabi ideology throughout the world. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other NGOs in order to gain status as the leader of the international Islamic community.

[redacted] In 1978 MWL created the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), with a stated objective to provide relief and aid to Muslims. IIRO's offices in more than 90 countries distributed more than $400 million in aid between 1987 and 1995, according to public statements. FBI investigation has established that the International Relief Organization (IRO), the American branch of IIRO, has been operating in the United States as the Success Foundation.

[redacted] The FBI is currently investigating the Success Foundation, the nature of its support by the GSA under the MWL umbrella, and its suspected ties to various US-based Islamic fundamentalists and other suspect NGOs, including the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America (IIASA), located in Virginia.

[redacted] The Success Foundation and its management, like many Saudi-based charities operating in the United States, appear to be connected to a number of individuals and organizations associated with subjects of al-Qa'ida investigations, and with individuals associated with militant Palestinian causes. According to USIC reporting, the foundation may also be involved in money laundering for HAMAS.

- Success Foundation chairman Abdurahman Alamoudi, a naturalized US citizen, has numerous ties to HAMAS leaders, and [redacted] (J-2) [redacted] (J-2) He is currently under arrest in the United States and has admitted to being involved in a Libyan-sponsored plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah. He was sentenced to

23 years in jail after he pled guilty on separate charges relating to business transactions he conducted with the government of Libya. Alamoudi is cooperating with the USG as part of his plea agreement and has been providing information regarding international terrorism.As a result of Alamoudi's incarceration, the Foundation is to be dissolved.

- Success Foundation president Mohammed Omeish, a Libyan national who holds a green card, has traveled to Chechnya on behalf of the Foundation. (O-1) the purpose of his travels was possibly to deliver cash to *mujahidin* fighters. Our investigation also reveals that Omeish participated in a covert videotaping of security practices at Dulles International Airport in 1996. Omeish is suspected of being involved along with Alamoudi in the plot against the Saudi Crown Prince.

- Jamal Badawi, a member of the Success Foundation's board of trustees based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, is a known associate of the international Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement and HAMAS.

[redacted] The Success Foundation has been associated with Sanabel al-Kheer of Herndon, VA (aka Sana Bell, Inc.), which invests money in businesses in order to raise money for charities, including the Success Foundation. Yaqub M. Mirza, a naturalized US citizen, and Abdullah A. al-Noshan, a Saudi national and Embassy employee, are both on the board of Sanabel al-Kheer. Both men are also affiliated with a number of Saudi charities under investigation, including MWL, whose registered president in the United States is al-Noshan.

- Al-Noshan, who has an (J-3) has been observed by FBI surveillance acting in a manner consistent with a foreign intelligence officer.

- Al-Noshan is connected through monetary transactions and telephone calls to an FBI subject in Kentucky whose name, address, and telephone number were found in an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi.

[redacted] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America

[redacted] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) is a branch of the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University in Riyadh and maintains links to suspected terrorist organizations and their supporters according to FBI investigation. Several of IIASA's staff members have been Saudi nationals employed in an official capacity as administrative officers at the Embassy. IIASA is funded by the Embassy.

- During a one-month period in late 2002, an FBI source reported that approximately $2 million in cash was delivered to IIASA. FBI was able to substantiate the corresponding financial transactions in the organization's accounts.

- Mohammed Y. al-Raee, a Saudi IIASA instructor of Pakistani origin, has recently been charged with a number of Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) violations and will be deported. In addition to his IIASA association, al-Raee was a professor of aeronautics at the University of the District of Columbia.

- The FBI has learned that IIASA has a new management team. Funding by the Embassy has ceased, and the institute's funding is now believed to come from its parent organization in Riyadh.

- (O-1) (O-1) and ICE has investigated immigration violations by former IIASA staff members.

[redacted] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[redacted] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is a Saudi Arabia–based NGO with ties to Abdullah Bin Ladin (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) WAMY's 2002 US plan called for approximately $5 million in spending over 18 months.

[redacted] (O-1) the plan originated in Jeddah in November 2002. An FBI source reports that Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, of Orlando, FL, is expected to manage and lead the five-year plan's implementation in the United States.

- Harunani, a Uganda-born Kenyan citizen of Pakistani origin, is under investigation for his ties to WAMY and al-Qa'ida subjects in the United States.

- FBI information also links Harunani to Abdullah Bin Ladin and WAMY through his company, Discover Islam, reportedly one of the linchpins of the five-year plan.

- Harunani's activities have been limited following several FBI interviews on a variety of matters.

[redacted] WAMY offices in other countries are directly funding HAMAS-affiliated NGOs, including the UK-based charity Interpal and the Palestinian *zakat* (tithing) committees. The FBI is monitoring WAMY's US activities, which appear to have been severely curtailed since the FBI conducted a search of the organization's Northern Virginia office in conjunction with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement earlier this year.

[redacted] Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi Foundation

[redacted] The Saudi Arabian-based al-Rajhi family established the Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi (SAAR) Foundation in the 1980s to manage the family's charitable contributions. SAAR is a complex web of overlapping companies with parallel ideologies, personal relationships, and financial associations that has exhibited numerous affiliations with entities known to support terrorism. (O-1) the SAAR Foundation, in concert with its subsidiary companies, provided monetary support and other assistance to organizations linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS.

[redacted] Appendix B: US-Based Muslim Clerics Funded by the Saudi Government

[redacted] Several radical Imams preaching in the United States who are mostly Arab or African nationals are paid a salary or stipend by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), on an irregular but almost bi-monthly basis. More than a dozen of these individuals are or have been subjects of FBI counterterrorism investigations, with HAMAS and/or al-Qa'ida links. Investigations are ongoing to further identify these individuals, their associates, and the nature of their relationship with the GSA. The following are some of the individuals who have received stipends:

[redacted] Abdirahman S. Ahmed (aka Ahmed), who receives a stipend of $800 from the Embassy, (A), (G), (J-1) he organized a fundraiser on behalf of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI) in 2001 that raised $167,000. Ahmed, a naturalized US citizen, is believed to be AIAI's current leader in the United States. AIAI is a Somalia-based terrorist organization with ties to al-Qa'ida.

[redacted] Jamal Mohammed Abdellatif (aka Jamal M. Said), who receives a stipend of $1,948.54 from the Embassy, (A), (G), (J-1) for his connections to HAMAS. Said was born in Jordan and became a naturalized US citizen in 1988. He is the Imam at the Mosque Foundation of Chicago in Bridgeview, IL. Said is under investigation for his involvement with HAMAS.

[redacted] Monir Yasin al-Farra, who receives a stipend of $1,150.93 from the Embassy, is under investigation for ties to Muslim extremists. A Saudi national living in the United States as a permanent resident alien, al-Farra is the Imam at the Little Rock Islamic Center in Little Rock, AR. Al-Farra is involved with Jamaat al-Tabligh (JT) activities in the United States, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) JT, an international Muslim missionary organization, has been infiltrated by Islamic extremists.

[redacted] Melvin Eckless Perkins (aka Umar I. al-Khattab), who receives a stipend of $637.60 from the Embassy, is a US-born African-American convert to Islam. He is the Imam at the Al-Fajr Mosque located in Indianapolis, IN. Perkins is associated with Abdul Salam, an FBI investigation subject who (O-1) s tied to the al-Qa'ida network based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Salaam has met with Perkins in Indianapolis.

[redacted] Appendix C: Omar Al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan

[redacted] At this time the FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or that they provided material support for the 11 September attacks.

[redacted] Omar Al-Bayoumi

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi unwittingly assisted hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi following their arrival in the San Diego area in early February 2000. Al-Bayoumi helped the hijackers secure an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and signing as a guarantor on their lease application. He also assisted al-Mihdhar in the opening of a bank account. There is no evidence that al-Bayoumi provided financial support to the hijackers.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi was employed by the Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) from 1975 until 1995. From 1995 employment records indicate that al-Bayoumi was paid as a "ghost employee" of Dallah (a Saudi subcontractor of PCA).

[redacted] Many Arab individuals in the San Diego area, including (O-1) as well as al-Hazmi himself, suspected al-Bayoumi of being a Saudi intelligence officer because he was frequently observed videotaping events at the local Islamic center. To date the FBI has not received any information to corroborate this assertion.

[redacted] According to FBI interviews of Isamu Dyson, in late January 2000, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, where al-Bayoumi met with an unknown consular officer. After visiting the Consulate, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to a restaurant and discovered that it was now a butcher shop. The butcher shop employees recommended another *halal* restaurant nearby. At this second restaurant, al-Bayoumi and Dyson met Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who both stated that they did not like living in Los Angeles, to which al-Bayoumi suggested that they come to San Diego.

[redacted] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi arrived in San Diego shortly thereafter. Investigation has determined that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi initially attempted to obtain an apartment on their own with cash. Because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments, al-Bayoumi signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check for them. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check was deposited into al-Bayoumi's bank account on the same day.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi departed the United States in the summer of 2001 to attend school in England. When his association with the hijackers was determined after 11 September, New Scotland Yard (NSY) detained al-Bayoumi on 21 September 2001 under the United Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000. Al-Bayoumi's residence, office, and automobile were searched. Evidence recovered in the search of his residence revealed various documents and correspondence that can be interpreted as extremist in nature. Al-Bayoumi was interviewed by NSY between 22 and 28 September 2001.

[redacted] An arrest warrant for al-Bayoumi was issued on 27 September 2001 in the Southern District of California based on a criminal complaint alleging fraud and misuse of US immigration documents. A provisional US arrest warrant was not secured, however, because the immigration-related offense did not fall within the regulations of extradition from the United Kingdom to the United States.

[redacted] On 28 September 2001 al-Bayoumi was released from custody since NSY did not have enough evidence to charge him with any criminal violation. [redacted] (C-2) (C-2) Al-Bayoumi moved from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia in August 2002; he was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith sometime during October 2002.

[redacted] Osama Basnan

[redacted] Osama Basnan came to the attention of the FBI as the result of an interview conducted by the San Diego Field Office immediately after the 11 September attacks. The interviewee alleged that Basnan was a supporter of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and had espoused anti-American rhetoric. Basnan, a 44-year-old citizen of Saudi Arabia, entered the United States in 1980 on a visitor's visa. In 1992 Basnan listed his place of employment on apartment rental records as the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission in Washington, DC, which is associated with the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Uncorroborated source reporting alleged that on 17 October 1992, Basnan hosted a party in Washington, DC, for Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, aka the "blind sheikh," convicted in 1995 on multiple terrorism-related charges stemming from his involvement with the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and additional plots to attack landmarks in New York City, NY. However, a review of Basnan's financial records from the relevant time period fails to corroborate that allegation.

[redacted] Prior to 11 September, some considered Basnan a prominent member of the San Diego Saudi émigré community. He claims to have been in contact with UBL family members and may also have ties to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a Sudanese-based terrorist group. He was also a close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi. In April 2001 the wives of both al-Bayoumi and Basnan were arrested together in San Diego for shoplifting. Prior to and after the 11 September attacks, Basnan had significant telephonic contact with the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, and Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

[redacted] Basnan's wife has received significant payments from the Saudi government. Between January 1999 and May 2002, Basnan's wife received 34 checks from Princess Haifa, most in the amount of $2,000 per month, totaling $82,000. Other payments were also made to Basnan or his wife from Prince Bandar's or the Embassy's account. In total, Basnan and his wife received $127,469.29 from the Saudi government between January 1998 and May 2002. When interviewed by the FBI, Basnan explained that these payments were scholarships and charitable contributions he had solicited to help pay for his wife's thyroid surgery and support his family. Princess Haifa reportedly provided the money to help cover the family's medical and daily living expenses. The Saudi government has denied that Basnan was ever employed by the Embassy or Educational Mission, or that he was ever on a scholarship. However, the Saudi

(O-1)

[redacted] To date, no information developed by the FBI indicates that Basnan ever had any contact with al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi other than being introduced to al-Hazmi by al-Bayoumi. (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan said he "met" al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan denied that he "knew" al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar. Basnan also told the asset that he "saw" (that is, "observed") al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, who lived in the Parkwood apartment complex located across the street from the apartment complex where Basnan resided. Although Basnan had significant telephonic contacts with al-Bayoumi and Omar Bakarbashat, both of whom were close associates of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, there is nothing to indicate that Basnan ever interacted with al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar other than his introduction to al-Hazmi. In an interview with the FBI in August 2002, Basnan said he saw al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the mosque but never met them.

[redacted] During the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, there was much speculation as to the meaning of a consensually recorded Arabic conversation between Basnan and an FBI asset. During their discussion the asset referred to al-Bayoumi and his relationship with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Basnan told the asset that al-Bayoumi was "nothing compared to what I used to do." The Joint Intelligence Committee construed Basnan's comment to mean that Basnan did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did; however, a studied examination of the entire conversation reveals otherwise. In this conversation Basnan compared his religious activities seven or eight years ago to what al-Bayoumi did for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in helping them to get established in San Diego. In the conversation the asset brought up al-Bayoumi, saying that al-Bayoumi did a favor for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar by arranging for their apartment and, as a result, was now the subject of law enforcement scrutiny. Basnan responded that al-Bayoumi collected a lot of funds from a rich person and bought a mosque. Basnan advised that al-Bayoumi had stopped all of his religious activities and was now with his family. He told the asset that if the asset had come to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) years ago, he would have seen how active Basnan was in the Muslim community, visiting Muslims in prison and giving the Friday liturgy at the mosque. The language specialist who translated this conversation believes it is clear that Basnan was boasting about his religious activities in the Muslim community seven or eight years ago and comparing it to al-Bayoumi's activities. There is nothing in the conversation to indicate that Basnan was suggesting he helped al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar more than al-Bayoumi did.

[redacted] As a result of FBI investigation, Basnan and his wife were charged with visa fraud in August and September 2002 and pleaded guilty. Basnan was deported to Saudi Arabia in October 2002, and his wife was deported to Jordan a month later.

- There is no indication that any of the money Basnan or his wife received from the Saudi government ever went to al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar.

- Based on his overt contacts with the Saudi Embassy, the Saudi consulate, and members of the royal family, it does not appear that Basnan was a Saudi intelligence officer.

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/04/2002

To: Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] ER)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Request opening of a Full Investigation on captioned subject and authorization to conduct physical surveillance on captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: [redacted] Attached wit munication, is a copy of a letter from FBIHQ, approved by (S) dated 08/26/2002, (O-1)
(O-1) statement regarding captioned subject. The (O-1) was approved on 09/03/2002.

Reference(s): (F)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Details: [redacted] The above referenced communications document various interviews of several material witnesses involved in the PENTTBOM Investigation.

[redacted] Two of the (G), Isamu Dyson (DYSON) and Mohdar M. Abdullah (MOHDAR), have given detailed accounts of their involvement with American Airlines Flight #77 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf AlHazmi, while they were in Los Angeles and San Diego. Portions of Dyson and Mohdar's interviews are listed below to support the opening of a Full Investigation on Fahad Althumairy, captioned subject.

[redacted] During October 2001, Dyson was interviewed several times by Boston, Portland Maine RA agents, San Diego agents, and (D) (D).

[redacted] During the interviews, it was learned that Dyson knew Mr. OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, subject of San Diego investigation, during late 1999 and early 2000. Dyson indicated he once took a trip to Los Angeles with Omar Al-Bayoumi during this time frame. They went to the Saudi Arabian consulate in Los Angeles and then to a small Mediterranean café/restaurant in the Culver City area. It was at this restaurant that Omar Al-Bayoumi met American Airline Flight #77 hijacker's Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

[redacted] After this meeting (exact date unknown), the hijackers moved to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi played a major role in getting them established in the community. This included finding them an apartment and providing them with financial assistance. As receiving offices are aware, Al-Bayoumi is being actively investigated, by San Diego, for his role of supporting the hijackers. He is currently in England. He was detained and questioned in September related to the terrorist attacks, but had to be released.

[redacted] Investigators brought Dyson to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Dyson indicated that Al-Bayoumi dealt with a representative of the Consulate described as a Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'8" in height, in his 40s, with a black/grey beard down to his chest, wearing a suit. It appeared obvious to Dyson that Al-Bayoumi and the Saudi official knew each other and had met before. Their conversation was in Arabic however, and Dyson did not comprehend it. Al-Bayoumi and this man then went behind closed doors to take care of their "business". They spend up to one hour at the Consulate.

[redacted]

[redacted] After leaving the consulate, Al-Bayoumi suggested that he and Dyson travel to a local restaurant to have lunch. The two first entered the Mediterranean Café. Al-Bayoumi had informed Dyson that he and his family had dined at this restaurant before. Once Al-Bayoumi and Dyson entered the Mediterranean Café, they were informed that the Mediterranean Café did not serve food. Al-Bayoumi asked if this was the Mediterranean Café on Venice Blvd. Al-Bayoumi was informed that another Mediterranean restaurant was located a few yards away. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson walked a short distance west on Venice Boulevard and into the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET Restaurant, located at 10863 Venice Boulevard, phone number (310)842-8291.

[redacted] While at the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET, Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met with hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Alhazmi. It is unknown at this time whether this meeting between Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers, in LA, was a planned event or a "chance meeting." meeting is believed to have occurred on 02/01/2000, based on [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) and toll record analysis. San Diego investigation has indicated that Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. He was being supported in the U.S. with a stipend from his employer, the Saudi Arabian Civil Air Administration, and/or the Saudi government. There is speculation that Al-Bayoumi could be a Saudi intelligence officer based on numerous factors and circumstances. Therefore, there remains the possibility that the meeting was planned or Al-Bayoumi was directed by someone at the Saudi Consulate to meet the two hijackers at the restaurant in LA.

[redacted] During the conversation, Dyson learned via Al-Bayoumi that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had an apartment in LA and have only been there and in the United States for a short time. They stated that they did not like Los Angeles. They were having a difficult time and didn't know anyone. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the U.S. to learn English. Al-Bayoumi invited them to come to San Diego and check it out. Al-Bayoumi told them they would probably like it in San Diego. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar indicated they were interested. Al-Bayoumi gave his phone number to Al-Hazmi. It is also possible that Al-Bayoumi got their phone number as well, but Dyson was unsure. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant/café and went to the Culver City Mosque, also know as the King Fahad Mosque.

[redacted] The next time Dyson met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar was when they were in the Parkwood Apartments on Mt. Ada Road in San Diego. This was at the welcome/housewarming party Al-Bayoumi had thrown for the hijackers. It was a matter of a few weeks to a month between the meeting at the LA restaurant and the time of the welcoming party for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. During this interim period, Al-Bayoumi did mention that he had been in contact with the

[redacted]

two men they met at the restaurant in LA. Al-Bayoumi also told Dyson that they even came down to visit San Diego one time and liked it.

[redacted] Mohdar stated that he met and became acquainted with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 1999, after an introduction by Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Nawaf told Mohdar that they, Nawaf and Khalid, had arrived in Los Angeles via United Airlines into Los Angeles Airport. Mohdar was unaware of the location they stayed in Los Angeles or how they arrived in San Diego. Omar brought Nawaf and Khalid to an Islamic Mosque located in Lemon Grove, CA, to make the introduction to Mohdar. Omar asked Mohdar to become acquainted with Nawaf and Khalid, acclimate them to the area and assist in any way in their affairs. Mohdar noted that Nawaf told him not to tell anyone that they had taken an excursion trip to Malaysia after arriving in Bangkok. Mohdar knew that the hijackers traveled in their Toyota to Los Angeles, however, he did not know the purpose of the trip or the date.

[redacted] In approximately the summer on 2000, Mohdar traveled with Nawaf in the Toyota to take Khalid to the LAX Airport in Los Angeles, CA. Khalid was returning to Saudi Arabia to be with his wife and newborn female child. Khalid traveled commercial airlines from LAX on Lufthansa Airline. After dropping off Khalid at the airport, Mohdar and Nawaf visited the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. They returned to San Diego the same day. Nawaf had a gifted voice for leading the prayer at the residence and at the Mosque. FBI Los Angeles Comment: Los Angeles has no explanation as to why Khalid Al-Mihdhar had to travel from San Diego to Los Angeles in order to fly to Saudi Arabia.

FBI Los Angeles Investigative Results:

[redacted] Los Angeles has determined that Fahad AlThumairy may be a potential contact of the hijackers and Al-Bayoumi in Los Angeles. AlThumairy is an administrative officer at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and may have diplomatic status. AlThumairy is also believed to be one of the Imams at the King Fahad mosque. AlThumairy also fits the description, as provided by Dyson, of the individual that Al-Bayoumi met at the Saudi consulate prior to Al-Bayoumi's "chance" meeting with the hijackers at the restaurant.

[redacted] Los Angeles review of ACS also revealed a communication from Legat [redacted] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles ([redacted] (F)) dated 12/17/2001, that according to a letter from the Saudi Arabian Mabahith to Legat [redacted] (G) AlThumairy is "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" and that he has been sent to the United States for the "purpose of religious guidance." The Saudi Mabahith letter also indicated that the Mabahith request of Legat (G) had the "special attention of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah". Los Angeles notes that according to the US Department of State records, Al-Thumairy is listed as an Administrative Officer and does not carry any special religious status within the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. ACS further indicated that in (F), (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted] A review of Al-Bayoumi's home telephone records and cellular telephone records has revealed that Al-Bayoumi had (16) telephonic contacts with AlThumairy. In addition, Al-Bayoumi had (24) telephonic contacts with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles prior to the events of 09/11/2001.

[redacted] Various reliable sources of the Los Angeles have reported that AlThumairy returned to Saudi Arabia in mid-August 2001 and did not return to Los Angeles until 12/24/2001. Los Angeles notes that Al-Bayoumi also left the United States, for England, prior to the events of 09/11/2001. Sources have also reported that AlThumairy's sermons at the King Fahad mosque have a militant, anti-West tone to them. Al-Thumairy is also reported to be anti-United States and Israel.

[redacted] According to Mohdar, the hijackers and Mohdar took a trip to Los Angeles in order for Khalid Al-Mihdhar to return to Saudi Arabia for the birth of his daughter. Mohdar stated that they stayed at a hotel close to the mosque. Mohdar also reported that the hijackers met several people a the King Fahad mosque including a person identified as "Khallam". According to Mohdar, Khallam visited the hijackers at the hotel that evening. Upon Khallam's arrival, the hijackers asked Mohdar to wait outside. FBI investigation has determined that Mohdar and the hijackers stayed at Deno's Motel on 06/09/2000. Information from FBI New York has revealed that (O-1), SAID SALEH BIN ATTASH, aka "KHALLAD" (O-1). Bin Attash is the alleged mastermind behind the bombing of USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. New York indicated that (O-1) (O-1). New York opined that certain diplomatic arrangements exist at various airports which allow diplomats to meet incoming foreign nationals at the baggage (O-1) (O-1) (O-1). Los Angeles can not confirm whether "Khallad" and "Khallam" are identical.

[redacted]

To: es From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 09/04/2002

[redacted] On 03/07/2002, Los Angeles interviewed Mr. Qualid Moncef Benomrane, while in INS custody. Benomrane is a Tunisian national that regularly attended the King Fahad Mosque.

[redacted] Benomrane reported that he had heard that two Saudi Arabian men had arrived at LAX and were met by a person unknown to Benomrane. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. Benomrane stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and Palm St. FBI Los Angeles Comment: This is the apartment complex whose records were recently search by Los Angeles.

[redacted] One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis, Benomrane was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy introduced Benomrane to the two Saudis and asked Benomrane if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak English. Benomrane agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.

[redacted] The next day the Saudis called Benomrane and asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. Benomrane picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around. They then ate at the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day Benomrane took them back to their apartment complex.

[redacted] Two to three days later the Saudis called Benomrane again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. Benomrane agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given $100 and told he would get the remainder after the trip. Benomrane stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a San Diego gas station. Benomrane could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles Benomrane called them to receive the remainder of his money. The Saudis told him that Sheik Fahad AlThumairy would give him the rest of the money.

[redacted] When asked by investigators who else knew about the two Saudis, Benomrane replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy to keep the presence of the two Saudis to himself. Benomrane did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told Sheik Fahad to take care of the Saudis.

Benomrane was told by Sheik Fahad that the Saudis were here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. Benomrane said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if Benomrane

[redacted]

knew for a fact that they returned to Saudi Arabia he replied no and that he was just told that they had left Los Angeles.

[redacted] Benomrane could not remember the Saudis names, but remembered one was approximately twenty one years old and the other was approximately twenty-five years old. Benomrane stated over and over that the two Saudis came to Los Angeles prior to 09/11/2001.

[redacted] During the interview, Benomrane was shown photographs of all the hijackers and numerous photographs of unrelated individuals. Benomrane looked at all the photographs carefully and placed all the photographs in a pile on the left side of the desk. When he viewed the photographs of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi, he placed the photographs on the right side of the desk. Once he had gone through all the photographs, he mixed the photographs and stated that he did not recognize anyone from the photos. FBI Los Angeles is of the opinion that Benomrane may have been less than truthful with the investigators regarding his recognition of anyone from the photographs.

[redacted] As stated earlier, Los Angeles conducted a search of lease/rental records of the apartment complex that was shown to the investigators by Benomrane. The search revealed that Fahad Al-Thumairy and the King Fahad Mosque had an extensive rental history with the apartment complex. Lease records indicated that Al-Thumairy would customarily rent furnished apartments for a 4-6 week period. Lease records also indicated that Al-Thumairy would not personally reside in the apartments rented at the complex. This apartment complex is within ½ mile of the Mediterranean restaurant where Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met the hijackers. The apartment is withing 3/4 mile of the King Fahad mosque and is within one mile from Deno's motel where the hijackers and Mohdar had stayed on 06/09/2000. Additionally, a check of all other hotels in the vicinity of the King Fahad Mosque and Deno's Motel revealed that Al-Thumairy has an extensive rental history with Travellodge Hotel and Sunburst Motel. The hotel searches also revealed that Al-Bayoumi has extensive rental history at the Travellodge Hotel and the Half Moon Motel. All these motels/hotels are adjacent to Deno's motel and within ½ mile of the apartment complex.

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] Los Angeles is of the strong opinion that Fahad Al-Thumairy may have known about the hijackers while in the United

States and may have assisted them. Based on the above, Los Angeles has initiated a Full Field investigation on Al-Thumairy in order to determine his association with the tragic events of 09/11/2001 and to disrupt any future terrorist operations that may be planned by Al-Qaeda or its support network in the United States.

♦♦

(Rev. 01 31 2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/20/2008

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G)
SSA [redacted] (S)
IA [redacted] (S)
LEGAT

[redacted] (G)

From: Los Angeles
[redacted] (G)
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F), (G)

Title: [redacted] FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To request authorization from FBIHQ to close captioned case and to provide Counterterrorism with a closing Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) as required by the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). Captioned subject will remain in [redacted] (G)

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for the Los Angeles file is the Annual Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) of the captioned case. An electronic copy of the LHM will be sent to FBIHQ via email for passage to DOJ. FBIHQ is requested to review the electronic copy of the annual LHM for passage to [redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] This closing EC was coordinated with CTD on 10/01/2008.

Full Investigation Initiated: 11/30/2007

Details: [redacted] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual

[redacted]

who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers. FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[redacted] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., unaware that his (J-3) (J-3) ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 by FBI agents at his home in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No new information was garnered as a result of the interview. ALTHUMAIRY's investigation was closed on 10/31/2005 because he was no longer in the United States, although he (G)

[redacted] Per (F) (P) who was closely associated with 9/11 hijackers ALHAZMI and ALMIDHAR, was interviewed on 08/29/2007. (P) noted that he personally introduced ALTHUMAIRY to the hijackers, which indicated that ALTHUMAIRY had more direct contact with the hijackers than was previously known.

[redacted] Due to ALTHUMAIRY's prominence in the Los Angeles area and association with the 9/11 hijackers during that time, Los Angeles re-opened the closed investigation on ALTHUMAIRY in order to locate and interview him.

[redacted] On 01/28/2008 (F) CTD passed two (G) approved tearlines to Legat (G) requesting Mabahith assistance in coordinating an interview of Fahad Al-Thumairy (F) and Princes Nawaf and Meteb Al-Saud in Saudi Arabia. However, per telephonic and email communications with LEGAT (G) Saudi Mabahith denied the interview requests. Due to the fact that Al-Thumairy remains in Saudi Arabia, this case is being closed. Al-Thumairy will, however, (G) because of his reported association with the 9/11 hijackers.

[redacted] As set forth in an EC provided by CTD, dated 12/01/2006, "Section 19 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM), or (F) policy, is being modified to include policy and procedures when an international terrorism investigation in the (F) classification is closed." As requested, information contained within this text is reiterated below:

a. This was a Full Field Investigation.

[redacted]

b. The investigation was opened on 11/30/2007.

c. The investigation was initially opened as a Full Field Investigation.

d. There is no recent LHM because the case is being closed within a year of opening. The closing LHM is attached.

e. The subject is a Non-USPER.

f. The extent to which the subject is aware of the terrorist aims of the foreign power is unknown due to his location in Saudi Arabia and the inability to conduct a subject interview.

g. A sensitive national security matter exists as FAHAD AL-THUMARY may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government.

h. Known Identifiers

(U) The following identifiers are being provided for the captioned subject:

a) Name: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY; FAHD IBRAHIM ABDULLAH ALTHUMAIRY
b) DOB: (P-1)
c) Non-USPER
d) Religious affiliation: Sunni

Descriptive Data:

(U) Main Subject
Name -
Last: ALTHUMAIRY
First: FAHAD
Middle:
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1)
POB:
ARN: Alien Registration #
DLN: None
PNO: (J-3)
SOC: (P-1)
Alias(es) -
Last: ALTHUMAIRY
First: FAHD
Middle: IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
Address(es) -
House #: Unknown
Street Name:
Street Suffix:
Unit:
City:
State:
Postal Code:
Country: Saudi Arabia

[redacted]

Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.

i. Subject has resided in Saudi Arabia since he was refused re-entry into the U.S. on 05/08/2003. LEGAT (G) is aware of ALTHUMAIRY's presence in Saudi Arabia.

j. Subject is classified as possible direct associate.

[redacted]

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Request concurrence to close captioned investigation. Provide the enclosed LHM, making notification of the closing of this investigation, to DOJ.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

[redacted] (G)

AT [redacted] (G)

[redacted] LEGAT: Read and clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the Attacks of September 11, 2001 **Date:** 07/23/2021

From: (G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(F) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTTBOMB (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) [redacted] PENTBOMB (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR CASE (MC) 182 (A), (G), (J-1)

(F)

[redacted]

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: (F) 07/23/2021

(F)

Synopsis: [redacted] To file. To provide summary and historical information for subsequent agents of (G)

(G)

Administrative Notes: [redacted] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
Thos replaces Serial (F) which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. [redacted] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

`Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Connections to the`
`Attacks of September 11, 2001`
`Re: (F) 07/23/2021`

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

(A), (G), (J-1) there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[redacted] (G) was originally formed as (G) in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of (G) there was (A), (G), (J-1) a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been previously established. (G) was quickly transferred to the new (G) and changed to (G) and then subsequently (G) During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the (G) (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in (G) the program was again transferred to (G) (G) before returning to (G) (G)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) and (F) These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[redacted] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[redacted] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, (A), (G), (J-1)

♦♦

(F) [redacted]

The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support network for the attacks of September 11, 2001; and the SAG creation of and support and direction for a network of offices and personnel involved with militant Salafi Islamic activities and proselytization within the United States.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

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(G) before returning to (G)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

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[redacted]

Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through 2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to enter the U.S. and the "muscle hijackers", although recruited in 2000, were the last – not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers involved in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation and the 9/11 Commission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appeared to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihdar's difficulties may have resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi alone in California except for elements of his support network. Almihdar would not return to the US as a "muscle hijacker" until July 2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.

It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members. After Almihdar departed the U.S. Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000. The second primary group of hijackers were the "Hamburg Group"

[redacted]

(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their need for a support network would be minimal.

Due to the lack of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the existence of a support network would make operational sense. Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government.

Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO) (Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi Arabian Intelligence

[redacted] **Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Arabian diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The Islamic Affairs Offices worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in supporting the Saudi Arabian Government's objective to be perceived as the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi Arabia's religious and political competition with Shia Iran.** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)**, the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) **and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to provide cover for the movement of** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)**. Saudi Arabian "non-governmental organizations" (NGO), ie. "charities", supplemented this activity with large funding streams as well as cover for personnel.**

One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (O-1) FBI Serial (F) (F)) reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with approximately 50 MIA officers. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) Many Saudi Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section, Majid Aljashaihan (SA (S) NOTE: This would be **Majed Alghesheyan**), was either a GIP officer or had some special connection to the GIP. The same opinions were held about **Khalil Khalil**, the deputy chief of the MIA section. Musaid Aljarrah (**Musaed Aljarrah**) was one of the known GIP officers in the MIA section.

[SA (S) note: Presumably the above number of "approximately 50" would include both Saudi and non-Saudi personnel (non-diplomatic) in both Islamic Affairs and Dawa. It is unknown if personnel assigned to other offices such as **Muslim World League (MWL), World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)** would be included (G) [The large number of employees in a national not pre-dominantly Muslim signaled the significance of the activities of this office in the U.S. to overall Saudi Arabian policies and objectives.]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) On (A), (G), (J-1) 2009 (O-1) Sahal Ergesous was the head of the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA. (O-1) the Islamic Affairs Office is active and is charged with monitoring Indian, Iranian and Egyptian Islamic societies primarily. Ergesous is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F) On 08/20/2010 (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] Various serials in indices notes that (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the EKSA as the (A), (G), (J-1) the (A), (G), (J-1) Office and that Musaed Aljarrah was assigned to work (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) Serial (F)). According to (F) Serial (F) that in February 2005 Aljarrah met with (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah stated that (A), (G), (J-1); however, (A), (G), (J-1) insisted that Aljarrah return to head the Islamic Affairs Office and Aljarrah returned in March 2005.

[redacted] Per the above and information on visas noted below it is known that (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (J-3) (J-3) (J-3). (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah's replacement was Abdullah Alajroush (F) (F)). Alajroush was a suspected Intelligence Officer (SIO) who had previously served in Pakistan (O-1) (O-1). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and had attempted to (A), (G), (J-1) Alajroush's replacement was Sahal Ergesous (Sahl Ergesous)((G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) discussed (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) ((F) Serial (F)).

The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within the MIA offices. (A), (G), (J-1) and Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence officer (A), (G), (J-1). This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.

[redacted]

Use of MIA/Dawa Offices to Obtain Intelligence

The purpose of the MIA/Dawa offices is also of relevance. The information below clearly indicates that one of the purposes of the offices was to obtain intelligence on individuals and communities of value to Saudi Arabian intelligence or government purposes. Thus at least some individuals assigned to these offices would be working at least partially for Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) This serial provided excellent information related to one of the purposes of the Dawa/MIA offices and is particularly interesting as it provides information regarding taskings as well as names of personnel during the crucial years before 9/11.

[redacted] The communication reported the arrest of Omar Abdi Mohammed (aka Omar Alkhatib) (F) in San Diego, California on 01/20/2004 and documents obtained during a subsequent search. Omar Abdi Mohamed had been identified (A), (G), (J-1) as the leader of the Al-Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. Mohamed was selected as the AIAI leader of the U.S. approximately nine months ago. AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). WFO had previously obtained a list of 50 US based clerics who were supported by the EKSA IFTA (Dawa) office. Alkhatib was one of those listed. On January 20, 2004, he was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" which was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization

[redacted]

interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from the Global Relief Foundation (GRF). The United States Treasury Department has frozen the assets of the Global Relief Foundation and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism.

(O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] [redacted] (F) Documents located during searches of Muslim World League identified efforts to recruit within the U.S. military.

[redacted] The above documents (there are others within FBI indices) help confirm [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) reporting regarding the functions of the MIA/Dawa offices.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Personnel Assigned to the MIA/Dawa Offices:

[redacted] Multiple individuals were employed inside the MIA/Dawa offices within the EKSA. The following is summary information on the most pertinent individuals within these offices that are associated with the 9/11 support network.

(A), (G), (J-1)

DOB: (P-1)

Passport: (P-1)

(J-3)

Memo on (J-3)

Employer: **Prince Bandar bin Sultan**

Telephone: (P-1)

POC: (A), (G), (J-1) (P)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] Possible USPER (P) DOB: (P-1) /
(P-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Summary: (A), (G), (J-1) was an official diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1) has been

[redacted]

(O-1) known to have been employed by Bandar bin Sultan's National Security Council. (O-1)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) As noted above, (A), (G), (J-1) was (A), (G), (J-1) to be a GIP (A), (G), (J-1) at the (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (F) (J-3), (O-1) (J-3), (O-1)

(J-3), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Musaed A Al Jarrah (Musaed Aljrarrah)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Occupation: Accountant

Address: (P) McLean, Va

Telephone: (P) (home) (P) (cell)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1) and was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.

[redacted] Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the 9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government involvement. Per investigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had a "controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of

Sunni extremist activity in Southern California." Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of **Almuhanna** (herein) and **Althumairy** (herein) who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. After Almuhanna and Althumairy were expelled for from the King Fahd Mosque, they and their followers created an "underground" mosque near the King Fahd Mosque. After their departure, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) Communication dated November 2000 requesting (A), (G), (J-1) reported that (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) dated 11/14/2003] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar "Wahhabi line of thinking" as Mohammed Almohanna (see herein). (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was last in LA two years prior.

[redacted] (F) Dated 2009] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) In 1995, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). It was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the **ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA), (see herein)** a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) of the Islamic Affairs department. (O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] [redacted] (F) Dated 2007] According to multiple sources, Al-Jarrah returned to Riyadh, **Saudi Arabia where he works for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., in the Saudi National Security Ministry.** However, Al-Jarrah returned to the U.S. on July 11, 2006 using [redacted] (J-3) departed on September 19, 2006, and has not returned since. Al-Jarrah reportedly traveled to several U.S. cities and has been associating with [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) assigned to the EKSA. Over the past several months, Al-Jarrah has traveled to Cairo, Egypt; San Paulo, Brazil; Beirut, Lebanon; Demascus, Syria; Tokyo, Japan; and Hong Kong, China. It is unknown what Al-Jarrah is doing during his travel. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (G) that Al-Jarrah [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) actually works for Prince Bandar's National Security Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)
(O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Southern California Based Investigations

[redacted] A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation Encore. During the [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be involved. The individuals in these locations were known to have contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the EKSA Dawa office. The following additional persons of interest were working at the Consulate:

[redacted]

Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy

Fahad I A Al Thumairy (Fahad Althumairy)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: (P-1), believed to be Althumairy’s son, was initially (J-3) to visit California (google was listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or arranged for their meeting key members of the support network. Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.

[redacted] Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under (F).

[redacted] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.

[redacted]

FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[redacted] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., (J-3) (J-3) ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 by FBI agents at his home in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No new information was garnered as a result of the interview. ALTHUMAIRY's (A), (G), (J-1) because he was no longer in the United States, although he (G).

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] A communication from Legat (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles (F) dated 12/17/2001 provided Saudi Mabahith return of information related to a request for information on Althumairy. The Saudi response noted that AlThumairy is "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" and that he has been sent to the United States for the "purpose of religious guidance." The Saudi Mabahith letter also indicated that the Mabahith request of Legat (G) had the "special attention of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah".

[redacted] (F) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (F) On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents interviewed (P) regarding any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between (P) and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). (P) stated that he was told by (P) that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. (P) did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other then to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. (P) did request (P) to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. (P) would see (P) with the two men at the mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

[redacted] (P) states he was told by (P) that the two men were living at his house on (P). (P) stated to (P) that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with (P) other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. (P) was unaware when (P) had requested that of his sister.

[redacted] (P) recalls a conversation that he had with (P) shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A. regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that (P) told (P) that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. (P) asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. (P) stated to (P) that he just needed to take them there. (P) did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings. [See **Bayoumi**]

[redacted]

Mohammed S Almuhanna (Mohammed Almuhanna / Mohammed Almohanna)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Phone #: (P), (P),
(P)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Almuhanna was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanna was known to be a leader and spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King Fahd Mosque. Almuhanna was a close associate of Althumairy.

[redacted] Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, a Sunni Salafi extremist with ties to 9/11 (subject of (F)). ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque. (O-1) (O-1) "ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" (F) (F).

[redacted] Almuhanna is the son of prominent Saudi judge – Sulaiman Almuhanna (DOB: (P-1) (J-3). (J-3) (J-3) A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB: (P-1)).

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] [(F) dated 11/13/2003] (A), (G), (J-1) that Almuhanna had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.

[redacted] (F) Per interview of **Mohammed Alqudhaieen** (see herein) Almuhannad was invited by Alqudhaieen to provide sermons while in Tucson. (F) Interviewee stated that al-Muhanna was a virulent critic of America and American society. According to (P) al-Muhanna was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non-Muslims and Muslims who did not meet al-Muhannas religious standards. (P) (P) stated that many people in the Muslim community were surprised when al-Thumairy was not allowed to re-enter the United States, but no one was surprised that al-Muhanna was excluded.

Sultan Mehmas Sultan Alkahtani (Sultan Alkahtani)

(F)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Summary: Alkahtani was a Saudi Arabian diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Alkahtani was a close associate of Almuhanna. Alkahtani's brother was identified as having been killed fighting for ISIS.

Relevant Serials:

(F) : (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Muhanna is the subject of Los Angeles (A), (G), (J-1) (F) based on the extremist ideology which he has preached at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles and a smaller mosque/madrassa school Al-Muhanna helped create known as the Dar Al Quran Education Center. Al-Muhanna has been associated with **Fahad Althumairy**, another religious mullah from the Consulate, who is the subject of Los Angeles FFI (G). Al-Muhanna also gives religious guidance to the Islamic Center of Long Beach where he is in

[redacted]

contact with Hamad Al-Badr, [redacted] (G) (G).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Prior FBI investigation has determined that Alkahtani's brother - Fahad Mihmas Alqahtani - [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) prior to traveling to Syria to join ISIS where he subsequently was killed. [redacted] (F)

[redacted]

Mutaib Alsudairi (Mutaib Alsudairy)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] [redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] Asudairi's Virginia DMV photo that lists place of residence of [redacted] (P) Falls Church, Va in September 1999.

[redacted] **Summary: Mutaib Alsudairy and Adel Alsadhan were two Saudi clerics and Saudi Arabian officials who entered the U.S. in 1999 and met with Omar Albayoumi. These individuals later attempted to reenter the U.S. Alsudairy is known to have lived with AQ facilitator Ziyad Khaleel.**

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F)] [redacted] [redacted] (O-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

DC and had [redacted] (J-3). (FBI Comment: This was the same arrival date as al-Sadhan and both men listed [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3). Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. He assumed duty on 14 June 1999. Al-Sudairy's position was terminated on 11 April 2001. Prior to this he worked at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from March 1998 to June 1999. Al-Sudairy was reported to be the nephew of Doctor Abdullah bin Turki, former head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League president.

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (F) [redacted] FBI TA shows that al-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[redacted] Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with **Ziyad Khaleel** (see herein) for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice. (FBI Comment: Khaleel was reportedly killed in a car accident in Saudi Arabia in March 2002)

(J-3)

[redacted] SA (S) note: Mutaib Alsudairy is the brother of long term LA Saudi Consulate employee Faisal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1))(confirmed via review of applications that confirmed same father and mother). (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted] [(F)] Faisal Alsudairy was the subject of an LHM to (J-3) (J-3) as well as (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (J-3) (J-3) Another brother, Saud Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) was a brother assigned as a diplomat at the EKSA. Another brother, Turki Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1) is noted in early New York Saudi investigative file and in PENTTBOMB files for unknown reasons. Another brother Ahmad Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)), an MOI officer, (J-3) (J-3) Ahmad was the (G) communication is unclear. Another brother Mishaal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) appears to have been (G) (G). Another brother Bandar Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1) is an MOD police officer.

(J-3)

[redacted] Faisal Alsudairy , Mutaib Alsudairy's possible brother, (J-3) (J-3)

Adel Alsadhan

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

Relevant Serials:

(F) Captioned investigation was opened based on (O-1) AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject **MUSAED AL-JARRAH** (F)) at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL-JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN (O-1) a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.

[(F) Serial (F) dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor Abdussattar Shaikh: **Omar Albayoumi** introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia. They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven weeks. [NOTE: Alhazmi and Almihdar also lived at Shaikh's residence at a later date. (F) This serial also noted that both Alsudairy and Alsadhan were imams at the Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon (San Diego)(See Albayoumi).

(J-3) Attempted to enter the US in 2013 as (J-3) but was refused. (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

SSN: [redacted] (P-1)

Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: [redacted] (P) (LA) / [redacted] (P)

Possible present address:

[redacted] (P)

Anaheim, CA

May be USPER of [redacted] (P) origin

Summary: [redacted] (P) was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. [redacted] (P) was a close associate of Alhtumairy and may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with [redacted] (P) later had contact with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) Listed employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed [redacted] (P) as a translator with a US arrival date of 10/23/1991 although the biographical section noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from 1979-1983.

[redacted] In February of 2000, **Omar Al-Bayoumi** and Kaysan Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi. When later interviewed, Al-Bayoumi and Bindon characterized this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon identified a photograph of [redacted] (P) as the person at the Consulate who gave religious materials to Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] During the investigation of the 9/11 attacks by FBI personnel an associate of the hijackers identified as Isamu Dyson was interviewed and advised that he knew Omar Albayoumi from 1999. Dyson indicated that he once visited the Saudi Consulate in LA with Albayoumi and while there Albayoumi met separately with an unknown individual. [During an interview on 08/18/2003 Albayoumi described this person as follows: a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia. After this meeting they traveled to a cafe in Culver City where Albayoumi met with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdar. At the time, investigators believed this meeting occurred in February 2000.

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] This serial details investigation of (P) as part of Operation Encore. Contrary to (P) claims of not discussing 9/11, a source reported that after the attacks (P) (O-1) stated "Isn't it great that our brothers are fighting?"

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] (P) known telephone number ((P)) was also known to have one contact (06/14/2001) with telephone (P) which was registered to an apartment used by Eyad Alrababah and (P) who both also provided significant logistic support to Mihdar, Hanjour and two additional hijackers. According to Alrababah, he met Hanjour and Hamzi at a 7-11 store "by chance" (similar to the story made by Albayoumi). In May 2001, Alrababah drove four of the hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. (D) (D)

[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] (P) was a close associate of **Althumairy** and led prayers and handled administration at the King Fahad Mosque. Althumairy also served as an admin officer at the Saudi LA Consulate and held an office at that location.

Omar Albayoumi

Alternate names found: Omar Al Bayoumi / Omar A M Al Bayoumi / Omer Bayoumi / Omar Bayoumi / Omar Bayayoomi / Umar Albayoumi

Omar Abu Emad)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3) It is known that Albayoumi, a Saudi national, had entered the US in the decade before 9/11 and remained.

(F)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: [redacted] **Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar.** (O-1)

(O-1)

Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a "ghost employee" while in the U.S. After Almihdar departed the U.S. in June 2000, a nephew of Albayoumi's supposed employer moved into the home.

Relevant Serials:

Omar Albayoumi was originally opened as (A), (G), (J-1) (F) Provided synopsis of Saudi official links to Albayoumi:

[redacted] Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi intelligence; however, could not locate any evidence and Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on a chance meeting. Information contained herein, (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) This is significant as Albayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately available to Hazmi and Mihdar upon entry into the U.S. during a time period that both of these ill-prepared operatives were most vulnerable to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a "ghost employee" of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of Albayoumi's boss within this company would later move in to the same apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar's departure.

[redacted] (F) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by writer were from 1998.

[redacted] [(F) Serial (F)] On (A), (G), (J-1) 1998, (F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) new property has been purchased for a mosque, located at (P) (P) in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is (P), Bayoumi's residential number is (P) and his cellular phone is (P). The property cost $580,000.00 and is going to be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the property was bought and renovated.

[redacted] (F) Date 04/01/1999] In this communication an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of (P) (P) had delivered $400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob (P-1), (P-1) address (P) San Diego, CA (Villa Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone (P), may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"

[redacted] [(F)] An interview of an employee of Dallah Al Baraka in Saudi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the Director General of PCA at that time, (P) (DOB (P-1) , had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses related to these individuals. Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN (P) assured the interviewee that he (P) wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by (P). These purchase orders were controlled by Mohammed Basharil (Mohamed Basharahil)(PCA). Basharil and a Hamid Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to Albayoumi's account.

[redacted] [9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi) DOB: (P-1) (J-3) was the (P).

(F)] [redacted] Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each other, as would be expected since each was a well-known member of the local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the

[redacted]

hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi, Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated with the hijackers while in San Diego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque) at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in Yemen while a part of AQAP.] [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F)

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) dated 10/03/2001 Interview of [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G)] [redacted] (G) noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi has access to Saudi money, more than $800,000, to build Mosques and Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would come to the Mosque and video tape everything. [redacted] (G) noted that Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate and even with known crooks.

[redacted] [[redacted] (F) Dated 04/2016] Operation Encore analysis: [redacted] (P) described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a "very high status" when he entered the building. Bayoumi's status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.

[redacted] [[redacted] (F)] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[redacted] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[redacted] Dr. Jameel Alshami [redacted] (P); Saudi Embassy WA. [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P), AbdulAziz Assaleh [redacted] (P) and F [redacted] (P) **Khalid Asswailem** [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) and C [redacted] (P). **Saudi Consulate** [redacted] (P) F [redacted] (P), **Islamic Affairs** [redacted] (P) Abdullah Awaad [redacted] (P) Sami Assadhan [redacted] (P) and Saad Al Jebreen, [redacted] (P) LA, CA

[redacted]

90025. [redacted] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] Al-Bayoumi is also linked to **Abdolrahman Barzanjee.** Barzanjee is a possible Al-Qaida associate, (O-1)

(O-1)

[SA (S) Note: Bayoumi's association with the Kurdish Mosque, reportedly paid for with Saudi money, and his association with Barzanjee may be of interest. According to open source reporting, AQ was exploring its associations with Iraq during this same time period which resulted in the organization of Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq's Kurdish areas. See (F)

[SA (S) note: Possible brother Ahmed Albayoumi has a more recent (J-3) .]

Osama Basnan (Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan)

DOB: (P-1)

SSN: (P-1)

(P)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also known to have connections to the "Blind Sheikh." Basnan and his wife were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan's wife, who was known to have sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar's wife.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) This serial noted (A), (G), (J-1)

[(F)] [redacted] This investigation was predicated based on interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation. Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as having a very close relationship with **Omar Al-Bayoumi**, who provided support to hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal mayor, of the Saudi Arabian Community in San Diego. Individuals in the Middle Eastern community opined that Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi Intelligence Officer and that Basnan came to San Diego to take his place. Basnan was living in the same apartment complex on 09/11/2001 where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers had resided and Al-Bayoumi's mail was being forwarded to Basnan's apartment. Basnan harbors anti-American sentiments and espouses pro-UBL opinions.

[redacted] Basnan entered the U.S. in 1980 (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) believed to be associated with the Saudi Embassy. Also in 1992, he hosted a party for the blind Sheik Omar Rahman in Washington, D.C. prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1998, he moved to San Diego and became the Omad. **In January of 1999, he began to receive $2,000 per month in his wife's name from the Princess Haifa Bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar. The checks were endorsed by Basnan and Al-Bayoumi's wife.** In April of 2001, Al-Bayoumi's wife and Basnan's wife were arrested together for shoplifting. In June of 2001, Al-Bayoumi and his wife claimed to leave the U.S. to return to Saudi, but actually went to London.

[redacted] **In July of 2001, Basnan moved into the same apartment complex where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers lived.** In August of 2001, the U.S. Post Office began to forward Al-Bayoumi's mail to Basnan's residence. On (A), (G), (J-1) was (A), (G), (J-1) who has provided extensive (A), (G), (J-1) of Basnan and his associates (A), (G), (J-1) . (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[(F) Serial (F) [redacted] According to a witness, on October 17, 1992,
BASNAN hosted a party at the (P) (P) Washington D.C. for the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. The party was hosted in a common area party room located in the (P) complex where BASNAN lived. BASNAN's name was the tenant name on the reservation sheet for the party room the night the party was held. The witness identified Sheik Rahman from television photos. Sheikh Rahman attended the party along with a large entourage.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) he hosted a party at his house for Sheik Omar Rahman. After Rahman was jailed, Rahman dispatched a messenger to Basnan to instruct him not to contact Rahman in jail. Basnan stated (O-1) came to interview Basnan regarding his association with Rahman. Basnan lied to (O-1) about his association with Rahman and acted like he didn't speak any English.

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) was questioned about Omar Abdel Rahman and the first World Trade Center bombing. Basnan acted like he did not understand the questions by (O-1) and the he played stupid putting on a production. Basnan stated .. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan was told by another (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[(F) Serial (F)] In 1980, BASSNAN, a Saudi Arabian citizen, enters the United States (J-3) BASSNAN may be an operative for Saudi Arabian government and is in the United States illegally.

2. [redacted] On October 17, 1992, BASSNAN hosts party for Sheik Omar Rahman, mastermind of 1993 bombing of World Trade Towers. [SA (S) Note: (F) noted the specific date to be 10/17/1992]

3. [redacted] Since 1998, BASSNAN is considered the "Omad," or informal mayor of Saudi Arabian's living in San Diego, California.

Payments from Princess Haifa to Majeda Dweikat (Basnans wife), 1999-2001. Manal Bagader (Al-Bayoumis wife) co-endorsed three of the checks. Of the three co-endorsed checks, one check was deposited by Yasser Hijazi (Basnans associate) in Maryland; an attempt was made to deposit one check into Bagaders account, but the check was returned as payee not verified; and one check was deposited into an unknown account. FBI information indicated that from at least April 1999 through at least September 2001 Princess Haifa, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, provided $2,000 monthly payments totaling $40,000 in checks and wire transfers to the wives of al-Bayumi and Basnan. Note: There is no indication of direct payments to Manal Bagader, the wife of Al-Bayoumi.

(F) [redacted] On February 10, 2002, ABDULRAZAQ ALI A. ALTURKI, Managing Director, Namma Cargo Services was interviewed in Riyadh. ALTURKI worked as an assistant to Ambassador PRINCE BANDAR at the Saudi Embassy in DC and while working there in about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional status. ALTURKI's relationship with the Saudi government is very strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI travels to Houston, Texas where (P-1) (P-1) In August 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [(F), Serial (F) and (F), Serial (F)

[redacted] On May 14, 1992, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] For financial activity: (F) Serial (F). For summary see (F) Serial (F)

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, (A), (G), (J-1) (F), (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN recently obtained a large unspecific amount of money during his recent travel to Houston, Texas. BASNAN's friend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN received money in excess of $10,000. BASNAN (A), (G), (J-1) gave a large portion of the money to his wife to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel. (F), Serial (F). [SA (S) note: (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Alsaud (A), (G), (J-1) may have been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]

(F) [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, Basnan asked (G) specific questions about how Anthrax and Small Pox are transmitted and what affects infection has on the human body. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, Basnan asked (G) specific questions about how Small Pox infection advances through the human body. Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) was true that just prior to dying a Small Pox victim suffers extreme abdominal pain. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (G) (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan's wife, Majeda Dweikat, in possession of a book titled "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Anthrax and Sarin." The book was in Basnan's residence. (G) (A), (G), (J-1) Dweikat had tabbed a section of the book that showed the skin coming off the body.

(A), (G), (J-1)

Abdullah A S Al Jraithen (Abdullah Aljraithen)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) [redacted] As outlined by writer in referenced serial,
ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with **OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI** on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[redacted] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on [redacted] (F) ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers [redacted] (P-1) and C (cell) [redacted] (P-1). (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[redacted] ECF searches on [redacted] (P-1) and [redacted] (P-1) both yielded a hit on [redacted] (F) [redacted] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN (P-1) and cell (P-1) An IDW search on (P-1) yielded additional other government service information (O-1): "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN (P-1)" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in (O-1)

[redacted] According to a (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Also according to the (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source: (O-1) (O-1) AITHREAT@00001 NON-RELEASABLE)

Islamic Foundation of Sheikh Ibn Taimmiyyah

11004 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

(King Fahd Mosque)

10980 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

[redacted] Ibn Taimmiyyah was a medieval Islamic jurist who's teachings formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine (Ibn Al Wahhab). Ibn Taimmiyyah's teachings included the believe that Muslims could kill other Muslims (Takfir) which is utilized by AQ to justify attacks. The Saudi Arabian foundation that supports the King Fahd Mosque is named for Ibn Taimmiyyah.

[redacted] The associations between Saudi Arabian diplomats who worked at the King Fahd Mosque and the hijacker support group are otherwise noted above. An additional person of interest is listed Chairman of the Ibn Taimiyyah Foundation Khalil Alkhalil.

Khalil Alkhalil (aka Khalil Khalil / Khalil Alkhaleel)

DOB: (P-1) [redacted]

(J-3) [redacted]

(J-3) [redacted]

[(F) Serial (F) [redacted] For the information of Los Angeles, (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) KHALIL al-KHALIL, who was head of the Islamic Affairs Section at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (SAEMB), Washington, D.C. about ten years ago, resides in California (O-1) al-KHALIL set up the BIN (possibly IBN) TAIMIYAH mosque in Los Angeles. (O-1) al-KHALIL had access to a lot of money.

(F) Serial (F) [redacted] On December 6, 1999, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P-1) at 22:05:00 for 2 minutes. (This number is KHALIL ALKHALIL's cell phone according to an FBI interview with FAHAD ALQAHTANI.) At 22:58:00, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P) (ALBAYOUMI), duration 1 minute (note: this is believed to be the first call between ALTHUMAIRY and ALBAYOUMI since the previous year).

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Other Offices Associated with EKSA

[redacted] Investigation of (A), (G), (J-1) activities within the US prior to and especially after 9/11 identified numerous "charities" and "non-governmental organizations" (NGO). Several of these organizations were (A), (G), (J-1) prior to 9/11. Although the (A), (G), (J-1) as an element many were (A), (G), (J-1) due to suspected funding of association with HAMAS. The connections of these "charities" and "NGOs" to terrorism is well documented both in open source and within (A), (G), (J-1) communications.

[redacted] The primary NGO of Saudi Arabia was MWL under which operated the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Sana Bell (Sanabel Alkheer "Seeds of Charity")(an investment arm), Alharamain and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The Saudi charities such as MWL and IIRO were also affiliated with the Virginia based offices of the "Herndon charities" of which Sanabell (Sana Bell Alkheer) was a part as well as the SAAR Foundation. These were collectively run out of of offices at (P) in Herndon, Va. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[See (F)] This serial documents the extensive ties to the Saudi Arabian government as well as extensive ties to terrorism - specifically AQ. AQ members were employed within these organizations and utilized funding for terrorism support and used the offices for cover for movement of personnel. Extensive open source information and court documents are also available detailing this same information.

(F) A telephone directory obtained by the FBI in 2002 listed the following additional offices under the title " Saudi Arabian Offices":

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)
(P)
Falls Church

[redacted]

Muslim World League (MWL)
134 West 26th Street
New York, NY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
4516 Old Columbia Pike
PO Box 8096
Falls Church, Va
Telephone: [redacted] (P)

The Islamic Center
2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)
8500 Hilltop Road
Fairfax, Va

[redacted]

[redacted]

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

(F)

[redacted] **Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S. subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primary administrators and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.**


Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan Ibn Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud
OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC SCIENCES IN

Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud on right (seated).



Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi (J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) as hating

[redacted]

America); Abdullah Alnoshan (see herein) and Salah Albakhit (Saleh Albakheet - PhD student).

[redacted] [(F) Serial (F)]According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[(F) Serial (F)] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI (O-1) (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in (O-1) (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

(A), (G), (J-1) the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and (P) **with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA** (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. (A), (G), (J-1) not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

(D) (D) (D) Information provided by (G) (O-1 (O-1)

(O-1) NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[redacted] In 2003, NADWI's (P-1) in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN (A), (G), (J-1), (D) and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F) (F)). ALNOSHAN was "employed at the IIASA as (J-3)" with the SAE and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) (F)

[redacted] During January 2004, (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

(D)

[redacted] (D)

Below are some observations supporting the above:

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[redacted] During January 2004, [redacted] (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has been notified that these six remain in the United States.

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted]

(D)

(O-1)

(D)

[redacted] [(F) (A), (G), (J-1) that between
(A), (G), (J-1) and
(A), (G), (J-1) 2003 the IIASA deposited approximately $23,318,623 into its accounts. The primary source of these funds was the Saudi Embassy and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Association (SAMA).

(O-1)

A review of Virginia Corporation and Limited Partnership Records indicates that the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America was incorporated on 10/26/1993 and voluntarily terminated on 08/18/1995. According to public source information, the President of this corporation was listed as His Excellency PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN and the Executive Director was SULAIMAN ALJARALLAH.

[redacted] (F) Those requested to be removed from the U.S. by USDS were the following who were listed as Saudi Arabian diplomats:

(O-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(O-1), (J-3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Muslim World League (MWL)

[redacted] (F)

Abdullah Alnoshan (Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)

(Director) [redacted] (G)



[redacted] The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in order to gain leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under which the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an international level.

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan, were extensively connected to [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) See [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) for connections to [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) - the connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoshan was known to have been a "purchasing agent" for the EKSA (see [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Alnoshan was an associate of Musaed Aljarrah.

[redacted] The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above, the New York address, was formed into a sub-office by the time of the creation of [redacted] (F). The main office had been moved to 360 South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster – however, by this same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a "Herndon Charity") and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum mosque which hosted many of the convicted "Northern Virginia Jihad Group." (see more below)

[redacted] (F) During the search of MWL's office space in New York in 2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was from Tehreek-E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and included sign-up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad on an international and inter-Islamic level."

[redacted] The [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed within [redacted] (F)

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[redacted] (F)

Abdullah Bin Laden

[redacted] (G)

Related: [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F)]: [redacted] Analysis revealed that the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya lil Shabab al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number [redacted] (P) WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane, Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family services organization and youth center. Additional analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.

[redacted] Also, analysis has revealed that [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] WAMY is believed to be a subsidiary or affiliate of the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, aka Rabitat al'Alam al-Islami, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, aka Hay'at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyah, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CHARITY COMMITTEE, aka Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; AL-WAIF FOUNDATION, aka al-Waif al-Islami, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; and, the KUWAITI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE, headquartered in Kuwait.

WAMY first appears in FBI electronic indices as a lead to FBI from Legat (G) from 1995/1996:

(F) : [redacted] The French National Police Renseignements Generaux (RG) has established that Mokhtar Jaballah, a Tunisian national residing in France, member of the Ennahda, and president of the G.I.F.--an association RG describes as supporting the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood--has been in contact with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. This organization has an office in the U.S., at the address: WAMY Regional Office in VA--America, P.O. Box 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041-8096; telephone (P) and (P) ; fax (P)

(F) (4) The translation of a publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH", which gives information of the methods and teachings on terrorism.

[redacted] The publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH" lays out in great detail the fundamentals, tactics, and logistics of waging a war on ones enemies through acts of terrorism.

[redacted] In particular, the publication lists duties, requirements, and responsibilities including: (1) collecting information on the enemy and his neighborhood, (2) removing soldiers from the enemy; taking its documents, secrets and weapons, (3) killing the enemy's personnel as well as foreign tourists, (4) releasing our brothers imprisoned by the enemy, (5) spreading rumors and communiques to turn the population against the enemy, and (6) causing the explosion, the destruction and the

[redacted]

sabotage of entertainment spots, immoral and debauched areas.

[redacted] Other sections in the document refer to members' essential and typical qualities, methods of communication, travel, security measures, meetings, and the purchase and transport of weapons.

(A),(G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) (G) (G) (G). According to ACS/TA, BINLADEN has been in contact with the telephone number for (P) (G). One of the telephone numbers used by (P) at his current address is registered to the AOU. THE AOU is a correspondence school for Islamic studies which may be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. (G) indicates that the AOU allegedly arranges paramilitary training in Pakistan and is partially funded by the Saudi Club (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[SA (S) Note: (G) ((G)). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) (F)

(F) (G) Mohammed Harunani]

[See page 432 of 9/11 Commission Report – " 28 pages "]

(O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] FBI toll records indicate that on June 21, 2000, TRANSCOM INTERNATIONAL was in telephonic with a telephone number in Hamburg, Germany. This German telephone number was listed in FBI telephone applications (ACS) from toll records taken from the PENTTBOMB investigation. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On 10/12/2001, (P) who is a Teacher's Assistant at (P) School, told the FBI she recognized one of the 09/11/2001 hijackers after his picture was displayed on television. (P) was introduced (in early June 2001) to Marwan Al-Shehhi by Harunani. Harunani's children had been enrolled at the school. MARWAN Al-Shehhi had accompanied Harunani as he was picking his children up from school. (P) stated she remembered the name because the name was so unusual.

[redacted] On 10/15/2001, (P) was shown a photographic lineup which consisted of only the photographs of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI, HAMZA S. ALGHAMDI, MOHAND AL-SHERRI, and AHMED AL-GHAMDI from United Flight 175 with no names or any other identifying data. (P) immediately, and without hesitation, pointed to the photograph of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI as being with the man she saw with Mohammed Harunani at the (P) Falls Church, Virginia in early June 2001.

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

(G)

[redacted] **Summary: The IIRO office (G) morphed into an (G) into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish) which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that this organization was originally created as IIRO within the same offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as an office of the EKSA (G). The history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.**

[redacted] IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or "operating arm" of the Muslim World League. The Secretary General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT-G)

[redacted] As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as being located at the (P) address which was later assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s and prior to its move to the (P) address (G) Mohamed Salem Omeish (G) appeared to alter IIRO into the Success Foundation (G). Thereafter it appeared to be primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared office space with Abdulrahman Alamoudi who was convicted of attempting to assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.

Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti writer, historian , businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al-Suwaidan was listed by the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development which was convicted along with its leaders of financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti-Semitic remarks, hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.

[redacted] AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization' (IRO) [redacted] (G) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in [redacted] (F) (an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least $11,000 from the IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an officer, provided $60,000 to the IRO.

[redacted] Finally, [redacted] (F) indicates potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh [redacted] (G) incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and other targets in New York. "Umar Al-Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan" (believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found (during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a document in Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number [redacted] (P) beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the documents with telephone number [redacted] (P).

[redacted] Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB [redacted] (P-1) is of Kuwaitian nationality and is a non-US person. His SSAN is [redacted] (P-1). According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood." He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which the Tulsa mosque and school now stand. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AlSuwaidan currently provides $50,000 per month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is taken off the top for the benefit of HAMAS.

[redacted] It is known from (A), (G), (J-1) that IIRO was located for a period of time at (P) (P) Washington, D.C. During this time it was co-located with the organization Solidarity International for Kuwait that was started by Tareq Al-Suwaidan.

1. Incorporation Records:

[redacted] A 1992 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al Ali President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi VP (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaidan S/T (P) Alex, Va.

Principal Address: (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] A 1993 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaiden S/T (P) Alex, Va.

Abdul Al-Moslah Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

Freed Qurash Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

Salah Badahdh Officer (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993 report except listing all addresses as (P) (P), Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] A 1995 Annual Report for IRO (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President (P)
Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President

Tareq M. Al-Mahdi S/T

Abdul Al-Moslah Director

Salah Badahdh Director

Freed Qurashdi Director

Principal Address: (P) Falls Church, Va.

[redacted] In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to Chicago FBI's (G) with which IRO had invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.

[redacted] The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.

[redacted] On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID (P-1), primary address (P) Falls Church, Va., was ordered re-instated. The new officers were listed as follows:

Sulaiman Al Ali Removed (P)
(P) Falls Church, Va.

Mohamed S. Omeish President (P)
Alexandria, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President (P)
(P) Falls Church,
Va.

Tareq M. Al-Suwaiden S/T (P)

Abdul Al-Moslah Director (P)

Salah Badahdah Director (P)

[redacted] A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO (P-1) listed the primary address as (P) and the only officer as Mohamed S. Omeish, (P).

[redacted]

Sulaiman Alali (Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3) Va ID and two SSNs.

Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.

Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali

Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.

(F)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other “charities” and global investment entities such as Global Chemical (G) (G). Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali returned to Saudi

[redacted]

[redacted]

Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined Alqaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali’s son Amro is a known AQAP member.

[[redacted] (F) dated 05/23/1997] [redacted] Reference Butel advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al-Ali, who is the Director of the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al-Ali is believed to be a friend of Al-Gama al-Islamiyya supporter Zahir 'Abd Al-'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist circles throughout the Balkans. Al-Ali reportedly maintains a telephone number of [redacted] (P), which is subscribed to by the "International Relief Organization," [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046-4417.

[[redacted] (F)] [redacted] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., at [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22041 with [redacted] (G) (Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia, status is active. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., [redacted] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046, Telephone number [redacted] (P) This organization provides humanitarian aid.

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) Dated 11/02/2001] [redacted] Alali used an address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi (Omar Baymi) as his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address Albayoumi was listed on Alali’s rental application as a co-tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.

[[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F) dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial] [redacted] Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over $128,000. Sanabell also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali paid Albayoumi almost $7000.

[redacted]

[redacted] Alali has multiple children who were [redacted] (J-3) Alali’s son Amro Syliman Alali (Amro Alali) was a known AQAP member (see [redacted] (F)). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was released by Saudi authorities.

[redacted] (J-3)

Amro Alali – AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali

[redacted]

U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia

Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIASA).

[redacted] [[redacted] (F) Serial [redacted] (F)] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] [[redacted] (F) dated 2003] The original list provided the following names:

[redacted] Names Salary

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] At the time this list was provided (G) had (G) Abuelgasim Osman Ramadan (G), KHALED I. Al-SOWEILEM (G) (G) Abdel-Moniem M. El-Hillali (G), Abdullah Arafa (G), Nasser F. Almogbel (G), and Fareed S. Ajlan (G) (G) were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on (G) to better identify their function at the EKSAB. All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State Department of State list of Embassy employees. (G) has (G) (G) (G) (G) will continue with (G) (G)

[redacted] The list of individuals were all queried through ACS revealing (G) (G). The following are possible matches with individuals (G): Ali Sulaiman Ali (G), Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif (G) (G), Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib (G)

[redacted]

(G), Omar Abdi Mohamed (G) Nizam A. Rouf Zaman (G) Salah Al-Rashood (G) Monir Yasin Al Farra (G) Jameel A. Ahmen (G) Mohammed Al Mohanna (G) and Abdulaziz Ahmed (G) (G) Omar Al-Khatab (G) Ridwan Aremu Yussuf (G) Mohamed Munaf Mohamed (G) (G) Sulaiman Al-Bali (G)

[redacted] (G) revealed the following additional names of interest as receiving a stipend from the EKSA (only relevant individuals are noted herein):

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY departed the USA for Saudi Arabia on 02/14/2002. While in the USA he resided at (P) (P) Culver City, CA. In 1998, per direction of the Da'wa Office of EKSA, AL-THUMAIRY owned and operated a bookstore near the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, CA, in an effort to oversee Islamic propagators in California. AL-THUMAIRY was also a member of the KFM.

Name: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
Aliases: Fahd Ibrahim Abdullah Althumairy,
Sheikh Fahd Bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3);
(J-3)
Case #: (F)
IFTA funds: $4,837.31 (2002)
$4,305.13 (2003)

[redacted] (P), (P) San Diego, CA, (P) Islamic Center of San Diego and (P) the Islamic Services Foundation. (P) is a member (P) of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA, and (P) the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (HLF). The HLF was shut down by the US government on 12/04/2001 due to its fund-raising connections to Harakat Al-Mugawamat Al-Islamayya (HAMAS). (P) (P) for HLF, traveling throughout the US for this purpose. (P) was interviewed on 7/8/04, prior to the arrest of several HLF leaders for material support to terrorism ((F) (F)). (P) has received various checks from FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and is (P) in the San Diego (P) system.

[redacted]

Name: (P)
Aliases: (P)
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)
(P-1)
POB: (P-1)
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #: (F)
IFTA funds: $533.33 (2002)

[redacted] ADEL M. AL-SADHAN departed the USA on

10/25/01. While in the USA, AL-SADHAN resided at (P) (P) LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box address with MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, (P) Columbia, MO. AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until (J-3) Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as (P) JERSEY CITY, NJ.

Name: ADEL M. AL-SADHAN
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3) Departed USA (?)
Case # (F)
IFTA funds: $100.55 (2002)

[redacted] MUTAIB A. AL-SUDAIRY resided at (P) (P) Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an Administrative Officer for EKSA until (J-3) (J-3) AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re-entered on 6/6/01. AL-SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant without documents subject to deportation. AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 10/25/01. (J-3) (J-3) and has since been linked to suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia.

Name: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairi
Muteb Al-Sudairy
Moteb Al-Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)

[redacted]

Other Saudi Arabian entities and personnel who formed the core of the Saudi proselytizing and intelligence gathering community during the time period leading to 9/11.

Islamic Foundation of America (IFA)

Ibrahim Binkulaib (Ibrahim Almogherah)

(J-3)

(F)

Abdullah Alkhwyter

(G)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] The IFA was first known as the GLORIOUS KORAN, originally located on George Mason Drive, Falls Church, VA, was established in 1996 in order to teach the Koran in the

[redacted]

Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Drive, Springfield, VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for $6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which is synonymous with the IFA. Source further reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the EKSA.

[redacted] The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib) who also operated alongside of (A), (G), (J-1) Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be associated with the address of Alelm (Al Elm Research and Development) in Norfolk, Virginia – (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also listed as an officer of Alelm. (The uses (A), (G), (J-1) may be similar to Albayoumi's use of a (A), (G), (J-1) for his expenses/payments during his time in California.) (F) (F)

[redacted] IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: (P-1), was listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an Administrative Officer of the Embassy of the Government of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but was named (by the names of AL-KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL-MOGHERAH) (A), (G), (J-1) was (J-3) (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) the primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad Alsaud. (F) Abdulaziz bin Fahad was known to support the funding of students at the IIASA.

[redacted] In March, 2006, (A), (G), (J-1) BINKULAIB and AL SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA, however, AL-SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL-SUWELIM, head of Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA, ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) who runs Friday prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL HURAISHI (aka SAID AL-HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during prayers. AL-HURAISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A-HURAISHI is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

[redacted] [(F)] On 01/08/2013 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) weets for Alsaud (using (G) account) in which he spoke with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest pinnacle of Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) Ayed Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.

American Open University (AOU)

[redacted] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris

[redacted] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris (Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had [redacted] (J-3)

Sons Yousef Idris [redacted] (G) **and Abdulrahman Idris and Abdulmoneim Idris.**

Associated with MWL and Ali Altimimi.

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdulmoneim Idris. Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris, [redacted] (J-3) was a close associate of jihadi groups operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the "Northern Virginia Jihad Group."

(S) [(F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) according to an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) American Open University, 3400 Payne Street, Suite 200, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041; telephone (P) (P), fax (P), is connected to the Moslem Brotherhood and arranges for paramilitary training in Pakistan. At the time, Salah El-Sawi, PHD, was the President of American Open University.

[redacted] In 1998, a group of individuals began attending lectures provided by Sheikh Jaafar Idris (hereinafter Sheikh Jaafar). These lectures were typically provided at the residence of Sheikh Jaafar and occasionally featured a guest lecturer named Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi (Al-Timimi). Over time these lectures attracted large crowds and were eventually moved to a more accommodating location, American Open University (AOU), located in Falls Church, Virginia. After the lectures were moved to AOU, Sheikh Al-Timimi started offering more frequent and regular lectures. Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures became so popular and so well attended that in 1999, some of Al-Timimi's followers opened the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center. Once at the Dar al Arqam, Sheikh Al-Timimi assumed the role of the primary lecturer. Al-Timimi became very popular and was well-respected for his knowledge about the topic of jihad and his outspoken views. Al-Timimi was willing to discuss the topic of jihad openly while other speakers were not. Once the lectures were moved to the Dar al Arqam, a smaller core group of followers emerged. After Al-Timimi's lectures, typically delivered on Friday nights at the Dar al Arqam, this small group of individuals would meet for hours into the night to discuss various topics with Sheikh Al-Timimi.

During these closed discussions, Sheikh Al-Timimi frequently would provide his personal opinions on the topic of jihad, particularly the need for his followers to prepare themselves so that they would be ready for the day when their service in support of jihad would be needed.

In response to Sheikh Al-Timimi's guidance on the topic of jihad, a few members from the core group decided to organize regular para-military training using the cover of apparently innocuous endeavor, recreational paint-ball activities. The organizers of the jihad training group (Yong Kwon, Nabil Gharbieh, Ibrahim Hamdi, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem) established rules and procedures to ensure operational security and secrecy. Members of the group were well versed on the rules, and new members were required to acknowledge their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The weekly training consisted of physical para-military training using paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad training sessions, many of the group's members purchased AK-47 type rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world, and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The group also kept abreast of the current events related to ongoing jihad, in areas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed these events during their weekly training sessions.

Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad training group would often meet at members’ homes and watch video tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya.

Soon after Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al-Timimi's lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al-Timimi. Royer became well known for his experiences fighting jihad in Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, Royer traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp. As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al-Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to facilitate his travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp. Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11, 2001. Travel records indicate that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with several others from the jihad training group. Chapman indicated to some that he had purchased some land near the camp so that he and his family could move there. In August, 2002, Chapman left the United States for Saudi Arabia, apparently at the guidance of Sheikh Al-Timimi. Chapman is a current resident of Saudi Arabia and is believed to be working for the Saudi Ministry of Education as an English teacher. As a result of his activities in this investigation, Chapman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25, 2003. Chapman has been detained by the Saudi government. During the year 2000, the paint-ball group used to meet in the parking lot of the **INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC STUDIES IN AMERICA (IIASA), aka THE MAHAD.**

[redacted] [(F) (A), (G), (J-1)
IDRIS is of Sudanese origin who came to the U.S. in the 1980's as a student when Dr. HASSAN TURABI, an Islamic fundamentalist, became Minister of Justice in Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic state abolishing the Constitution and implementing Sharia (Islamic) laws. He was sent to the U.S. along with 14 other individuals for post-graduate studies in Islam. They joined the Islamic center in Houston, Texas, which later was transferred to Fairfax, Virginia (A), (G), (J-1) this is the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America). These students were a back-up for TURABI who had dreams of becoming a leader in the Islamic world. The 15 obeyed TURABI blindly as he gave them the scholarships in the U.S. Many of the 15 worked in the Saudi embassy as the Saudis trusted the Sudanese.

[redacted] (G) had contact with OMAR AHMED ALI ABDEL RAHMAN (aka: the blind Sheikh) who was found guilty of being involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. (G) was in contact with a Sudanese intelligence officer under (A), (G), (J-1)
NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1) that revealed that several (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) were involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center as well as a plot to bomb several prominent New York City landmarks (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] IDRIS and ALI AL-TIMIMI (G) (G) co founded the DAR AL-ARQAM mosque which grew out of Muslim Student's Association at George Mason University and Northern Virginia Community College. This mosque now operates out of 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, Virginia which is also the home of several Hamas front organizations as well as the Muslim World League (MWL) the subject of another FBI full investigation. This building is also owned by Sanabel Al-Kheer which is the investment arm of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (G) (G) AL-TIMIMI is a known radical Islamist (G) supporting several individuals who are believed to have left the U.S. shortly after 09/11/2001 to fight for the Taliban against the U.S.

[redacted] Al-Timimi started weekly Islamic study sessions Friday evenings after general prayer at Dar Al Archem. The study sessions evolved into in depth discussions of jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers. The sessions, were originally held at the Dar al Arqam, 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, VA (a two-story office building) and began around 8:00 PM. The study session would meet after the general session, after most of the congregation had left, around 11:30 PM. The study sessions were not open to the public and only certain members were invited. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The meetings are now even more private and held at the individual residences of the members, not at the mosque.

[redacted] This group/study session identify themselves as "wahabi's", though they do not state that publically. The 'wahabi" group is lead by Ali Al-Timimi, Yousef Idris and Mohamed Al-Kahtani. Other members of the group include: (P) (P) (P)
Select members of this group have also participated in Jihad training exercises. On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) chart depicting the primary leadership and participants in jihad training exercises which included the following:

ADMINISTRATORS:
(P)

VISITOR:
(P)

[redacted]

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Alharamain)

Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman Albutti)

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (G)

Related: [redacted] (F)
[redacted] (F) herein)

[redacted] (J-3)

Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic "NGO" or "charity" who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its primary operator Suliman Albouthe.

[redacted] (G) [redacted] The Al Haramayn or Al Haramain Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has been utilized as a front organization for supporting and facilitating the movement of Islamic Mujahadin into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia. A French National Police report about Islamic humanitarian organizations described the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as having ties to the members of extremist Islamic organizations (Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt and I.S.F. in Algeria) and as serving as a cover/point of logistical support for the Arab Mujahadin in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

[redacted] In (P) (P) (P) is identified as (P) of the Al Haramain Foundation. It is further stated in (P) that "an African chapter of the Jedda, based group was identified in a 1999 State Department report as one of the suspect terrorist groups operating in Nairobi, Kenya, before the bombing of the U.S. Embassy there in 1998." (P) also states the group has a chapter in Ashland, Oregon and has an account at the Bank of America.

[redacted] An inquiry through the Oregon Secretary of State Corporate Records database revealed the Al Haramain Foundation, 1257 Siskiyou Blvd, #224, Ashland, Oregon, Business Identification Number, 60062388, is an assumed business name with an active status. The original filing date for the entity was 10/22/97.The business license was renewed on 10/18/99 and changed with renewal on 10/27/99. (P) is listed as (P) and (P) using the same address as the foundation. Soliman H. Albut'he was (P) as a (P) using the same address.

[redacted] On 12/31/97, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation purchased the residence at (P) Ashland, Oregon, for $190,162 in cash. Review of documents obtained from Jackson County Title pursuant to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena revealed the registered agent signing on behalf of the foundation was Soliman Al Buthe.

[redacted] For information, as described in referenced (F) (F) Soliman H. Albut'he is further identified in (F) as being Soliman Albut'he, aka Soliman H. S. Albut'he, date of birth (P-1) citizen of Saudi Arabia, passport number (P-1) using (P) 's mail drop address of (P) (P) and the address of (P) 's residence and local mosque at (P). This serial referenced a (O-1) document identifying Albut'he as a Saudi national entering the United States with $200,000 in U.S. Currency in 1997.

[redacted] Soliman H. Albut'he is believed to currently be in Saudi

Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with (P) Based on source information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia cellular telephone number (P-1) and is associated with (P-1) (P-1) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation, (P) (P) Albut'he is further believed to be involved with (P) an ISP with access to a high speed data line. Albut'he has been identified with website (P-1) Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to (P) (P) which was co-owned by (P) and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan indicated in a recent interview that (P) is now in complete control of (P).

Other Individuals Associated with Saudi Arabia as well as the 9/11 Investigation:

Saleh Alhussayen (Saleh A A Al Husayen / Saleh Alhusayen)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Summary: Saudi cleric and Saudi government official Saleh Alhussayen entered the U.S. prior to the 9/11 attacks. According to statements by he and his wife, Alhussayen was in the U.S. to visit mosques and Islamic organizations who were provided funding from Saudi Arabia. According to an interview of Alhussayen's wife, Alhussayen was invited by and visited Mohammed Alahmari. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Alhussayen was staying at the same Northern Virginia hotel as Nawaf Alhazmi on the evening prior to the attacks. Alhussayen's nephew, Sami Alhussayen, was a Saudi Arabian student arrested for providing material support to AQ.

Relevant Serials:

(F) dated 2002] [redacted] As a matter of background, FBI Seattle has identified

SALEH ALHUSSAYEN as an official or employee of the Saudi (government). SALEH ALHUSSAYEN and his wife, FADDIAH PETERSEN, traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia in August, 2001 and remained in the U.S. until mid-September. On 9/17/2001, both ALHUSSAYEN and his wife were interviewed by FBI WFO. This interview and [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) was prompted by the fact that hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI had checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia on 9/10/2001 in which SALEH ALHUSSAYEN was staying. During said interview, SALEH ALHUSSAYEN advised that he had only traveled to the U.S. on one other occasion approximately twenty two (22) years ago. **He claimed no knowledge of the hijackers and stated that he had come to the U.S. via JFK IA on 8/20/2001 at the request of his friend IANA leader MOHAMMED AL-AHMARI. (See below Salah Alrashood)**

[redacted] As part of our investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001 FBI Agents from Washington Field Office interviewed SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN. The interview was conducted due to the fact that he was a registered guest in the same hotel the hijackers from Flight 77 stayed in on September 10, 2001, the night before the attacks. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was a retired Saudi Government Official and currently worked at fund raising for charity organizations. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was in the United States to visit some Mosques that had been built with charity funds. He stated he did not know the hijackers and was only staying at that hotel because it had a kitchen which allowed him to make his own food.

[redacted] (F) An interview was conducted of Alhussayan's wife (Faddiah Peterson) after Alhussayan experienced the medical emergency. Peterson advised that Alhussaysn had visited while in the US the offices/personnel of IANA, Global Relief Foundation and IIIT. Peterson advised that they visited Michigan, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Canada prior to Virginia.

[redacted] [redacted] (F) (The above mentioned) Mohamed Al-Ahmari, the leader of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) in Ypsilanti Twp., Michigan, is a leading Salafi figure and Saudi dissident. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a Saudi student living in the U.S.

Sami Alhussayen

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Related: islamtoday

(J-3)

[redacted] FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al-Hussayen as a citizen of Saudi Arabia and a non-USPER currently enrolled in the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] It is also important to note that a connection between Al-Timimi and **Mohammed Al-Ahmari** has been established (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Al-Ahmari is a close associate of Al-Hussayen. Al-Ahmari is a leading Salafist and former president of the IANA. Al-Ahmari is very supportive of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) that actively support Jihad against the United States. AL-AHMARI recently departed the United States for Qatar in an effort to start an IANA branch there.

[redacted] On September 24, 2001, the Washington Field Office (WFO) received documents from a search related to a visit to the U.S. of Saleh Al-Husayen. The documents indicate that Al-Husayen is promoting the use of the media to present the Arab world in a favorable view. He is also promoting the formation of Islamic organizations in the U.S. to pursue political agendas.

[redacted] On page 1 of the document, under Page 3, the name Saleh Al Husayen appears. A review of ACS indicates one reference to Al Husayen, indexed on 9/27/01. He was born on 1/1/31 in Sharqua, Saudi Arabia and has Saudi Arabian passport number (P-1) (P-1) Special/Official passport. A review of serial (F), an FD-302, indicates Al-Husayen was interviewed by the FBI in Herndon, Vi(S) The next name on the document is Shaikh Khalid Al-Swailim, Washington, D.C., work telephone (P), mobile (P) and fax number (P). A review of ACS was negative on Al-Swailim. A review of Telephone FOIMS indicates (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The second name on page 78 of the document is (P) (P) (P) Springfield, Virginia, work telephone (P), fax number (P) and mobile number (P). A review of ACS indicates an (P) (G) (G) indexed on 10/13/98.

Salah Alrashood

Name: Salah Alrashood
SSN: (P-1)
DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Phone: (P)

(G)

(J-3)

Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area. (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

(G) SALAH AL-RASHOOD, dob (P-1), the Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his association with many individuals who have been the subjects of FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) After the September 11, 2001, attacks, (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] SALAH AL-RASHOOD departed the USA on 12/15/2002; he later attempted to return but was denied re-entry into the USA. While in the USA, AL-RASHOOD resided at (P) Pittsburgh, PA, and was the head of the AL-TAWHEED ISLAMIC CENTER, a/k/a ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION, which provided financial support to the Mujhadeen in Chechneya. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Alrashood was paid approximately $55,000 in 2002 by the EKSA.

[redacted] The number (P) is subscribed to Salah AL-RASHOOD, (P) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. AL-RASHOOD is (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The word "marriage" is a word used by terrorists to denote martyrdom or attack. FBIHQ

[redacted]

reported that an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) ALRASHOOD (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) which has had (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Ahmed Kattan (Ahmed Qattan / Ahmad Kattan / Ahmed Khattan)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Summary: Ahmed Kattan was** (J-3) **and high level official at the EKSA. Presently he is the Minister of African Affairs.** (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F): [redacted]KATTAN has been identified as a (O-1) (O-1) who works closely with Ambassador Prince BANDAR. KATTAN, (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (F): Kattan was from a poor family but had been with Prince Bandar for 20 years (as of 2003). (O-1) Kattan was responsible for the departure of the Bin Laden family members following 9/11.

[redacted]

[[redacted] (F)] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1)

(O-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (D)

[redacted]

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] [redacted] (F) Hassan Noor Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his residence. Evidence indicated Kumbi was related to the Kisauni Islamic Institute. According to same serial, [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] According to [redacted] (F) a Ali Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Omar, is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.

[redacted] According to [redacted] (F) a Shaykh Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to Afghanistan.

[redacted] According to [redacted] (F) Shaykh Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al-Haramain organization.

[redacted] The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL and IIRO (see [redacted] (F) which provides more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Khaled Alsowailem (Khaled Al Sowailem)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Memo: works at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Telephone: (P-1)

Email: (P-1) [NOTE: In the past writer has noted the use of 911 in various emails of (J-3) Writer cannot confirm if this is a reference to the 9/11 attacks.]

Wife: Bushra Alkhamais

(J-3)

(J-3)

Telephone (P) Mobile (P) Fax (P)

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Alsowailem was a high level employee of the Saudi Dawa office as a diplomat at the EKSA.

[redacted] Alsowailem was interviewed by FBI on 10/08/2001 but claimed diplomatic immunity.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] In November, 2004 FBIHQ requested that a (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AL-SOWAILEM left Washington, DC in June 2003 to take a position as the General Director of Da'wa Abroad in Saudi Arabia effective 8/30/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) detail that DA'WA is an Arabic word which means "the calling" as in the preaching of Islam, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) head of the DA'WA office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a posting which he held until June 2003 at which time he departed for Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) the DA'WA office, one of their responsibilities was to handle the logistics for the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. DA'WA was also responsible for the salaries of Islamic preachers in the United States and for the shipment of religious books and copies of the Koran to those that request them. The majority of those requesting copies of the Koran were affiliated with the prison chaplain program. Investigation has shown that the DA'WA responsibilities are now handled by the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA.

[redacted] From the time AL-SOWAILEM left the EKSA until March 2005, he kept in contact with MUSAED AL-JARRAH (G) who began handling the business previously handled by AL-SOWAILEM at the EKSA.

Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security

Muhammmad Alqudhieen

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

Hamdan Alshalawi

DOB: [redacted] (P-1)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] **Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi nationals and** [redacted] (J-3) **who conducted activities on a U.S. based flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.**

[redacted] [[redacted] (F) [redacted] Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Qudhaieen, DOB: [redacted] (P-1), [redacted] (P) Tucson, Arizona; [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of [redacted] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen is [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) on 11/19/1999, Al-Qudhaieen and his associate Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi, address [redacted] (P) Tempe, Arizona

85283, telephone (P), were aboard America West Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen, according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant (P) (P) advised Al-Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on two occasions." The pilot, Captain (P) ordered an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus airport. In accordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al-Qudhaieen said he believed he never touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al-Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al-Qudhaieen did ask him where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al-Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom. However, Al-Qudhaieen disappeared from Al-Shalawi's view toward the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.

[redacted] U.S. District Court transcripts revealed the following information: Al-Qudhaieen and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the President of Imam University in Ridyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, (P-1) (P-1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone: (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's assistant.

[redacted] On 10/22/2001, the (O-1) following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah Al-Shalawi, DOB (P-1), POB (P-1) Saudi Arabia, married with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. **Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in Afghan terrorist camps and intended to conduct Al-Khobar type bombings.** No further specifics were available (O-1) Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August 2001. (J-3) (J-3) Based upon this information received on Al-Shalawi, he was designated (G) (G) In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, this incident is being re-examined to determine whether Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of

America West Airlines in-flight security procedures. (A), (G), (J-1) Based on analysis of reporting that AL-QAEDA operatives do extensive research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al-Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.

[redacted] Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel (J-3) continued post 9/11.

[redacted] (G) identified extremist Saudi clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite open social media posts advocating jihadi activity (J-3) (J-3) (G) were forwarded to (J-3) - thus eliminating the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.

Mohammed Mousa

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] WFO identified Mousa based (A), (G), (J-1) and subsequent review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO (J-3) (J-3) and forwarded requests for information to various foreign governments.

(F) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] One of the attendees to the ABAAD organized event was Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who uses the name Alshareef to denote a possible relation to Mohammed). Mousa is a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot but also a religious scholar who has openly advocated jihad in Mali/Israel/Iraq and has eulogized UBL. (J-3) [redacted] (J-3)

(F) [redacted]

[redacted] Saudi cleric named Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who utilizes Internet name Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef)(NOTE: Alshareef is a term utilized by descendants of Mohammed and may or may not be an official last name utilized on a passport)(DOB: (P-1) [redacted]), a Saudi airlines pilot who had studied in Florida (according to article "Days in America"), had entered the US and had attended the Dar Alhijra as well as a Saudi student meeting in Chicago. Mousa supports jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Mali and other countries against "Crusaders" and claimed to have wanted to go to fight in Iraq but was persuaded by Iraqi fighters not to go but to raise money in Saudi Arabia instead. Mousa was once in WAMY magazine stating that he would not return to the US as the US was an enemy of Islam. [NOTE: Based on an initial review of the websites (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] identified Mousa as Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef but writer was able to later determine that name Mohammed Mousa and DOB of (P-1) [redacted].]

[redacted] (O-1) [redacted]

(O-1) [redacted] INFORMATION INDICATING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TRAINING OF THE TERRORIST AIRPLANE HIJACKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 11 SEPTEMBER

[redacted]

ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA. MOUSSA, AGE 35-38, DOB (P-1), A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO (O-1) COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN 2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFUSED TO FLY HEAVY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS" WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM.
PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000), (O-1) MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT (747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.

[redacted] A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.

[redacted]

Ayid Alqarni

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] (F) On (A), (G), (J-1) 2012 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a known extremist Saudi cleric named Ayid Abdullah Alqarni (ph) would be traveling to the US to attend the ICNA/MSA Conference in Chicago in December 2012. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni had a DOB (P-1) On 12/12/2012 (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni could be located on the following youtube videos:

http://youtu.be/wrEEu-Fjzqk

http://youtu.be/L2Q3A5XaTxE

[redacted] The first video is titled "Ayid Alqarni – Jihad the Path to Victory" and is dated 2004. In this video Alqarni – recognizable as the individual (J-3) – laments the death of Abdalaziz Alrantisi and Ahmad Yassin and praises jihad in Iraq against the "occupiers".

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) open source information found on the ICNA website, exact matches of biographical information as well as a review of the available video writer concludes that the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who (J-3)

(J-3) is the same as the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against American soldiers in Iraq and the “slitting of throats”. In addition, the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism investigations.

[redacted] According to (G) Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]

Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials – Known or Suspected AQ Members

[redacted] **Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S. for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (Pensacola). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi Arabian (J-3) who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: (P-1)) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB: (P-1))((F)) were in contact were in contact with Alhazmi and Almihdar.**

Mustafa Alshehri

(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi)

DOB: (P-1)

Entered US on (J-3) July 2001

(G)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office. Alshehri is an admitted AQ member as were several members of his immediate family (one of whom served time at GTMO). Alshehri entered the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.**

[redacted]

[redacted] (F) and other serials] Mustafa Alshehri was a Ministry of Interior employee in the passport section and an identified AQ member who had traveled to Afghanistan in approximately 2000-2001 and underwent weapons training at the Faruq camp. Subsequently he was utilized to transfer large sums of money to other AQ members. Alshehri was subsequently arrested by the Mabahith and the Mabahith reported that Alshehri had three brothers - all of whom were involved with AQ. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) Yousef was subsequently released and became a leader of AQAP before being killed in 2009.) According to records and Alshehri's statements he traveled to the US for medical reasons (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) and actually entered on 09/01/2001 with intended stay (J-3) Alshehri had also provided at least one stolen passport to one of three individuals captured by Saudi authorities entered Saudi Arabia from Iraq with the expressed purpose of attacks on Americans. One of these three had a telephone that contained the Pakistani cell number of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). During interrogation, Alshehri claimed that while in the US he had traveled to NYC along with a employees of the Saudi Embassy to meet with a Saudi delegation. Alshehri had several associates in the EKSA to include Yousef Zakri (G) who was a long term EKSA employee who had a close relationship with known AQI member Shawki Omar (G) who was subsequently arrested in Iraq. Another associate was believed to be Fahad Alotaibi (DOB: (P-1)) of the Military Attache office. While in the DC area Alshehri lived with Mohammed Ali Alqahtani (G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Amer Alshehri (G) a diplomat at the EKSA, is a known relative and (A), (G), (J-1) noted his association with multiple (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and that he was involved with retrieving Yousef Alshehri's body. Ali Al Nafisah (G) , another EKSA diplomat, was a close associate of both Omar, Zakri and Alshehri.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Faisal Ahmed Alshehri

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(G)

(J-3)

(G)

[redacted] On May 9, 2003, FBIHQ notified the Dallas Division (A), (G). (J-1)

Initial investigation revealed that the user of the email address was located at Sheppard Air force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas. Soon thereafter, this individual was identified as Faisal Ahmed Al-Shehri. (A), (G). (J-1) (A), (G). (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (A), (G). (J-1)

(A), (G). (J-1)

[redacted] At approximately 6:00 p.m., Al-Shehri was approached by Dallas FBI agents. The agents advised Al-Shehri that there was a possible security issue with his luggage and wanted to talk to

[redacted]

him for a couple of minutes. Al-Shehri and the interviewing agents went to the business lounge area and began to question Al-Shehri. After a short time, the interviewing agents questioned Al-Shehri regarding his knowledge of Al-Yari. Al-Shehri denied any knowledge of Al-Yari and advised the interviewing agents that he had never met or seen him before. Al-Shehri was told by the interviewing agents that his phone number had been found on Al-Yari's body after he had been killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities. Al-Shehri continued to deny his knowledge of Al-Yari. During this time, Al-Shehri provided biographical information and consented to a search of all his carry-on items. After approximately six hours, Al-Shehri finally admitted that he had designed and built a computer for Al-Yari several years ago. Also, Al-Shehri advised that he had a long standing and close relationship with Al-Yari. Al-Shehri explained how he was recruited by Al-Qa'ida and eventually became a financial supporter and recruiter for the organization. Also, Al-Shehri explained how he frequently communicated with Al-Yari and had traveled to meet him on many occasions. Al-Shehri was debriefed from June 5, 2003 until July 8, 2003. During this time, Al-Shehri provided invaluable intelligence information regarding Al-Qa'ida members, Al-Qa'ida trade craft, and Al-Qa'ida recruitment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) On December 8, 2001 a search was conducted of AlMari's apartment which revealed photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters". Many documents were discovered during the search of the apartment to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts, hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [[redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) noted some secondary connections between phone numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Albayoumi.]

Mohammad Alkahtani

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

(F)

(J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

(J-3)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL-QAEDA. Furthermore AL-KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL-KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the propagation of Islam. (A), (G), (J-1) Virginia home, AL-KAHTANI has been vocal about his support for AL-QAEDA and UBL.

[redacted] Investigation has revealed Al-Kahtani, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States (J-3) and is working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably sometime before the end of this year.

[redacted] Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation for participation in jihad and/or jihad training overseas. Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar-E Taiba jihad training camp. Among those involved in the jihad group are (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Ali Al-Timimi, a former lecturer at Dar al Arqam, has been a spiritual advisor to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad. The activities of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (G) (G) two of Al-Kahtani's sons attended the paintball training, however they were not part of the core jihad group. Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al-Timimi was asked to leave Dar al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash, Jaf'far Idris and AL-Kahtani) because Al-Timimi openly supported the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result, Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al Arqam.

[redacted] Alkahtani (J-3) despite the above information. Alkahtani noted that he was traveling with a “prince” and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is a state owned (J-3) (J-3) defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and Military Industries Corporation (MIC) per Wiki which is lead by Mohamed Almady. (J-3).

Abdullah Mohamed Alshehri

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

(G)

(J-3)

[redacted] **Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the** (A), (G), (J-1) **officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was conducting this business while a student.**

[redacted] (G)

(G) ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB (G) (G). While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.

[redacted] On 03/18/2002, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a young Yemeni immigrant to Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA" (or ABU NORA)(determined (G) to be (G) ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering, the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL). When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of September 11th were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to

[redacted]

change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the Yemeni.

[redacted] (G)
(G)

Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS, ELTAYEB gave a forwarding address of (P) Pittsburgh, telephone (P). Follow-up investigation at the GREENBRIAR APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure, (P) was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALSHEHRI, with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Portland believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell operating in the Portland area.

[redacted]

Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)

King Abdullah Academy

(G)

[redacted] The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy, is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Arabian government and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative planning to assassinate President George Bush. (P) was a teacher at the Islamic education department.

(F) [redacted] Since 2001 there have been many independent analysis conducted of the teaching curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the Freedom House report and the recent report from the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In addition, reports have been written on similar schools in foreign nations such as a report in Britain on the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled "The Hijacking of British Islam".

[redacted] All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. The specific statements listed in these reports have been well documented in the press and need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these multiple and independent analysis have been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages in question were Saudi interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar to the interpretation provided by Elyacoubi mentioned above.

[redacted] According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign

Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal stated that "our schools and our faith teach peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince Turki Al-Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the inflammatory content in their school textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time after the Freedom House report. Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have denied the existence of derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.

[redacted] The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been completed. An FBI review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also revealed the continuing use of passages that are considered to be defamatory to other religions and that could be construed to encourage violence.

Saudi Arabian Student Population

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (F)

Serials with LHMs to USDS:

[redacted] (F) (2014/2017/2018)

[redacted] (F)

Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the years but increased greatly after 2005 but has recently sharply declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior to and following the 9/11 attacks such as [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) ([redacted] (F) and [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (F). Following the creation and growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.

[redacted] (J-3)

Homaidan Alturki Saudi [redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals - 15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian

[redacted]

perception management campaigns have worked to convince Americans that UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the interrogations of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed that the true reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for Saudi Arabian citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to 9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express program. (See 9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232-233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Pages 116-130.)

[redacted] Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material utilized in Saudi K-12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after 9/11. An unclassified report [redacted] (O-1) regarding Saudi education and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle school curriculum 2009-2010) revealed that - despite claims to the contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non-Muslims. This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of religious violence". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate some of the offending passages in the higher-grade textbooks, the youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and violence, and many will have already internalized these teachings." This analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in December 2013 a large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out to Saudi society – in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within these clerical establishments.

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) This was highlighted by the recent death in Saudi Arabia of an ISIS bomb maker who was a student in New Zealand. Additional Saudi Arabian students are voicing encouragement and support and multiple Saudi Arabian students are under terrorism investigation by the FBI. In addition, it is known via FBI investigation, that radical Saudi based clerics and religious authorities are traveling to the U.S. to visit with the U.S. based Saudi population. In December 2012 a Saudi cleric who had openly called for jihad against the U.S. was granted a visa to enter the U.S. FBI investigation prevented his entry and his intended destination was an Islamic conference in Chicago. In December 2013 investigation revealed a large student gathering in Chicago that included a presentation by a Saudi cleric who has openly supported jihad activities and who eulogized Osama Bin Laden. This cleric is also a Saudi Airlines pilot and wrote of meeting Saudi Arabian students in various locations in the United States. In December 2016 a Saudi Arabian national who was a professor for a Saudi military academy and a supporter of militant ideology was granted a visa to the U.S. (J-3).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an Islamic bookstore (Albasheer Publications) while on (J-3) status; his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq)((F) (see (F) (see herein)’ Mohammed Alahmari (IANA)(see herein); and the EKSA’s/SAG’s attempts to obtain his release from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an (J-3) holder.

[redacted] (A),(G), (J-1) is noted herein due to the (A),(G), (J-1) centering on a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing (J-3) fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters".

Ziyad Khaleel (Ziyad Sadaqa)

[redacted] (G)

Summary: Noted herein due to references above.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The above referenced serial [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Investigation by Phoenix has indicated that all of these individuals may have a current or former association with Michigan State University (MSU).

[redacted] Al-Shalawi [redacted] (G)

[redacted] (G) and is believed by Phoenix to be an operative of Al Qaeda. Al-Shalawi obtained a PhD in Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU). [redacted] Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) were involved in an incident aboard an America West airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were traveling from Phoenix to Washington, DC via Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen was observed by the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the flight landed in Columbus, Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewed [redacted] (F). No charges were filed against Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen.

[redacted] Based on [redacted] (G) regarding the association of Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has developed an investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations. [redacted] (O-1) Al-Shalawi obtained training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.

[redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Newark, N.J. 07102

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 21, 2008

(P)
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - (A), (G), (J-1)

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Annual Letterhead Memorandum

This document is classified [redacted] in its entirety.

Office of Origin:

Newark, New Jersey

Date Investigative Summary Prepared: 04/21/2008

Basis of Investigation:

[redacted] Captioned investigation is based upon specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that (P) (P) is engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, pursuant to FCIG, Section III.C.1.b.6. AL-QAEDA is considered a "foreign power" as it engages in "international terrorism" or activities in preparation thereof.

[redacted] (P) was the subject of a Preliminary Investigation by the Newark Division opened on or about (A), (G), (J-1) subsequent investigation under the PENTTBOM case which revealed some of (P) involvement with several of the known hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001. (P) is believed to have had contact with HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, MAJED MOQED, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. The former Preliminary Investigation expired on (A), (G), (J-1) and was subsequently closed.

[redacted] A Preliminary Investigation was opened on or about (A), (G), (J-1) due to the belief that (P) had provided false information (O-1) to United States (U.S.) authorities and had not cooperated with the U.S. government concerning his relationship with the aforementioned

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hijackers. The second Preliminary Investigation was set to expire on or about (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] On or about (A), (G), (J-1), a Full Investigation was initiated due to (P) false statements (O-1) (O-1), lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities in regards to his knowledge of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001 and his knowledge of the individuals responsible for those attacks, and (P) association with individuals known to be members of terrorist organizations or supporters of terrorist organizations.

[redacted] For background information the following information is provided: (P) arrived in the U.S. on 07/03/2000, with a tourist visa. His Syrian passport (J-3) (P) stayed in the U.S. past the expiration of his U.S. visa and was subsequently arrested by what is now known as the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for being "out of status" in the U.S.

[redacted] (P) was later arrested as a Material Witness in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation, but he only agreed to be interviewed and (D) (D) (D). (P) was also subjected to a polygraph on 01/24/2002, in which he appeared to be deceptive when answering questions about his prior knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001.

[redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] A number of requests have been sent to the Syrian government, via Interpol, for any information that illustrated that (P) was wanted by the Syrian authorities. (C-2) (C-2)

[redacted]

[redacted] Subsequent investigation of (P) has revealed that he is believed to have had contact with other individuals of interest to the FBI:

1. (P), also known as (aka) (P), aka, (P)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] During the TERRSTOP investigation, communications occurring over CLEMENT HAMPTON-EL's (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) The TERRSTOP investigation pertained to individuals involved in a conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel and the New York Office of the FBI. The (A), (G), (J-1) that occurred over HAMPTON-EL's telephone were (A), (G), (J-1) used at trial.

[redacted] Portions of the aforementioned declassified telephone communications occurred between the following subjects of investigation; HAMPTON-EL and (P) HAMPTON-EL and (P), and HAMPTON-EL and (P) (P) The aforementioned communications illustrated that HAMPTON-EL, (P), and (P) were involved in money transfers intended to support training and the purchase of weapons in support of terrorist acts. HAMPTON-EL's communications with (P) illustrated that (P) (P) was interested in training in support of violent jihad.

2. (P)

[redacted] The entry, (P), was noted in the (P) address book and is of interest to the Newark Division. A query of the ACS database revealed that the telephone number, (P), is subscribed to by (P), the father of (P), a self admitted member of AL-QAEDA and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (P) is a U.S. citizen by birth who was arrested by the Saudi Mabahith in 05/2003 in connection with the 05/2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (P) has admitted to the FBI, Secret

Service, and Mabahith to being a member of the Medina Al-Qaeda terrorist cell. Subsequent investigation revealed (P) involvement in activities on the behalf of AL-QAEDA and he was charged and convicted in U.S. federal court on 9 terrorism charges. (P) was later sentenced to 30 years in prison and 30 years probation.

3. (P)

[redacted] On 01/14/2002, (P) was interviewed as part of a proffer agreement at the United States Attorneys Office (USAO), Eastern District of Virginia. The interpreter for 1 of the proffer sessions was (S). (P) was not cooperative in that he did not provide any specifics concerning his interaction with the aforementioned hijackers.

[redacted] Toll records for (P) cellular telephones, past and present, have been obtained by the writer from T-MOBILE INC. via Grand Jury subpoena. A review of (P) toll records has revealed that (P) has been in contact with at least 2 cellular telephones possibly utilized by (P) (P). (P) and (P) appeared to have had contact on numerous occasions.

[redacted] It should be noted that (P) is currently a (P) of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Federal Courts in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Federal Courts in New York, New York.

[redacted] (P) was interviewed by agents from the Washington Field Office of the FBI on the morning of 07/20/2006 and questioned about her associations with a number of individuals including (P). It is believed that (P) contacted (P) subsequent this interview and advised him about the FBI interest in him.

[redacted] On 07/24/2006, (P) contacted the Newark Division of the FBI asking "if there was anything going on" and appeared to be extremely nervous on the telephone to the agents who spoke with him.

[redacted] Newark's investigation has determined that (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

4. (P).

[redacted] The (O-1) (O-1) in Iraq reviewed documents recovered from government offices in Iraq. One recovered document, marked "Top Secret" with heading "(A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) listed (P) or (P) (O-1)

[redacted] (P) was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P), a (then) (P) to the United Nations, offered to provide an Iraqi Intelligence Officer with any information she obtained related to then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's meeting with various Arab countries regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (P) had also worked at the (P).

[redacted] During an interview of (P) on 12/04/1998, (P) acknowledged providing various newspapers to Iraqi officials when she was a (P), however, she never admitted to providing information regarding the Secretary of State's meetings, or engaging in any such illegal activity during her employment at the (P). She stated that she no longer worked at any of the (P) (P) and was employed by (P) located in (P) New Jersey. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] Subsequent investigation has revealed that (P) is associated with (P) and members of (P) family. It is unknown how these relationships developed or what is the true nature of the relationships.

5. (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] On 08/04/2006, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P-1) (P-1) and (P-1). Both number were provided to the source (O-1) and were reported to be associated with an individual named ABU MUTHANNA. ABU MUTHANNA is believed to be ABDULLAH AL-ARIFI, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and an alleged leader of an AL-QAEDA cell in Iraq.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (P) is believed to be an alias for (P), (P) (P), SSN (P-1), DOB (P-1), address (P) Alexandria, VA.

[redacted] The Newark Division has not determined the true purpose for the aforementioned contacts of (P). It appears that (P) maintains contact with individuals that potentially have access to information that may be of interest to terrorist organizations. It also appears that (P) maintains contact with individuals that are either associated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence services.

6. (P)

[redacted] Another contact of (P) that should be noted is an individual named (P). (P) (P), date of birth (DOB) (P-1), has been interviewed by the FBI on several occasions. (P), (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), became a subject of interest to the FBI due to his association with (P) and recent activity.

[redacted] In early 05/2005, (P) was stopped by the police in Clifton, New Jersey because of traffic violations. At the time, he claimed to be too poor to afford an apartment and was living in his vehicle. (P) and (P) used to work together selling ice cream out of trucks with another individual named (P). (P), (P), and (P) (P) have lived together at a number of locations in the past. (P) and (P) were questioned by the FBI subsequent the events of 09/11/2001. As stated above, (P) was questioned about his contact with a number of the 19 hijackers.

[redacted] On 06/19/2001, at approximately 11:03 pm, HANI HANJOUR conducted a transaction at the aforementioned PNC Bank ATM. A review of all transactions conducted 30 minutes prior and 30 minutes after HANJOUR's transaction, revealed four individuals who were believed to possibly be associated with HANJOUR. The individuals were (P), DOB (P-1), FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, aka FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DOB (P-1), (P) (P), aka (P), DOB (P-1), and (P), DOB (P-1).

[redacted] (P), ABUTALEB, (P), and (P) all lived together at one time. (P) was interviewed by the FBI because of the aforementioned automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank in Paterson, New Jersey. (P) was present at the time of (P) interview with the FBI, but portrayed himself as an associate that was present to assist with interpretation, if needed. (P) speaks sufficient English and did not need an interpreter at the aforementioned interview.

[redacted] On 05/29/2005, (P) was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) while attempting to cross the border into Canada. (P) was denied entry by the Canadian authorities and subsequently interviewed by SA (S) from the Seattle Division and CBP agents. (P) advised the interviewers that he was on his way to Alaska to fly and he had a number of flight training materials in his possession.

[redacted] On 10/12/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and Port Authority Police Detective (S) from the New York Division at his parent's home in (P), New York. (P) advised the interviewers that he had worked on a commercial fishing boat in Alaska fishing for salmon. (P) had advised the interviewers that he had gone to Alaska to fish and did not reiterate his previous reason for his travel to Alaska.

[redacted] On 11/02/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S) (S), FBI Language Specialist (LS) (S), SA (S) from the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Detective (S) at (P) residence, (P) (P), (P), New York. During the interview, (P) advised the interviewers that he had traveled to Alaska to fish. After being reminded that he was detained en route to Canada with flight materials, (P) advised that he has always wanted to fly and threw away the flight materials after being detained.

[redacted] (P) did not have a consistent or logical story concerning his travel to Alaska and the purpose for the trip. (P) was also not cooperative when discussing his past activities and appeared to have had a selective memory for things he was willing to discuss. Subsequent investigation revealed that (P) also had computer disks and satellite installation equipment with him when he was detained at the Canadian border.

[redacted] Additionally, investigation revealed that (P) utilized a laptop computer while on board the fishing boat, expressed interest in and studied the nautical charts on the boat, and attempted to steer the boat on at least 1 occasion. (P), by his own admission, has no prior fishing experience and was apparently out of his element. Additionally, the boats that (P) worked on utilized routes frequented by a number of cruise ship lines.

[redacted] (P) had a pamphlet from the HOLLAND AMERICA CRUISE LINE in his possession when he was detained at the Canadian border. When questioned as to why he possessed the HOLLAND AMERICA pamphlet, (P) advised that he contacted the cruise line to ask questions about Alaska.

[redacted] In the past, (P) has made his living selling ice cream in New Jersey with (P) and others. (P) aforementioned trip took place at a time when he would have been in the middle of the season for selling ice cream. In fact, (P) was interviewed just prior to his departure for Alaska and he was selling ice cream at the time. (P) did not appear to make any profit from the aforementioned trip which appears significant in that he supports his family that resides in (P).

[redacted] At the present time, it is not known why (P) took the aforementioned trip. However, considering the fact that (P) was a close associate of (P) at the time (P) interacted with the hijackers and that (P) has not been cooperative with law enforcement when questioned about the aforementioned trip necessitated further investigation of (P).

[redacted] Further investigation of (P) has revealed strange behavior and has not revealed a logical reason for his trip to Alaska. During the 11/02/2005 interview, (P) advised that he lived with (P) after his return from the Falls Church area of Virginia and before the attacks on 09/11/2001. (P) also advised that 2 unknown men arrived at the residence one day and that there was discussion of (P) moving out so that the 2 men could stay at the residence. (P) discussion of the 2 men was in response to questions associated with the 19 hijackers responsible for the attacks on 09/11/2001.

7. (P)

[redacted] (P), DOB (P-1), is an (P) that formerly worked for (P) at (P) in New York, New York. (P) represented (P) pro bono during the BIA appeal process concerning his possible deportation (O-1).

[redacted] (P) was interviewed by the FBI on 06/19/2006 and he advised that he was contacted by (P) a number of times at his office at (P). (P) advised that his office number was the only contact number (P) had for him and this was the only way he contacted him. (P) also advised that the only outside contact he had with (P) was he had dinner with (P) one night and he brought (P) to the hospital on several occasions.

[redacted] (P) was asked if he traveled to the Syrian Consulate in New York with (P) in the past. (P) advised that he could not recall if he had done that. (P) was advised that (P) had told the FBI that they had both gone to the Syrian consulate to renew (P) Syrian passport. (P) again advised that "he could not recall" if he had gone to the Syrian consulate with (P).

[redacted] Subsequent investigation revealed that (P) had been in contact with (P) via (P) work telephone number, cellular telephone number, and home telephone.

[redacted] (P) was re-interviewed on 03/26/2008 regarding (P). (P) advised that he now worked at the (P) (P) located at (P) Street, New York, NY 10021, telephone (P). (P) described the (P) (P) as a "think tank" type of organization.

[redacted]

[redacted] (P) was advised that the FBI had reviewed phone records and that it appeared that he had previously lied to FBI agents when he advised that he only spoke to (P) from his office on several occasions. (P) advised that he did not recall giving (P) his home number or his cellular telephone number and that he did not recall more extensive contact between (P) and himself.

[redacted] (P) was asked if he went to the Syrian Consulate with (P) in the past. (P) reiterated his past answer to this question and advised that he did not recall going to the consulate with (P).

[redacted] (P) appears to be lying to cover some actions that he and/or (P) have conducted. (P) was advised that stating that "he did not recall" something was not the same as saying he didn't do it. (P) answer to this statement was that he did not recall doing it. The Newark Division believes (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and will document this in an EC and forward the information to the New York Office to pursue.

[redacted] On or about 03/27/2007, (P) was arrested by the Paterson Police Department for (P-1) (P-1) The final disposition is unknown at this time.

[redacted] The FBI was advised by ICE representatives that on or about 12/13/2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made a decision (O-1) based on new evidence presented to them from the FBI and (G) BIA decided to " reopen the proceedings and remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration judge".

[redacted] (O-1) (O-1) (O-1). The order goes on to state that ICE submitted a declaration submitted to them by the FBI which indicates that (P) lived with EYAD ALRABABAH who assisted 2 of the hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001.

[redacted] The order continues in which it states that ALRABABAH introduced the aforementioned hijackers to (P) in Falls Church, Virginia. The aforementioned facts along with the fact that the FBI had advised that it is unable to rule out (P) as a threat to security (O-1).

[redacted]

[redacted] Additionally, the order states that there were accusations that the Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a generally fair manner and indicated that there are instances in the record that are sufficient to justify a remand to another Immigration Judge. Ultimately, BIA also ruled to remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge.

[redacted] The declaration mentioned in the BIA order advised that (P) should be removed from the U.S. and could not be ruled out as a threat to national security for the following reasons:

1. (P) was encountered by the FBI investigating the terrorists attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.

2. (P) had direct contact with several of the hijackers responsible for the attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.

3. (P), through a number of documents and interviews, misrepresented facts and deceived the government.

4. (P) illegally remained in the U.S. after he was supposed to depart the U.S. and he has admitted that he is an overstay.

[redacted] The preceding information suggests that the captioned subject has associations with members of and/or supports the terrorist activity associated with AL-QAEDA and other terrorists organizations. As a result of the relationships, circumstances and information set forth, (G), Newark authorized a Full Investigation to fully identify (P) and investigate the level of his involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

Objective(s):

[redacted] The captioned investigation was authorized to further investigate the level of (P) involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[redacted] At the current time, the Newark Division is continuing to investigate (P) activities and contacts. The Newark Division has also been working with ICE to facilitate the deportation of (P). Additionally, the Newark Division will attempt to (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] Current and future investigative objectives seek to further characterize the United States based AL-QAEDA support network. Investigative targets include, but are not limited to, the United States based AL-QAEDA core leadership and membership structure, AL-QAEDA logistical and financial networks, and overseas connections with AL-QAEDA political/military elements. The captioned investigation will continue to further identify [redacted] (P) role in the identified United States based AL-QAEDA support network as well as his role in other international terrorist organizations.

FD-542 (Rev. 04-07-2006)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/25/2007

To: New York **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)
[redacted] (G)

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Analytical Support: [redacted] (G) A set of questions to pose to [redacted] (P) for his interview on 7/26/2007 with members of NYO [redacted] (G).

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Administrative: [redacted] Captioned EC is in response to collection requirement detailed in [redacted] (F).

[redacted] This analysis addresses the following intelligence requirements as outlined in the FBI's IT Standing Intelligence Requirements Set:

Section [redacted] (G) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

Section (G) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Executive Summary: [redacted] Questions for (P) resident (P) were compiled based on a review of serials and phone data involving his current (P) and prior (P). (P) was one of a number of mostly (P) emigrees in the San Diego area who provided support to 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI from February to December 2000.

Details: [redacted] On 7/23/2007, SA (S) and Detective (S) of the NYO (G) Squad (G), requested that the author provide a list of questions that might be posed to (P). In response, I researched the FBI's Telephone Application (TA) and Automated Case System (ACS), as well as Intelligence community databases ((O-1)), (G), (J-1) TIDE) and open source (GOOGLE, Lexis-Nexis, ChoicePoint, etc.). Biographical information as well as derogatory information was collated into a string of questions in more or less temporal order. The questions I framed arose out of (P) continuous association, via personal friendships, a shared community of interest and direct/ indirect telephonic connections with known terrorists and their support networks here and abroad. The questions were sometimes written in a conversational style so as to convey a context for the question that would be memorable.

[redacted] **PEDIGREE:**

NAME: (P)
DOB: (P-1)
SSAN: (issued (P-1))
Current ADDRESS: (P)
(short drive from (P))
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: (P) SAN DIEGO 92117
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: SAN DIEGO 92117
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: SAN DIEGO 92117
Wife: (P)
Passport: (P) # (P-1)

[redacted] 1) With respect to your relocation to (P) can you tell us more about that? Why in the Summer of (P) did you leave San Diego?
[redacted] **Background:** (P) told Agents who interviewed him last Fall that he left San Diego in (P) and then received his "green card" establishing him as a permanent legal resident of the US (A# (P-1) issued (P)) via mail in (P), presumably via his (P) PO Box. Did he move because he did not anticipate his green card arriving and he was out of status on the H1B visa? He also told Agents he relocated to (P) for the (P-1) -- and yet, (P) has a branch office in Phoenix, Arizona, which would appear a much more appealing climate.

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

[redacted] 2) (P): What's Your Middle/or Any Other Names [redacted]
Background: "(P)" was associated with (P) number (P-1) possessed by a Saudi AL-QA'IDA recruiter incarcerated in April 2006 named KHALID "AL-TURKISTANI" (Khalid 'Abd Al-Jalil Ghulam Muhammad, DOB (P-1), At Taif, Saudi Arabia). The same number was called by (P) on December 5, 1999, two months after he left (P) for San Diego, and one month before the San Diego hijackers arrived in the US. (P) is Arabic and it means (P) whereas (P), also Arabic, means (P) I would ask: "Do you have a middle name you use? ("(P) sounds too much like '(P) and I don't want to insult you" or "We spoke to some folks who know you as (P)")

[redacted] 3) What was it like growing up in (P)
[redacted] **Background:** Claimed to FBI in two interviews (2001 and 2006) to have grown up there, and left at age (P) for (P) in (P). (P) was (P) (P) in (P) which fits this migration (as he likely knew - this refugee status also a gambit used by Yemeni Mohdar Abdullah to gain entry). Ask him these questions which he should know if he actually grew up there:

[redacted] Who was the President of (P)? (Answer: (P)). When did President (P) flee the country? (Answer: (P)). Where did President (P) go? (Answer: (P)). Who took over (P) then? (Answer: (P) or (P) (P)). When did (P) come to (P)? (Answer: (P) -- this was supposedly after (P) left). (P) came to help the UN peacekeeping forces and a few months later, the (P) (P) of (P) occurred, so ask him: Do you remember any movies about your old home town? (ANSWER: (P) released (P)). For purposes of impeachment, features of (P) per Internet sources include the (P), the (P), and the former resort of (P) (P). The (P) comes within 19 miles of the (P) (P) near (P) it provides water essential for the cultivation of (P) Roads link (P) with many (P) locales and with (P) Private airlines service (P) at various airports within and around the city; the intense fighting largely destroyed the old (P) International Airport.

[redacted] 4) What language did you speak up until age (P) Must have been tough landing in (P) as a refuge (P) with no English, huh? Yet in 3 years, you were in college in (P) studying (P). Amazing!

[redacted] 5) Are you Kurdish?
[redacted] Since the honorific bestowed on the afore-mentioned mujahadeen "AL-TURKISTANI" suggests he might have been Kurd, and if (P) admits to being (P) or (P) (or even if he insists he's (P) which is simply a nationality, not an ethnicity): Are you an ethnic Kurd?
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** Many of the San Diego Muslims who befriended ALHAMZI and ALMIHDHAR were Kurdish or supporting Kurds (Al-Bayoumi was caretaker of Kurdish Mosque; (P) was/is Kurdish; so is his father, (P) (P) who is active in Kurdish politics; and so was (P),

the cousin of (P) and nephew of (P). (P) should remember (P) because (P) (P). And there is also (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1). (O-1)

[redacted] 6) If you are (P) how often do you call (P) Can you give us a number to check?
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) An associate of (P), MOHDAR ABDULLAH, who possessed a phone number subscribed to (P) when he was arrested as a material witness in the wake of 9/11, claimed to be Somali in order to gain asylum in the US, but he subsequently admitted to being from Yemen. Also, (P), another friend of (P), traveling with a Saudi passport, and a likely Yemeni, claimed in 2001 that (P) was (P).

[redacted] 7) What college did you attend in (P) Did your family move with you? Who did you live with? Major was (P), right? Did you work your way through college? How did your folks get by? Did you work with computers at all? Is it possible you worked for an electrical supply house?
[redacted] If (P) worked at a company that had access to transistors, this might be significant given that AL-TURKISTANI reportedly distributed transistors to bomb makers in Chechniya.

[redacted] 8) A phone is presently listed for (P) at (P) current home in (P) -- (P) --is he (P) FATHER? When did (P) (P) arrive in (P)? Was he ever in the US?
[redacted] **ANALYST NOTE:** A (O-1) record entered on 10/6/2006 for (P), DOB (P-1), recorded the issuance of a (J-3) on (J-3) in (J-3) to expire (J-3), with a US address of (P), SILVER SPRING MD 20906. The same record notes a father's name of (P) and a mother's name as (P) with a maiden name of (P). The POB is given as (P-1).

[redacted] 9) While you attended college in (P) from (P) to (P), how often did you drive across the border with pals? Did you ever fly across? What names did you use? Ever drive an hour East to (P) and visit with jihadis there? Ever meet the Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressam? He was from (P) (Algerian - unlikely but you never know since he (P) for California in the Fall of 1999 after getting AQ training overseas). Did you ever travel back to the Middle East during college?

[redacted] 10) **TRAVEL** According to travel records, you entered the US at OGDENSBURG, New York, on 10/23/1999, with a destination address of (P) in San Diego. Did you enter with a H1B Specialty Occupation Visa as a computer worker and stay here with that? Did it ever lapse (I see it expired in Dec 2006 - is that what really prompted you to leave San Diego and the green card came as an unexpected surprise in October?) Did you ever have to leave the US and then come back because of issues with that Visa? On October 23, 1999, did you drive to the US? Who were you with? Were you planning to drive all the way to San Diego? We know you were there by mid- November. Did you stop off along the way? Maybe visit LA? Why so many trips back and forth across the border in 2006?

10/07/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
09/16/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
08/15/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
07/26/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)

[redacted] Did you visit with [redacted] (P) of [redacted] (P) in Dallas? (see below) on the following trip:

04/09/06 - ENTERED US AT BOSTON FROM TORONTO (AIR)
04/05/06 - DEPARTED US AT DALLAS FOR TORONTO (AIR)

[redacted] Who did you visit overseas for 6 weeks on this trip?

02/05/06 - ENTERED US AT LOS ANGELES FROM LONDON (AIR)
12/24/05 - DEPARTED US AT LOS ANGELES FOR LONDON (AIR)

[redacted] Who did you visit on these brief trips?

11/29/05 - ARRIVED AT TORONTO/PEARSON (AIR)
11/24/05 - DEPARTED US AT CHICAGO FOR TORONTO (AIR)

10/04/05 - ENTERED US AT LOS ANGELES FROM LONDON (AIR)
09/19/05 - DEPARTED US AT LOS ANGELES FOR LONDON (AIR)

[redacted] Who did you visit overseas for two weeks on this trip?

06/03/04 - ARRIVED US AT LOS ANGELES
05/20/04 - DEPARTED US

[redacted] When you re-entered the US on 3/7/2004, where were you coming from?

03/07/04 - ENTERED US AT PHILADELPHIA (From where?)

[redacted] 11) Who invited you to San Diego in [redacted] (P)? You didn't pick it out of a hat, right? Clark Security sponsored your entry for the H1B Specialty Occupation visa? How did you get wind of that? Upon arriving in San Diego, how did you land the job with [redacted] (P), then [redacted] (P) ? Somebody working there already, right? We notice you lived in a hotel before moving to that apartment at [redacted] (P) -- who was living at that apartment?

[redacted] 12) Phones in temporal order in case an issue arises:
[redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) This phone was in contact with [redacted] (P) -- your new San Diego landline -- on 11/13/99.

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

(P) Pacific Bell - Active by (P) -- (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) -- and subscribed to (P) at (P); stopped using this about June 2005.

(P) Landline; work number at (P), subsidiary of (P).

(P) Pacific Bell - Formerly (P); (P) used this phone located at (P), Apartment (P) San Diego and claimed it as his area code when interviewed by San Diego FBI on (P); this number was found in the wallet of Mohdar Abdullah at the time of his arrest on 9/24/01 and it was also in contact with Omar Al-Bayoumi, Faisal Almuhana, and Fahad Althumairy.

(P) MCI was carrier.

(P) Pacific Bell. (P). Beginning 02/14/2004, ending July 2006, with a forwarding address of (P), (P) (P).

(P) T-Mobile. (P) used this phone until moving to (P) in July 2006.

(P-) (P) landline since Oct 2006 for (P) (P-).
(P-) business fax since Oct 2006.
(P-) business # on web site.
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] TA reports these totals for the above-listed phones:
(A), (G), (J-1) (G) calls
(G) calls 04/11/2001-04/11/2001
(G) calls 03/05/2001-03/05/2001
(G) calls 07/10/2006-07/10/2006
(G) calls 12/02/2004-06/06/2006
(G) calls 12/27/1999-06/25/2000
(P) (G) calls 07/26/2000-01/20/2004
(P) (G) calls 01/21/2004-05/07/2006
(P) (P-) (G) calls
(G) calls
(G) calls
(G) calls
(A), (G), (J-1) (G) calls
(G) calls

[redacted] 13) Tell us how well you knew, and how often you saw, the following people: Khalid 'Abd Al-Jalil Ghulam Muhammad, DOB (P-1), Saudi Arabia (aka Khalid Al-Turkistani)

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** This Saudi AL QAEDA recruiter possessed a Canadian number called by (P) in 1999 as discussed above.

[redacted] Anwar Aulaqi - fiery Imam/scholar at Al-Ribat aka Ar-Ribat Mosque at (P) in San Diego.

[redacted] (P) aka (P) Aka (P) - he served as the mosque (P) at the (P) on (P). He lives at 5606 Amaya Dr, Apt (P), La Mesa, CA.
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** Reportedly, (P) was in contact with Anwar Aulaqi in Yemen pror to Aulaqi's arrest.

[redacted] (P) aka (P) aka (P): he used to live at (P), Apt (P) El Cajon and let your pal Mohdar Abdullah live there too. Is (P) related to your wife, (P)?

[redacted] Imam (P) - Over in Germany. Ask how often he has visited Germany and in which cities there has he stayed.
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** (P) had (P) San Diego number and name along with (P) and (P) when the Germans raided his place in December 2005.

[redacted] (P), aka (P) aka (P) from Germany.
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** Another German associated with Imam (P).

[redacted] Mohdar Abdullah
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** He drove the hijackers to LAX so Al-MIHDHAR could catch a flight home. He had one of (P) phone numbers in his possession when he was arrested. MOHDAR ABDULLAH introduced (P) to hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHDAR. And Mohdar resided with the (P) family at the (P) at the invitation of (P). (P) (P) resided at this address before (P) when he left San Diego to study in (P). On his way to (P) in 2001, (P) stopped in (P) to obtain a visa.

[redacted] Omar Al-Bayoumi -- what do you think his story was? Just a kindly student-holy man? Did you ever think he might be spying on you all for the Saudi MABAHITH? According to the best-selling book by Lawrence Wright, "The Looming Tower" (paraphrasing): "Bayoumi was probably a Saudi intelligence asset [who spied on possible Saudi dissidents in the San Diego area]. He was likely tasked to look after the hijackers so Saudi Inteligence would know what Al Qaeda was up to."

[redacted] (P) -- he was (P).

[redacted]

[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** (P) is a (P) who went to Yemen to attend AULAQI's masjid and then (A), (G), (J-1) where (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (P) -- he was (P) and (P) who was friendly with the hijackers, (P) (P) in (P).

[redacted] 14) Did you know (P) from Sana'a, Yemen.

[redacted] 15) Did Khalid Al-Mihdhar or Nawaf Al-Hazmi ever visit your apt on (P)?

[redacted] 16) Did anyone else use your phone in that apartment on (P)?
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** Phone records show (P) land line phone (P) called AL-HADA on March 2, 2000. AL-HADA was AL- MIHDHAR's father-in-law and a known AL-QA'IDA asset whose phone was in contact with known AL-QA'IDA operatives. More specifically, on 3/20/2000, phone (P), used by KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI at their Parkwood apartment (6401 Mount Ada Road), called (P) in Sana'a, Yemen, the telephone number of AL-MIHDHAR'S father-in-law. The same YEMENI number had been called earlier that month, on 3/2/2000, from (P), with a connect time in excess of 20 minutes. (P) was a phone used by (P), at (P) (P) (per (F), Serial (F) and (F), Serial (F)). (P) also had contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, (P) and FAYAD AL-THUMAIRY (aka FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY, DOB (P-1)) from 12/27/1999 to 06/25/2000.

[redacted] 17) Did you actually establish that (P) in San Diego in (P)? Why not? What were you going to sell? Who was your supplier?

[redacted] 18) Do you know (P) and his (P) company? Do you know anybody who does work for (P)? Do you know what (P) (P) is?
[redacted] **BACKGROUND:** (P), (P) and (P) have all been employed by (P), a Dallas company which is owned by (P) (P). (P) has common contact with (P) ((F))'s (C-2) phone ((O-1) (O-1) and with (P) aka (P) ((G)) at his Florida number (P). (P) also has contact with (P). (P) (DOB (P-1) or (P-1)) - (G) a 7/6/2007 (A), (G), (J-1) EC ((F), Serial (F)) has contact with both ELARBI and KARIM and (P) is also associated with a wireless business.

[redacted] 19) Since you're familiar with computers, ever hear of "War Plugging"? When you want to communicate via Wi-Fi without being detected? What can you tell us about this as it relates to your security business at all?

[redacted] 20) Did you attend Mosque every week?

MORE BACKGROUND:

[redacted] The investigation of the San Diego subjects commenced within hours of Flight 77 crashing into the Pentagon, when a car was found parked at the hourly lot in Dulles International Airport on 9/11/2001 that was registered to NAWAF AL-HAZMI, one of the passengers on Flight 77. It was quickly determined that the vehicle was registered by AL-HAZMI at [redacted] (P), in Lemon Grove, a suburb of San Diego, California. Investigation by San Diego FO found the building was owned by ABDUSSATTAR SHAIKH, who was renting a room therein to OMER SALMAIN SALEH BAKARBASHAT (aka OMAR BAKARBASHAT), DOB [redacted] (P-1), SSAN [redacted] (P-1). BAKARBASHAT, a foreign student from Yemen who had dropped out of college and was out-of-status, admitted to associating with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and was arrested [redacted] (D) and later deported for immigration fraud. BAKARBASHAT further identified MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID (aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDOULAH, aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH), DOB [redacted] (P-1), as a close associate of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. ABDULLAH in turn admitted meeting the hijackers at a San Diego mosque in early 2000, where OMAR AL-BAYOUMI tasked ABDULLAH with acclimating them to the U.S. At the time, ABDULLAH was residing at [redacted] (P) St, [redacted] (P), La Mesa, another San Diego suburb, with several others.

[redacted] The hijackers were housed, through AL-BAYOUMI, at the Parkwood Apartments, 6401 Mt. Ada Rd, [redacted] (P) San Diego, CA 97111, just off Balboa Avenue, in an apartment in the same complex where AL-BAYOUMI had been residing with his wife and three children (in Apt [redacted] (P) at 6333 Mount Ada Rd) since September 1999. AL-BAYOUMI was a Saudi national who entered the U.S. in 1993 [redacted] J-3) attending school in San Diego. He acted as manager/facilities supervisor for the MASJID AL-MADINA AL-MUNAWAR MOSQUE, 511 Magnolia Ave. South, El Cajon, California (aka the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, or KCIA), but claimed on his rental paperwork at Parkwood to be a student supported by his family [redacted] (F), Serials [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F)

[redacted] As noted above, at AL-BAYOUMI's request, MOHDAR ABDULLAH helped AL-HAZMI obtain a driver's license, a car, a Social Security number and enrollment in a Florida flight training school and arranged local instruction in English. ABDULLAH also accompanied AL-HAZMI on June 10, 2000 as he drove KHALID AL-MIHDHAR to the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to catch a flight to Muscat, Oman via Frankfurt, Germany, to visit his wife and new-born daughter. AL-HAZMI then moved out of the Parkwood Apartments into the afore-mentioned [redacted] (P) building owned by SHAIKH, which SHAIKH claims the hijackers found via an ad he had placed at the Islamic Center of San Diego ([redacted] (F), Serial [redacted] (F)). AL-HAZMI and ABDULLAH continued to maintain close contact, visiting each other, dining and even working together washing cars at a Texaco gas station at [redacted] (P), La Mesa, CA 91941. BAKARBASHAT also worked at the same gas station. Soon after the arrival of the eventual

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

Flight 77 hijacker/ pilot, HANI HANJOUR, on 12/8/2000, AL-HAZMI introduced HANJOUR to ABDULLAH and the hijackers departed for La Mesa, Arizona days after HANJOUR's San Diego arrival.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI introduced AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to the Saudi-Yemeni community in San Diego during a party at his apartment and brought them to the AL-RIBAT AL-ISLAMI CENTER, a mosque at 7173 Saranac St, La Mesa, CA 92115. The Imam of the Mosque was ANWAR NASSER AULAQI (aka SHEIKH ANWAR AL-AWLAKI, aka ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ, aka ANWAR AL-AWLAKI) DOB (P-1), the subject of (F), and as it was later discovered, a childhood neighbor of MOHDAR ABDULLAH in Yemen. In January of 2006, the FBI learned via photo comparison that AULAQI was also identical with Yemeni Extremist ANWAR AL-AWLAKI ABU ATIQ, who was incarcerated in June 2006 by the Government of Yemen in connection with a plot to attack oil interests.

[redacted] AULAQI was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico to immigrant Yemeni parents, who returned with him to their native land when AULAQI was about 11 years old. AULAQI's father, NASSER AL-AULAQI, eventually became the President of Sana'a University and visited the U.S. (J-3). ANWAR AULAQI meanwhile, returned to the U.S. in 1990 to attend school in Colorado and moved to San Diego in late 1995. AULAQI resided in San Diego, preaching at the AL-RIBAT Mosque, until at least August 2000, then traveled to Yemen and returned to California on 10/23/2000 -- two weeks after the Cole bombing -- and moved to Virginia in March, 2001. AULAQI served as Imam of the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Falls Church, before returning to Yemen in March, 2002, where he has remained aside from a brief sojourn in October-November 2002 in Virginia, Santa Clara and San Diego, California. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] While it is known that AULAQI had contacts with NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR in San Diego, California and may have had contacts with AL-HAZMI and HANI HANJOUR at the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Virginia, AULAQI's exact relationship with the hijackers remains unclear.

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F), 07/25/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: (G)
ITU:
ITU: TOLLS/PEN REGISTERS
Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (S)
Squad: (G)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F), 07/25/2007

Set Lead 1: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] [redacted] (G). Read and clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.

C-2 INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT''S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/24/2014

MOHDAR MOHAMMED ABDULLAH, date of birth (P-1) 5, 1979, mobile telephone number (P-1) was interviewed first at the Restaurang Thang Long, Upplandsgatan 51, Stockholm, Sweden, then at the Knut Restaurang and Bar, Upplandgatan 17, Stockholm. An Officer of the Swedish Security Service, Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO), was also present for the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, ABDULLAH provided the following information:

ABDULLAH stated that he is very tired of answering the same questions posed by security services, notably the FBI, regarding the events surrounding the attacks on September 11, 2001. He wanted to speak to the interviewing agent again because he felt this time was different, since during their interview with him the previous day, on December 19, 2013, agents did not ask him the questions he is usually asked. ABDULLAH wanted to put the events of the past behind him.

ABDULLAH was angry and upset when he was first showed the surveillance video taken at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on June 10, 2000 (hereafter the "LAX video") (C-2) He stated this was because he had been told that the unknown individual in the LAX video (hereafter the UNSUB) was there with him, Nawaf AL HAZMI, and Khalid AL MIHDHAR, although he did not recognize the UNSUB. Additionally, he saw what he believed to be AL MIHDHAR speaking to the UNSUB over the UNSUB's shoulder in the LAX video, which exacerbated ABDULLAH's feelings of being used and lied to by AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI. ABDULLAH reiterated that he did not know or recognize the UNSUB, but postulated that AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI maybe did, since they had lied to him about so many other things.

It was ABDULLAH's opinion that the UNSUB appeared older than him, AL MIHDHAR, and AL HAZMI in the LAX video. When asked how old he thought the UNSUB appeared to be in the video, ABDULLAH stated that he wasn't sure, but maybe he might have been in his early thirties.

ABDULLAH was told that the object in the UNSUB's hand in the LAX video was a camera (C-2) when he first saw the LAX video, and that they had shown him blown-up pictures of it emphasizing what

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Investigation on 12/20/2013 at Stockholm, Sweden (In Person)

File # (F) Date drafted 12/23/2013

by (S)

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they said was a light on the top and a dark area which was a lens aperture. ABDULLAH does not remember what his impression of the object was prior to them stating it was a camera.

ABDULLAH believes that the third person he had referred to in his e-mail to the San Diego Union Tribune newspaper reporter (P) was (P) (P), though that was a mistake caused by not having seen the video yet. He did not think the person was (P) upon viewing it the previous day, on December 19, 2013. Additionally, he reiterated that he was fairly sure he had travelled to LAX on June 10, 2000 with only AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI, and absolutely certain that he had travelled back to San Diego that day by car with only AL HAZMI. ABDULLAH stated that they had listened to music of Quranic verses on their trip.

When asked about his statement that he had been shown a picture of himself, AL MIHDHAR, AL HAZMI, and the UNSUB standing in front of a departures status board in LAX, ABDULLAH stated that his memory of that picture had them standing in the same positions that he had seen them in the LAX video he had seen the previous day, on December 19, 2013. ABDULLAH believed he misremembered the location of the photo, and that it was likely from the security line as depicted the LAX video.

ABDULLAH has not told anyone in Sweden about his involvement with AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI or his arrest and detainment by the United States Government, and did not think anyone he currently associates with knew about it. He was careful to keep only a small group of friends and avoided sticking out in any way. ABDULLAH feared the release of the video will cause many people not to want to associate with him, and make his life very difficult and possibly dangerous.

ABDULLAH primarily wanted his immigration issues in Sweden resolved so that he can visit his sick father, who resides in Italy. ABDULLAH's brother also resides in Italy with their father.

ABDULLAH was very concerned that he has not ever seen his son. When asked when his son was born, he stated that the FBI knows already, and that he had been born in the year 2002. ABDULLAH did not know the child's full birth date. He stated that his ex-wife (P) (understood by the interviewing agent to be (P)) had three children, the middle one being his, and that he FBI had tricked (P) into lying about not being married to him and not having his child. ABDULLAH believed (P) knew the child to be his, but despite this had faked his son's death with a fraudulent death certificate in order to prevent ABDULLAH from trying to see the child. ABDULLAH identified his primary motivation in life as trying to meet his son.

ABDULLAH had participated in an interview on Al Jazeera television in Yemen in 2005 or 2006 in which he and Anwar AL ALAWKI were interviewed by reporter Yusri Fuda in Arabic. The night before the interview, ABDULLAH met Fuda and AL ALAWKI for dinner, during which AL ALAWKI espoused Takfiri principles, specifically justifying violence against Muslims. ABDULLAH stated he disagreed and argued with AL ALAWKI, and that interaction carried on into the televised interview the next day. ABDULLAH had asked Fuda that Al Jazeera obscure his face during the interview.

ABDULLAH met AL ALAWKI one other time in Yemen, but stated that he did not remember what the context of the meeting was.

ABDULLAH did not remember AL ALAWKI ever saying anything inflammatory or extreme while he was Imam of the mosque in San Diego, though that had changed once AL ALAWKI moved to Yemen. ABDULLAH remembered a group in San Diego who split off from that mosque, and that there was one individual who was a convert to Islam with very radical views among them. ABDULLAH did not remember the individual's name.

At this time in the interview, the Restaurang Thang Long closed and Abdullah and the interviewing agents travelled down the street to Knut Restaurang and Bar to continue. During the walk, ABDULLAH received phone calls from his brother in Italy, and his housemate. ABDULLAH stated that he did not drink for religious reasons, but would not be offended if anyone else did.

ABDULLAH was very angry about the method in which AL ALAWKI had been killed. ABDULLAH believed that since AL ALAWKI was a U.S. citizen, he should have been given a trial. ABDULLAH was even more upset over the way AL ALAWKI's son had been killed, since unlike AL ALAWKI, he was a boy and had not done harm to the United States.

ABDULLAH's father and AL ALAWKI's father had been friends when he was growing up in Sanaa, Yemen. ABDULLAH did not remember AL ALAWKI well from this time, but ABDULLAH was friends with AL ALAWKI's brother, Omar. ABDULLAH had not spoken to Omar in years, and said he wondered how Omar was doing.

ABDULLAH stated he sides very strongly with the plight of the Palestinians, and does not agree with the Israeli occupation of Palestine. ABDULLAH has always dreamed of visiting Jerusalem.

ABDULLAH stated that he has a theory regarding the UNSUB, specifically that the UNSUB was an Israeli agent. ABDULLAH stated that he had no way to know that this was true, but that he thought the FBI should check the passports of any Israelis who were in the Los Angeles area at the time of the LAX video.

ABDULLAH stated that in retrospect, he did not know whether AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI did or said anything that would indicate the future plans they had regarding the events on September 11, 2001. ABDULLAH remembered he was watching the news, and AL HAZMI refused to sit and watch with him, stating that the way the female reporters dressed was "haram" (forbidden). ABDULLAH told him that AL HAZMI should recognize the great opportunities they had by living in the United States, and that they must make some allowances and be forgiving of some customs in return for those opportunities. AL HAZMI stated that ABDULLAH does not understand. ABDULLAH became angry, and asked AL HAZMI if he was so concerned about Quranic Law, why he did not grow his beard. AL HAZMI smiled and stated that there were things ADBULLAH would only understand later. ABDULLAH stated that he did not know what AL HAZMI meant at the time.

ABDULLAH was initially introduced to AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI by Omar Al Bayoumi, and stated that everyone in the Islamic community at the time believed that Al Bayoumi was working for the Saudi Arabian government. ABDULLAH questioned why Al Bayoumi had asked him to look out for AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI, and stated that since he had not heard anything about Al Bayoumi in the media since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government had not done an adequate job of investigating him.

ABDULLAH also stated that the FBI should talk to Hashim Al Attas, but would not elaborate on why, stating that it should just be done.

ABDULLAH had previously been detained in Sanaa, Yemen following his deportation from the United States. He remembered being detained in group holding cells along with two individuals who had been transferred there from U.S. detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ABDULLAH did not remember their names. He additionally remembered there was another prisoner in the Yemeni jail who had been held in U.S. detention in Guantanamo Bay, but that individual was held in solitary confinement in the basement of the jail. ABDULLAH had heard about three other former Guantanamo Bay detainees who where in Yemen, but they were held in a separate jail.

ABDULLAH stated that he was an individual of above-average intelligence, and that he had taken IQ tests to prove this. He understood why he had been continuously approached since the attacks on September 11, 2001, but reiterated that he was very tired of being chased and confronted with the same questions.

ABDULLAH had been thinking of giving [redacted] a call (understood by the interviewing agent to be [redacted] (S). ABDULLAH stated that [redacted] (S) had ruined his life, but that they had both good and bad times together.

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/22/2014

MOHDAR MOHAMMED ABDULLAH, date of birth [redacted] 1979, was interviewed at the Scandic Victoria Tower Hotel, Stockholm, Sweden. Officers of the Swedish Security Service, Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO), were also present for the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, ABDULLAH was advised by the Swedish officers of information as required by Swedish law, to include the purpose and nature of the interview.

ABDULLAH immediately advised that his primary concern was his immigration status in Sweden. Specifically, he had been told by SAPO that his request for status had been denied for unknown reasons, and that he would be deported from Sweden. ABDULLAH stated that he would listen to agents' questions, but would not provide information until his immigration status had been resolved.

ABDULLAH stated that he had previously undergone polygraph examination regarding his relationship to individuals associated to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. He had initially been told by [redacted] that he had passed the polygraph examination, and was later told that the result were inconclusive.

ABDULLAH was shown the text of the email sent by him to San Diego Union Tribune newspaper reporter [redacted] on October 2, 2006, referring to the surveillance video taken at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on June 10, 2000 (hereafter the "LAX video"). This email stated that "I could not make the face of the third person whether he was Khalid or their friend who was residing in LA. They introduced me to him when we were here as a person they had known before coming to San Diego." ABDULLAH stated that he believed the LAX video had been released in the media, and that it had been shown in a television news broadcast. He was informed by interviewing agents that the video had not been released, and that the news report had only verbally referenced the video.

ABDULLAH then stated that he had first heard of the LAX video through [redacted] and that he was unsure whether he had seen the video at the time the email had been sent. He thought that maybe the friend he had been referring to in the email as residing in Los Angeles was [redacted].

Investigation on 12/19/2013 at Stockholm, Sweden (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/19/2013

by [redacted]

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who had stayed at the hotel in Los Angeles with ABDULLAH, Nawaf AL HAZMI, and Khalid AL MIHDHAR on the night of June 9, 2000, prior to the trip to LAX the next day. ABDULLAH did not remember [redacted] travelling to LAX with them, or meeting them there.

ABDULLAH was then shown the LAX video. He identified himself, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR. He stated he did not recognize the unknown individual (hereafter the UNSUB) who was initially standing in front of them at the security line and who appeared to be holding a camera. ABDULLAH noted that the UNSUB does not talk with him, AL HAZMI, or AL MIHDHAR in the video. ABDULLAH claimed he had been shown pictures in a previous interview where he, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR had been standing next to the UNSUB for approximately twelve seconds in front of a departures status board at LAX to check the gate they were to go to. They did not interact with the UNSUB at that time, either.

ABDULLAH advised that he, AL MIHDHAR, AL HAZMI, [redacted] (known to interviewing agents to be [redacted]), and [redacted] attended the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles the night of June 9, 2000. He advised that the King Fahd Mosque Imam, Fahad Al Thumairy, was also possibly present during their visit. ABDULLAH advised that he had visited the King Fahd Mosque again the next day on June 10, 2000, but he did not recall whether it was before or after the trip to LAX. He did not remember any other persons than himself, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR travelling to LAX on June 10, 2000. He recalled driving to Los Angeles in a car belonging to AL HAZMI or AL MIHDHAR.

ABDULLAH stated that the UNSUB appears Arab, in his opinion. However, he stated that he did not know the identity of the UNSUB and had never met him, as he was sure AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR would have introduced the UNSUB if they knew him as per custom in the Arab culture. ABDULLAH was informed that absent any assistance he could provide, the last investigative step available to the FBI to identify the UNSUB would be to potentially publicly release the LAX video. ABDULLAH requested that his face be obscured if the video was released, and he reiterated that he did not know the UNSUB.

ABDULLAH inquired about the status of his son, and asked for pictures of him. ABDULLAH was informed that since the individual was a minor, the sharing of any information about him had to be approved by his legal guardian.

ABDULLAH then reiterated his position that he could not talk until he knew his immigration status in Sweden, and that he had always been cooperative when questioned by any agency.

Prior to his departure from the hotel, ABDULLAH asked the SAPO Officer who escorted him out if he could meet (S) by himself in the hotel lobby. (S) met ABDULLAH in the lobby of the Scandic Hotel, and ABDULLAH again stated that he wanted information about his son. He additionally stated that should the LAX video be released, it may put him in danger and he again requested his face be blocked in it. He was informed that in the event of a release, his face would not be obscured. ABDULLAH asked if the FBI was sure that every possible method of finding the UNSUB had been explored. He recommended checking the records of the long-term parking area near LAX, which is where he, AL MIHDHAR, and AL HAZMI parked their car when they went to LAX on June 10, 2000.

ABDULLAH stated that if the UNSUB knew AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI or was a member of Al Qaeda, he would be a very dangerous individual who should be caught. ABDULLAH requested another meeting with (S) the next day, on December 20, 2013. While leaving the hotel, ABDULLAH stopped the SAPO Officer and informed him that ABDULLAH next intended to travel to the Swedish immigration office nearby to check his status.

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 08/17/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Attn:

Attn:

Cincinnati **Attn:**

New York **Attn:**

From: Los Angeles
[redacted] (G)
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] [redacted] (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: [redacted] To request authorization for Los Angeles and New York agents to travel to Cincinnati and to conduct an interview of [redacted] (P) on 08/28/2007.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] 08/14/2007 Telcals between FBI-Cincinnati SSA [redacted] (S), FBI-Los Angles SA [redacted] (S) to

[redacted]

coordinate an interview of [redacted] (P) in Cincinnati. 08/16/2007 Telcal between FBI Los Angeles SA [redacted] (S) and FBI-New York SA [redacted] (S)

Details: [redacted] Captioned subject was interviewed in Cincinnati on
01/23/2007 and again on 01/26/2007 in Los Angeles, California regarding his knowledge of 9/11 Hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (American Airlines Flight 77) during their time in Los Angeles in January-February 2000 and in June, 2000.

[redacted] During those interviews, [redacted] (P) admitted to meeting Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City. Nawaf and Khalid told [redacted] (P) that they were staying in a hotel downtown, but wanted to move closer to the community. [redacted] (P) showed Nawaf and Khalid a couple of hotels on Sepulveda Boulevard just west of Washington Boulevard.

[redacted] The next day or day after, [redacted] (P) met Nawaf and Khalid again at KFM. After prayers, Nawaf and Khalid then invited [redacted] (P) to go back to the hotel they found.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) walked with agents to the hotels on Sepulveda Boulevard between Washington and Venice. [redacted] (P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid stayed in a hotel that one could drive right up to and faced the street in a room on the second floor. [redacted] (P) believed that Nawaf and Khalid either stayed at the motels identified as Deano's, (3868 Sepulveda Boulevard, Culver City, California), or Astro Motel, (3850 Sepulveda Boulevard, Culver City, California). [redacted] (P) stated that he was 70% sure it was the Astro Motel, Room 23 and 30% that it was Deano's Motel. After viewing Room 23 at the Astro Motel, [redacted] (P) recalled that Nawaf and Khalid offered him some milk out of a small refrigerator. Room 23 of the Astro Motel contained two beds and a small refrigerator.

[redacted] After [redacted] (P) interviews, Los Angeles agents obtained registration cards for both Deano's and Astro Motels. There were no registration cards for in the name of Khalid Al-Mihdhar or Nawaf Al-Hazmi at the motel. Per [redacted] (F), leads were sent to [redacted] (G) to assist in identifying individuals who checked out of the motels between 02/03/2000-02/04/2000. (Note: 9/11 Investigation revealed that the first documented evidence of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi being in San Diego was 02/04/2000. Subequent interviews of registrants at the motels have been negative for any information on Al-Mihdhar or Al-Hazmi thus far. (Registrant interviews are documented in [redacted] (F).)

[redacted] (C-2)

(C-2)

[redacted] On 08/02/2007, during an interview with New York PENTTBOM Intelligence Project case agents, KAYSON BIN DON was questioned about specific information in the "chance" meeting that he and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI had with Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar at the Mediterranean Restaurant in Culver City on 02/01/2007. BIN DON stated that during the meeting, AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were currently living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar gave a land-line number.

[redacted] Los Angeles believes that there is a discrepancy on when or if Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi stayed at the motels in Culver City. The evidence that supports this is as follows:

1) Los Angeles has not been able to find any information through the registration cards or subsequent interviews of registrants at both motels that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were there in the beginning of February, 2000.

2) During the 08/02/2007 interview, KAYSON BIN DON recalled AL-BAYOUMI translating to him that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were staying at an apartment as of 02/01/2007.

(C-2)

4) (P) recollection during interviews of 01/2007, that he showed Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi various motels on Sepulveda Boulevard in Culver City, and then on another day, he visited the motel were they were at to which he stated it was either Deano's or Astro's.

(C-2)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F), 08/17/2007

[redacted] (G) is following up from the initial lead and conducting trace checks and develop a spreadsheet of all individuals who were registered at the motels for the entire months of January and February, 2000.

[redacted] Request SAC authority for travel to Cincinnati for one Los Angeles and one New York agent to conduct interview of (P) on 08/28/2007 in order to resolve these possible discrepancies and gain additional intelligence on the Al-Mihdar's and Al-Hazmi's activities in Los Angeles.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] At [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G): For your information, read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G): Develop a biographical spreadsheet of registrants sorted by room number for both Deano's Motel and Astro Motel from information provided in [redacted] (F) as well as additional information provided via email on 08/14/2007. This spreadsheet should include ACS checks and most recent address for the registrant. Provide results via EC to Los Angeles and New York.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

CINCINNATI

AT CINCINNATI, OHIO

[redacted] Request SAC authority for Los Angeles and New York case agents to travel to Cincinnati to conduct interview.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] [redacted] (G): Read and clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/22/2007

To: New York **Attn:** (S)

San Diego **Attn:**

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: IA (S), (G)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To provide information on possible former roommate of (P).

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] In the referenced EC, (C-2) (C-2) provided additional information on (P) (C-2) (C-2) specifically that (P) met Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar through (P) at the time, who was from Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] New York and San Diego have identified two possible roommates for (P) at this address -- (P) and (P) (P) The latter is a Saudi, and a likely match for the Saudi roommate (C-2)

[redacted] Additionally, San Diego reviewed Lexis-Nexis records for (P) (P) San Diego CA 92117, and identified another possible

[redacted]

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 08/22/2007

roommate for the period when (P) lived at that address: (P). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Lexis-Nexis records are not always accurate, and no specific time frame beyond 2000 to 2002 (the search parameters used) is associated with (P) affiliation with that address. However, if there is additional contact with (P) he could be queried as to any possible relationship with (P) To that end, San Diego has attached his California drivers license photo from March 1998. His March 1998 license information provides his address as (P) San Diego CA 92117.

[redacted] (P) based on his most recent drivers license, is currently resident in San Antonio, TX. San Diego (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) into him unless a connection to (P) is substantiated.

[redacted] Identifying information:

Name: (P)
Sex: M
Height: 5'8"
Weight: 130 pounds
Address: (P) San Antonio TX 78223
Prior Address: (P) San Diego CA 92117
Prior Address: (P) San Diego CA 92117
DOB: (P-1)
Texas DL: TX-(P-1)
California DL (surrendered): (P-1)

[redacted]

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 08/22/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NY

[redacted] For use as appropriate in any additional investigation into [redacted] (P).

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/01/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

Attn:

Attn:

San Diego **Attn:**

Los Angeles **Attn:**

New York **Attn:** (G)

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID;
A.K.A. MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDOULAH;
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] PENTTBOM- (F)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Request authorization for (S) to travel to San Diego Division from 10/10/2007 to 10/13/2007 in response to a request from (G) to attend a case coordination meeting.

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] By way of background, MOHDAR ABDULLAH assisted 9/11 Hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI in acquiring a California drivers license; made inquiries in obtaining a social security card; made telephone calls for the hijackers to enroll in flight lessons with a flight school in Florida; made calls to a community college in San Diego to enroll AL-HAZMI in a computer class; and helped AL-HAZMI attempt to enroll in an English language school in San Diego. On 06/10/2000, MOHDAR traveled with AL-HAZMI to take AL-MIDHAR to the LAX Airport in Los Angeles, California, when AL-MIDHAR returned to Saudi Arabia. After dropping off AL-MIDHAR at the airport, MOHDAR and AL-HAZMI visited the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California. MOHDAR was at one time employed at a Texaco Gas Station in San Diego, which was the same station where AL-HAZMI worked for a three week period at the end of 2000.

[redacted] On 9/18/2001, FBI agents interviewed MOHDAR and he was arrested on 9/21/2001 on a Material Witness warrant issued out of the Southern District of New York, after he declined to take a polygraph examination. (D) MOHDAR was detained and charged in a two-count indictment for making false statements in immigration documents on 5/4/2000, and making false statements to an immigration officer on 7/24/2001. MOHDAR remained in detention until 5/21/2004, when he was deported to to Yemen.

[redacted] Captioned subject, MOHDAR ABDULLAH, was in Canada from August to December 1998 prior to entering the U.S. In as much as the captioned subject resided in (G) (G) and FBI San Diego met with (G) in March 2006 to brief them on FBI's investigation and gain any information which San Diego may not posses.

[redacted] (G) has remained in contact (C-2) since the March 2006 meeting. In September 2006, MOHDAR applied for a Canadian VISA at the Canadian Embassy in Abu Dhabi, UAE. Since that time, (G) has lobbied for access to MOHDAR, or at the least (C-2) (C-2) On 12/19/2006, (G) met with (C-2) to brief them on the June 2000 LAX Video which depicted MOHDAR with 9/11 hijackers AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDAR. (C-2) (C-2) (C-2) (C-2) 2 individuals of interest have been identified.

[redacted]

On two occasions in January 2007 , FBI San Diego and FBI Los Angeles interviewed (P) regarding his interactions with MOHDAR and the 9/11 hijackers in Los Angeles in 2000. Additionally, FBI Cincinnati (A), (G), (J-1) and interviewed (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1) regarding his interactions with MOHDAR and the 9/11 hijackers in 2000. (G), FBI San Diego and FBI Los Angeles continue to analyze the information provided during these interviews.

(G) Per referenced serial, FBI San Diego, FBI Los Angeles, and traveled to (C-2) (C-2)

[redacted] Per informal communication with (C-2) (C-2) (C-2). FBI San Diego plans to host (C-2) on 10/12/2007 with representatives from FBI Los Angeles, FBI San Diego, (G), and (G). An informal inter-FBI case coordination meeting is scheduled for 10/11/2007.

[redacted] This EC authorized the use of a rental car in support of this travel. The accommodation is more than ten miles from the FBI SD office and it is anticipated that the standard rental car rate for the TDY is lass than the cost of public transportation and/or taxi cabs.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F), 10/01/2007

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Read and clear.

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: DEADLINE 05/25/2007 **Date:** 05/07/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (S), (G)

[redacted] (G)

PENTTBOM TEAM

[redacted] (S)

Office of Public Affairs **Attn:** [redacted] (S) International
Operations **Attn:** [redacted] (S), (G)

San Diego **Attn:**

[redacted] (G) **Attn:** LEGAT
Attn: LEGAT

From: Los Angeles
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] [redacted] (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] MOHDAR ABDULLAH
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] PENTTBOM

Synopsis: [redacted] Request a coordination meeting with appropriate representatives of CTD-HQ, Office of Public Affairs, (G), LEGATs (G) and (G) ADIC and SAC Los Angeles, SAC San Diego, members of PENTTBOM and respective case agents to discuss options on how proceed in order to gain additional leads to identify the UNSUB that was seen with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and San Diego Subject Mohdar Abdullah in the 06/10/2000 LAX Video as soon as feasible.

[redacted] (G)

Details: [redacted] In 2004, in order to determine if FBI-San Diego subject MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) immigration cell mates' allegations that ABDULLAH had advance knowledge of 9/11, FBI-LA began reviewing ABDULLAH's connections in Los Angeles, because 1) it was known that he had driven 9/11 hijacker's Khaled AL-MIHDHAR and Nawaf AL-HAZMI (American Airlines #77 that crashed into the Pentagon) to Los Angeles on 06/09/2000 and 2) AL-MIHDHAR's and ALHAZMI's whereabouts in Los Angeles for a two week period between 01/15/2000 and 02/04/2000 were still unknown. The purpose of the investigation was to identify and to identify individuals connected to ABDULLAH may have assisted AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI in Los Angeles. The investigation was documented in (F), (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION; (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] During the investigation, FBI-LA identified video surveillance footage from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) security cameras for 06/10/2000. The video surveillance footage is believed to show ABDULLAH and AL-HAZMI walking with AL-MIHDHAR at LAX before AL-MIHDHAR's return trip to Yemen to visit his family. More importantly, this footage also shows one additional unknown male subject (UNSUB) who appears to be accompanying ABDULLAH, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR through LAX security. The UNSUB appears to be holding a camera and may have been conducting reconnaissance of LAX. To date, FBI-LA investigation has not identified the UNSUB.

[redacted]

[redacted] This EC covers 1) Important Dates in the FBI-SD ABDULLAH Investigation and FBI-LA PENTTBOM Investigation; 2) National Media Attention concerning ABDULLAH and the LAX Video; 3) [redacted] (C-2) [redacted] (C-2); and 4) Recommendations in order to determine the identity of the UNSUB in the LAX Video.

[redacted] **IMPORTANT DATES**

[redacted] 05/2004 - While in ICE custody in San Diego, MOHDAR ABDULLAH reportedly told cell mates that he had advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks and that he assisted the hijackers in Los Angeles.

[redacted] 05/21/2004 - ABDULLAH was deported to Yemen.

[redacted] 06/2004 - Based on the recent reporting of ABDULLAH's cell mates that he had advance knowledge of 9/11, FBI-LA began reviewing prior interviews of ABDULLAH to corroborate ABDULLAH's information and to identify ABDULLAH's associates in Los Angeles. The prior interviews of ABDULLAH revealed that he drove AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI from San Diego to L.A. in June 2000. During the PENTTBOM investigation, FBI-LA obtained hotel registration information at Deano's Motel in Culver City, CA that reflected ABDULLAH's vehicle information for 06/09/2000.

[redacted] During June and July 2004, FBI-LA agents and TFOs reviewed video tapes from various terminals at LAX trying to corroborate ABDULLAH's statement that he had drove the hijackers to LAX.

[redacted] On 07/26/2004, the 06/10/2000 video tape depicting ABDULLAH, AL-HAZMI, AL-MIHDHAR and the UNSUB was located. The tape shows an individual entering the security check point with the hijackers while holding what appears to be a video camera. The UNSUB appears to be recording the security check point area at LAX.

[redacted] 07/27/2004 - FBI-LA (under [redacted] (F)) submitted a request to the FBI lab to have the LAX video enhanced.

[redacted] 07/28/2004 - FBI-LA and FBI-SD, in conjunction with PENTTBOM, establish a "working group" meeting in order to coordinate leads with the ABDULLAH investigation.

[redacted] 09/30/2004 - The FBI Lab provided inconclusive results as to what the individual had in his hands.

[redacted] 03/17/2006, a Director's (G) Brief was prepared for captioned case: (A), (G), (J-1) .

[redacted] On 03/21/2006, FBI Lab provided an analysis of the height of the UNSUB which was determined to be approximately 5-feet-5 3/4 inches, plus or minus one inch.

[redacted] **MEDIA ATTENTION**

[redacted] 09/11/2006, NBC Today and MSNBC ran a news story on ABDULLAH that stated, "the FBI has now renewed its investigation of a man the 9/11 Commission said was perfectly suited to help the hijackers with their mission. . .NBC News has learned that the renewed FBI investigation was triggered in part by surveillance videotapes inside the Los Angeles Airport shot in June 2000 - a year before 9/11. Law Enforcement officials tell NBC the grainy tapes show terrorist Nawaf al-Hazmi with Abdullah and an unidentified man. Sources say the men appear to be scouting out the airport. Some FBI agents believe that one of the men may be holding a video camera and rotates in a circle while secretly videotaping the security area. . . Why didn't they find these tapes until 2004 isn't known - especially since the FBI knew that on the day the tapes were shot in June 2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to Yemen. Critics are certain to questions whether the FBI again missed an important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away."

[redacted] It is unknown how NBC received information on the investigation of the LAX Video and ABDULLAH.

[redacted] Per (F), on approximately 09/29/2006, San Diego AUSA (S) advised he received an unsolicited telephone call from (P), a reporter for the San Diego Union Tribune. During their conversation, which centered on the upcoming sentencing of an individual convicted of a terrorism hoax, (P) advised she had recently been in e-mail contact with ABDULLAH (currently believed to be in Yemen.) (P) advised she asked ABDULLAH about the recent NBC news article published on 09/11/2006 regarding ABDULLAH's role in helping 9/11 hijackers Nawaf AL-HAZMI and Khalid AL-MIHDHAR. (Note - (P) has reported extensively on San Diego 9/11 subjects and associates.)

[redacted] (P) advised that ABDULLAH did not answer any of her specific questions but related the following points:

- the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- (P) should contact attorney (P) if she wants to interview him (ABDULLAH.)

[redacted] On 10/03/2006, AUSA (S) was again contacted by (P). (P) advised that she had received a second e-mail from ABDULLAH. (P) advised that ABUDALLAH related the following points:

- regarding this notorious story, the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- the other individual in the video was either a friend of AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR and was residing in Los Angeles at the time (06/10/2000).

- ABDULLAH was introduced to this individual on a previous occasion when this individual traveled down to San Diego to visit.

- this individual was residing in Los Angeles and the two hijackers knew the individual prior to going to San Diego.

[redacted] It should be noted that San Diego AUSA (S) did not attempt to direct (P) to provide any information and did not direct or task (P) in any way regarding future contact with ABDULLAH.

[redacted] (C-2) (C-2)

[redacted] On 11/15/2006, ABDULLAH presented himself at the Canadian Embassy in Abu Dhabi in relation to his application for a Canadian visitor's visa. (C-2) (C-2)

(C-2)

[redacted] FBI-LA follow-up with LEGAT (G) in 03/2007 and 04/2007 (C-2) was negative.

[redacted] **FBI-LA STEPS TAKEN IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THE UNSUB**

[redacted] **Since the LAX Video was discovered on 07/26/2004, investigation to date has not identified the UNSUB.** Steps taken to identify the UNSUB have included:

1. Sending photographs to the High Value Detainees (HVDs) and GITMO Detainees for recognition including questions regarding any reconnaissance video of LAX;

2. Exploiting all evidence related to contacts in Los Angeles found in ABDULLAH's possession at the time of his arrest;

3. Exploiting all Los Angeles area telephone numbers called by ABDULLAH;

4. Analyzing (G) that passed through LAX on 06/10/2000 to match (G) photograph with the UNSUB;

5. A Request that all Field Offices show the photograph of the UNSUB to all Sources for recognition and knowledge;

6. FBI-LA investigation on the participants of Yemeni Student meetings that AL-HAZMI attended has been completed.

(O-1)

8. Coordination with San Diego on their case concerning ABDULLAH and related leads.

9. Briefing (G) on case and requesting their plan of action concerning ABDULLAH.

[redacted] RECOMMENDATIONS

[redacted] FBI-LA recommends three courses of action in order to identify the UNSUB depicted in the 06/10/2000 LAX Video. ABDULLAH is the only individual in the investigation to date who can potentially identify the UNSUB. It is recommended a meeting take place with the leadership of CTD, Office of Public Affairs, appropriate (G) officials, ADIC and SAC Los Angeles, SAC San Diego, LEGATs (G) and (G) members of PENTTBOM, and respective case agents to discuss the options identified below. Since the meeting in (G) was over two months ago, it is requested the suggested meeting occur before 05/25/2007.

1. US Government request to (G) authorities to gain access to ABDULLAH. This is the best, most direct option, to question ABDULLAH about who the UNSUB is in the LAX Video. At this point in the investigation, ABDULLAH is the only person who can identify the UNSUB. However, the 9/11 Commission attempted to gain access to ABDULLAH in (G) but was denied. It is important to note that the 9/11 Commission wrote their report before the LAX Video was discovered. It is unknown if a high-level coordinated effort by FBIHQ and (G) to pressure the (G) Government will result in gaining access to ABDULLAH. A full briefing on the LAX Video to the (G) Authorities may assist in the importance of this effort.

2. Coordinate with the SAC in San Diego to work an operation with the San Diego Union Tribune reporter to gain more information from her email contact with ABDULLAH. This option may gain the information needed to determine the identity of the UNSUB in the LAX Video but carries the obvious exposure to a potential leak. However, a piece of information about the UNSUB may be the only thing needed to determine his identity, as witnessed by FBI-LA and FBI-SD operation identifying witnesses who had contact with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR after (C-2) (C-2)

3. Release the LAX video to the public media in order to gain new leads. This option is the only one that can be completely controlled by the FBI. The LAX Video story has already been reported in the news, and may raise questions as to what the FBI is doing to identify the UNSUB. The actions of his associates, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, are well known. We need to determine whether the UNSUB is part of additional plots to attack U.S. interests. Information from (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (i.e., (O-1) (O-1) (C-2) ; (O-1) (O-1) the recent overseas arrest of a Los Angeles Paintball subject; the unknown location of (P), a Los Angeles resident who was seen at a terrorist training camp in Somalia, and observed engaged in combat in the Horn of Africa; etc.). It is anticipated that this option would be a national initiative to be coordinated with all Field Offices. A release to the media should include local Los Angeles and San Diego networks; America's Most Wanted; images posted on FBI most-wanted Web-sites; and Department of State Web-sites.

[redacted] If any of the three options identifies the UNSUB, the ability to gain bank and telephone records (G) will be severely hampered, because financial institutions and telephone carriers are only required to keep records (G) (G) Thus, a decision by FBIHQ to exercise one or more of the above described options should be made prior (G) in order to allow sufficient time to acquire appropriate bank and telephone records before they are destroyed.

[redacted] FBI-LA, FBI-SD, FBIHQ-CTD, and PENTTBOM members have established a dialogue about the three options described above. FBI-LA requests a meeting with the entities previously noted in order to bring all parties to the table and determine which option(s) to exercise, if any.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F) 05/07/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Coordinate a meeting with the leadership of CTD, Office of Public Affairs, appropriate (G) officials, LEGATs (G) and (G), ADIC and SAC Los Angeles, SAC San Diego, members of PENTTBOM and respective case agents to discuss lead options to identify the UNSUB seen with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and San Diego Subject Mohdar Abdullah in the 06/10/2000 LAX Video.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] OPA: Read and clear. Be available for requested meeting.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Read and clear. Be available for requested meeting.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] Read and clear. Be available for requested meeting.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

(G)

[redacted]

AT (G)

[redacted] Read and clear. Be available for requested meeting.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

(G)

AT (G)

[redacted] Read and clear. Be available for requested meeting.

◆◆

FD-542 (Rev. 04-07-2006)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/18/2007

To: New York **Attn:** (G) (S)
(S)
(S)

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)
[redacted]

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE 182

[redacted] Analytical Support: (G)
Synopsis: [redacted] A frequency report and Analyst Notebook link charts were prepared for the above-captioned case showing target-to-target contacts.

[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Enclosure: A 42 page spreadsheet entitled "Frequency Report for Phones Used by Al-Bayoumi, Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi" and i2 Charts.

Administrative: [redacted] Captioned EC is in response to collection requirement detailed in (F)

[redacted] This analysis addresses the following intelligence requirements as outlined in the FBI's IT Standing Intelligence Requirements Set:

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

(F) (A), (G), (J-1).

(F). (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

Executive Summary: [redacted] Phones used by Saudi-Yemeni emigrees in the San Diego area who provided support to 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI from February to December 2000 were analyzed for inter-connectivity and the findings were displayed in tabular and link chart formats, per below and attached. Some of these subjects continue to have direct and indirect linkages to known terrorists and terrorist operations and two of these individuals (OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and FAYAD AL-THUMARY) had long ties with the Saudi Arabian government. Of particular interest, (A), (G), (J-1) AHMAD MOHAMMED MUSTAFA, who lived with the hijackers during March 2000, is the son of the founder of the violent Islamist organization, PIK, which is closely allied with ANSAR AL-ISLAM.

Details: [redacted] SSA (S) and Detective (S) of the NYO JTTF, Squad (G), requested that the author provide: 1) a frequency report of the phones used by OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI during the period of time they all resided in San Diego; and 2) target-to-target phone analysis displayed on an Analyst Notebook i2 chart for the Yemeni/Saudi support cell in San Diego, with particular emphasis on phone connectivity involving the number (P).

[redacted] (P) was a cell phone subscribed to MANAL A. BAGADER, and used by her spouse, hijackers-associate OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, from 11/20/1998 to 03/09/2001, per (F) and (F) although tolls were only available through 9/20/2000. ANALYST NOTE: The cessation of activity on this phone in late September coincides with AL-BAYOUMI's travel to the U.K. shortly thereafter, on 10/8/2000; he did not return to the U.S. until 11/30/2000. This number was subsequently assigned to (P), (P-1), and his daughter, (P), at (P) El Cajon CA 92020 (F) (F), with an activation date of 6/23/2002 and tolls uploaded to TA through 6/20/2004.

[redacted] Since this reassignment, (P) had contact, on 2/26/2003, with cellular number (P), subscribed to AHMAD MOHAMMED MUSTAFA, now a MicroSoft employee in Redmond, Washington. MUSTAFA lived with the San Diego hijackers for 15 days in March of 2000 and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mozaffar PARTOWMAH (P), (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), who provided support to Sheikh Abdel Rahman BARZANJEE, the European leader of **ANSAR AL-ISLAM** (AI), designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. on March 22, 2004. It was first designated under Executive Order 13224 on 2/23/2003 for providing a safe haven to AL QAEDA in northern Iraq, having been formed in late 2001 as a coalition of other Kurdistani Islamist groups to fight for an independent and a "pure" Islamic Kurdistan. However, in April 2006 and August 2006, (O-1) and NSA, respectively, informed the FBI that they no longer consider BARZANJEE a subject of interest (F) dated 6/19/2007) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] MUSTAFA's father is MOHAMMAD ALI MOSTAFA GABORI, aka DR. MOHAMMAD SALIH MOSTAFA, who founded the Islamic Party of Kurdistan, aka Parti Islami Kurdistan (PIK for short) in 1979. PIK's goal is to establish an Islamic state encompassing southeaster Turkey and northwestern Iraq. GABORI, a Kurd, has resided in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for many years, having (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) That phone is still active and has been in frequent communication with US phones associated with AHMAD MOHAMMED MUSTAFA and MUSTAFA's (P) (P), (P-1), (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) As noted below, (P) the son of (P), has become (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) INS records indicate (P) (P) was a member of the KURDISH DEMOCRAT PARTY (presumably in Syria, where he was a member of the Syrian armed services for the four years ending 1973, then moved to Germany before entering the US on 1/12/1977). Open source identifies (P) as helping to organize the Kurdish National Congress that met in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in August 1988. Upon relocating to San Diego, (P) opened a (P) company named (P) (F).

[redacted] (P) (P) number also had 117 contacts, between 4/5/2003 and 6/20/2004, with (P), a cell phone used by (P) (P), (P-1), an ethnic Kurd from Iraq who entered the US as a refugee on 9/24/1999, residing first at (P), Amarillo TX 79107, and then at (P), (P), El Cajon CA, per (F) The residential number at the (P) residence on (P) in El Cajon, (P), also had 10 contacts with former hijackers' roommate AHMAD MOHAMMED MUSTAFA's (P) phone, from 6/6/2003 to 12/12/2004. In addition, (P) phone (P) was also found to be in contact with AI supporter (P) in New York. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) ((F)). Finally, former hijackers' roommate AHMAD MOHAMMED MUSTAFA's (P) cell phone also had 17 contacts with a phone in Texas subscribed to (P), (P), from 11/30/2002 to 12/14/2002.

[redacted] The investigation of the San Diego subjects commenced within hours of Flight 77 crashing into the Pentagon, when a car was found parked at the hourly lot in Dulles International Airport on 9/11/2001 that was registered to NAWAF AL-HAZMI, one of the passengers on Flight 77. It was quickly determined that the vehicle was registered by AL-HAZMI at (P) (P) in Lemon Grove, a suburb of San Diego, California. Investigation by San Diego FO found the building was owned by ABDUSSATTAR SHAIKH, who was renting a room therein to OMER SALMAIN SALEH BAKARBASHAT (aka OMAR BAKARBASHAT), DOB (P-1) SSAN (P-1) BAKARBASHAT, a foreign student from Yemen who had dropped out of college and was out-of-status, admitted to associating with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and was arrested as a (D) and later deported for immigration fraud. BAKARBASHAT further identified MIHDAR MOHA AL-MIHDAR ZAID (aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDOULAH, aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH), DOB (P-1) as a close associate of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. ABDULLAH in turn admitted meeting the hijackers at a San Diego mosque in early 2000, where OMAR AL-BAYOUMI tasked ABDULLAH with acclimating them to the U.S. At the time, ABDULLAH was residing at (P) (P), La Mesa, another San Diego suburb, with several others.

[redacted] The hijackers were housed, through AL-BAYOUMI, at the Parkwood Apartments, 6401 Mt. Ada Rd, (P), San Diego, CA 97111, just off Balboa Avenue, in an apartment in the same complex where AL-BAYOUMI had been residing with his wife and three children (in (P) at 6333 Mount Ada Rd) since September 1999. AL-BAYOUMI was a Saudi national who entered the U.S. in 1993 on (J-3) (J-3), attending school in San Diego. He acted as manager/facilities supervisor for the MASJID AL-MADINA AL-MUNAWAR MOSQUE, 511 Magnolia Ave. South, El Cajon, California (aka the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, or KCIA), but claimed on his rental paperwork at Parkwood to be a student supported by his family ((F)).

[redacted] As noted above, at AL-BAYOUMI's request, MOHDAR ABDULLAH helped AL-HAZMI obtain a driver's license, a car, a Social Security number and enrollment in a Florida flight training school and arranged local instruction in English. ABDULLAH also accompanied AL-HAZMI on June 10, 2000 as he drove KHALID AL-MIHDHAR to the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to catch a flight to Muscat, Oman via Frankfurt, Germany, to visit his wife and new-born daughter. AL-HAZMI then moved out of the Parkwood Apartments into the afore-mentioned (P) building owned by SHAIKH, which SHAIKH claims the hijackers found via an ad he had placed at the Islamic Center of San Diego ((F)). AL-HAZMI and ABDULLAH continued to maintain close contact, visiting each other, dining and even working together washing cars at a Texaco gas station at (P) La Mesa, CA 91941. BAKARBASHAT also worked at the same gas station. Soon after the arrival of the eventual Flight 77 hijacker/ pilot, HANI HANJOUR, on 12/8/2000, AL-HAZMI introduced HANJOUR to ABDULLAH and the hijackers departed for La Mesa, Arizona days after HANJOUR's San Diego arrival.

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI and his family, meanwhile, moved out of the Parkwood Apartments on 6/23/2001, advising that he was leaving the U.S., and he left no forwarding address. After it was learned he had provided significant support to the hijackers, New Scotland Yard executed a search warrant at AL-BAYOUMI's residence, auto and office on September 21, 2001, at (P-1) Birmingham, UK, and AL-BAYOUMI was detained and questioned for seven days.

[redacted] At that time, New Scotland Yard obtained the following phone numbers for AL-BAYOUMI: (P-1) (cell), (P-1) (business) and (P-1) (fax). Both the cell and fax numbers were in contact with (P) a number at the MASJID AL-MADINA AL-MUNAWAR MOSQUE (Kurdish Community Islamic Center) in El Cajon, California, where AL-BAYOUMI had been a caretaker, as well as with (P), subscribed to the Director of the Center, an Iraqi emigree, SABAH DIZAYE, (A), (G), (J-1) from 1/15/2001 through 8/9/2001. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Another number called from San Diego in 2000 proved to be significant. On 3/20/2000, phone (P), used by KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI at their Parkwood apartment (6401 Mount Ada Road), called (P-1) in Sana'a, Yemen, the telephone number of AL-MIHDHAR'S father-in-law. The same YEMENI number had been called earlier that month, on 3/2/2000, from (P), with a connect time in excess of 20 minutes. (P) was a phone used by another hijacker-associate in San Diego, (P), DOB (P-1), at (P) (see (F) and (F)). (P) also had contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, Faisal Almuhana and FAYAD AL-THUMAIRY (aka FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY, DOB (P-1)) from 12/27/1999 to 06/25/2000.

[redacted] ANALYST NOTE: (F), identifies (C-2) (C-2) (C-2) A review by the author of TA and Intelligence Community databases failed to find any direct linkage. But analysis of the (P) phone noted above, (P) which did have contact with the Yemen number, revealed that its calling patterns were similar to two of AL-BAYOUMI's phones, specifically (P) and (P).

[redacted]

[redacted] AL-THUMAIRY, like AL-BAYOUMI, was a possible Saudi Arabian intelligence asset. In fact, AL-THUMAIRY entered the U.S. on 05/21/1996 as Administrative Officer to the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, fresh out of graduate school in Riyadh. Per (F) (F) the Administrative Officer is the official who conducts routine business with the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) at the Department of State on behalf of the Consulate, but OFM had no dealings with AL-THUMAIRY. Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY's land line of (P) had five telephonic contacts with (P), the cell phone of MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) And AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) called AL-JARRAH's cell phone 48 times from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003. AL-THUMAIRY, the subject of closed case (F) who possessed extremist views and whose financials appeared to link him to terrorist financing, left the U.S. three days after his last telephonic contact with AL-JARRAH and (J-3), (J-3) (see (F) and (F).

[redacted] Telephone (P), subscribed to by AL-THUMAIRY at (P) (P), Culver City, California, received five calls from ANWAR NASSER AULAQI's San Diego telephone (P) between 12/18/1999 and 04/25/2000 (also see (F) and (F). As discussed more extensively below, AULAQI was a "spiritual advisor" to the terrorists in San Diego and a fiery jihadist orator who was arrested last year in Yemen where he reportedly operates a terrorist training camp.

[redacted] Per a recent phone analysis by San Diego FO of phones used by OMAR BAKARBASHAT and his (P) (P) (F) (F), (P) was subscribed to (P) at (P), (P), San Diego. The same number was found in the wallet of MOHDAR ABDULLAH -- the Texaco employee AL-BAYOUMI had asked to assist the hijackers -- at the time of ABDULLAH's 9/21/2001 arrest on a PENTTBOMB material witness warrant. A search warrant was executed at ABDULLAH's then current address of (P) East Lexington Avenue, (P), El Cajon, CA 92019. Among the items recovered was an identification card with his photo issued by the government of Yemen, his apparent country of origin, although ABDULLAH had sought political asylum upon his arrival in the U.S., claiming to be from Somalia. Also recovered was a notebook containing references to planes falling from the sky, mass killings and hijacking. ABDULLAH remained incarcerated and was indicted for immigration fraud and then eventually deported to Yemen on 5/21/2004. (C-2) (C-2) (C-2) (F).

[redacted] As for OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, DOB (P-1) the subject of a 1998 Preliminary Investigation (F) (large gatherings of Middle Eastern males at his residence, suspicious mail, etc. - case closed June 1999), he reportedly drove to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles on 2/1/2000 to settle a visa issue and overheard the hijackers in a nearby cafe speaking Gulf-accented Arabic, befriended them, and invited them to San Diego (F). He was accompanied on this trip by CAYSAN BIN DON (aka KAYSON BINDON DYSON, aka CLAYTON MORGAN), DOB (P-1) (P). BIN DON described to the FBI a discussion in Arabic he witnessed between AL-BAYOUMI and a Consulate representative just before the "chance" encounter with the hijackers, who had arrived at LAX on 1/15/2000, a week after attending a "summit" in Kuala Lampour with notable AL QAEDA operatives.

[redacted] The hijackers arrived in San Diego three days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI in Los Angeles, and AL-BAYOUMI arranged a rental apartment for them, paying their initial rent, in his apartment complex at the Parkwood, where the hijackers resided until 5/31/2000. Thereafter they moved to the (P) (P) apartment, although AL-MIHDHAR's stay was brief, since he left the U.S. on 6/10/2000.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI introduced AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to the Saudi-Yemeni community in San Diego during a party at his apartment and brought them to the AL-RIBAT AL-ISLAMI CENTER, a mosque at 7173 Saranac St, La Mesa, CA 92115. The Imam of the Mosque was ANWAR NASSER AULAQI (aka SHEIKH ANWAR AL-AWLAKI, aka ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ, aka ANWAR AL-AWLAKI) DOB (P-1) the subject of (F) and as it was later discovered, a childhood neighbor of MOHDAR ABDULLAH in Yemen. In January of 2006, the FBI learned via photo comparison that AULAQI was also identical with Yemeni Extremist ANWAR AL-AWLAKI ABU ATIQ, who was incarcerated in June 2006 by the Government of Yemen in connection with a plot to attack oil interests.

[redacted] AULAQI was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico to immigrant Yemeni parents, who returned with him to their native land when AULAQI was about 11 years old. AULAQI's father, NASSER AL-AULAQI, eventually became the President of Sana'a University and visited the U.S. (J-3) ANWAR AULAQI meanwhile, returned to the U.S. in 1990 to attend school in Colorado and moved to San Diego in late 1995. AULAQI resided in San Diego, preaching at the AL-RIBAT Mosque, until at least August 2000, then traveled to Yemen and returned to California on 10/23/2000 -- two weeks after the Cole bombing -- and moved to Virginia in March, 2001. AULAQI served as Imam of the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Falls Church, before returning to Yemen in March, 2002, where he has remained aside from a brief sojourn in October-November 2002 in Virginia, Santa Clara and San Diego, California. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] While it is known that AULAQI had contacts with NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR in San Diego, California and may have had contacts with

AL-HAZMI and HANI HANJOUR at the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Virginia, AULAQI's exact relationship with the hijackers remains unclear. Of particular note, San Diego [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) determined that an American Express expense bank account associated with the MASJID AR-RIBAT funded round trip air travel for ANWAR AULAQI on 1/31/2001 from Baltimore to Phoenix to San Diego [redacted] (F).

[redacted] In fact, ANWAR AULAQI was first opened as an investigative subject in 1999 as a result of his telephonic contacts with members of HAMAS and AL QAEDA, and Virginia opened a case on him in September 2001, [redacted] (F). In April 2006, San Diego re-opened its case, [redacted] (F), based on his being identified as ABU ATIQ, the radical jihadi apologist who was also believed to be running a terrorist training camp in Yemen and "might be running cells in the U.S." [redacted] (O-1) Subsequent analysis indicates AULAQI had multiple contacts with various FBI International Terrorism subjects, including [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (F), who reportedly participated in "paint ball exercises" organized by AULAQI in 2000. [redacted] (O-1) [**ANALYST NOTE:** [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) [redacted] (P), advised an FBI Supervisory Special Agent, during a community outreach meeting in January 2006, that he has "traveled to Hawaii, Tahiti and the Red Sea as part of his hobby of SCUBA diving."]

[redacted] Reportedly, [redacted] (P) discussed above, [redacted] (P), and presumably the [redacted] (P) of MicroSoft employee AHMAD MUSTAFA, became a student of ANWAR AULAQI's AL-IMAN INSTITUTE in Yemen in early 2006. Thereafter, [redacted] (P) participated in terrorist activities in Somalia in mid-2006. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (P) had numerous contacts with his father's Riyadh telephone number via pre-paid calling cards from 10/2/2001 until 5/15/2003 [redacted] (F).

[redacted] Finally, AL-BAYOUMI was subsequently charged with visa fraud in a sealed indictment in the Southern district of California but the statute of limitations has since lapsed and he was last known to be residing in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as of August 2003 [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F). Of interest, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), stated AL-BAYOUMI was believed to work for the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service, reporting on dissident Saudis in the United States (F). In fact, UPS records indicate AL-BAYOUMI was shipped a package from the SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY, 601 New Hampshire Ave NW, Washington DC on 1/18/2001 (F) and PENTTBOMB investigators believe that the contents of the package shipped from the Saudi Arabian embassy to Al-BAYOUMI may have contained foreign intelligence information (F).

[redacted] NOTEWORTHY PHONES

Phone (# Sort)	**Name/DOB POB/SSAN**	**Reference**	**Address**	**Notes**
(P) (Cell)	ANWAR AULAQI (P-1) (Bogus DOB (P-1) to get SSN) Born Las Cruces, NM, to Yemeni emigrees.	(F)	(P), Falls Church VA 22044 (5/01-7/02)	(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)	Fayad Al-Thumary (P-1) (Saudi Arabia) SSN: (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) Culver City CA; CBR (P) 5/99-3/01	Saudi Intel asset?; # found in Saleh Al-Mari's cell when arrested 1/13/02.
(P-1)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	Found in documents seized from Abdullah, 9/22-9/24/01	Abdullah had brother in Italy. No calls in TA.
(P)	(P) (P-1) (Saudi Arabia)	(F)	Work email is now (P-1)	Met hijackers @ Abu Bakr Mosque, Balboa Ave; (P) (P)
(P) (Business)	Omar Al-Bayoumi (Fitness	(F)	Parkwood Apartments, 6333 Mt. Ada	

	Warehouse) (P-1) Saudi Arabia (P-1)		(P) San Diego, CA 92111	
(P) (Cell)	(P) aka (P) (P) (P-1) (Iraq-Kurd) (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P), El Cajon CA	Subscribed to daughter, (P), but used by (P)
(P) (Business)	Omar Al-Bayoumi (Fitness Warehouse) (P-1) Saudi Arabia (P-1)	(F)	(P) San Diego CA (8/94-6/01)	
(P) (Cell) Subscribed by (P)	Omer Salmain Saleh BAKARBASHAT (P) (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	(P) Lemon Grove CA 91945 (AL-HAZMI's DMV address)	Arrested as Penttbomb material witness; associate of hijackers; deported
(P)	(P) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) El Cajon CA 92020	(P) is daughter of (P)
(P) (Cell; Subscriber MANAL A. BAGADER, spouse, 11/20/98-03/09/01)	Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P-1) Saudi Arabia (P-1)	(F)	(P) San Diego CA (11/98-9/00)	Met hijackers @ café in Culver City, LA, 2/1/00, accompanied by Caysan Bin Don; they moved in with

Number subsequently assigned to (P) [redacted] per below.				him 2/4/00 and he arranged apt. in same complex on 2/14/00
(P) [redacted] (Cell) (Formerly Bayoumi's cell phone #: see above)	(P) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted]	(F) [redacted]	(P) [redacted] (P) [redacted] El Cajon CA 92020	(P) [redacted] is daughter of (P) [redacted]
(P) [redacted]	(P) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted]	(F) [redacted]	(P) [redacted] (P) [redacted] El Cajon CA 92020	(P) [redacted] is daughter of (P) [redacted]
(P) [redacted] (Cell)	Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P-1) [redacted] Saudi Arabia (P-1) [redacted]	(F) [redacted]	Parkwood Apartments, 6333 Mt. Ada Rd, (P) [redacted], San Diego, CA 92111 (1/27/00-9/20/01)	
(P) [redacted]	Omar Al-Bayoumi (P-1) [redacted] Saudi Arabia (P-1) [redacted]	(F) [redacted]	Parkwood Apartments, 6333 Mt. Ada Rd, (P) [redacted], San Diego, CA 92111	
(P) [redacted] (Residence)	(P) [redacted] aka (P) [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) [redacted]	(F) [redacted]	(P) [redacted] (P) [redacted] El Cajon CA	(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
(P) [redacted]	Mohdar Abdullah (at	(F) [redacted]	LA serial dated 4/25/07	(G) [redacted] calls uploaded to TA

(Pay Phone)	La Mesa Texaco station)	(F)	served FGJ subpoena on AT&T (G) to obtain Pre-paid calling card info.	(last call is 12/19/01)
(P) (Pay Phone)	Mohdar Abdullah (at LA Mesa Texaco station)	(F)	Texaco, 4925 Spring St, La Mesa, CA	(G) calls uploaded to TA (1/1/00-12/19/00)
(P) (Aulaqi was subscriber, 10/01/95 to 10/13/02)	ANWAR AULAQI (P-1) (Bogus DOB (P-1) to get SSN) Born Las Cruces, NM, to Yemeni emigrees.	(F) Note: (P) (P) @ (P) (F) was called 5 times by Aulaqi on 2/5/00. (P) in 2005 plot to blow up US Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen	(P) (P) La Mesa, CA 91941 Note: (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)	(A), (D), (G), (J-1)
(P) (Cell)	(P) Worked at La Mesa Texaco station where Mohdar Abdullah.	(F)	(P) (P), La Mesa CA.	10/13/00-08/28/02 47 contacts with cell (P) used by Omer BAKARBASHAT.
(P) (Business; used in Al-Bayoumi's office at the KCIC)	Omar Al-Bayoumi ("dba Masjed Al Madianah") (P-1) Saudi Arabia (P-1)	Per (F) (F) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)	Kurdish Community Islamic Center (KCIC), 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, CA	Service disconnected 4/22/01 at MASJID Al-MADINA AL- MUNAWAR MOSQUE (Al-Bayoumi left US June

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

				'01)
(P)	(P) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) El Cajon CA 92020	(P) is daughter of (P)
(P)	Mohdar Abdullah (at La Mesa Texaco station)	(F)	Texaco, 4925 Spring St, La Mesa, CA	(P-1)
(P)	Mohdar Abdullah (at LA Mesa Texaco station)	(F)	Texaco, 4925 Spring St, La Mesa, CA	(P)
(P)	ABUSSATAR SHAIK/ Hijackers (P-1) (Saudi Arabia)	(F)	Parkwood Apartments, 6401 Mt. Ada Rd, (P) San Diego, CA 97111	Used by hijacker Nawaz Al-Hazmi
(P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) El Cajon CA 92019 (Subscriber: 11/19/00-9/20/01). Last call made on this phone was on 8/25/01.	Drove hijackers to LA, 6/9/00; appears with them and UNSUB in LAX video, 6/10/00; worked at Texaco station; arrested 9/24/01; deported to Yemen, 5/21/04
(P) (Residence)	ANWAR AULAQI (P-1) (Bogus DOB (P-1) to get SSN) Born Las Cruces, NM,	(F)	(P) (P) Falls Church VA 22041 (1/01-5/03)	Spiritual leader of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar

	to Yemeni emigrees.			
800-207-0382 PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	Calls (P) (P) (user is (P)	12/17/00
800-383-0090 PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	PIN Calls: (P-1) (his brother in Yemen, AHMED MOHAMMED AL-MIHDAR ZAID, DOB (P-1)	12/04/00 (3 calls)
800-572-0457 800-597-2421 PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	PIN Calls: (P) (P-1) (SN 18657) (P) (Abdul Aziz Alturki) (P)	1/08/01-1/27/01
(O-1)		(F)	(O-1)	

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

800-978-7631 PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	PIN Calls: (P) (P) Mohdar's girlfriend; her home # was (P)	08/17/01-08/30/01 Used phone (P) for these PIN calls
(P)	(P) aka (P) (P) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) Amarillo TX 79107	
(P)	CAYSAN BIN DON (aka KAYSON BINDON DYSON; aka CLAYTON MORGAN) (P-1) (P-1) (P)	(F)		Accompanied Al-Bayoumi to LA, 2/1/00; (P)
(P) (Business)	Omar Al-Bayoumi (Fitness Warehouse) (P-1) Saudi Arabia	(F)	(P) (P) San Diego, CA (12/96-8/23/01)	See (F) (F)

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

	(P-1)			
(P)	NAWAZ Al-HAZMI (P-1) Mecca, Saudi Arabia & KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (P-1) Mecca, Saudi Arabia	(F)	Parkwood Apartments, 6401 Mt. Ada Rd, (P) San Diego, CA 97111	Used by hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar & Nawaz Al-Hazmi. Placed call on 3/2/00 to Yemen number (P-1) of Mihdhar's father-in-law.
(P) (Cell) (Subscribed to spouse, Manal Bagader)	Omar Al-Bayoumi (P-1) Saudi Arabia (P-1)	(F)	San Diego CA (9/13/00- 9/22/01)	
(P)	(P) (P-1) (Mogadishu) (P-1)	(F)	(P) (P) San Diego CA (1999-2000)	# had 3 contacts on 3/2/00 with Yemeni phone of Mihdhar's father-in-law.
(P)	(P) (P-1) (P-1) (P)	(F)	(P) (P) San Diego CA (2001-2006)	In Mohdar's wallet @ arrest
(P)	(P) (P-1) (Kurd)	(F)	Used by (P) (P) s parents.	Spouse: (P)
((P) PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	(F)	PIN Calls: None found	10/19/01-10/19/01
(P) PIN (P)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen	(F)	PIN Calls:	10/17/01-10/17/01

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

	(P-1)			
(P-1) (Business)	(P) (P-1) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P-1) Catherines, ON	2006-Present
(P-1) (Cell)	(P) (P-1) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P-1) Catherines, ON	2006-Present
(P-1) (Fax)	(P) (P-1) (P-1) (P-1)	(F)	(P-1) Catherines, ON	2006-Present
(A), (G), (J-1)			(A), (G), (J-1)	
(P-1) (Inmate Phone Tracking ID)	Mohdar Abdullah (P-1) Yemen (P-1)	INMATE REGISTRY # (P-1) San Diego MCC.	Calls from Bureau of Prisons	5/01/02-9/23/02

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

Set Lead 1: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] (G) Read and clear.

[redacted]

To: New York From: New York
Re: (F) 07/18/2007

Accomplishment Information:

(G)

Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (S)
Squad: (G)

◆◆

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 09/24/2001

To: All Field Offices **Attn:** Personal Attention SACs
All Legats Personal Attention LEGATs

From: Counterterrorism
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE - 182
OO:NY

Synopsis: [redacted] SUMMARY XIII: This communication provides recipients with the current daily summary of information gleaned from the PENTTBOM investigation.

[redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] **ALL OFFICES SHOULD MAINTAIN EVIDENCE, TO INCLUDE ORIGINAL NOTES, AT THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELD OFFICES/LEGATS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED OTHERWISE. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE ITEMS WHICH REQUIRE LABORATORY PROCESSING.**

Details: [redacted] The following provides recipients with information obtained, to date, from the PENTTBOM investigation. Recipients are advised that this communication contains information previously

[redacted]

provided, as well as information recently obtained, in the course of this investigation.

Headquarters-related Information

[redacted] Field offices are asked to shift their focus to any leads that are preventative against further terrorist attacks. This should be the field's highest priority.

[redacted] Field offices are asked to inform FBIHQ of the action taken by field offices on incoming threats.

[redacted] FBIHQ would like to note that additional items have been added to the statistics form. This form is needed first thing in the morning.

[redacted] FBIHQ put out an NLETS requesting local law enforcement assistance to look for crop duster aircraft.

Atlanta

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As of 09/23/2001, FBI Atlanta has received 14,299 calls.

Baltimore

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI Baltimore (FBI BA) was scheduled on 09/23/2001 to conduct numerous interviews and to display photo spreads at [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) an apartment complex located at [redacted] (P) in Laurel. This is the address provided by KHALID ALMIHDHAR (American Airlines (AA) Flt. #77) to the First Union Bank as his residence and was also indicated on a Maryland MVA receipt recovered by FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) from the vehicle of NAWAF AL HAZMI (AA Flt. #77).

[redacted] Subpoenaed cellular telephone and bank records have yet to be returned regarding [redacted] (P) He remains under surveillance at his Bladensburg, Maryland, apartment. As previously reported, FBI BA is conducting surveillance of [redacted] (P), who has resided in various Laurel/College Park motels since June 2001 and who was tentatively identified by a motel manager as a possible associate of AA Flt. #77 hijacker HANI HANJOUR. Subpoenaed Cellular telephone and bank records have been subpoenaed but not yet returned. As soon as they are returned, they will be reviewed and provided to SIOC CP and appropriate field offices for further review and analysis. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] [redacted] (D)

[redacted] 09/23/2001, [redacted] (P), tentatively identified as an [redacted] (P), was surveilled to a Middle Eastern restaurant in Northern Virginia where he discarded a plastic bag containing numerous documents. Some of the documents contained Arabic writing and referred to an account at the First Union Bank, the rental of a box at Mailboxes, Etc. and Washington, D.C. area airports. He then traveled to a Kinko's store where he discarded additional documents, some of which referred to a limousine rental business. Surveillance and records checks/analysis continues in an effort to fully identify this individual. INS cannot determine when ALI entered the U.S., [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) (G) reports [redacted] (P) engages in unusual behavior (visits multiple banks, sits in restaurants for 2-3 hours, uses isolated payphones, moves from location to location in parking lots and otherwise appears surveillance conscious).

[redacted] Log-in records and eyewitness employee accounts at the Gold's Gym, College Park, indicate an individual named [redacted] (P) (preliminarily identified as [redacted] (P) DOB [redacted] (P-1) 6'6, 220 lbs, residing in Germantown, MD) signed in and worked out with flight #77 hijackers KHALID AL MIHDHAR, NAWAF ALHAZMI and HANI HANJOUR on 09/05/2001. The Gold's Gym guest register and MD driver's license signatures for [redacted] (P) are unusual and appear identical. Investigation continues to fully identify this individual.

[redacted] Leads to contact all crop dusting companies/local airports were distributed to the Maryland State Police (MSP) on 09/23/2001. These aviation entities had previously been identified and appropriate data/photos assembled for dissemination to MSP. In addition, MSP, MVA and other agencies have been working with Baltimore regarding hazmat/commercial trucking-related issues.

Boston

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] [redacted] (C-2) ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) has two brothers who reside in Springfield MA. [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) reside at [redacted] (P),

[redacted]

Springfield, MA, telephone numbers (P) and (P)

[redacted] As previously reported, FBI BS obtained the passenger manifest for Northwest Airlines Flight #345, which was deplaned on 09/22/2001 because of a missing strike plate on the cockpit door. A review of the manifest determined that there were no matches to the Security Directives Watch List.

[redacted] On 09/23/2001, a draft affidavit for the arrest of MUSTAFA AL HAWSAWI (aka MUSTAFA AHMAD ADIN AL-HUSAWI; aka MUSTAFA AHMAD; aka MUSTAFA AHMED; DOB (P-1)) was prepared in concert with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston, FBIHQ Office of General Counsel, Department of Justice Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section, and the Southern District of New York. HAWSAWI will be charged with Providing Material Support to Terrorists, Conspiracy, and Aiding and Abetting. Investigation determined that he was the recipient of four Western Union money orders sent by MOHAMAD ATTA (AA Flt. #11), WALEED ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11), or MARWAN ALSHEHI (UA Flt. #175) between 09/8/2001 and 09/10/2001, totaling $18,260. HAWSAWI was also the recipient of a wire transfer from a Sun Trust account held by ATTA (approximately $8,055 on 09/06/2001). All of these transactions were sent to locations in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). HAWSAWI, a native of Saudi Arabia, flew from the U.A.E. to Karachi, Pakistan, on 09/11/2001.

[redacted] FBI BS (G) executed a Search Warrant at the apartment of (P) ((P)), who is under INS detainment in Washington, D.C., for (J-3). (P) gave written consent to search his apartment. Although there is little furniture in the apartment, at least 29 latent fingerprints have been obtained, as has a receipt for a Western Union wire transfer and a handwritten note in Arabic. Translation of the wire transfer and the handwritten note are underway and will be provided upon completion. FBI (G) will polygraph (P) on 09/24/2001. Investigation being coordinated between FBI (G) and FBI (G)

Chicago

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] Nabil Al-Marabh (G) is in the process of being transported to New York City by INS Agents. (D) (D) is forthcoming.

[redacted] A review of approximately 300,000 United Airline (UA) passengers scheduled for 09/11/2001 flights is ongoing.

Analysis is being conducted to determine if there are patterns of possible suspects who were traveling together in an attempt to conduct another hijacking.

[redacted] FBI Chicago (FBI CG)is looking at illegal drivers licenses, for records of those carrying HAZMAT certifications.

[redacted] FBI CG was notified by Delta Airlines that, during a security sweep of a Delta aircraft in Frankfurt, Germany, a blade was discovered sewn into the headrest of a seat. Additionally, FBI CG was advised that a knife was located hidden under a seat in a Delta aircraft in Bombay, India. FBI CG is continuing liaison with Delta Airlines regarding these incidents, and to determine any similar incidents. Investigation continuing.

Dallas

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] [redacted] (G) identified ZIAH JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) taking one flight from Munich to Istanbul (Lufthansa) on 12/22/2000. FBI Dallas (FBI DL) is trying to identify as many flights as possible.

[redacted] Ten hard drives have been received by FBI DL. Four from Las Vegas have been reviewed, and the only information associated to terrorists was Travelocity information.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) has received all flight manifests from December 1999 through September 11, 2001. Information is being reformatted by [redacted] (G) in order to properly forward information to SIOC CP. Further, the team is acquiring Passenger Name Record (PNR) for future travel (60 days in advance) to be forwarded to SIOC CP.

[redacted] The Kinkos hard drive project continues with eight hard drives fully examined. All eight were received from Las Vegas and none contained relevant information other than the Travelocity query. The value of this project cannot be determined until hard drives from Kinkos in other cities begin to be examined.

Houston

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] Investigation in Houston indicates AHMAD ABDUL AL-TURAYIF [redacted] (G)) and AMMAR FARRAJ ALJUHANI [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) may have returned to Saudi Arabia. The E-mail account assigned to AL-TURAYIF began being accessed from Saudi Arabia on 09/22/2001.

The wife of ADEL ALJUHANI, a cousin of AMMAR ALJUHANI, stated she spoke with ADEL last night, who stated AMMAR was in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Investigation in Houston has determined FAROUQ AQRAWI is the Saudi Medical Health Officer at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. AQRAWI stated TAREQ ALJEHINI has worked directly for PRINCE KHALID BIN FAISAL ASSAD of the Saudi Royal Family for the past nine years. ALJEHINI arrived in Houston, Texas, on 08/27/2001 and departed 09/20/2001 in route to Jeddah with PRINCE ASSAD.

[redacted] As previously reported, MUHAMMED ASRAR was detained by INS for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm. ASRAR also had photographs of several high-rise buildings in Texas and Georgia. ASRAR remains in custody and has been appointed counsel. Through his attorney, ASRAR has not agreed to be re-interviewed. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] The last remaining subject of investigations regarding UBL extremists has been located and will be interviewed. The subject is the mother of one of the subjects of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Her son is currently in prison. Houston is waiting for an Arabic translator and expects to interview her on Tuesday, 09/25/2001.

Jacksonville

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI JK was advised by FBI MM that 17 crop duster aircrafts are registered within the Jacksonville territory. FBI MM was advised by the Florida State Department of Agriculture and the Florida State Department of Law Enforcement that approximately 140 crop duster aircrafts are registered in the State of Florida. Investigation determined that several of the registered owners do not reside in the State of Florida.

Los Angeles

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As previously reported, FBI Los Angeles (FBI LA) identified RAMEZ NOAMAN, who is currently (D) (D), as an associate of NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77). Further investigation by FBI LA identified (P) of NOAMAN. (P) were polygraphed on 09/21/2001. One cousin (P) (P) failed the polygraph on the question of knowledge of the events and subjects from the attacks on 09/11/2001. (P) later explained he suspected NOAMAN was somehow involved in the attacks because of his secretiveness and because he admonished his relatives after they revealed he had moved to Pomona, CA. (P) will be interviewed and polygraphed again. FBI LA determined that NOAMAN has another (P) (P) who resides in San Mateo, CA. FBI SF has been advised.

Louisville

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] Office Depot gave FBI Louisville (FBI LS) the wrong card receipt. Office Depot employees are doing more research today to obtain credit card numbers and customer names. There is no surveillance video in that store.

Miami

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] Miami has interviewed and polygraphed person who reported on meeting MOHAMMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) in 04/2000. She passed the polygraph. There is uncertainty on the date of the meeting, as ATTA reportedly entered the country in June. There is no paperwork regarding ATTA’s inquiry regarding loan to buy crop duster, because he did not fill out a loan application. There was also no surveillance camera. Individual who purchased crop duster had some associates present with him. Identified one (P) (ph), who has (P) commercial license and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) card. Miami has identified the Cessna bought by (P) (ph). Aircraft has been located. Miami is working with FBI Jacksonville (FBI JK) on a list of crop dusters in Florida.

[redacted] FBI Miami (FBI MM) received an anonymous call report regarding an individual who works at the Miami Airport. On 12/13/2000, this individual was dressed as a pilot, although he is a maintenance worker. FBI MM has learned this individual is possibly, (P)...(ph). (P) possesses a certificate and has an airport pass. Investigation has determined that he was missing from work during 09/10-14/2001, and was at work 09/17-19/2001. FBI MM attempted to interview him, but could not locate him. According to FBI MM, (P) comes up as a reference in a case regarding a Manila airline.

Newark

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI Newark (FBI NK) has identified HANI HANJOUR and NAWAF ALHAZMI (both AA Flt. #77) as the UNSUBS on the Dime savings Bank video in Totowa, NJ. The two were attempting to open an account and obtain a debit card.

[redacted] FBI NK has identified KHALID ALMIDHAR (AA Flt. #77) and SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93) as staying at the Holiday Inn in Totowa, NJ during 09/01/2001 to 09/02/2001. FBI NK continues to analyze the significance of this lead.

[redacted] FBI NK has witnesses who placed ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) and MARWAN ALSHEEHI (UA Flt. #175) at MAS JID AL-SALAAM mosque in Jersey City. Similarly others such as (P) and (P) (P) were also seen at the mosque. A recent development identified that (P) also attended the mosque and had trained at the Teterboro Airport where HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77) and SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93) were seen. NASR will be served an arrest warrant for theft by the New Jersey State Police and interviewed.

[redacted] FBI NK continues to track known financial records from Dime Savings Bank, First Union, Hudson United Bank and Bank of New York for activities which may identify others yet not known to this investigation.

[redacted] Newark continues its PEN on the home telephone and cell phone of (P) and is going to make a decision in 24 hours whether they will go further on the pen register. Subpoenas are outstanding for subscriber information. (P)'s E-mail records have not produced any substantive material at this time.

[redacted] FBI NK identified all airport facilities associated with agricultural and pesticide applications and pilots licensed to operate these aircrafts. FBI NK obtained cooperation from aircraft operators to disable their crafts so that they can not be used. The Security Directives Watch List was disseminated to these facilities. Liaison continuing.

New York

Recovery and Evidence Collection:

[redacted] As of 09/23/2001, FBI NY has received 6,966 missing persons reports, (P-1) bodies have been recovered (P-1) of which have been identified), and a total of (P-1) body parts have been recovered, of which (P-1) have been identified.

Investigative Efforts:

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F) 09/24/2001

[redacted] (P) (ph) arrived today from Chicago to JFK, and FBI New York (FBI NY) is scheduled to interview him.

[redacted] (P) (ph), (G), was scheduled to depart JFK on 09/23/2001.

[redacted] FBI NY determined that KHALED MOHAMED HAMDAM is currently under INS detention in Buffalo, NY. HAMDAM was originally detained on 09/11/2001 in Toronto after his flight to Detroit, MI, was diverted in the wake of the attacks. HAMDAM was determined to share a number of characteristics of the hijackers: young male (24 years old); employed as an aircraft maintenance engineer; possessed documents from US flight schools; and numerous documents pertaining to avionics. At the time of his detention, HAMDAM possessed a "flight uniform," which consisted of a navy blazer with epaulettes, and photographs of himself in front of the World Trade Center. HAMDAM allegedly commented to another INS detainee that he had "failed in his mission." Lead set to FBI Buffalo (FBI BF) to interview HAMDAM. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI NY received information from an anonymous female that terrorists have a car in a parking garage at 432 W. 42nd Street, New York, NY and are planning to bomb the Lincoln Tunnel on 09/24/2001. FBI NY will review videotapes from the parking garage. Surveillance of parking garage is also underway. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] FBI NY has identified ABDULAZIZ AL-ANGARI (DOB (P-1) as an individual of investigative interest. AL-ANGARI was detained by INS on 09/13/2001 after he was stopped while traveling to San Jose, CA. A search of his carry-on bag revealed four identifications identifying AL-ANGARI as a pilot. AL-ANGARI was proferred on 9/23/2001 by the SDNY (D) (D) (D). (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] FBI NY has (P) (DOB (P-1) and (P) (P) (DOB (P-1) (D) (P) and (P) arrived in New York on 09/09/2001 from Saudi Arabia. They were scheduled to fly on 09/11/2001 from JFK to Los Angeles aboard a TWA flight, but this flight did not take off after all domestic flights were grounded on 09/11/2001. On 09/15/2001, they boarded a flight from JFK to Las Vegas (via St. Louis) but were removed from the plane before take-off because of suspicious and surveillance-conscious behavior before and after they boarded the plane. A search of their luggage yielded numerous photographs, taken on 09/10/2001, of the World Trade Center, downtown Manhattan, the United Nations, and the Verrazano Narrows Bridge. A search of (P)'s personal property identified a Missouri DMV identification card for (P) An individual known as (P) (aka (P)) who utilized the same Missouri address on the (P) identification card that was found in (P)s personal property, is a suspected UBL associate. (D) (D)

Pittsburgh

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] On 09/23/2001, FBI PG identified 20 Iraqi nationals who apparently received Pennsylvania commercial driver's licenses under fraudulent circumstances. Nineteen (19) of these licenses carry a HAZMAT rating. These individuals turned in licenses from Virginia, Michigan, Washington, Tennessee, Kentucky, Kansas and Texas when receiving the Pennsylvania licenses. Investigation by FBI PG determined that a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PA DOT) employee was accepting $30 - $50 to issue fraudulent identifications. This individual has been detained and is cooperating with investigators. The employee indicated that he may have issued as many as 30 identification cards with HAZMAT ratings. The employee indicated that he dealt with a "middle man" known only to him as BEN LNU, to arrange for these licenses. FBI PG is attempting to further identify and locate BEN LNU. FBI PG has prepared an affidavit for federal arrest warrants for the 20 known Iraqi nationals who obtained the fraudulent identification cards. The affidavit has been presented to the U.S. Magistrate for the Western District of Pennsylvania, who is expected to sign it on 09/24/2001. As soon as the warrants are signed, they will be entered into NCIC. Investigation continuing.

Springfield

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI SI advised that, on 09/23/2001, a vehicle that was stopped for speeding. This vehicle was occupied by three males claiming Israeli citizenship. Observed in the vehicle were three box cutters, ski masks, flex cuffs and rope. FBI SI conducted initial interviews of the males and determined that the box cutters were being carrying for "protection." (NFI) FBI SI indicated that they appeared to be Israeli, spoke Hebrew, and were vocal in their condemnation of recent terror attacks in the U.S. Investigation continuing pending INS checks.

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 09/24/2001

San Diego

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As previously reported, OMAR AL-BAYOUMI is currently in custody in England. One of the telephone numbers found in AL-BAYOUMI's possessions, following his apprehension, was a telephone number which comes back to MODHAR ABDULLAH. On 09/21/2001, ABDULLAH was arrested on a Material Witness Warrant. On 09/22/2001, searches were conducted of his residence and vehicle. A notebook, found in his vehicle, contained personal writings concerning terrorist attacks similar to those which took place on 09/11/2001. Investigation continuing.

[redacted] MODHAR ABDULLAH was arrested on 09/21/2001 on a Material Witness Warrant. On 09/22/2001 searches were conducted of his residence and vehicle. A notebook, found in his vehicle, contained personal writings concerning terrorist attacks similar to those which took place on 09/11/2001. The notebook is being sent back to the Lab at FBIHQ for analysis. San Diego has also requested the [redacted] (G) to review the notebook.

[redacted] A box-cutter was found under seat [redacted] (G) of an AA Flight #160 which flew from San Diego to JFK on 09/10/2001. The same plane flew back from JFK to San Diego on 09/10/2001 carrying Flight #127. On 09/11/2001 the same plane was scheduled to fly from San Diego to JFK carrying Flight #160, but it never left San Diego due to the airport closings. The plane was grounded in San Diego until 09/13/2001 when it flew to LAX without passengers. On 09/14/2001 it flew, without passengers, from LAX to AA's maintenance facility in Ft. Worth where it remains. On 09/17/2001 maintenance found the box-cutter under seat [redacted] (G) On 09/10/2001, seat [redacted] (G) Flight #160 (SD to JFK), was occupied by [redacted] (P), one of the 13 Saudi Arabian pilots previously reported on by San Diego. Investigation is continuing in an effort to ascertain the occupant of seat [redacted] (G) Flight #127, on 09/10/2001 (flight from JFK back to San Diego) and to verify that no passengers boarded the plane on 09/11/2001 prior to the airport closing.

Tampa

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] FBI TP will interview [redacted] (P) ([redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) Palm Harbor, FL [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) provided information that [redacted] (P), an emergency room [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) had been accessing Arabic computer sites. A review of the sites found some apparent disturbing information that (P) believes would be of interest to the FBI. FBI TP will interview (P) and obtain the information. Appropriate leads will be set if needed. Investigation continuing.

Washington Field

Recovery and Evidence Collection:

[redacted] (P-1) body portions and (P-1) remains have been recovered at the Pentagon. Of those recovered, (P-1) have been identified: (P-1) who were in the Pentagon (P-1) who were in the aircraft.

Investigative Efforts:

[redacted] As previously reported, FBI WFO was seeking an arrest warrant for (P) a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from (P) who was previously interviewed and polygraphed in relation to his name and phone number being found in NAWAF ALHAZMI's (AA Flt. #77) vehicle. On 09/23/2001 (P) was arrested by the FBI for violating Title 18, USC 513 (Passing Forged Securities). (P) could not provide an explanation as to why his phone number and name (P) (P) were written on a road map of Washington, DC, found during a search of NAWAF AL HAMZI's 1988 Toyota on 09/12/2001. (P) said he had no Middle Eastern friends and speculated that the map and other personal papers may have been left in a vehicle that he donated to the Salvation Army in approximately 12/1999. His initial appearance is this afternoon. WFO conducted a consensual search of (P) vehicle and attempted to interview (P) wife, though a considerable language barrier existed. Nothing of significance was generated from either the search or interview.

[redacted] Pen registers are being established on (P)'s cell phone and home phone. As of noon on 9/24 they were not up. WFO telephone toll analysis has established a link through a common called number between AULAQI and OMAR AHED AL'BAYOUMI, the Saudi citizen arrested by the British in connection to the events on 09/11/2001. AL'BAYOUMI was associated with NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR (AA Flt. #77) through an apartment in San Diego for which he co-signed the lease.

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/24/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Receiving offices are requested to continue to conduct all logical investigations. Relay any pertinent information back to FBIHQ, SIOC, FBI NY CP, FBI WFO, and other relevant field offices. LEGATs are requested to share new information with Station.

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 11/13/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
New York
Oklahoma City
Baltimore
Boston
San Juan
Newark

From: Newark
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: Investigation and telephone toll analysis conducted regarding MOHAMED SALAH SOLIMAN. Leads set for receiving offices.

Details:

HISTORICAL:

MOHAMED SALAH SOLIMAN, Date of Birth (P-1) Social Security Number (P-1) was identified as a individual from Egypt, who came to the FBI's attention through his former employer, (P). SOLIMAN previously did contract work with (P) (P), Newark, NJ, specifically driving a bus from the terminal to the aircraft. His employers thought it was strange when he quit in 07/2001, to attend flight training.

Investigation at (P) ated and identified SOLIMAN. He is currently living at (P), Lodi, NJ, and is employed as a flight instructor at (P) Lincoln Park, NJ. SOLIMAN is a graduate of AIRMAN FLIGHT SCHOOL, INC., 1950 Goddard Ave, Norman, Oklahoma, which he attended in 1998.(it should be noted that the AIRMAN FLIGHT SCHOOL is the same flight school attended by Mohammed Atta, Ihab Mohammed Ali, and Zacarias Moussaoui). SOLIMAN obtained his Commercial Pilot's License, Multi-engine, and Instrument rating at the school.

During an interview of SOLIMAN in 10/2001, he advised that he obtained his private pilot's license at Caldwell Flight Academy, located at the Essex County Airport, NJ in 1997. His instructor was AHMED ELASHMOUNY. ELASHMOUNY has several references in indices regarding a (F) case out of New York. This case involved the first WTC attack. Specific information regarding the reference is kept in New York. There were also references to the current PENTTBOMB investigation.

SOLIMAN has not had contact with ELASHMOUNY since he finished his private pilot's license in 1997. SOLIMAN believed that ELASHMOUNY spent some time in jail for credit card fraud and believes he is living in New York. SOLIMAN advised that ELASHMOUNY had been a flight attendant instructor for Egypt Air prior to being a flight instructor.

After he obtained his private pilot's license, SOLIMAN traveled to Airman Flight School, Norman, Oklahoma, for his other ratings, specifically his Instrument, Commercial, and Multi-Engine. SOLIMAN recently finished his Certified Flight Instructor certification (CFI) in the spring/summer of 2001 at Teterboro Airport, NJ.

(P) rrived in the United States (U.S.), he first lived at Paterson, NJ, with (P) SOLIMAN advised that the house was owned by the (P) family. Which consists of a group of brothers, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) by Newark. This family has potential ties to the hijackers and may be involved in document and credit card fraud. While residing in Paterson, SOLIMAN opened P.O. Box # (P) Paterson, NJ, and still utilizes the PO Box.

SOLIMAN advised that he obtained his undergraduate degree in Egypt in photography and had worked for Egyptian TV prior to coming to the U.S. He still does some freelance work for them. SOLIMAN served in the Egyptian Military in 1995, and was assigned as a Peacekeeper in Bosnia. He denies any foreign travel to or having contacts in Europe, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates or Pakistan. SOLIMAN stated that his only foreign travel was when he came to U.S. in 1997, with approximately $14,000 for flight training. Upon completion of his training, SOLIMAN went back to Egypt to obtain his Egyptian pilot's license and returned to the U.S. in 12/1999.

SOLIMAN's parents and two brothers still reside in Egypt. One brother drives tanks for the Egyptian Army, the other is an Agricultural Engineer. SOLIMAN is (P) whom he met in New York, she is currently in (P)

Throughout the interview, SOLIMAN did not appear to hide any information and voluntarily provided information already known to the FBI. He did not identify any of the photographs of the terrorists, nor did he know of any planned attacks.

Newark closed the investigation/lead into SOLIMAN since no ties to terrorism were identified, however toll records were requested, and were still pending.

Although SOLIMAN denied foreign contacts and travel, and denied prior knowledge of terrorists or their activities, a review of toll records from his residence possibly shows a connection between SOLIMAN and past/present International Terrorism Investigations. It should be noted that SOLIMAN's roomate, yet to be identified, also has access to the telephone in the residence.

TELEPHONE ANALYSIS:

Telephone analysis of (P), subscribed to MOHAMED S. SOLIMAN, of (P), Lodi, NJ., revealed numerous calls to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. Furthermore, a large number of calls have been placed to numerous locations throughout the U.S., to include Oklahoma, California, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Washington D.C., Virginia, and Niagra Falls, New York. In addition, telephone analysis revealed calls to the United Arab Emirates Mission in New York. Many of the phone numbers called have links to (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

The following telephone calls are of interest and possibly link SOLIMAN to ongoing terrorist activities:

On 8/6/2001, at 3:46 P.M., SOLIMAN placed a ten minute call to number 703-671-4290. Subscribed to YOUNG CHOI, 6095 Belleview Dr, Falls Church, VA. Telephone analysis of this number shows calls to Rakka and Damascus, Syria; Afif, Saudi Arabia; All Points, Great Britain; and multiple calls to Islamic education centers located throughout the U.S.

Through appropriate FBI database searches, it was revealed that this number is associated with EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED ALRABABAH, DOB (P-1) and (P) These individuals, located in New Jersey, are being investigated by the Newark office under the PENTTBOMB investigation. It appears that several of the hijackers, specifically HANI HANJOUR and NAWAF ALHAZMI may have stayed at the Virginia address with ALRABABAH. ALRABABAH also provided the hijackers transportation to Connecticut, and Patterson, New Jersey, and assisted them in obtaining identification. ALRABABAH and (P) have (D) pending.

Telephone numbers obtained during a consent search of ALRABABAH's address book were reviewed. The numbers, (P) (P), and (P), which were located within ALRABABAH's address book, are all linked to Newark's investigation of (A), (G), (J-1), (P) (A), (G), (J-1), (P).

Eleven calls were placed to telephone number (P). from 8/11/2001, through 9/23/2001. The subscriber to this number is (P) (P) Social Security Number (P-1), born (P-1) and residing at (P) Spotswood, NJ. (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

On 9/23/2001, SOLIMAN contacted (P), AKA (P) at telephone number (P) The call lasted 34 minutes. (P) may have a SSN of (P-1). And may also posses an Airframe and Powerplant Mechanics license (Airplane mechanic) from the Federal Aviation Administration, in the name of (P), PO BOX (P) RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA, 11565.

A choice point check indicated that ABDULLAH's most recent address is (P), JAMAICA, NY. (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

SOLIMAN contacted VIDEO NABLUS INC., located at 1029 Main Street Patterson, on 8/26/2001, telephone (P). (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

Analysis indicated that SOLIMAN made several calls in 6/2001 to telephone number (P). The subscriber to this number is unknown at this time. (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

(A), (D), (G), (J-1)

SOLIMAN made over twenty-five calls to SCHMIDT RECOVERY and LEGAL DOCUMENTS, located in LAWTON, Oklahoma, telephone (P), in 6/2001, and three calls in 7/2001. Many of these calls were for a significant lengths of time, up to 117 minutes, and were placed between 11P.M. and 2:00A.M.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (D), (G), (J-1)

Toll records indicated that SOLIMAN has contacted (P) (P), Wayne, NJ at telephone number (P) ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)). (A), (D), (G), (J-1) (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

(P) has several sons, approximately the same age as the hijackers, (P), DOB (P-1) and (P) DOB (P-1).

Telephone analysis and toll record review of (P) telephone number (identified below) revealed that (P) contacted the Doctor's office, from telephone number (P) and had been contacted by SOLIMAN directly. (P) came to FBI Newark's attention when a local airport identified him as a individual with a pilot's license obtained in California, a Laurel, Maryland residence, who attempted to rent an aircraft in New Jersey. Review of his logbook by the airport prior to aircraft rental indicated he flew a Cessna 172 on 09/10, from SUBURBAN AIRPORT to BAYBRIDGE AIRPORT several times. His flight would have taken him past all the major landmarks in the Washington D.C. area.

(P) is a Naturalized United States Citizen, SSN (P-1), DOB (P-1) home phone (P) work (P), he resides at (P), Laurel Maryland, and is an (P) in the (P), and is (P). Leads have been sent to Baltimore, to have (P) interviewed, the status of the leads in unknown.

Toll records indicated that SOLIMAN contacted OK SATELLITE, STATEN ISLAND, NY, telephone (P) on 6/4/2001, the call lasted fifteen minutes. Telephone applications shows that OK SATELLITE has ties to (P) who is an associate of SHEIKH OMAR RAHMAN and AL-GAMA AL ISLAMIYYA.

SOLIMAN placed seven calls to telephone number (P). This number is subscribed to (P), of (P) BLOOMFIELD, NJ. The dates of these calls were 9/6/2001 for 35 minutes;

9/8/2001; 9/15/2001; 9/17/2001; 9/18/2001; 9/20/2001 for 26 minutes and 9/22/2001. Analysis showed that this telephone number is linked to [redacted] (F), a case which involved RESSAM, a member of a USAMA BIN LADEN cell located in Montreal, Canada. RESSAM attempted to enter into the United States from Canada with large amounts of explosives, and was arrested by US Customs.

SOLIMAN made eleven calls to telephone number [redacted] (P), located in Morgantown, WV. These calls occurred from 07/29/2001 through 09/23/2001. Most of the calls occurred in September on 09/06/2001; 09/07/2001; 09/08/2001; 09/10/2001, and 09/23/2001.

SOLIMAN made three calls to number [redacted] (P). This number is subscribed to GENZYME INCORPORATED, CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts. GENZYME is a biotechnical company which studies rare diseases and genetic disorders. The company does research with many organisms that are on the National Watch List. Cambridge, MA is the location of the companies import/export division. The company is owned by MEDIX BIOTECH INC.

Logical checks conducted at Newark for the various overseas calls made by SOLIMAN listed below were negative:

Egypt:

[redacted] (P-1)

SAUDI:

[redacted] (P-1)

UN KNGDM:

[redacted] (P-1)

ITALY: [redacted] (P-1)

FRANCE: (P-1)

GERMANY: (P-1)

No subscriber information is known.

Based on the above information, further investigation into SOLIMAN, his activities, and associates is warranted. Newark plans to interview SOLIMAN again, and possibly conduct a polygraph examination into his possible criminal/terrorist connections.

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

FBIHQ is requested to conduct logical telephone analysis for the overseas calls listed below. Advise Newark if additional information is required.

Egypt:

(P-1) [redacted]

SAUDI:

(P-1) [redacted]

UN KNGDM:

(P-1) [redacted]

ITALY: (P-1) [redacted]

FRANCE: (P-1) [redacted]

GERMANY: (P-1) [redacted]

Set Lead 2:

BALTIMORE

AT LAUREL,MD

Conduct logical investigation into (P) in attempt to fully identify him, and determine possible ties to terrorist activities. Contact (P), to determine what security clearance, and access (P) possesses. (Lead regarding interview of (P), previously set is still pending, EC to Baltimore dated 10/08/2001). Last known address is (P), Laurel, Maryland. SSN (P-1)

Set Lead 3:

BOSTON

AT CAMBRIDGE, MA

Conduct logical investigation at Genzyme Incorporated, located in Cambridge, MA. Determine who was working at the company on the dates and times SOLIMAN called. Determine through the companies telephone records, if any unknown overseas calls were made around the time of SOLIMAN's calls to the company (Newark believes, SOLIMAN may have made overseas calls through the company.) The calls occurred on 08/13/2001 at 11:21 A.M.; 8/13/2001 at 1:09 PM, 8//14/2001 at 9:49 AM

Set Lead 4:

NEWARK

AT JERSEY CITY, NJ

Conduct logical investigation into TACTICAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, located at (P), Jersey City, NJ.

Set Lead 5:

NEWARK

AT NEWARK, NJ

Conduct logical investigation into MOHAMMED SOLIMAN, his associates and activities, and roommate. Review SOLIMAN's financial records to determine sources of income. Verify if he had any prior knowledge of the attacks on 9/11/01. Determine if he any ties to terrorism and or terrorists cells operating in the United States. Consider polygraph examination of SOLIMAN and his roommate.

Set Lead 6:

AT NEWARK, NJ

Conduct logical investigation into DR. [redacted] and her sons, [redacted] DOB [redacted] and [redacted], DOB [redacted]. Determine if any current ties to terrorism or terrorists exists. Identify the nature of the relationship between [redacted] MOHAMED SOLIMAN and [redacted]. [redacted]'s last known address was [redacted], Wayne, NJ.

Set Lead 7:

AT NEWARK

Locate and interview [redacted], subscriber of telephone [redacted], residing at [redacted]. Determine [redacted]'s relationship with SOLIMAN, and if other links to terrorism exists.

Set Lead 8:

AT NEW YORK

Conduct logical investigation to identify and interview [redacted], SSN: [redacted], DOB [redacted] and determine if any links exist to the hijackers, SOLIMAN, or other terrorist groups or activity. Last known address is [redacted], Jamaica, NY 11432.

Set Lead 9:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

Conduct logical investigation to identify [redacted] [redacted], SSN: [redacted] last known residence [redacted] [redacted] LINDENHURST, NY 11757. Determine any association with MOHAMED SOLIMAN, and/or links to the hijackers, terrorist groups or activities.

Set Lead 10:

OKLAHOMA CITY

AT LAWTON, OK

Conduct logical investigation regarding SCHMIDT RECOVERY and LEGAL DOCUMENTS, located at [redacted], Lawton, OK. Telephone [redacted]. Determine who was working during the times SOLIMAN contacted the company. [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Set Lead 11:

SAN JUAN

AT SAN JUAN

Attempt to locate and interview (P) [redacted], (P) [redacted] MOHAMED SOLIMAN. Determine the extent and nature of their relationship. (Newark will forward additional identifying information when obtained).

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/15/2006

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S), (G) [redacted]

Albuquerque
Atlanta
Denver
Detroit
Houston

New York JTTF
PENTTBOMB
(S) [redacted]

San Diego JTTF
(S) [redacted]

From: (G) [redacted]
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: (G) [redacted]
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
PENTTBOMB
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

Synopsis: [redacted] To report on (G) association to four significant terrorist attacks.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(F)

Details: [redacted] (G) continues to raise concerns in the (G) due to his connections to several major terrorist attacks in the U.S. and overseas. It has recently been determined (A), (G), (J-1) is either directly connected or only one person removed from numerous individuals involved in the following four attacks: 1) 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 2) 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Dar Us Salam and Tanzania, 3) 9/11 attacks, and 4) 2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] The fact that (A), (G), (J-1) is so closely connected to these terrorist attacks is concerning given his (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) It can be speculated that (A), (G), (J-1) achieved (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Nevertheless, based on the almost (A), (G), (J-1) and his (A), (G), (J-1) (G) speculates he may have achieved this status thru relationships he has with unidentified individuals in Saudi Arabia. Although (A), (G), (J-1), (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The belief that (A), (G), (J-1) has (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) has been supported by multiple reports. According to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Further, (A), (G), (J-1) has also reported on a possible Saudi Arabia link. (A), (G), (J-1) indicated he/she was 70% sure that (A), (G), (J-1) was one of Usama Bin Laden's "people" in the U.S. This might make sense as to why (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Given the above description of (A), (G), (J-1) and his connections to four terrorist attacks, (G) is increasingly concerned with what relationship (A), (G), (J-1) may have with international terrorism and the intelligence gaps that exist with relation to his activities. Even though source reporting continues to indicate (A), (G), (J-1) espouses mostly conservative rhetoric, (G) believes his behavior could be indicative of the infamous Ramzi Yousef (mastermind of the 1993 WTC bombing), who himself kept a very low profile prior to the attack. Unlike Yousef, (G) isn't speculating (A), (G), (J-1) may be planning an attack himself. It is simply becoming more plausible that (A), (G), (J-1) may have had prior knowledge of past attacks and could have current knowledge of pending ones.

[redacted] Nevertheless, it could be justified that just because you associate with individuals who have been involved with terrorist attacks doesn't mean you yourself had knowledge of those attacks. In fact, shortly after the 9/11 attacks it was reported that likely nobody in the U.S. but the hijackers themselves were aware of the 9/11 plot. However, the Los Angeles recently came across information leading them to believe the hijackers had assistance inside the U.S.; thus, leading them to reopen their PENTBOM-related investigations. Thus, as will likely be revealed in the Los Angeles reinvestigation, many more people may have known about these other attacks than what was once believed.

[redacted] Below are detailed descriptions of the connections (A), (G), (J-1) has to the four referenced terrorist attacks:

1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING and 2003 BOMBING IN RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA (subjects of both are interconnected)

(S) On February 26, 1993, a massive explosion occurred in the parking garage at the World Trade Center in New York City. During the initial weeks of the investigation, a number of subjects were identified and arrested as being responsible for the bombing. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind this attack, was eventually arrested in 1995, after he had fled the U.S. Yousef is the nephew of 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

[redacted] Another individual convicted for his role in the 1993 WTC attack and who is the common link between (A), (G), (J-1) and several of his associates, is Ahmad AJAJ. Even though AJAJ was incarcerated at the time of the attack, he was nevertheless convicted for his role based on his association with Ramzi Yousef. According to (F), in September 2002, Ajaj and Ramzi Yousef arrived together at JFK airport in New York. Since Ajaj was holding an illegal passport, he was detained and not allowed to enter the country. In his possession were several bomb making manuals. Based on this association and others later identified during the course of the (A), (G), (J-1) investigation, AJAJ was convicted for his role in the attack.

[redacted] AJAJ reportedly met Ramzi Yousef in Pakistan in April 1992, just after AJAJ hurriedly fled from Houston, where he was living. According to (F), AJAJ and his friend, (P) were hastily driven to the airport by (P) where they boarded a plane destined for Peshawar, Pakistan. AJAJ had used the name of his (G) friend, (P) (P) to purchase the tickets. Once in Peshawar, AJAJ, (P) and Ramzi Yousef all stayed in a safe house for mujahideen fighting jihad in Afghanistan. AJAJ was in constant contact with Yousef after this meeting in Pakistan and as referenced above, attempted to enter the U.S. with him several months later.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P)

[redacted] During the latter part of the 1990's, after being incarcerated for his role in the 1993 WTC bombing, AJAJ was transferred from his prison in Colorado to the federal prison in Beaumont, Texas. According to (F) shortly after his move to Beaumont, AJAJ requested the following telephone numbers be added to his list of numbers he was permitted to call: (P) The first number was the main line to the Holy Land Foundation (of which (P) was the leader), and the second number was the main line to (P) barber shop. Both numbers rang at the physical location of the barber shop (the HLF office was located inside the shop). AJAJ later made several calls to these two numbers.

[redacted] AJAJ is also associated with (P) through AJAJ's relationship with (P) Recall information provided above which indicates AJAJ used (P) name to purchase his airline tickets for the trip to Pakistan. While AJAJ was living in Houston, (P) was renting one of (P) houses.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) was the chief fundraiser for the Holy Land Foundation office in Houston. (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1).

(P)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). To this date, (G) has been unable to identify a positive link between (A), (G), (J-1) and (P) however, based on the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (P) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1993, after it was learned that (P) and his associates were followers of Sheikh Abdul Rahman (aka "the Blind Sheikh"). Further, (P) was living in Kingsville, TX at the time, where the FBI learned he and his associates were reportedly all members of a secret HAMAS cell. Thus, (A), (G), (J-1) (F).

[redacted] One of the most significant details discovered regarding the (A), (G), (J-1) surrounds a small gathering that took place at a park near Kingsville, TX, just weeks before the 1993 WTC bombing (F). At this gathering, (P) and his two co-leaders explained that the "group in Kingsville" needed to learn how to "kill and destroy" and that the others didn't have the same devotion to jihad as did the group leaders. Then one of the leaders addressed the group alone and told them it was time to quit talking and begin to "truly organize". After this, (P) and the other leaders proceeded to detonate a small bomb made out of putty. (G) the purpose of this demonstration appeared to be for the purpose of showing the group that the three leaders had the capability of detonating an explosive device.

(P) ASSOCIATION WITH (P) AND AHMAD AJAJ

[redacted] The fact that (P) took part in detonating an explosive device just weeks before the 1993 WTC bombing is of concern given (P) association with both (P) and Ahmad Ajaj. Recall Ajaj is one of the individuals identified above and convicted for his role in the 1993 WTC bombing. Ajaj had lived in Houston less than a year before the WTC bombing and was associated with some of the same individuals (P) associated with.

[redacted] A review of documents found in Ajaj's possession after his arrest revealed a letter from an Ibrahim Ahmad to "Sheikh Hasan" with the address and listed phone number of a Texaco gas station in Houston. According to (F), this letter was destined for (P) (DOB: (P-1), who was the owner of the gas station referenced in the letter. The basic topic of the letter was that a car owned by Ahmad was left for (P) to sell. In the letter, Ahmad was asking that

(P) turn the proceeds of the sale over to "brother" Ajaj.

[redacted] (P) is believed to be a relative of (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1). According to HDR records, on 3/05/96, both (P) and (P) were listed as the owners of the (P) Houston, TX. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Nevertheless, similar to the letter described above, another letter was found on Ajaj when he was arrested. This one was also written by (G) but this time addressed to "Brother (P) The letter describes the Muslim resistance fighting in Afghanistan and also mentions the goal of spreading the fundamentalist fighting to other countries in the Middle East. The letter directs (P) to give "Ajaj...the sum which remains from the price of the ticket." It was not determined what the ticket was but case files indicate a belief that it was probably a ticket purchased by (P) using (G) money and that Ahmad was asking for the change back. The letter to (P) was to be delivered to (P) service station where (P) could receive it. According to (F), this letter was believed to be destined for (P) Therefore, it appears that Ahmad Ajaj knew both (P) and (P) (P) The fact that (P) and (P) might know each other had already been identified during the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] As referenced above, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) after it was learned he was a HAMAS leader at the Islamic Center of Kingsville (ISOK). According to (F) [redacted] the same (P) identified above who owned the Texaco station would travel to the ISOK to meet with and provide guidance to its members, including (P). Before (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (G) after source information indicated (P) was utilizing the gas station he owned as an informal meeting place for HAMAS members.

[redacted] The fact that (P) might have been using his gas station as a meeting place for HAMAS members (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

[redacted] Another individual who is associated with the 1993 WTC bombing and who is also an associate of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) based on information that he was associated with Sheikh Abdel Rahman Barzanjee (G) (F)). Barzanjee has been identified as the new leader of Ansar Al Islam (AI) in Europe. Barzanjee and AI have received substantial financial support from Al-Qaeda financier Omar Al Bayoumi. Bayoumi secured lodging and provided financial assistance for 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdar. **As will be discussed in detail below,** (A), (G), (J-1) **connection to**

the 9/11 attacks is through his relationship with several San Diego (G) who associated with Omar Al-Bayoumi and these same two hijackers.

[redacted] (F) indicates the NYO has (A), (G), (J-1) Barzanjee's organization by way of a (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) has also indicated (A), (G), (J-1) is an associate of Al Qaeda associate, (P) (G). This is significant because it provides a link between (A), (G), (J-1) and another terrorist attack described below - the 1998 Embassy bombings in Dar us Salam and Tanzania - (D) (D)

[redacted] Nevertheless, the connection between (A), (G), (J-1) and (P) was identified in November 1998 by (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Prior to the his travel, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) several names of individuals which (P) referred to as (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) s name was on the list and (P) described (A), (G), (J-1) Another source has described (P) as an associate of Usama Bin Laden and leader of a Bin Laden assassination cell (F).

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) *CONNECTION TO* (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P)

[redacted] (P) connection to the 1993 WTC bombing is the fact that he was a facilitator for the buying of chemicals utilized in the manufacture of the explosive device used in the 1993 bombing. (P) provided money to Nidal Abderraman Ayyad (a captioned subject from the "Tradebomb" investigation, (F)). Examination of a calendar belonging to Ayyad listed a notation acknowledging receipt of $4,200.00 from (P) (P) Further, (P) is an associate of Abdul Rashid aka Clement Hampton-El, convicted in the 1993 plot to bomb several New York City landmarks (F). Hampton-El is also a close associate of (P) (identified above). (P) has facilitated funding for Hampton-El and associates in the past for establishing a safe house and to conduct firearms and paramilitary training for individuals who were arrested in a Queens, New York safe house mixing explosives.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) is also associated with (P) in that both (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

2003 BOMBING IN RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA

[redacted] Recall information provided above which indicates (A), (G), (J-1), (P), was closely associated with Ahmad Ajaj, one of the individuals convicted in the 1993 WTC bombing investigation. Of concern is the fact that (P) was considered a HAMAS leader in Kingsville, TX in the early 1990's, just around the time of the 1993 WTC bombing.

[redacted] According to case files, an individual now identified as Abu Mu'az was also associating with (P) and his group in Kingsvile in the early 1990's. Abu'Muaz was reportedly in Kingsville to attend Texas A&M University. Nevertheless, Abu Mu'az had rented an apartment just a few doors down from (P) apartment. The apartment manager was later interviewed regarding this connection and reported that Abu Mu'az was an associate of (P) and his co-leaders and that all of them would frequently gather in (P) apartment. ACS indicates Mu'az was present during the meeting where (P) and others detonated the explosive device. Nevertheless, another source later confirmed the relationship between Mu'az and (P)

[redacted] The fact that Mu'az was a friend of (P) in the 1990's is highly significant given the fact that Abu Mu'az is currently detained in Saudi Arabia after Al Qaeda members identified him as having been associated with the May 12, 2003 bombings that took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to (F), (F) on May 12, 2003, members of Al Qaeda carried out coordinated car bombings at three compounds inhabited by Americans and other Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The explosions killed at least 29 people and injured nearly 200 more.

[redacted] Nevertheless, of further concern is the fact that Abu Mu'az was not only friends with (P), but was also an (A), (G), (J-1). In fact, after Abu Mu'az moved from Kingsville, TX to Las Cruces, New Mexico, (A), (G), (J-1)
((S)) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Based on (P) association with both Ahmad Ajaj and Abu Mu'az, two individuals arrested for their roles in terrorist attacks, and his own interest in detonating explosive devices, (G) speculates (P) had some prior knowledge of at least the 1993 WTC attack. Further, based on (P) association with these same two individuals, and his (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P)

CURRENT ACTIVITY

[redacted] One might surmise that (P) may have been involved in HAMAS activities in the 1990's but as time passed and as Islamic extremists received heavy scrutiny after the 9/11 attacks, changed his ways and moved on to a more honest career. Recent analysis may show otherwise.

[redacted] In 1996, (P) moved from Kingsville, TX, to Denver, Colorado, where the (A), (G), (J-1) (F). After multiple source reporting continued to indicate (P) was no longer involved in HAMAS and was more interested in making money through his businesses, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) had opened (P) restaurants when he moved to Denver.

[redacted] Nevertheless, (A), (G), (J-1) (P) was (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) after it was learned that Abu Mu'az had been implicated in the May 2003 bombings which occurred in Riyadh. Denver was quickly made aware of the association between (P) and Abu Mu'az, who was implicated in the May 2003 car bombings which took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Shortly after the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F). The (A), (G), (J-1) after (O-1) detailing some suspicious wire transfers involving both (P) and (P), and another one of their associates, (P).

[redacted] According to (O-1) (P) maintained a bank account in the U.S., from which eight payments, totaling $5,715, were sent to a bank account in Kuwait held by Ahmad Al-Shalabi. Shalabi's phone number in Kuwait was provided as (P-1) (O-1) also indicated (P) employer, (P) (P) had also wired money to Shalabi. Between August 2001 and February 2003, (P) wired three payments totaling $2,100 to the same Shalabi bank account. What is of further interest is the fact that instead of also wiring money to Shalabi, (P) (P) was the receiver of $6,000 from Shalabi. The cable never indicated where this money might have gone or why it was changing hands in the first place. Even though it appears more likely these wire transfers were for a nefarious purpose, it's possible it could have something to do with the (P) these three men are associated with.

[redacted] Both (P) and (P) own several (P) (P) across the country, some of which are owned by both of them. Whereas (P) now lives in Denver. (P) currently lives in Houston, where he owns several (P) (P) currently works at one of (P) Houston locations. When interviewed in February 2006, (P) admitted to having worked for (P) for the last seven years. Prior to living in Houston, (P) lived in Denver, where he also reportedly worked for an (P).
(

[redacted] (P) (P) and (P) are further related to each other in that all three attended Hajj together in 2005. According to an interview of (P) upon his arrival from Hajj, (P) paid for their trips.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The wire transfers to and from Shalabi's Kuwait bank account may not in and of themselves represent a terrorism nexus;

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) *ASSOCIATION WITH* (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P) (A), (G), (J-1), *and LAJNAT AL DAWA AL ISLAMIYA*

[redacted] Nevertheless, whether or not (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) has an indirect association to (P) thru their associations with the terrorist group, Lajnat al Dawa al Islamiya (LDI). (A), (G), (J-1) also has a possible indirect association to both the 1993 WTC bombing and the 9/11 attacks. In (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, a woman named (P) and her female business partner made (A), (G), (J-1) to someone named (A), (G), (J-1) at a Riyadh branch of the Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation. (P) is married to Ammar Al-Baluchi, who is an Al Qaeda operative and was arrested for his role in a plot to blow up U.S. gas stations.

[redacted] Baluchi is the cousin of 1993 WTC bombing mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, and is the nephew of 9/11's mastermind, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Of more significant interest is the fact that Ammar Al-Baluchi is also the nephew of an uncle whose first name is Zahid. This same Uncle Zahid worked for Lajnat al Dawa al Islamiya

(LDI), which is based in Kuwait and was designated a terrorist group by OFAC in January 2003. This intelligence brings the connection to (P) and the 1993 WTC bombing full circle since (P) is currently listed as the Registered Agent for the North American branch of the LDI terrorist group. Recall information provided above which indicates (P) is involved in suspicious wire transfers to/from an entity in Kuwait; thus, these transfers could be associated with LDI.

(A), (G), (J-1) S ASSOCIATION TO BILAL PHILIPS, (P), AND FAYAD ALTHUMAIRY

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) has further associations to terrorism. According to ACS, (A), (G), (J-1)'s Saudi Arabia number was found in the cellular telephone book of Abd Al-Rahim Al-Talhi. Al-Talhi is described as a Saudi terrorist financier who has been incarcerated in Saudi Arabia since 12/05 on terrorism charges. Al-Talhi's wife was the recipient of a scholarship paid for by (A), (G), (J-1) Bilal Philips. Philips was a facilitator for the buying of chemicals utilized in the manufacture of the explosive device used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

1998 BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA

[redacted] On 8/07/98, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed by members of Al Qaeda. Wadih El-Hage (G), who is believed to have been the leader of the Kenya cell, was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the bombings. At the time, El-Hage was a senior associate and business partner to Usama Bin Laden. El-Hage later admitted to being Bin Laden's personal secretary. **El-Hage has numerous direct connections to individuals involved in the 1993 WTC bombing.**

[redacted] El-Hage's associate, (P), also became an (A), (G), (J-1) While El-Hage was living in Kenya, (P) had been in phone contact with him on numerous occasions. (P) had been selling Tanzanite gemstones he received from El-Hage. According to (F), (D) (D) (D) (F) also indicates that (P) is very active in fund-raising activity for Islamic extremist causes supported by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. For reference, both (P) (known to the (A), (G), (J-1) investigation) and (P) are leaders of the Masjid As-Saber Mosque in Portland, Oregon.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) has been in contact with the following individuals, all of whom have a direct connection to either (P) (P) or Wadih Elhage or both: (P) (P).

(P) (G) and (G)

[redacted] According to (F) (P) first came to the attention of the FBI due to his close association with (P). This relationship dates back to 1990, when (P) first moved to Arlington, TX. It is known, (O-1) (O-1), that (P) and (P) had ongoing communications (O-1) while (P) was living in Sudan and later when he lived in Kenya. (O-1) (O-1) (P) knowledge of (P) involvement in Bin Laden's terrorist organization. Further, (P) immediately returned to Dallas, TX in 1997 after agents were on to him and he was forced to leave Kenya. Upon his return, (P), who was (P) allowed El-Hage to give Friday sermons in the mosque. Further, when (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Once El-Hage was incarcerated for his role in the 1998 bombings, he asked the court to allow communication between himself and (P). It was during this same period in the late 1990's that (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] In 1993, (P) was also reportedly involved with Essam Al Ridi in the buying and delivery of a jet plane which was to Usama Bin Laden in Sudan. During the late 1990's, (P) and (P) were heavily involved in the recruitment of Mujahideen in the Dallas/Forth Worth area. It was also during this same time period, that (P) and (P) owned a business together which was involved in sending items such as sleeping bags, tents, knives, and other items overseas to Saudi Arabia. It was believed this export business was done at the behest of Bin Laden for the purpose of supporting Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan. (P) was also known to El Hage and was said to have stayed with El Hage in Sudan when he was there delivering the jet to Bin Laden. Further, on 8/08/98, surveillance observed (P) arriving at El Hage's residence in Dallas, TX.

(P) *AND* (P)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

According to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

Once (P) moved to the area, Detroit (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F). According to ACS, during the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) *ASSOCIATION TO* (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(P) previously served as the (P) (P) but was forced to leave sometime in 2000 due to his radical views. After he was forced to leave the (P). (P) came to Austin in July 2000 to help (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) After helping with (P) in Austin, (P) moved to Baltimore, where he presently resides. Nevertheless, he continues to speak at the (P) and review of the (P) website indicates that on several occasions in 1999 and 2000, (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) (G).

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) has not revealed how the two came to be close friends; however, the (A), (G), (J-1) (F) provides an indication. According to (F) (P) is a close associate of (P) and an associate of Wadih El-Hage. These three appear to have met each other thru the Central Arlington Mosque in Arlington, Texas, where all three have been members at some point. However, (P) appears to have known (P) as far back as the late 1990's, when (P) was involved in the sale of Tanzanite while living in Kenya. (O-1) a call was intercepted on 4/19/97 between (P) and an unknown person where (P) mentioned he gave some Tanzanite stones to (P) (likely the same (P) referenced here).

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) It is unknown whether (P) kept in contact with El-Hage once he moved from the Arlington area.

(P) (G)

[redacted] (P) (P) made one call to (P) (P) on 11/27/96.

[redacted] According to (F) in 1993, (P) name and number were found in the residence of Earl S. Grant aka Abdur Rasheed, an individual convicted for his role in the TERRSTOP investigation in New York. This investigation revealed a plot whereby the participants would blow up several landmarks in the area. Further, (F) indicates (P) has been in phone contact with (P)

[redacted] According to (F), there have been "numerous" calls between (P) and (P). (C-2) (C-2) has also indicated that (P), Wadih El-Hage, (P) and (P) were individuals residing in the U.S. who were associates of Usama Bin Laden. Interestingly, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) made one call to (P) on (A), (G), (J-1) 97. Recall information provided above which indicates (A), (G), (J-1) may be financing terrorism (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P) ((G))

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

[redacted] (F) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Case files indicate (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) a well-known leader of the mujahideen movement during the Afghan/Soviet war. In 2003, FBIHQ requested (O-1) (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) According to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

9/11/01 ATTACKS

(S) On 9/11/01, 19 hijackers overtook four U.S. airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. Two of these hijackers were Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdar. Prior to their moving to the D.C. area before the attacks, they were living in San Diego, CA. They first arrived in the U.S. at Los Angeles, where they stayed for approximately two weeks. However, from there they moved to San Diego.

[redacted] While in San Diego, these two hijackers ingratiated themselves with a group of Muslim males who all attended the same mosque, Masjid Ar Ribat, and were closely associated with each other. The hijackers even played soccer with them. (A), (G), (J-1) these individuals (A), (G), (J-1) and each have some connection, either direct or indirect, to the two hijackers.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] As referenced above, each of these San Diego (G) has a connection to the same two hijackers referenced above. Below is a very brief description of each (G)' association with the hijackers as well as (A), (G), (J-1)s relationship to them:

(P) (G)

[redacted] According to (F) Dulles Airport Police found a suspicious vehicle on 9/12/2001 at the Dulles International Airport. A check with the Department of Motor Vehicle Records identified the vehicle as a 1988, Toyota Corolla, which was registered to 9/11 hijacker, Nawaf Al-Hazmi. The vehicle was searched by law enforcement agents and found in the vehicle was a medical prescription (dated 3/22/00) for Khalid Al-Mihdar from a Dr. (P) (G). On 9/14/01, (P) was interviewed regarding the prescription and confirmed that he was the (P) who performed (P) on Mihdar, while he (Al-Mihdar) resided in San Diego.

[redacted] (P) is one of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) which makes sense as to why (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) time at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) while he is visiting San Diego. (P) serves on the (P) for the ICSD and spends most of his time there. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) (G).

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

[redacted] (P) direct connection to the hijackers is the fact that on 7/7/00, hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi cashed/deposited a $175 check from (P) (F) (F) Written in the memo line of the check, which was made out to "cash", was a partially illegible note in Arabic translated as "for the guys". This is of significant interest given the fact that around this same timeframe, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) _ (G).

[redacted] (P) association to the hijackers is the fact that he was good friends with Mohdar Abdullah (F), who lived with (P) for a short time. Adullah helped acclimate the two hijackers while they were living in San Diego and was described by (P) as a "close friend" of the hijackers. While living in San Diego, Abdullah admitted to helping the hijackers call a flight school in Florida. Further, on 6/10/00, Abdullah traveled with both hijackers to the Los Angeles airport so that Mihdar could travel back to Saudi Arabia to see his wife and newborn child. This incident at LAX is of significant interest as FBI Los Angeles recently provided information which indicates their belief that three other individuals may have accompanied Abdullah and the hijackers to the airport on this date and may have been conducting reconnaissance of the security checkpoint, which was captured on the surveillance cameras (F).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P) _ (G) .

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) was an associate and coworker of hijacker associate, (P) Further, it had been (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) both of whom were identified above.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) ((G))

[redacted] Although (P) is (G) (G) , he is currently studying overseas in Yemen. According (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) that Mustafa is studying Islam in Yemen with Anwar Aulaqi at the Jamat Iman's Language Center. Aulaqi, while serving as Imam, became the spiritual advisor for the two hijackers where they worshiped in San Diego. (O-1) Aulaqi is a Yemeni extremist associated with a number of Al-Qaeda/Islamic extremist subjects in Yemen and England (F) .

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P) (G).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) was in contact with (P) (above), an (A), (G), (J-1) who had direct connections to the same two 9/11 hijackers, and because (P) has supported HAMAS through financial contributions.

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) was in contact with (A), (G), (J-1). (A), (G), (J-1)

FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACKS

[redacted] As stated above, based on (A), (G), (J-1) associations with individuals who have direct connections to those convicted for the above terrorist attacks, (G) raises the concern that (A), (G), (J-1) could himself have knowledge of pending attacks. This becomes an even greater concern given the details of the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) investigation and (A), (G), (J-1) connection to the group.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] One of the subjects of the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F). (G) is also the target of (O-1) due to his being an agent of Al Qaeda. Further, he has been the subject of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) investigations. As a result of his terrorist affiliations, he and several others were arrested by RCMP in June 2006. According to CSIS, (G) claimed he was planning several simultaneous attacks during Ramadan 2006 on several Canadian targets. (G) reportedly has been given a plan by individuals overseas (believed to be those in a higher position than (G) which he is to implement in Canada (F).

[redacted] On 4/24/06, (C-2) provided information to FBIHQ regarding an intercept they captured whereby (C-2) (C-2) (C-2) Then, on 7/13/06, the New York FBI office provided information regarding (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (G) is the (A), (G), (J-1) (F).

[redacted] During (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Again, given (A), (G), (J-1) association to the other four terrorist attacks, it cannot be ignored that (A), (G), (J-1) could have some knowledge of this pending attack since he also has an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Per conversations with SA (S) and TFO (S), it was learned that during a week long period (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

ANALYSIS

[redacted] After analyzing the above information, (S) believes an extensive terrorism network exists within the United States and that high-ranking members of the network all had prior knowledge of the four terrorist attacks described. It is believed this network has existed since the early 1990's and continues to exist today. Even though several members have been incarcerated, it is likely the network continues to be run by those involved but not yet convicted or by those who fled the country prior to any conviction. This belief comes from the fact

[redacted]

that many of the individuals involved in one terrorist attack are also associated with other terrorist attacks or are at least associated with those convicted for these other attacks. Whereas individual terrorism "cells" (once thought to be autonomous) may exist in various cities across the U.S., (S) believes a level of leadership exists whereby the leaders are aware and approve of various terrorist attacks occurring within the U.S. and overseas.

(S) Further, based on the fact that (A), (G), (J-1) associated with so many individuals either directly involved or one person removed from each of these attacks, IA (S) believes (A), (G), (J-1) is a much higher ranking member of the terrorist community than previously thought. Based on his connection to these individuals believed to be terrorism leaders, (G) cannot ignore the possibility that (A), (G), (J-1) himself may be part of this leadership. Not only is he (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Further, recall that a source once reported they were 70% sure (A), (G), (J-1) was one of Usama Bin Laden's "people" in the U.S. Taken alone, this reporting seems far-fetched; however, taken together with the information provided above and the fact that (A), (G), (J-1) is so (A), (G), (J-1) it can no longer be ignored that this source reporting could in fact prove true. This would provide cause as to why (A), (G), (J-1) is afforded such an (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) - a suspicious status of which (G) has yet to learn its origin.

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: ??, 08/15/2006

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

(G)

AT (G)

(S) Based on information provided above, it is recommended (A), (G), (J-1) According to (A), (G), (J-1)

♦♦

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2028
DATE: 08-22-2021

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 05/13/2003

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: Los Angeles

(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Fahad Al-Thumairy;
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Interview of captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (Non-USPER).

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [redacted] U.S. Department of State, Certificate of Revocation.

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] On 05/06/2003, Fahad Althumairy was interviewed by (S) and (S) Fahad was detained by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) as a result of him not having a valid visa to enter the country. (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview Fahad provided the following information:

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad has been employed by the Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California since 1996. His assignment to the Consulate was recently extended for one year. He works with 2 other individuals, (P) and (P) in the Islamic Affiars/Media Section. Fahad has no official duties at the Consulate but rather works as an Imam for various Mosques including the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) and the Omar Al Katab Mosque. Fahad was recruited to work for the Saudi Consulate by an individual, Saud Al Abdullah, with whom he studied at the Mohammad Bin Al Saud University. At this University, Fahad obtained his Masters in Islamic Studies. Saud Al Abdullah is currently employed at the Islamic Ministry in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] A previous co-worker at the Saudi Consulate, Mohammed Al-Muhanna, left the consulate because he had finished his work. Fahad believes that Muhanna is currently in Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi, Fahad did not see Muhanna but spoke to him once on the telephone.

[redacted] [redacted] At the Saudi Consulate, Fahad had no responsibility for visas. If asked questions about visas, he would refer people to the appropriate Consular Section at the Saudi Consulate.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad has not had any problems with the management of KFM. He has never been told to change the message of his prayers/teachings as the Imam or told what topic to discuss. Moreover, he never spoke of America or Jihad against the U.S. as part of his prayers/teachings. Fahad provided (P) the manager of the KFM as a reference. Fahad is not aware of any financial discrepancies with the management of KFM, but has heard rumors about the management skimming from the donations.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad initially denied going to the Dar Al Quran mosque. When told that people in the community identified Fahad as going to this mosque, he said he had only been one or two times. Moreover, it was not a mosque but an Islamic school for young children. He was invited to the mosque by (P)

[redacted]

(Egyptian) to listen to the children speak. Fahad has no knowledge as to who funds this mosque.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad was approached by members of the KFM to make arrangements for incoming visitors, mostly scholars, to the mosque. Fahad would make reservations for these visitors at the Travel Lodge Motel. He did not pay for the motel. Fahad rented only one apartment for an associate, Salah. Salah traveled with his ailing father to the U.S. to obtain medical care at UCLA. Salah's father died and he has since returned to Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad's 05/06/2003 arrival in Los Angeles marked the end of his vacation in Riyadh. No one was at the airport to pick up Fahad. His plan was to take a taxi to the Travel Lodge Motel, rent a car, and look for an apartment. He likes the Travel Lodge Motel because of its proximity to the KFM and the Saudi Consulate and its affordable rates. Fahad had no plans to call or meet any friends. When asked who were his friends/associates in the Los Angeles area, Fahad identified the Consulate General, Sammy. Fahad said he was not a social person and had no persons who he considered friends/associates with whom he spent time. When asked if he had any friends in the U.S., he only identified [redacted] (P) living in Texas.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad's wife and children remained in Saudi Arabia. The sister of Fahad's wife is pregnant so she wanted to remain help with the impending birth.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad denied knowing anyone by the name of Omar Al Bayoumi. He was unaware that the FBI had investigated Bayoumi and that it was widely reported that he had aided the 9/11 highjackers. Fahad did not deny the possibility that he and Bayoumi had been seen together and had telephone conversations. He explained that because of his position as an Imam, Fahad had contact with many people whose names he did not know. Fahad had never been to mosque where Bayoumi was an Imam. He had only been to San Diego twice, once in either 1998 or 1999 to go to Sea World and once in 2002 to attend a party hosted by (P) the Imam of the Al Ansar Mosque.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad has traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan. He went for one week with a religious group to study at various universities.

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad's lives in Altakassy, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, home telephone number (P-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F) 05/13/2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] [redacted] Interview results of Fahad Althumairy.

◆◆

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/24/2014

MOHDAR MOHAMMED ABDULLAH, date of birth (P-1), 1979, mobile telephone number (P-1) was interviewed first at the Restaurang Thang Long, Upplandsgatan 51, Stockholm, Sweden, then at the Knut Restaurang and Bar, Upplandgatan 17, Stockholm. An Officer of the Swedish Security Service, Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO), was also present for the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, ABDULLAH provided the following information:

ABDULLAH stated that he is very tired of answering the same questions posed by security services, notably the FBI, regarding the events surrounding the attacks on September 11, 2001. He wanted to speak to the interviewing agent again because he felt this time was different, since during their interview with him the previous day, on December 19, 2013, agents did not ask him the questions he is usually asked. ABDULLAH wanted to put the events of the past behind him.

ABDULLAH was angry and upset when he was first showed the surveillance video taken at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on June 10, 2000 (hereafter the "LAX video") (C-1). He stated this was because he had been told that the unknown individual in the LAX video (hereafter the UNSUB) was there with him, Nawaf AL HAZMI, and Khalid AL MIHDHAR, although he did not recognize the UNSUB. Additionally, he saw what he believed to be AL MIHDHAR speaking to the UNSUB over the UNSUB's shoulder in the LAX video, which exacerbated ABDULLAH's feelings of being used and lied to by AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI. ABDULLAH reiterated that he did not know or recognize the UNSUB, but postulated that AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI maybe did, since they had lied to him about so many other things.

It was ABDULLAH's opinion that the UNSUB appeared older than him, AL MIHDHAR, and AL HAZMI in the LAX video. When asked how old he thought the UNSUB appeared to be in the video, ABDULLAH stated that he wasn't sure, but maybe he might have been in his early thirties.

ABDULLAH was told that the object in the UNSUB's hand in the LAX video was a camera (C-1) when he first saw the LAX video, and that they had shown him blown-up pictures of it emphasizing what

Investigation on 12/20/2013 at Stockholm, Sweden (In Person)

File # (F) Date drafted 12/23/2013

by (S)

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they said was a light on the top and a dark area which was a lens aperture. ABDULLAH does not remember what his impression of the object was prior to them stating it was a camera.

ABDULLAH believes that the third person he had referred to in his e-mail to the San Diego Union Tribune newspaper reporter (P) was (P) (P), though that was a mistake caused by not having seen the video yet. He did not think the person was (P) upon viewing it the previous day, on December 19, 2013. Additionally, he reiterated that he was fairly sure he had travelled to LAX on June 10, 2000 with only AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI, and absolutely certain that he had travelled back to San Diego that day by car with only AL HAZMI. ABDULLAH stated that they had listened to music of Quranic verses on their trip.

When asked about his statement that he had been shown a picture of himself, AL MIHDHAR, AL HAZMI, and the UNSUB standing in front of a departures status board in LAX, ABDULLAH stated that his memory of that picture had them standing in the same positions that he had seen them in the LAX video he had seen the previous day, on December 19, 2013. ABDULLAH believed he misremembered the location of the photo, and that it was likely from the security line as depicted the LAX video.

ABDULLAH has not told anyone in Sweden about his involvement with AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI or his arrest and detainment by the United States Government, and did not think anyone he currently associates with knew about it. He was careful to keep only a small group of friends and avoided sticking out in any way. ABDULLAH feared the release of the video will cause many people not to want to associate with him, and make his life very difficult and possibly dangerous.

ABDULLAH primarily wanted his immigration issues in Sweden resolved so that he can visit his sick father, who resides in Italy. ABDULLAH's brother also resides in Italy with their father.

ABDULLAH was very concerned that he has not ever seen his son. When asked when his son was born, he stated that the FBI knows already, and that he had been born in the year 2002. ABDULLAH did not know the child's full birth date. He stated that his ex-wife (P) (understood by the interviewing agent to be (P)) had three children, the middle one being his, and that he FBI had tricked (P) into lying about not being married to him and not having his child. ABDULLAH believed (P) knew the child to be his, but despite this had faked his son's death with a fraudulent death certificate in order to prevent ABDULLAH from trying to see the child. ABDULLAH identified his primary motivation in life as trying to meet his son.

ABDULLAH had participated in an interview on Al Jazeera television in Yemen in 2005 or 2006 in which he and Anwar AL ALAWKI were interviewed by reporter Yusri Fuda in Arabic. The night before the interview, ABDULLAH met Fuda and AL ALAWKI for dinner, during which AL ALAWKI espoused Takfiri principles, specifically justifying violence against Muslims. ABDULLAH stated he disagreed and argued with AL ALAWKI, and that interaction carried on into the televised interview the next day. ABDULLAH had asked Fuda that Al Jazeera obscure his face during the interview.

ABDULLAH met AL ALAWKI one other time in Yemen, but stated that he did not remember what the context of the meeting was.

ABDULLAH did not remember AL ALAWKI ever saying anything inflammatory or extreme while he was Imam of the mosque in San Diego, though that had changed once AL ALAWKI moved to Yemen. ABDULLAH remembered a group in San Diego who split off from that mosque, and that there was one individual who was a convert to Islam with very radical views among them. ABDULLAH did not remember the individual's name.

At this time in the interview, the Restaurang Thang Long closed and Abdullah and the interviewing agents travelled down the street to Knut Restaurang and Bar to continue. During the walk, ABDULLAH received phone calls from his brother in Italy, and his housemate. ABDULLAH stated that he did not drink for religious reasons, but would not be offended if anyone else did.

ABDULLAH was very angry about the method in which AL ALAWKI had been killed. ABDULLAH believed that since AL ALAWKI was a U.S. citizen, he should have been given a trial. ABDULLAH was even more upset over the way AL ALAWKI's son had been killed, since unlike AL ALAWKI, he was a boy and had not done harm to the United States.

ABDULLAH's father and AL ALAWKI's father had been friends when he was growing up in Sanaa, Yemen. ABDULLAH did not remember AL ALAWKI well from this time, but ABDULLAH was friends with AL ALAWKI's brother, Omar. ABDULLAH had not spoken to Omar in years, and said he wondered how Omar was doing.

ABDULLAH stated he sides very strongly with the plight of the Palestinians, and does not agree with the Israeli occupation of Palestine. ABDULLAH has always dreamed of visiting Jerusalem.

ABDULLAH stated that he has a theory regarding the UNSUB, specifically that the UNSUB was an Israeli agent. ABDULLAH stated that he had no way to know that this was true, but that he thought the FBI should check the passports of any Israelis who were in the Los Angeles area at the time of the LAX video.

ABDULLAH stated that in retrospect, he did not know whether AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI did or said anything that would indicate the future plans they had regarding the events on September 11, 2001. ABDULLAH remembered he was watching the news, and AL HAZMI refused to sit and watch with him, stating that the way the female reporters dressed was "haram" (forbidden). ABDULLAH told him that AL HAZMI should recognize the great opportunities they had by living in the United States, and that they must make some allowances and be forgiving of some customs in return for those opportunities. AL HAZMI stated that ABDULLAH does not understand. ABDULLAH became angry, and asked AL HAZMI if he was so concerned about Quranic Law, why he did not grow his beard. AL HAZMI smiled and stated that there were things ADBULLAH would only understand later. ABDULLAH stated that he did not know what AL HAZMI meant at the time.

ABDULLAH was initially introduced to AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI by Omar Al Bayoumi, and stated that everyone in the Islamic community at the time believed that Al Bayoumi was working for the Saudi Arabian government. ABDULLAH questioned why Al Bayoumi had asked him to look out for AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI, and stated that since he had not heard anything about Al Bayoumi in the media since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government had not done an adequate job of investigating him.

ABDULLAH also stated that the FBI should talk to Hashim Al Attas, but would not elaborate on why, stating that it should just be done.

ABDULLAH had previously been detained in Sanaa, Yemen following his deportation from the United States. He remembered being detained in group holding cells along with two individuals who had been transferred there from U.S. detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ABDULLAH did not remember their names. He additionally remembered there was another prisoner in the Yemeni jail who had been held in U.S. detention in Guantanamo Bay, but that individual was held in solitary confinement in the basement of the jail. ABDULLAH had heard about three other former Guantanamo Bay detainees who where in Yemen, but they were held in a separate jail.

ABDULLAH stated that he was an individual of above-average intelligence, and that he had taken IQ tests to prove this. He understood why he had been continuously approached since the attacks on September 11, 2001, but reiterated that he was very tired of being chased and confronted with the same questions.

ABDULLAH had been thinking of giving (S) [redacted] a call (understood by the interviewing agent to be (S) . ABDULLAH stated that (S) had ruined his life, but that they had both good and bad times together.

(F)

(S)

On 04/20/2004 the following investigation was conducted by (S) (S) and (S) and (S) (S) in Los Angeles, CA:

Caysan Bin Don, also known as (P) (P), with telephone number (P-1) (P-1) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents. (P) (P)

(P)

Mr. Bin Don was asked if he could recall traveling with Omar al-Bayoumi to Los Angeles from San Diego, CA during January 2000 to visit the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA and other business. Mr. Bin Don stated that he did remember this trip with al-Bayoumi. (P) (P)

(P)

[redacted]

(P)

[redacted]

As for the trip to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi asked Bin Don either one or two days before the two of them actually traveled to Los Angeles if Bin Don would accompany al-Bayoumi to the Saudi Arabian (Saudi) Consulate. Mr. Bin Don told the present interviewers that al-Bayoumi specifically asked for assistance with his (al-Bayoumi's) "I-94."

The I-94 is Immigration and Naturalization form that specifies the type of visa and length of time the holder (al-Bayoumi) is allowed to remain in the United States. Mr. Bin Don said that the trip to Los Angeles occurred on a "regular workday" and was not on Friday or the weekend. At this time, Bin Don had known al-Bayoumi about one month..

Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi drove his (al-Bayoumi's) automobile to the consulate in Los Angeles. Before arriving at the consulate, al-Bayoumi stopped at a photographic shop on Sepulveda Boulevard, in Los Angeles to get photographs of him suitable for a passport. Mr. Bin Don recalls that al-Bayoumi pulled his vehicle up to a gated entrance to a parking garage that was under the Saudi Consulate. Al-Bayoumi spoke in Arabic on the intercom microphone at the gate and the gate was opened and al-Bayoumi drove into the garage and parked. They parked in a normal parking place and walked towards a reception area. Both Bin Don and al-Bayoumi were dressed in Islamic clothing, i.e. a "thobe." The reception area was accessible from the garage. As they approached this area, three men dressed in western business suits, walked out of the reception area and greeted al-Bayoumi. The conversation was in Arabic and only lasted for a brief period of time. Mr. Bin Don stated that he considered this a happenstance meeting and that the three men from the consulate were only being polite to another "brother." Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then entered the reception area. There was no receptionist present and al-Bayoumi used a telephone in the reception area to announce his presence. Mr. Bin Don described the reception area as plain, with a few seats, an airport type metal detector and an airport type X-ray machine.

Mr. Bin Don said that shortly after the call was placed by al-Bayoumi a mid-eastern male, dressed in a western business suit, with a full beard, "two fists length" came out to the reception room and greeted al-Bayoumi in English. Al-Bayoumi introduced the consular employee to Bin Don, but Mr. Bin Don no longer recalls the employee's name. Al-Bayoumi and the employee spoke briefly about al-Bayoumi's interest in obtaining religious materials, including Korans from the consulate. Also mentioned in Mr. Bin Don's presence was the fact that al-Bayoumi had not been at the consulate for at least three months. On the drive up to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi told Mr. Bin Don that he, that is al-Bayoumi routinely traveled to the consulate to obtain Islamic religious materials.

Mr. Bin Don then stated that he "ran in to" the consular employee at a shopping mall in Anaheim, CA within the last six months. (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

(P)

(P)

Mr. Bin Don was asked about the rest of the visit to the Saudi Consulate. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi followed the consulate employee into the offices of the consulate while Bin Don waited in the reception area. After some period of time, al-Bayoumi reappeared carrying a box of Korans and other religious materials. Mr. Bin Don said that the religious literature was to be used at the El Cajon, CA mosque. Al-Bayoumi, with the sponsorship of a well-to-do Muslim, was helping to establish that mosque. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left the consulate by returning to al-Bayoumi's automobile. At Mr. Bin Don's suggestion they drove to the King Fahad Mosque, in Culver City, CA, which was not far from the Saudi Consulate's location in west Los Angeles. Mr. Bin Don explained that they prayed at the "*masjid*" (mosque). After their prayers, al-Bayoumi suggested that they both go to a near by *halal* restaurant. Al-Bayoumi drove from the King Fahad Mosque to the restaurant, which Bin Don recalls as being located on Venice Boulevard in Culver City. They found a parking place in front of what al-Bayoumi stated was the restaurant. They went inside and determine that this business was not a restaurant but a *halal* meat market. The proprietor of the market told al-Bayoumi that there was a *halal* restaurant a short walk from the market. Al-Bayoumi and Bin Don left the market and walked to the restaurant which is named the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don noted that they did not have to move the automobile. Mr. Bin Don is now very familiar with the Mediterranean Café and had patronized the establishment on the day of this interview. Mr. Bin Don said that he showed FBI agents both businesses during a previous interview.

Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi ordered their food over a counter, in a fashion similar to a fast food restaurant. Mr. Bin Don stated that they then sat in an "alcove" to wait while their food was prepared. While waiting at the table, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar walked into the restaurant. They were speaking Arabic and ordering coffee. Al-Bayoumi overheard them. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi is "very friendly" and immediately addressed the two in Arabic, and invited them to sit with Bin Don and al-Bayoumi. Al-Bayoumi asked al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar their names and where they were from. They told al-Bayoumi that they were from Saudi Arabia. The conversation was in Arabic, but al-Bayoumi occasionally translated the responses of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar into English. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi offered to buy a meal for the two in the "Islamic tradition." Al-Hazmi told al-Bayoumi and Bin Don that he was from Mecca, (P) [redacted] (P) When brought back to the subject at hand, Mr. Bin Don said that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi that they were living in an apartment "near by." Al-Hazmi went on to tell al-Bayoumi that they had just arrived in the United States and were studying English. Mr. Bin Don said that the exchange was vague to him, since he only spoke limited Arabic. Mr. Bin Don recalls at this late date that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi they were unhappy in Los Angeles. Al-Bayoumi invited them to visit San Diego to see if they would want to move to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi and al-Hazmi apparently exchanged telephone numbers. Mr. Bin Don was asked if he specifically recalls that al-Hazmi had a telephone, or whether al-Bayoumi only provided his telephone number. Mr. Bin Don could not recall the exact sequence. After about thirty minutes al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar left the restaurant. Mr. Bin Don said that they did not have a motor vehicle. He does not recall the direction that they walked after leaving the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don stated emphatically, that he had no information from al-Bayoumi in advance that they would meet al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the Mediterranean Café. He further said that the meeting was "purely a coincidence" and that al-Bayoumi's friendly nature was the reason that al-Bayoumi showed an interest in the situation of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then left the restaurant and returned to the King Fahad Mosque for the sunset prayer. Al-Bayoumi did not offer to take al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the mosque, nor did Bin Don see them at the mosque for the sunset prayer. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left Los Angeles before the evening prayer.

(P)

The next contact with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was at the party that al-Bayoumi organized. The party was held in the apartment occupied by al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don described the attendees at the party as, "many people from the community." Mr. Bin Don described the behavior of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar as normal and that they both appeared to be at ease. Mr. Bin Don videotaped the party at the request of al-Bayoumi, using al-Bayoumi's video camera. Some of the guests at the party did not want to be videotaped and Bin Don assumed that this was for religious reasons. Mr. Bin Don said that for most of the party, he remained in the kitchen area. During the party, based on what little conversation Bin Don could understand, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told the others that they were students. Mr. Bin Don said that everyone at the party was a "brother" that he recognized from attending prayer services at the ICSD.

(P)

[redacted]

Mr. Bin Don's statement to the 9-11 Commission and the Commissioners which has been paraphrased in part is as follows:

(P)

[redacted]

(P)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 08-19-2021

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/25/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** PENTTBOM Investigative Team [redacted] (S)

From: Los Angeles
[redacted] (S)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM
MC 182
[redacted] (A), (G), (P-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Interview of Cayson Bin Don concerning Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Administrative: ([redacted] Telcall on 8/18/04 between [redacted] (S), Los Angeles, and [redacted] (S), PENTTBOM Investigative Team.

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Original and copy of FD-302 for an interview of Cayson Bin Don and a photograph of [redacted] (P).

Details: ([redacted] On 8/3/04, Cayson Bin Don, aka Usama Alva Dyson, was interviewed concerning his visit to the Royal Consulate General of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles in January of 2000 with Omar Al-Bayoumi. After their visit to the Consulate, Bin Don and Al-Bayoumi met the Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar at a

[redacted]

nearby restaurant. This was Bin Don's third interview about these meetings which included one by the 9/11 Commission on 4/20/04. The reports of the previous interviews are in referenced serials (F) and (F).

[redacted] [redacted] The purpose of this third interview was to show Bin Don a photograph of (G) (P), an administrative employee at the Saudi Consulate, who is originally from (P) (P) matched the description Bin Don had previously provided to the Bureau of the Consulate employee that Al-Bayoumi had met with for the purpose obtaining Islamic books as per referenced (P). It is known (G) that (P) is a (P) (P) and he regularly passes out inflammatory Islamic literature at the Consulate which is above and beyond his normal responsibility to only pass out copies of the Koran.

[redacted] [redacted] Bin Don had previously been shown a California driver's license photograph of (P), number (P) but he could not identify him. However this photograph does not accurately depict (P) appearance since the photograph has his hair as dark and not gray, does not show the extent of his balding, and has his beard too short. The enclosed photograph from (P) immigration file, which was shown to Bin Don, is how (P) currently looks.

[redacted] During this third interview when Bin Don was shown (P) immigration photograph, Bin Don immediately said it was the person he met at the Consulate although he did not know his (P)'s) name. Bin Don also reported that he had seen this person at a Middle Eastern clothing store in late 2003 or early 2004 and told him that he had been interviewed by the FBI.

[redacted] Bin Don maintained that the meeting with the hijackers after his and Al-Bayoumi's visit to the Consulate was strictly a chance encounter. Bin Don had no information as to whether (P) would have known the hijackers and does not believe there was any connection between the encounter with the hijackers at the restaurant and their visit to the Consulate. Further details of the interview are documented in the enclosed FD-302.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) will be interviewed in the near future in accordance with (G) and will be asked about his meeting with Al-Bayoumi and knowledge of the hijackers.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT PENTTBOM INVESTIGATIVE TEAM, D.C.

[redacted] Read and clear. Provide a photograph of Omar Al-Bayoumi and any specific questions to be asked when [redacted] (P) is interviewed.

♦♦

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2033
DATE: 10-01-2021

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL B [redacted] F INVESTIGATION

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription 09/30/2008

[redacted] On 09/25/2008, (P) DOB (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1) A# (P-1) hereinafter, (P) was contacted on a public sidewalk on the corner of Charger Boulevard and Balboa Avenue, San Diego, California, by (S), FBI, and (S) NYPD. After advising the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, (P) needed time to attend prayer at the Islamic Center of San Diego, ICSD, also called Masjid Abu Bakr, and agreed to meet with the agents later that day.

[redacted] On this same date, 09/25/2008, an interview took place with (P) in his apartment at his request, (P) (P) home telephone (P), personal cellular telephone (P), business cellular telephone (P). After casual conversation, (P) voluntarily provided the following information. The end of December 1999, noted by (P) as the last ten days of Ramadan, Omar Al Bayoumi, asked (P) to host two visiting Sheikhs from Saudi Arabia at his apartment. (P) described these Sheikhs as two well known Scholars of Islam who had traveled from Saudi Arabia to San Diego to visit and attend the ICSD. (P) could not provide the names or any further information regarding the Sheikhs who stayed with (P) in his apartment for the last ten days of the Ramadan season. (P) believed Al Bayoumi asked him to host the Sheikhs because (P) was single, living alone in an apartment and the apartment was in close proximity to the ICSD. (P) noted that he had arrived in San Diego the end of October 1999 from (P) and after socializing at the ICSD, Al Bayoumi approached him regarding hosting the Sheikhs.

[redacted] (P) denied receiving or making telephone calls to or from Fahad Al Thumairy, (F) Omar Al Bayoumi, [redacted] [redacted] (F) or Anwar Aulaqi, (F) during the time period of December 1999.

[redacted] On 09/25/2008, (P) originally stated he had not idea who made the telephone calls mentioned above, taking place during the time period of December 1999 (P) later attributed the telephone calls mentioned above, taking place during the time period of December 1999, to his former roommate named (P). Further in the interview, (P) again changed his answer regarding the telephone

[redacted]

Investigation on 09/25&26/2008 at San Diego, California

File # (F) [redacted]

by (S)

Date dictated n/a

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calls mentioned above, taking place during the time period of December 1999, by attributing the telephone calls to the two visiting Sheikhs, mentioned above. [redacted] did not give the Sheikhs permission to use his telephone nor did he remember seeing or overhearing the two Sheikhs using his telephone in the apartment.

[redacted] On 09/26/2008, [redacted] voluntarily agreed to a second interview with the same interviewing agents which took place in a public place outside the Starbucks Coffee Shop on the corner of Balboa Avenue and Genesse, San Diego, California. During this interview, [redacted] attributed the telephone calls mentioned above, taking place during the time period of December 1999, to Khalid Al Mihdhar. (Agent note: Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi were identified as two of the 9/11 hijackers on American Airlines Flight 77. They both resided in San Diego for a period of time during the year 2000).

[redacted] [redacted] remembered Khalid Al Mihdhar using his telephone at his apartment to make a call on two occasions. The first time Khalid Al Mihdhar made a call, he paid [redacted] in cash for the call. At that time, Khalid Al Mihdhar told [redacted] he was calling his wife in Yemen. The second call was not agreed to by [redacted]. [redacted] remembered an incident where he had to confront his roommate at the time, [redacted], with an unexplained charge after receiving his telephone statement for a 30 minute telephone call to Yemen. [redacted] knew that Khalid Al Mihdhar had made the second call from his telephone to the country of Yemen because [redacted] was familiar with the area code to Yemen. [redacted] was upset with the amount of the telephone bill, [redacted] could not recall the amount of the single call or the approximate total of the bill.

[redacted] [redacted] claimed he did not know Fahad Al Thumairy, he only knew him as a guy working at the Saudi Embassy. [redacted] understood from Omar Al Bayoumi that the two hijackers wanted to move from Los Angeles, California, to San Diego, California. [redacted] stated Al Bayoumi drove the hijackers down from Los Angeles to San Diego. [redacted] did not accompany Al Bayoumi when he drove the hijackers from Los Angeles to San Diego. After arriving in San Diego, Al Bayoumi told [redacted] to help the hijackers get around and take them to drink coffee. [redacted] accompanied the two hijackers around San Diego because they did not read or write English and needed assistance in comprehending the locality. [redacted] had the hijackers over his apartment on a regular basis for dinner and to socialize. Al Bayoumi told [redacted] that he, Al Bayoumi, was responsible for the two hijackers, NFI. [redacted] understood the hijackers were just two students from Los Angeles. [redacted] never assisted or saw the hijackers attend school. [redacted] noted that Khalid Al Mihdhar would regularly pay for both Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] again informed he would regularly have Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi over his apartment to socialize. [redacted] attended a dinner party for Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi at their apartment located across the large street from his apartment. The party was hosted by Omar Al Bayoumi. Al Bayoumi went in person to [redacted] apartment in which Al Bayoumi personally invited [redacted] to the party for Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi. [redacted] was asked if he was aware of Al Bayoumi hosting the party for the hijackers as an introduction to the Muslim community or did the party serve as a farewell by the Muslim community to the hijackers. [redacted] claimed he did not know why Al Bayoumi hosted a party for the hijackers. [redacted] denied any participation or knowledge of any terrorist attacks which took place in reference to the United States. [redacted] denied participation or knowledge of any future terrorist attacks towards citizens of the United States. [redacted] denied knowledge of terrorist activities particularly in reference to Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi.

[redacted] [redacted] socialized with the two hijackers on a number of occasions but he could not recall or give agents an example of what they talked about. [redacted] played soccer with the hijackers at a park near the ICSD. After [redacted] saw the photos of the two hijackers on television after the attacks of 9/11 he said he was so distraught that he vomited. [redacted] claimed he became ill because he could did not expect the hijackers to do that. [redacted] further stated he never thought the hijackers could do something of that nature because they were not smart.

[redacted] [redacted] claims Omar Al Bayoumi brought the hijackers over to [redacted] apartment in March 2000. [redacted] was focused on the month of March as the month that he met the hijackers through Al Bayoumi, had them over the apartment for socialization, played soccer with them and took them to Starbucks Coffee shop. [redacted] stated he was not protecting anyone, and then made the statement, all of the people we are talking about live outside of the U.S. [redacted] then noted that he was the only one left here.

[redacted] [redacted] went to the Masjid Ar Ribat for the first time on a Saturday shortly after the hijackers arrived in San Diego. [redacted] could not remember with whom or how he got to the Masjid Ar Ribat. [redacted] denied driving or accompanying the hijackers to the gathering. [redacted] recalled it was a gathering and dinner for people originally from Yemen or of Yemeni descent who were living in San Diego. Anwar Aulaqi had invited [redacted] and all the attendees for the gathering and dinner. [redacted] remembered meeting Anwar Aulaqi at that gathering because he was the Imam of the Masjid Ar Ribat. It was important for [redacted] to go to this gathering because it was an opportunity to socialize with fellow Yemeni people living in San Diego, California. [redacted] could not remember if anyone told him to go to the Masjid Ar Ribat in order to meet the Imam, which was Anwar Aulaqi. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] remembered meeting mainly with Mohdar Abdullah at this gathering. Mohdar Abdullah and [redacted] had previously become acquainted at the ICSD. After the gathering Mohdar invited [redacted] over to his (Mohdar's) apartment which was in close proximity to the Mosque.

[redacted] [redacted] Mohdar Abdullah, [redacted] read the Quran at the apartment, the talk was all in the Arabic language. Samir Abdoun, who was Mohdar's roommate, was at the apartment. There where others at the apartment but [redacted] could not recall their names. [redacted] claimed nothing took place except for the reading of the Quran.

[redacted] [redacted] and the two hijackers, Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar visited the San Diego Zoo in February or March of 2000. [redacted] roommate at the time, [redacted], could not attend the outing that particular day and asked [redacted] to take the hijackers to the Zoo because [redacted] had an annual pass to enter the San Diego Wild Animal and Zoo parks. [redacted] remembered he and the hijackers rode the guided tour bus at the Zoo and stayed a total of a couple of hours visiting the San Diego Zoo. [redacted] did not know why the hijackers were interested in seeing the San Diego Zoo.

[redacted] The last time [redacted] talked to Omar Al Bayoumi was right before he left for England to attend college which was approximately in August 2001. [redacted] acknowledged it was a big honor to have the two before mentioned Saudi Sheikhs stay with him because Omar Al Bayoumi picked him after recently arriving in San Diego.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 08-19-2021

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Official Record

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/11/2016

[redacted] On Thursday, November 12, 2015, at 12:30 PM (Pacific Costal Time) (P) (P) Date of Birth (P) Social Security number (P-1) Place of Birth: (P) met in a conference room at the Anaheim Marriott Suites (12015 Harbor Boulevard, Garden Grove, California, Zip code 92840) with FBI New York (S) (S) (NYPD), FBI San Diego (S), Homeland Security Investigator (HSI) (S) FBI New York Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (S) and FBI New York (S) (S) (NYPD) who identified themselves and presented their credentials. (S) first inquired about (P)'s health. (P) stated he was recovering from a slight cold, but that the cold should not prevent him from participating in the interview. (P) advised that other than the cold, but he felt well. Investigators advised (P) that they appreciated his participation in this interview. (P) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) lives in Anaheim, California and is unemployed. (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) a friend found him employment at a school located in San Diego, California. (P) stated he worked there on a one year contract and that at the conclusion of the year, his contract was not renewed. Since then, (P) found occasional short-term work assisting students and tutoring. (P) s states his lack of steady employment caused financial difficulty.

[redacted] Investigators asked (P) why he continued to work at the CKSA-LA in an administrative capacity when he had a degree in (P). (P) stated visa issues impacted his ability to find work in the United States. (P) originally hoped employment with the CKSA-LA would assist him gain a permanent path to residency in the US and full time employment. (P) stated

(G)

Investigation on 11/12/2015 at Cincinnati, Ohio, United States (In Person)

File # (F) [redacted] Date drafted 01/08/2016

by (S)

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his educational background, work ethic and foreign language skills helped him get the job at the CKSA-LA. (P) states he is a fluent speaker of (P). He also understands and can speak some (P) He demonstrated some of those language skills for investigators. (P) stated these skills resulted in him being assigned to 'translation work' at the CKSA-LA.

[redacted] Arrival and Working at the United States:

[redacted] Investigators asked (P) how he came to work at the CKSA-LA. (P) stated he arrived in the US in about (P) to study (P) at the (P) and later found work at CKSA-LA [Author's note: for details on this period for (P) refer to FBI Case File# (F). (P) stated the majority of his assignments at the CKSA-LA focused on responding to mail (postage), correspondence on behalf of the Consulate and translation issues. (P) stated he worked in his office on the second floor of the Consulate, mostly by himself, and was directed by CKSA-LA leadership to handle inquiries from non-Saudi citizens who transacted business with the Consulate. (P) generally did not handle interactions with Saudi citizens who sought assistance. (P) stated Saudi citizens who came to or called the Consulate had direct access to Saudi employees of the consulate. These Saudi employees of the Consulate treated Saudi citizens who came for assistance with extra special care. (P) stated Saudi citizens who visited to the Consulate would go to a 'special section' of the building for service or meet the leadership of the Consulate elsewhere in the building. (P) stated business and assistance to Saudi citizens occurred outside of his awareness, as he spent most of his time in his office alone. (P) stated on some days he never came out of his office until it was time to go home. (P) added that CKSA-LA officials did not mix freely with non-Saudi citizens or non-Saudi employees of the consulate. (P) said, "The Saudis kept to themselves."

[redacted] (S) presented (P) with a series of photographs. (P) looked at the photographs and stated he did not recognize anyone.

FAHD AL THUMAIRY

[redacted] (S) pointed to FAHAD AL THUMAIRY's photo [author's note: one of the photos presented to (P) a few minutes before] and asked (P) if he recognized or knew THUMAIRY. (P) looked at the photo again and said THUMAIRY looked different in the photo and that he knew THUMAIRY when he was the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque (KFM). (P) also stated the real name of the King Fahad Mosque was the 'Ibn Tammiyah Mosque', which was sponsored by the Ibn Tammiyah Society (NFI). (P) added that he knew THUMAIRY well from his time at the KFM and that THUMAIRY was a good, kind and gentle person. (P) stated THUMAIRY was so gentle that if, he saw an ant crossing a road he would cross to the other side of the street to avoid stepping on the ant. (P) was asked if he had ever heard any negative information about THUMAIRY, to which (P) replied he had not. (P) added that THUMAIRY was the only person from the KFM who stayed in contact with him after he (P) was terminated. THUMAIRY kept in touch with (P), sometimes by phone, calling occasionally until recently, particularly on holidays to check in on (P) to see if (P) was well. (P) was asked when the last of these phone calls occurred and he stated the last time that THUMAIRY contacted him was approximately 2012. (P) stated he had a good relationship with THUMAIRY and THUMAIRY invited (P) to conduct prayers on Friday once a month at the KFM.

(P)

[redacted] (P) was asked if he recognized the name (P) (P) stated he did not know the (P) but added that he knew who we were asking about. (P) stated he knew (P)'s father, (P), who worked for the Saudi Educational Mission in Houston. (P) stated that any contact he might have had with (P) would have occurred when (P) was a very young child. (P) stated he knew (P)'s father (P) and that his father was a good man.

NAMAF AL HAZMI and KHALID AL MIDHAR

[redacted] (P) was shown photographs of NAMAF AL HAZMI and KHALID AL MIDHAR [Authors note: these photos were the same photos (P) had been shown at the beginning of the interview, when he did not recognize anyone] and stated he did not know either of them in his time at either the CKSA-LA or the KFM. (P) stated he does not recall ever meeting them, though he knows who they are now. (P) states he does not believe in terrorism and that terrorism is forbidden in Islam. (P) was asked if he knew anyone who helped HAMZI, MIDHAR or any of the 9/11 hijackers. (P) answered that he did not, but if he did he would tell us.

[redacted] CAISIN BIN DON

[redacted] (P) was shown a photograph of CAISIN BIN DON [Authors note: this is the same photo (P) had been shown at the beginning of the interview] and stated he recognized the individual as a person who approached (P) in an Islamic clothing store in the Los Angeles area after 9/11. (P) described (P) as a (P) and stated BIN DON (P) and told (P) that he (BIN DON) had been approached by the FBI and asked questions about 9/11 and the hijackers. (P) stated BIN DON asked (P)

(P) [author's note: (P) stated BIN DON (P) (P). (P) stated he told BIN DON (P) (P). (P) recalled the first time he met (P) was when OMAR AL BAYOUMI brought a (P) [author's note: (P) pointed to the photo of BIN DON] to the CKSA-LA. (P) (P) (P)] (P) was asked what he remembered about BIN DON. (P) stated that he did not know him, had never met him before the meeting at the Consulate and did not recall having any other conversations with him. (S) asked (P) to look at the photo again and to try and remember the conversation and what (P), BIN DON and BAYOUMI spoke about. (P) stated he could not remember because he spoke to so many people at the Consulate. (S) asked (P) what he knew about BIN DON, (P) replied that he did not know anything about (P). (P) was asked if he knew BIN DON's family, (P) stated BIN DON came from a (P) and added that BIN DON's wife was of (P) ethnicity.

[redacted] OMAR AL BAYOUMI

[redacted] (P) was shown a photograph of OMAR AL BAYOUMI. [Authors note: this is the same photo (P) had been shown at the beginning of the interview] On the second viewing (P) recognized him as the man who accompanied CAISIN (P) to the CKSA-LA. (P) stated BAYOUMI was a Saudi citizen who was treated with great respect inside the Consulate. BAYOUMI was well regarded by the people in the Consulate and held a "very high status" when he entered the building. (P) stated BAYOUMI's status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate. (P) stated he first met (P) when he was called to the Consular's office to provide BAYOUMI and (P) some literature about Islam and Islamic religious practice. (P) stated that these pamphlets and books are on display in the Consulate for anyone to take. (P) stated the Consulate gave them out for free. (P) stated he and BAYOUMI spoke for a brief time and then BAYOUMI took the pamphlets and left. (P) does not recall what they spoke about.

[redacted] (P) meeting with OMAR AL BAYOUMI and CAISIN BIN DON in the CKSA-LA.

(P) was asked if he remembered speaking to BAYOUMI by phone, he responded that he spoke to many people and does not recall speaking to BAYOUMI. (P) was asked if he recalled the first time he met BAYOUMI, he responded that he saw him once or twice but that the meeting in the Consulate was the first meeting he remembers. (P) added that the meeting only lasted a few minutes. Investigators asked (P) why he brought books and pamphlets to BAYOUMI and BIN DON if they are on display and available for all to take. (P) was unable to provide an answer to this question. (P) was asked if he sat down to speak to BAYOUMI and BIN DON, (P) replied the meeting took place by an exterior secretary's desk area and that he does not recall sitting down to speak to BAYOUMI or BIN DON. (P) added that people come in and out of the Consulate all the time but he rarely saw anyone because he sat in his office alone most of the time. (P) was asked what he could recall about meeting BIN DON and BAYOUMI that day and answered BIN DON was (P) who (P) later met again at the King Fahad Mosque. On this day at the Consulate with BAYOUMI, (P) was called by either head of the Saudi Affairs department in the Consulate or his secretary and asked to offer some literature about Islam to BAYOUMI's friend, (P) (P) recalled that this (P) came from a (P). (P) was asked if he had ever met with anyone like this before and (P) he had never met with anyone like he met with BAYOUMI and BIN DON.

[redacted] The Mediterranean Restaurant: OMAR AL BAYOUMI and CAISIN BIN DON meet AL HAZMI and AL MIDHAR

[redacted] (P) was asked if he knew of a Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Boulevard. (P) stated he did and added that it was owned by a friend of his. (P) was asked if he ever ate in that restaurant and (P) stated that he had eaten there many times. (P) was asked if other employees of the CKSA-LA ate at that restaurant and (P) stated that the Saudi employees at the mosque would never eat there. (P) added that the Saudis kept to themselves and brought their own food from home or ate together. If the Saudis wanted to order food, they would use a 'hi-end' Lebanese Restaurant in Los Angeles to cater for them. (P) was asked about the day (P) BIN DON came to the Consulate with Omar AL BAYOUMI. (P) was asked if he directed BAYOUMI or BIN DON to the Restaurant. (P) stated he could not recall what they spoke about. (P) was asked if it was possible that he could have recommended the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Boulevard as a location for AL BAYOUMI and BIN DON to go and eat. (P) said he could not recall right now, but it was possible. (P) added that his friend has sold the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Boulevard and his nearby store and made a lot of money.

[redacted] ANWAR NASSER AULAQI

(S) pointed to a photo of ANWAR NASSER AULAQI [Authors note: this is the same photo (P) had been shown at the beginning of the interview] and asked (P) if he recognized AULAQI. (P) stated he did not know who the man was. (P) was asked if he had ever heard of AULAQUI, (P) stated he did not know who AULAQUI was until approximately 2004, when he read about AULAQUI in an Arabic language newspaper named, Al Sharq al Aswat, which mentioned AULAQUI. Investigators asked (P) to explain this, since there was so much media coverage of AULAQUI and the events of 9/11, and the hijackers HAMZI and MIDHAR's activity in Los Angeles, San Diego and the KFM. (P) stated he does not have television in his house. (P) was asked if anyone he knew ever discussed these issues, (P) stated no one ever spoke about these people to him. (P) was asked how this was possible, and how were we (the investigators) supposed to believe that an educated man like himself who had had personal contact with a location visited by 9/11 hijackers AL HAMZI and AL MIDHAR would never have heard anyone speak about the people involved in the 9/11 attacks. (P) stated that of course he knew about the incident at the World Trade Center and that all Muslims disapprove of this type of event. (P) stated he had read the 9/11 Commission report. (P) was then asked if he recalled if anyone he knew met the hijackers or spoke about meeting them. (P) replied that no one he knew, met or helped the people involved in the accident at the World Trade Center. The investigators informed (P) that they were investigating the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, not an accident.

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P) was shown a photograph of (P) and asked if he remembered ever meeting or speaking to (P). (P) stated he did not recognize the photograph or remember speaking to (P) (P) was asked if he remembered the name (P) at all. (P) stated he did not and again stated he had met so many people in his job at the CKSA-LA he could not remember them all. (P) was asked if he had ever called (P) on the phone, and (P) responded that he may have, because he called so many people, but he could not recall now.

(P)

(P) was shown a photograph of (P) and asked if he remembered ever meeting or speaking to (P). (P) stated he did not recognize the photograph or remember speaking to (P).

[redacted] MANA: EMPLOYMENT AT THE CKSA-LA

[redacted] Investigators asked (P) to describe how he came to be released from employment at the CKSA-LA. (P) stated he was terminated from employment at the KFM with no explanation as to why he was being let go. (P) stated that one day he received a letter stating his service would no longer be required and that this practice was unusual because he was being terminate before the mandatory retirement age. At this point (P) began to choke up and get teary eyed. (P) stated he was let go with no pension, no money and no payment upon his release. (P) stated when former close friends he worked with at the CKSA-LA see him at holiday events, they ignore him. (P) stated no one, other than FAHAD AL THUMAIRY, has called him to check on him to see how he is or to check on his personal welfare. (P) stated that he is personally hurt by this. (P) added his termination has caused financial difficulty for him and his family. (P) stated that he had helped numerous people at the Consulate gain college degrees, helping them prepare college term papers, tutoring them for their exams, helping them with application for school. (P) stated he never asked for compensation for this [Authors Note: (P) wiped away tears while he told this story, his voice choked with emotion]. (P) said that within his time at the CKSA-LA, six people acquired master's degrees and three individuals gain doctoral degrees with his assistance (NFI).

[redacted] (D)

Investigators informed (P) that they were concerned (P) had not been forthcoming in the interview and had avoided providing complete answers to certain questions [Author's note: (P) is an articulate man who displayed a facility for remembering specific events and details related to the questions asked but was unable to remember other matters which he should be likely to recall. (P)'s statements regarding having never discussed matters and never have heard anyone speak about the people involved in the 9/11 attacks lack credibility]. (D)

(D)

[redacted] (P) was informed by interviewing investigators of the importance of telling the truth (D) [Authors note: (P) became visibly nervous during this time]. Investigators offered (P) the opportunity to meet again the next day (November 13, 2015) should (P) recall any additional details regarding the questions or should (P) which to clarify any matters discussed. (P) stated he would think about it and would contact the investigators.

[redacted] (P) called investigators later in the day and informed them he would like to discuss these matters further on Friday, November 13, 2015 (The next day).

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

Official Record

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2016

Document Title [redacted] Interview of (P) 13 Nov 2015

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 11-16-2018

Drafted Date: 11/17/2015

Type of Activity: Interview

Methods: In Person

Investigation On: 11/13/2015

At: Anaheim, California, United States

Details [redacted]

[redacted] (P) DOB (P-1) (P), Social Security Number (P-1) POB (P) was interviewed at the Anaheim Marriott Suites (12015 Harbor Boulevard, Garden Grove, California, Zip code 92840). Investigators waited for (P) to arrive at the hotel, the same location as the previous day's interview. (P) arrived in his own vehicle at approximately 11:35 (Pacific Coast Time) and greeted investigators FBI New York (S) FBI San Diego (S) Homeland Security Investigator (HSI) (S) (S), FBI New York (S) and FBI New York (S) were present and identified themselves. (P) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) began the discussion by taking a piece of paper and a pen from bag he brought with him and asked if he could write down the names of the FBI personnel present. All agreed, and (S) (S)

(G)

[redacted]

Investigation on 11/13/2015 at Anaheim, California, United States (In Person)

File # (F) [redacted] Date drafted 01/11/2016

by (S)

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(S) also presented (P) with their business cards. Upon receipt of the business cards, (P) stopped writing down names.

(U) (P) asked if he could clarify some matters he had discussed the prior day. (P) stated he spent (P) years and three months working for the Saudi Consulate and felt he had lived and worked as a semi-diplomat and he feels today that he lived up to the standard of a diplomat. (P) added that his wife is not aware that he has had contact with US government officials.

[redacted] Investigators asked (P) whether King Fahad Mosque (KFM) employees ever asked anyone at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (CKSA-LA) to help newly arrived Saudi exchange students or other foreign travelers, (P) recalled that one time Mohammed MUHANNA who worked at the CKSA-LA and the KFM, called the CKSA-LA Consul General to ask (P) to meet with two people. (P) stated the Consul General misunderstood the request and it was not related to the September 11 attacks.

[redacted] (P) stated that MUHANNA and THUMAIRY were closely associated at the KFM. Fahad al THUMAIRY was the Imam of the Mosque, but THUMAIRY never contacted (P) to coordinate between people and added that they both always showed respect for (P)

[redacted] OMAR AL BAYOUMI and CAISIN BIN DON'S VISIT to KFM

[redacted] (P) was asked if he remember any other details about BAYOUMI and BIN DON's visit to the KFM [Authors' note: for further details on this meeting see FD-302 related to November 12, 2015 [redacted] interview with (P) (F). (P) stated BAYOUMI had more clout at the CKSA-LA than either MUHANNA or THUMAIRY and added that BAYOUMI was considered higher in rank than the Consul General. On the day that BAYOUMI and (P) (BIN DON) came to the KFM, BAYOUMI may have asked (P) for the location of a nearby halal restaurant. If he had, (P) would have recommended the 'Mediterranean Grill' a restaurant on Venice Boulevard [Authors' note: This is the location Omar al BAYOUMI told investigators he met HAMZI and MIDHAR for the first time and invited them to visit San Diego]. This Mediterranean Grill was the only restaurant that (P) knew at the time in the area which had a grocery store with halal meat and is also a restaurant.

[redacted] (P) recalled that the owner of the Mediterranean Gourmet restaurant circa 2000 was his friend, (P) hamed (P) ' (P) reiterated as he did in the prior interview that Saudis from CKSA-LA never went to the Mediterranean Grill. They would cater food from a nearby

Lebanese restaurant. Also, married Saudi's like THUMAIRY would not have gone to the restaurant. [redacted] could not explain why he would recommend a like the Mediterranean Grill restaurant to someone as important as BAYOUMI, as it was not a place the other Saudis would have patronized.

[redacted] stated many people knew that [redacted] ate at the Mediterranean Restaurant He knew how to get there and he would have told BAYOUMI how to travel there.

[redacted] was specifically asked if THUMAIRY told him to tell BAYOUMI to go to the Restaurant or if THUMAIRY asked [redacted] to provide BAYOUMI with direction to the Restaurant. [redacted] stated he did not recall THUMAIRY asking him to do either.

[redacted] was asked to provide any other detail he might recall on when he was asked to meet BAYOUMI and BIN DON and he stated the day BAYOUMI and [redacted] visited the Consulate, BAYOUMI and [redacted] came to the Saudi Section on the first floor and [redacted] was called down to bring them a packet of literature on Islam that he had been asked to prepare for the convert. [redacted] says he clearly remembers this. Before BAYOUMI arrived, the Saudi section of the Consulate called [redacted] telling him to ready the packet for BAYOUMI's companion, [redacted]

[redacted] remembers that he stood with BAYOUMI and BIN DON, and greeted them. [redacted] spoke to BAYOUMI in Arabic, BAYOUMI inquired how [redacted] was doing and [redacted]. The meeting occurred near mid-day.

[redacted] states did not know BAYOUMI by name at the time, he had to ask the Saudi section afterwards who BAYOUMI was.

[redacted] was asked if he recalled or knew anything about an individual named [redacted]. He said he did not, but then added he may have met him at the KFM. [redacted] stated his children and his wife never knew BAYOUMI.

[redacted] was asked if he had ever spoke by phone or email with any of the people we had asked him about. [redacted] denied having spoken with [redacted]. [redacted] did note that a lot of people would call him at home and at work and ask for favors, such as speeding up their visa applications. At work he also received a lot of calls from religious centers and schools. People called [redacted] because he was known for getting things done. He was known as far as New Mexico, Texas, Colorado and New York for giving out Korans from the CKSA-LA.

[redacted] [redacted] DEPARTURE FROM THE CONSULATE

[redacted] When [redacted] left his job at the KSA consulate, he did receive a stipend. The Consul General at the time and a visiting Saudi prince gave him some financial help. After he left the consulate, [redacted] wife got a teaching job for three or four years. Now [redacted] gets about $500 per month from Social Security.

[redacted] [redacted] stated that during his [redacted] years working at the CKSA-LA consulate, he earned approximately [redacted] a month in salary. He stayed at the CKSA-LA for that length of time in a [redacted] job, even though he has [redacted] degree, because he felt he needed the visa to remain in the United States. He has sometimes wondered whether it was a curse or blessing to be at the Consulate. [redacted] felt his treatment at the CKSA-LA was worse than a slave without an education, and [redacted] survived this time in his life on his own personal strength.

[redacted] CKSA-LA leadership asked [redacted] to perform tasks which he considered beneath him, such as [redacted] the Saudi National Day celebration event. [redacted] performed this task for two years, but then in the third year he refused. He apologized to the Vice Consul, Dr. Sami al Ibrahim, and told Dr. al Ibrihim he would not do it. [redacted] was concerned about refusing because Dr. Ibrahim's wife is related to the late Saudi King Fahad. About three year ago, Mr. Zahrani (who had first introduced [redacted] to Dr. Ibrihim) told [redacted] that Dr. Ibrahim said that [redacted] had refused [redacted] and it was a "shame." Ibrahim conjectured that maybe this was the reason [redacted] [redacted] at the consulate.

[redacted] [redacted] TIME IN SAUDI ARABIA

[redacted] In 1981, [redacted] went to KSA for seven months to receive training in assisting Saudi students who would travel to and study in the United States. When asked if he had been ever been approached by Saudi governmental officials, recruited or received training by Saudi intelligence services at this time, [redacted] was non-committal and did not answer the question.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2032
DATE: 08-19-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/07/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Buffalo **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Cincinnati **Attn:**

Los Angeles **Attn:**

New York **Attn:**

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Title: [redacted]

PENTTBOM
[redacted] (G)

MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID;
aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDULLAH;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

ANWAR AULAQI
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To report results of interview of [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Details: [redacted] On 07/19/2007, writers and Buffalo JTTF member [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) met with [redacted] (P) at his place of business [redacted] (P), [redacted] (P) Niagra Falls, New York 14303.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) stated that he does not go by any other names including [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) reported that he was born on [redacted] (P) in [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) immigrated to Toronto, Canada in [redacted] (P) from [redacted] (P). When questioned regarding the details of such immigration [redacted] (P) became visibly upset, stopped talking and began to cry. Writers surmised that the experience of leaving [redacted] (P)

[redacted]

during [redacted] (P) would have been particularly traumatic, gave [redacted] (P) a moment to collect himself and moved on to other questions.

Family

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P) stated that his father's name is [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) and his mother's name is [redacted] (P) Both his father and mother are U.K. citizens normally residing in London. However, currently, [redacted] (P) is living with his younger wife [redacted] (P-1) Last Name Unknown (LNU) in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia.

[redacted] [redacted] In total, [redacted] (P) stated that his father had four wives and twenty children. [redacted] (P) advised that he did not know the name of the other two wives and that, in addition, he felt uncomfortable providing such information as he did not feel it related to him. [redacted] (P) added that his mother and father had ten total children, including [redacted] (P). There are four sons in order from oldest to youngest: [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) Both [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) live near [redacted] (P) in Canada, while [redacted] (P-1) lives in Maryland. There are six daughter in order from oldest to youngest: [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) and [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P) indicated that all six of his sisters are currently residing in the U.K.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P) stated that he is ethnically Arab but his family and their ancestors had been living in [redacted] (P) for "maybe 500 years." [redacted] (P) added that his family was probable originally from Yemen as there are a number of Yemenis who have the name [redacted] (P).

[redacted] [redacted] During the beginning of the interview, SA [redacted] (S) called a Department of Homeland Security [redacted] (P) Interpreter (INTERPRETER) and then passed the phone to [redacted] (P). In [redacted] (P), the INTERPRETER asked [redacted] (P) if he spoke [redacted] (P), if he was [redacted] (P) and where he was from originally. [redacted] (P) answered in [redacted] (P) stating that he did speak [redacted] (P), was [redacted] (P) and grew up in a small town in the south of [redacted] (P). The INTERPRETER stated to writers that from his limited interaction [redacted] (P) seemed to be [redacted] (P) and that his accent "sounded like someone from the south of [redacted] (P)."

Canada

[redacted] [redacted] In 1994, [redacted] (P) began attending [redacted] (P) in Ottawa, Canada. In 1999, [redacted] (P) graduated from [redacted] (P) with a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science. Soon after graduating [redacted] (P) began interviewing for jobs. One interview was with [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) located in San Diego. According to [redacted] (P) saw the job opening on monster.com and decided that San Diego was "a nice place" so went to San Diego to interview. (P) was subsequently offered a job working on their website, (P) and entered the U.S. on October 23, 1999 with an H1B visa. (P) indicated that he got along well with the CEO of the company (P) LNU, but has not had contact with him of late.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) states that he never knew MOHDAR ABDULLAH while he or ABDULLAH was living in Ottawa, even though they were both living there at the same time. (P) indicated that he only met ABDULLAH in San Diego.

San Diego

[redacted] [redacted] (P) stated that he lived at (P), (P) San Diego, CA 92117 when he first arrived in southern California. (P) described the apartment as a "small one-bedroom." When questioned regarding whether he had a roommate or if anyone had stayed with him while he was living at the above address, (P) responded "no, except for my wife later on." However, upon further prompting (P) seemed to recall that from approximately January 2000 until April or May 2000 he had a roommate. (P) was unsure what his roommate's name was, but believed it to be (P). (P) was a Saudi Arabian national who was attending an ESL program at UCSD. (P) was unable at such time to provide any additional information regarding (P) except to say that he attended the ISLAMIC CENTER OF SAN DIEGO (ICSD) with (P). (P) agreed to try to find out (P)'s whereabouts and let writers know.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) was then asked about the following individuals and provided information thereto:

[redacted] [redacted] **ANWAR AULAQI** - (P) was familiar with the name and perhaps the individual but did not know him well. (P) stated that AULAQI was political and that he (P) was not particularly interested in such things.

[redacted] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) [redacted] advised that he met (P) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia when they were both making the Umrah. (P) along with three other individuals, (P), (P) and (P), had won a scholarship given out by an (P), NFI, in San Diego. (P) stated that other than in this context he did not know or interact with these individuals.

[redacted] **MOHDAR ABDULLAH** - [redacted] (P) stated that he knew ABDULLAH casually from the ICSD. [redacted] (P) stated that no one introduced them but that they simply met one time after prayers at the mosque. When asked, [redacted] (P) stated that ABDULLAH had emailed him once since ABDULLAH returned to Yemen in May 2004, about getting his college transcripts. [redacted] (P) indicated that he did not respond to this email and has not heard from ABDULLAH since. [redacted] (P) could not explain how ABDULLAH would still have his email address after spending three years in prison, except to say that it was an easy email address to remember. [redacted] (P) offered that ABDULLAH would probably respond if [redacted] (P) wrote an email to him, adding that he had heard ABDULLAH was "reaching out" to a lot of people in the San Diego community.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) also could not explain why ABDULLAH would have had his phone number when ABDULLAH was arrested in 2001, only adding that they knew each other so it would be natural for him to have it.

[redacted] According to [redacted] (P), ABDULLAH was always with a group of people and was a very gregarious individual.

[redacted] **OMAR AL BAYOUMI** [redacted] (F) - [redacted] (P) [redacted] met AL BAYOUMI at the ICSD after one of the prayers sessions, but did not know him well. AL BAYOUMI, according to [redacted] (P) did try and talk with [redacted] (P) often but this was almost always in reference to AL BAYOUMI trying to sell him his "business model." [redacted] (P) could not recall what exactly was his "business model." [redacted] (P) stated that AL BAYOUMI was "kinda different" but could not elaborate. Everyone, according to [redacted] (P) noticed this differentness.

[redacted] [redacted] When questioned about AL BAYOUMI's relationship to KHALID AL MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL HAZMI, [redacted] (P) stated that AL BAYOUMI acted as if he was "responsible for them" and was always very "interested in their affairs." [redacted] (P) added that this was probable because AL BAYOUMI had "brought them" to San Diego (referring to AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR). [redacted] (P) was not able to be more specific as to how AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR had been brought to San Diego from Los Angeles.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) recalled one occasion when AL BAYOUMI invited him to come over to AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR's apartment. [redacted] (P) believed that this would have been in February or March of 2000. In addition to the four of them there were some additional individuals from the ICSD. [redacted] (P) believed that this gathering was a way to introduce AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR to the local community.

[redacted] [redacted] At first, (P) stated that AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR never visited his apartment, however, after some prompting he stated that, in fact, they came over somewhat regularly to visit with his roommate (P). (P) added that there were often "a lot of guys" from the ICSD over at his apartment with AL HAZMI, AL MIHDHAR and AL BAYOUMI. Despite such regular visits (P) states that he did not know AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR well or speak with them often. (P) described this group of males as very similar in situation, i.e. they were all around the same age, all students, and all attended the ICSD. (P) advised that he was unable to recall anyone else's name as he broke contact with them in the summer of 2000 after he got married. (P) stated that he changed apartments, stopped socializing with the group and thereafter lost contact with everyone. (P) added that he does remember that ABDULLAH was a part of the group and came over with them as well.

[redacted]

[redacted] (P) (P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

[redacted] (P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

[redacted] (P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

[redacted]

(P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

(P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

(P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

(P) - (P) stated that he did not know him.

[redacted] Writers subsequently questioned (P) about calls that had been made from telephone number (P) subscribed to (P) during his time living in San Diego. In particular, (P) was asked about seven calls between himself and AL BAYOUMI in the first three months of 2000 and an additional five calls in June of 2000. (P), in the opinion of writers, become noticeably angered and stated that there were "no calls" with AL BAYOUMI. Upon the insistence of writers that such calls existed, (P) remembered two additional individuals that stayed with him in his one-bedroom apartment on (P) From the middle of December 1999 until the middle of January 2000, IMAM MUHAMMED and IMAM KHALID, NFI, both from Saudi Arabia, were visiting the ICSD. AL BAYOUMI asked if they could stay with (P) for the month and (P) agreed. According to (P) the IMAMs must have made those calls to AL BAYOUMI or AL BAYOUMI must have been calling the IMAMs. (P) added that it was also possible he spoke with AL BAYOUMI on the phone regarding a blanket that AL BAYOUMI had loaned to the IMAMs for their stay in San Diego. (P) stated that the IMAMs had lost the blanket which was "special to AL BAYOUMI," and therefore AL BAYOUMI was upset and calling (P) about it.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) was also asked about two calls received from and one call made to telephone number (P) on 03/02/2000. (P) responded that he does not know anyone in Yemen and would not have made those calls. Again, after repeated insistence from writers that such calls took place, (P) stated that it must have been his roommate (P) (P) could not explain why a Saudi national would receive calls from or make a call to this Yemeni telephone number. (P) also then began to recall an argument he had with (P) regarding a call to Yemen that cost "something like fifty bucks." (P) could not provide any more information as to these phone calls.

[redacted] Finally, (P) was questioned regarding any phone calls made to Dallas, Texas. (P) responded that he had never called Dallas, but had been looking at getting a job there. NOTE: See (A), (G), (S) [redacted]

Recent Situation

[redacted] [redacted] (P) left San Diego on 07/09/2006 driving with his family to St. Catherine's, Canada. He drove because he wanted to take his family on a cross-country trip. (P) stated that he decided to leave San Diego because he wanted to open up his own business in a location where there would be less competition and his visa was expiring at the end of the year. Soon after arriving in Canada, (P) started a company (P) that specializes in (P).

[redacted] [redacted] In August of 2006, after leaving San Diego, (P) officially graduated from (P) with a Master of Science in Computer Science. (P) had, however, finished classes earlier in the summer, adding that he had not been in San Diego since he left in July 2006.

[redacted] [redacted] In December 2006, (P) learned that he had won a U.S. "green card" through the lottery system. (P) stated that he had originally applied for one while still living in San Diego in October or November of 2004. (P) is currently planning on moving back to the U.S. before the end of October to ensure he keeps his green card.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 08/07/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUP MEMBER
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted] (G), (S)
Name:
Squad:

SSN:
Name:
Squad:

SSN:
Name:
Squad:

Number: 1
Type: DOMESTIC/FOREIGN TRAVEL OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted] (G), (S)
Name:
Squad

SSN:
Name:
Squad

Number: 1
Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
Claimed By:
SSN: [redacted] (G), (S)
Name:
Squad:

SSN:
Name:
Squad:

SSN:
Name:
Squad:

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 08/07/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

BUFFALO

(G)

[redacted] [redacted] [Conduct logical investigation of (P) (P).

Set Lead 3: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

CINCINNATI

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Discretionary) NEW YORK

(G)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 08/07/2007

[redacted] [redacted] Consider the information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination, coordinate with (G)

♦♦

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

OFFICIAL RECORD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 11-16-2018

Date of entry 12/31/2015

[redacted] On December 16, 2015, (S), FBI SD-JTTF, and Detective (S) NYPD, NY-JTTF, interviewed (P) [redacted], aka (P) date of birth (P-1) (P), Place of Birth, (P), Social Security number, (P-1) INS number (P-1) at his home address (P) (P) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents in which (P) voluntarily provided the following:

[redacted] (P) inquired as to why interviewing agents were still asking further questions regarding (P) previous association with two 9/11 hijackers. (It should be noted that two 9/11 hijackers, named Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar from AA flight 77, resided and were assisted in their personal affairs by (P) during the beginning of 2000 while they all resided in Los Angeles, California). (P) stated that he thought investigators were finished after his previous interview in 2007 with his attorney present. (P) was advised that the interviewing agents were pursuing current leads, particularly, to an event that occurred at a Mediterranean restaurant in the Los Angeles area that pertained to (P) being a participant. (P) remembered the event stating the hijackers were staying in his apartment at the time and that he was asked by the hijackers to take them to the above mentioned Mediterranean restaurant. Being that (P) apartment was in close proximity to the restaurant he walked the hijackers to the restaurant from his apartment. (P) insisted he was not instructed by anyone to take the hijackers to the restaurant other than the hijackers instructing him to take them there. (P) said the hijackers previously knew of this restaurant before him walking them to it. (P) was unaware of how the hijackers knew the restaurant or if they were instructed to be at the restaurant for lunch. (P) did mention that after walking the hijackers to the restaurant he left and did not eat with the hijackers. (P) denied being instructed or notified by anyone to walk the two hijackers to this particular Mediterranean restaurant prior to that event occurring. (P) was aware that the two hijackers met with an individual named Omar Al Bayoumi while at the restaurant but (P) was unaware of the conversation that took place between them.

Investigation on 12/16/2015 at (P) United States (In Person)

File # (F) Date drafted 12/21/2015

by (S)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

[redacted] In addition to the above event, (P) wanted to point out to interviewing agents that he was not present at another occasion that he was asked about in the past. This event occurred at a hotel room where the hijackers stayed, (It should be noted that this event took place on a return trip by the hijackers to Los Angeles from San Diego, California, in June 2000). (P) pointed out that two Yemeni males, identified as Mohdar and (P) stayed with the hijackers in the hotel room on that occasion. (P) ate dinner with the hijackers earlier that evening but did not go to the hotel room that night. (P) agreed when interviewing agents said that Mohdar was named Mohdar Abdullah and (P) was named (P).

[redacted] Interviewing agents asked (P) if he was acquainted with an individual named (P). (P) immediately acknowledged that he was acquainted with (P) (P) and (P) met through the mosque in Los Angeles, California. (P) and (P) became acquainted after they attended together the King Fahad Mosque years ago. (P) described his relationship with (P) as not close, he said they spoke in person on a casual basis. (P) denied ever speaking to (P) over the phone. At the time, (P) was working for the Consulate Office for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles. (P) was unaware of (P) particular duties at the Consulate Office. (P) acknowledged that his mother was best friends with (P) wife and as a result the (P) family and the (P) family have been well acquainted for years. (P) mother and father have relocated back to San Diego, California, after only residing in (P)

[redacted] (P) wanted clarification from interviewing agents as to why (P) (P) contacted his, ((P) (P) named (P), to make a current inquiry of (P). (P) relayed that (P) telephonically contacted (P) two days ago to advise of (P) inquiry of him, ((P) The contact between (P) and (P) occurred recently in Los Angeles, California. (P) asked (P) why (P) was asking about him and learned that (P) was in the process of obtaining citizenship from the United States. (P) would not elaborate on how (P) knew of (P) immigration process or what else was discussed between (P) and (P) (P) was unaware of how being acquainted with (P) would affect (P) immigration process. (P) was still confused as to (P) inquiry with his brother in law due to (P) not having had any contact with (P) since (P) resided in Los Angeles.

[redacted] At this time, (P) wanted to advise interviewing agents that he has moved on with his life since associating with the two 9/11 hijackers by relocating to (P) and buying an affordable home, he has had two more children born to the union with his wife since moving to (P) and now he has a total of five children to raise. (P) has been employed by the (P) for the past (P) years to include a company transfer to (P) from San Diego. Presently, (P) has been promoted to the position of (P) for (P) (P) of (P). (P) ended the interview at this time stating any further questions should be directed to his attorney, (P).

(D)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2032
DATE: 08-19-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/08/2007

To: Counterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

CIRG **Attn:**

Buffalo **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Los Angeles **Attn:**

New York **Attn:**

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

[redacted] **Title:** [redacted] PENTTBOM
[redacted] (G)

MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID;
aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDULLAH;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] To report results of interview of KAYSAN BIN DON.

[redacted] (G)

Administrative: ([redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Photocopies of photographs of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] **General Note:** [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] (P) (P) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted]

(P) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] BIN DON was asked to recount the events of the day he traveled with AL-BAYOUMI to Los Angeles, California, and met NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON explained that AL-BAYOUMI had had an issue with his visa and had for weeks been trying to decide how to handle it. Writers queried BIN DON if it was a visa or passport renewal issue, to which BIN DON stated that it was "definitely" a visa issue. BIN DON was sure because AL-BAYOUMI had considered going across the U.S.-Mexican border and then coming back into the U.S. so that his visa would renew. Writers queried BIN DON how a U.S. visa issue, issued by the U.S., could be resolved at a Saudi Consulate. BIN DON stated that he "didn't know," but assumed that it resolved during their visit since he never heard AL-BAYOUMI discuss it again.

[redacted] [redacted] A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles.

[redacted] [redacted] BIN DON advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[redacted] [redacted] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[redacted] [redacted] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's." [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] [redacted] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to [redacted] Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[redacted] [redacted] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'" AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[redacted] [redacted] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[redacted] [redacted] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[redacted] [redacted] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[redacted] [redacted] At this time in the interview, BIN DON wanted to emphasize to writers that this was a "chance meeting" and that AL-BAYOUMI had received no information about AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR before meeting them. [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] [redacted] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P), however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P)

(P) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

```
Number:  1
Type:  ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUP MEMBER
ITU:  AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By: (G), (S) [redacted]
     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:

     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:

Number:  1
Type:  DOMESTIC/FOREIGN TRAVEL OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL
ITU:  AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By: (G), (S) [redacted]
     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:

     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:
Number:  1
Type:  POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU:  LIAISON WITHIN FBI
Claimed By: (G), (S) [redacted]
     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:

     SSN:
     Name:
     Squad:
```

[redacted]

[redacted]

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CIRG

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear

Set Lead 3: (Info)

BUFFALO

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] [redacted] Read and clear

Set Lead 4: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] For information only.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Discretionary)

NEW YORK

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] [redacted] Consider the information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination, coordinate with [redacted] (G)

◆◆

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035
DATE: 08-19-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/20/2010

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

San Diego **Attn:**

From: New York

[redacted] (G), (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
[redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID;
aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDULLAH;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Results of interview of Kaysan Morgan

Details: [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted]

(P)

[redacted] [redacted] (P)

(P)

[redacted] (P)

(P)

[redacted] [redacted] MORGAN was asked to recount the events of the day he traveled with AL-BAYOUMI to Los Angeles, California, and met NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR. MORGAN explained that AL-BAYOUMI had an issue with his visa and had for weeks been trying to decide how to handle it. Writers queried MORGAN if it was a visa or passport renewal issue,to which MORGAN stated that it was "definitely" a visa issue. MORGAN was sure because AL-BAYOUMI had considered going across the U.S.-Mexican border and then coming back into the U.S. so that his visa would renew. Writer queried MORGAN how a U.S. visa issue, issued by the U.S.could be resolved at a Saudi Consulate. MORGAN stated that he "didn't know," but assumed that it resolved during their visit since he never heard AL-BAYOUMI discuss it again.

[redacted] [redacted] A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked MORGAN if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take MORGAN to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to MORGAN). MORGAN stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles.

[redacted] [redacted] MORGAN advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. MORGAN stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. MORGAN stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[redacted] [redacted] MORGAN stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to MORGAN and spoke with him in Arabic. MORGAN described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. MORGAN stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and MORGAN subsequently left. MORGAN did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[redacted] [redacted] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and MORGAN proceeded to the KFM. MORGAN advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session, but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writer queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed MORGAN around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason MORGAN came to Los Angeles. MORGAN commented no. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for MORGAN, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that he had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[redacted] [redacted] MORGAN and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like "Mediterranean Deli." Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for MORGAN as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals." AL-BAYOUMI and MORGAN then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that MORGAN believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to MORGAN. AL-BAYOUMI and MORGAN entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[redacted] [redacted] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, MORGAN now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the menu that was hanging near the counter. MORGAN described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. MORGAN advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. MORGAN indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. MORGAN remembers this because he was engaged in a conversation with AL-BAYOUMI at the time, and AL-BAYOUMI was preoccupied with the two men and ignoring MORGAN.

[redacted] [redacted] MORGAN stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. It appeared to MORGAN that the two men were reluctant to come with AL-BAYOUMI to the table where MORGAN and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. MORGAN described AL-BAYOUMI "pulling at their shirts" to persuade them to come over to the table. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with MORGAN. MORGAN indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed, because MORGAN knew no Arabic at the time. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for MORGAN that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently living in an apartment nearby, but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. MORGAN added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that MORGAN did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (P) The four then separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and MORGAN returning to their car. Before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[redacted] [redacted] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and MORGAN prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. At this time, AL-BAYOUMI met with the same unknown male he met at the Saudi Consulate earlier. The two men went into a "conference room" near the entrance of the mosque, and spoke alone for approximately 2 to 3 minutes. When AL-BAYOUMI exited the room, he walked over to another male and engaged in a brief conversation with him also. (P) (P) (P) AL-BAYOUMI and MORGAN then left the KFM to return to San Diego. MORGAN guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] [redacted] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by MORGAN, for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. MORGAN stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. MORGAN video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind MORGAN, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P) (P) the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." MORGAN stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told MORGAN that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] (P) (P)

[redacted] (D) [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 06/20/2010

(D) (P)
(P)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 06/20/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

[redacted] read and clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CA

[redacted] read and clear

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043
DATE: 10-18-2021

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OFFICIAL RECORD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of entry 04/05/2018

Mohdar Mohammed ABDULLAH, date of birth (P-1)/1979, mobile telephone number (P-1) telephonically contacted (S) on 04/04/2018. ABDULLAH continues to reside in (P-1) and is currently married with children. ABDULLAH intends to attempt to travel to the United States (US) to try to establish the parental status with the son he believes he had with his former fiancee (P) and sought information regarding his current status with the US Government.

ABDULLAH believes his alleged child with (P) is residing in (P-1) now, and ABDULLAH has been in contact with the "San Diego Family Law Firm," telephone number 619-618-1984, regarding potential efforts to establish his parentage of (P) child. The San Diego Family Law Firm quoted him a retainer fee of $4,000.00 USD, which he has withheld paying pending determination of his ability to visit the US.

According to contacts in an unidentified San Diego mosque (P) attends whom ABDULLAH still speaks with, (P) does not want any contact with ABDULLAH. These contacts have also provided ABDULLAH with social media accounts for (P) and her former boyfriend.

ABDULLAH is aware that he is mentioned in a pending lawsuit involving allegations of Saudi Arabian government involvement in the 09/11/2001 attack on New York on made by families of the victims, and asked about further information regarding the lawsuit. ABDULLAH believes that Saudi Consulate employees, particularly Omar AL-BAYOUMI, may have been somehow complicit in helping the hijackers. When questioned why he believes that, ABDULLAH stated that is his opinion and he doesn't know anything more than what he had provided to the FBI in the past.

ABDULLAH asked about the status of the tape of the hijackers in Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) from June 2005, and whether the unidentified person in the tape had been located. ABDULLAH claims to remember the tape as it was shown to him vividly, and that he thought about often. ABDULLAH claimed no further information about the tape or the visit to the airport than what he had previously provided.

Investigation on 04/04/2018 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)

[redacted] File # (F) Date drafted 04/05/2018

by (S)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[redacted] (F)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] Telephonic contact with Mohdar Mohammed ABDULLAH, On 04/04/2018, Page 2 of 2

ABDULLAH is in the process of applying for a (P-1) passport, and intends to apply for a US visitor visa. Before doing so, he wishes to communicate with the FBI to determine his status, particularly whether he is still a subject of investigation. ABDULLAH remains in contact with agents from the (P-1).

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2032
DATE: 08-26-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/21/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Buffalo **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Cincinnati **Attn:**

Los Angeles **Attn:**

New York **Attn:**

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 04-06-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

From: New York

(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

[redacted] **Title:** [redacted] PENTTBOM

(G)

MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID;

aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDULLAH;

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] To report information received during telephone call from (P).

[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: ([redacted]) (F) 08/21/2007

Administrative: [redacted] (G), (A), (J-1)

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] On 08/21/2007, writer received a phone call from (P) who was calling from his place of business at (P) Niagra Falls, New York 14303.

[redacted] [redacted] Writer queried (P) as to his well-being and whether the prior interview had caused any problems at work. (P) stated that "things are fine" at work, adding that his employers had had some questions regarding the interview but (P) had resolved everything. (P) advised that he would have his attorney call writer and that (P) would prefer to speak in the future, which he stated he is willing to do, with his attorney present. (P) added that his attorney would provide contact information for contacting the attorney in the future.

[redacted] [redacted] Writer emphasized that this was not a custodial interview and that (P) was "free to answer or not answer" any question he wished; adding that anytime (P) spoke with writer, it would only be on a voluntary basis. Writer added that [redacted]' attorney was welcome at any future meetings between [redacted] and the FBI.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] stated that he was willing to answer any questions but felt that he had already provided as much information as he knew. Writer advised that there were some questions for which writer needed additional information. Writer reminded [redacted] that those questions had been discussed at the end of the previous interview. [redacted] stated that he had no more information regarding [redacted] (variant [redacted] [redacted]), adding that it must have been [redacted] who called that number in Yemen (referring to telephone number [redacted]). [redacted] stated that [redacted] was probably calling his "folks." [redacted] could not explain why [redacted], a Saudi would be calling his "folks" in Yemen. [redacted] advised that his attorney would be in contact with writer in the near future.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 08/21/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type: ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUP MEMBER

ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW

Claimed By:

(G), (S)

SSN: [redacted]

Name:

Squad

Number: 1

Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)

ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI

Claimed By:

(G), (S)

SSN: [redacted]

Name:

Squad:

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 08/21/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary) NEW YORK

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Consider the information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination, coordinate with [redacted] (G)

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL OTHER RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Read and clear.

♦♦

FD-542 (Rev. 06-13-2007)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2033
DATE: 10-21-2021

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/16/2008

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

Cincinnati **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Los Angeles **Attn:**

New York **Attn:**

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 06-13-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (S)

FATHI MOHAMMED ALI AIDARUS
[redacted] (S)

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] To report information received during an interview of [redacted].

[redacted] [redacted]

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Photocopy of a photograph of [redacted] [redacted].

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] On 01/10/2008, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] of the New York Office and [redacted] of the Cincinnati Office met with and interviewed [redacted] [redacted] in the presence of his attorney [redacted] at [redacted]'s office, located at [redacted] [redacted]. [redacted]'s attorney, while generally cooperative, was particularly sensitive to questions regarding [redacted]'s background and path to U.S. citizenship. This, agents surmised, was possibly due to some potential irregularities in

[redacted]

(P)'s immigration file. As a result, in order to maintain the flow of the interview as well as ensure that it would not be cut short by the attorney, many followup questions regarding (P)'s background were omitted with the hope that, if necessary, such details could be filled in at a later date.

[redacted] **Background**

[redacted] Interviewing agents began the interview thanking (P) for agreeing to participate and letting (P) know that while the primary purpose of the interview was for information the agents could make no guarantee that information garnered would not be used for future prosecution or investigation of (P).

[redacted] (P) was born on (P) in (P) which at the time was (P). All of (P)'s grandparents were (P), with the exception of his paternal grandfather, who was (P). (P) lived in (P) for approximately (P) years and then moved to a small village in (P) with his family. The move was prompted by civil unrest in (P). After living in (P) for approximately (P) years, (P) and his family moved to (P). This move was prompted by (P)'s mother's declining health and (P)'s father's belief that (P) would offer greater medical options. (P) lived in (P) for the next (P) years, from the age of [redacted]. After graduating from high school in [redacted] at the age of 19, [redacted] attended college in [redacted] for approximately one year and then transferred to a college in [redacted].

[redacted] For the next [redacted] years, from [redacted] until [redacted], [redacted] lived in [redacted] pursuing his undergraduate degree. After finishing his Bachelor's Degree, [redacted] worked in [redacted] for approximately [redacted] years, until [redacted], at which point [redacted] moved back to [redacted] for [redacted] [redacted] to be closer to his family. [redacted] then moved back to [redacted] for [redacted] [redacted]. Sometime during this year in [redacted], [redacted] applied for a U.S. Diversity Visa (DV) based on his [redacted] nativity.

[redacted] [redacted] was subsequently awarded a DV and proceeded to move to [redacted] California, where his uncle then lived. [redacted] lived in [redacted] with his uncle for approximately one year. In [redacted], [redacted] moved to [redacted], California for better employment. [redacted] spent about [redacted] years in [redacted] before moving to [redacted] in early [redacted], where his sister was then living. The reason for this move was again for better employment. [redacted] lived in [redacted] until [redacted] when he then moved to [redacted]. [redacted] had been working for a company called [redacted] in [redacted]. The company was about to lay [redacted] off in [redacted], so [redacted] inquired and subsequently found a job with the same company in San Diego. While in San Diego, [redacted] (P) began working for [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P). In February 2006, [redacted] (P) moved to [redacted] (P), where he now resides, to pursue a job opportunity with [redacted] (P).

[redacted] Interaction with NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR

[redacted] [redacted] (P) recalls first meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR as he [redacted] (P) was exiting the KING FAHAD MOSQUE (KFM) after prayers. [redacted] (P) along with around 15 to 20 other individuals were walking out when AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR came up to him, introduced themselves and asked if the prayer was over. [redacted] (P) replied that it was, but he would show AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR inside the KFM. (NOTE: There is some contradiction in [redacted] (P) s recollection of this first meeting. In the first interview of [redacted] (P) by the FBI, [redacted] (P) states that he meets AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the KFM while entering to pray. In the next two interviews, [redacted] (P) states that he meets AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR as he is exiting the KFM.)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) advised that he could tell AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were Saudi, by way of their accent. So [redacted] (P) decided to introduce them to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, the Imam of the KFM, as he was also Saudi. Agents asked [redacted] (P), considering that the KFM is a Saudi Mosque, if he was familiar with any other Saudis then in attendance and if he personally knew them. (P) replied that there were other Saudis there with whom he was acquainted but he did not know them well. Agents then asked (P) the demeanor of AL-THUMAIRY, noting that (P) had described AL-THUMAIRY in previous interviews as quiet and not very personable. (P) agreed that Al-THUMAIRY was not "really a friendly person," adding that he seemed "arrogant." Continuing, Agents then queried why (P) would introduce AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY considering he knew other Saudis at the KFM and AL-THUMAIRY did not seem like the "friendliest Imam." To which, (P) was not able to provide an explanation. (NOTE: During the first interview and this interview (the fourth) (P) states that he introduces AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY the first time he meets them, however, during the second and third interviews (P) states that he introduces them during the second meeting.)

[redacted] [redacted] After introducing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY, (P) walked to another part of the KFM and began his personal prayers. While (P) was praying, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR spoke with AL-THUMAIRY. (P) estimated that they talked for about 10 minutes. After finishing his prayers, (P) walked over to where AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were talking with Al-THUMAIRY. Then, (P) walked out of the KFM with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. (P) emphatically stated that he did not hear any of the conversation and at no time did he exchange any words with AL-THUMAIRY, other than to introduce AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Agents queried (P) as to how he could so precisely time his movements as to not hear any portion of the conversation among AL-HAZMI, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-THUMAIRY, to which (P) shrugged.

[redacted] As the three left the KFM together, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told (P) that they were staying at a hotel downtown, but would like to move closer to the community. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stated they planned on studying English in the U.S. and wanted to live close to the local Muslim community. (P) then offered to show AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR a few motels located on Sepulveda Blvd., which were close to the KFM. Agents queried (P) why he would show them motels rather than apartments near the KFM. (P) stated that they wanted to stay in a motel. Agents followed up by asking why AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR would choose to live in a motel and not an apartment if their plan to study English and integrate into the community was more long-term. (P) again could not offer an explanation as to their behavior, adding that he didn't question their actions.

[redacted] After pointing out a few of the motels, (P), AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walked north on Sepulveda Blvd. and then headed east on Venice Blvd. toward Midvale Avenue. (P) showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR a few local "Mediterranean restaurants" and grocery stores. (P) stated that the "Mediterranean restaurants" he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were immediately east of Midvale Avenue on Venice Blvd. (NOTE: This location is the exact place where both the Mediterranean Deli and Mediterranean Restaurant were located. According to KAYSAN BIN DON, when he (BIN DON) and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI first met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR it was in the Mediterranean Restaurant (after first quickly stopping in the Mediterranean Deli) on Venice Blvd. immediately east of Midvale Avenue (F) [redacted] (F) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] Agents queried (P) why he was showing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR "Mediterranean restaurants." (P) looked to his attorney, who replied that (P) meant "Middle Eastern restaurants." Agents followed up by asking (P) if he was familiar with and used the terms "Arabic or Middle Eastern." (P) replied that he was familiar, to which Agents then asked why (P) had used the word "Mediterranean" to describe the restaurants he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR instead of "Arabic or Middle Eastern." (P) replied that he had meant "Middle Eastern." (NOTE: In the first two interviews of (P), he refers to the restaurant as an "Arabic restaurant," not a "Mediterranean restaurant." In the third interview, (P) does not specify the type of restaurant he shows AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.)

[redacted] Agents asked (P) whether they then ate at any of the restaurants he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. (P) replied that he did not eat with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. However, (P) then immediately added that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR may have ordered food, but that he didn't order anything. (P) advised that they may have ordered the food "to go" or they may have quickly eaten the food. Agents then asked again if (P) ate with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the restaurant, to which (P) replied that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR "probably got something to eat" and they "probably ate it at the restaurant," but that he (P) did not order anything. After visiting the restaurant, (P) pointed out a nearby grocery store on the same block to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.

[redacted] [redacted] Agents queried (P) as to whether they exchanged phone numbers or agreed to meet again. (P) advised that he provided his home phone to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and told them he would see them in the mosque. (P) does not recall exactly how they parted but he (P) walked home from the restaurant.

[redacted] [redacted] Agents asked (P) what he knew about AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR after the first meeting. (P) replied that he knew they were from Saudi Arabia and that they had come to the United States to study English. (P) advised that when they first met, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told him they had only been in the United States a couple of days. Agents then queried

(P) as to why he was providing assistance to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, to which (P) replied that it was common among Muslims to assist others in the community, especially travelers. Agents queried (P) how many other times prior to meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, did he (P) assist other Muslims from the mosque. (P) replied "this was the first time." Agents queried (P) how many times since meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, did he (P) assist Muslims from the mosque. (P) replied "never."

[redacted] (P) stated that the next time he saw AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was a "couple of days later at the mosque." (P) was walking into the KFM when he "ran into" AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR who were also coming in to pray. After praying the three exited the KFM together. (P) then accompanied AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to their motel located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Washington Blvd. and Venice Blvd. in Culver City. (P) estimated that it was a five to ten minute walk from the KFM. (P) went into their room for a short while and then returned home.

[redacted] [redacted] After another "couple of days," (P) met with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR again. (P) could not recall if AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR had called him at home or if they had all met at the mosque again. In either case, (P) drove AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to a local grocery store, "probably only a couple of blocks from the mosque," in (P)'s car. (P) advised that

AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR bought some groceries and then they all returned to their motel room. Agents queried (P) why he would drive them to a grocery store that seemed to be within walking distance of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel room. (P) replied that he had his car with him at the KFM so he decided to drive them. When agents reminded (P) that he had just stated AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR may have called him at home to pick them up, (P) replied that he couldn't remember. Agents then queried (P) whether he drove AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR because they planned on buying "a lot of groceries," to which (P) replied that they didn't buy very much at the grocery store.

[redacted] [redacted] The next time that (P) recalls being with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR is when they asked if (P) would drive them to the downtown area of Los Angeles, so AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR could take a bus to San Diego. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told (P) that they wanted to visit San Diego to see if they would prefer to live there. (P) advised AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR that he would not be able to take them "all the way downtown," because of (P)'s work. (P) offered to instead call and find out if there was a bus terminal closer to Culver City. (P) placed a call from the payphone in front of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel to the bus company ((P) could not recall the name of the company, but thought that it could have been the GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY). According to (P) the bus company told him there was another terminal in Santa Monica that would have buses going to San Diego. (P) asked about the schedule for the following day and provided the information to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Agents queried (P) as to why he would use a payphone and not his own phone or AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel phone. (P) could provide no explanation except to say that they must have needed to use the phonebook. Agents queried (P) if he had a phonebook at home or if there was a phonebook in AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel room, to which (P) replied "yes" to both. Agents then followed up by asking if it was (P)'s normal practice to use payphones, to which (P) replied "no." Agents then asked again why (P) had used the payphone, to which (P) stated that they must have been in front of the payphone, "so it was easier to use the payphone." Agents then asked if (P) had ever called flight schools for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR from that payphone or any payphone, to which (P) replied that he had not.

[redacted] [redacted] The next day (P) picked AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR up at their motel and dropped them off at the bus terminal in Santa Monica. (P) could not recall how they "checked out" of the motel. (P) stated that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR left a suitcase with him, stating that they would pick it up at a later date. After dropping AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the bus terminal, (P) did not hear anything from them for "a week or so" and then received a call from AL-HAZMI. AL-HAZMI told (P) that they had decided to stay in San Diego and would come and get their bag at a later date. At this time in early 2000, (P) advised that he didn't know anyone in San Diego.

[redacted] [redacted] (NOTE: During the interview, (P) presented his interaction with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR during the time they lived in Los Angeles as discreet and limited. However, considering the amount of time AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR first spent in Los Angeles (between 10 and 20 days), (P) actually appears to have seen them quite frequently and for relatively long periods of time on each occasion. During the interview, (P) was able to recall at least 5 specific occasions when he was with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Yet, as (P) himself admits, although he cannot recall exactly, he likely saw them a couple of additional times at the KFM. This would mean that (P) saw them almost every other day during their time in Los Angeles. (P)'s contact with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at this level of frequency appears to contradict his characterization of their interaction.)

[redacted] [redacted] Agents asked (P) how he felt when AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR left Los Angeles. (P) appeared befuddled by this type of question, as he began to stammer and looked repeatedly to his attorney for guidance. When agents asked (P) if he was happy or relieved, (P) immediately stated that he was "relieved." (P) appeared to relax considerably at that moment, slouching more into his chair and leaning back from the table. During much of the earlier questioning (P)'s lower jaw quivered, his hands shook and he played with the bottle top of his water bottle.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) does not recall hearing anything from AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR for "a couple of months or so," and then received a call from AL-HAZMI stating that both he and AL-MIHDHAR were coming up to Los Angeles. (P) believed that this was probably around the summer of 2000. (P) stated that he invited his friend (P) to come to dinner that night and meet everyone at (P)'s apartment. (P) could not explain why he asked (P) to come along with him, merely stating that (P) was his friend so he asked him.

[redacted] (P) advised that he and (P) met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and another individual named MOHDAR ABDULLAH (MOHDAR) at (P)'s home on (P). Agents queried (P) how AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR knew where (P) ived, to which (P) replied that he had shown them before. Agents then asked when (P) had shown them, as he had earlier stated that he merely pointed in the direction of his home, up (P) (P). At this point (P)'s attorney interjected that (P) must have told them on the phone. (P) could not recall what kind of car the three had driven from San Diego but stated that he believed MOHDAR was driving because "he always drove." That night MOHDAR, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed at the home of

(P)'s sister, which was located in the same apartment complex as (P)'s. (P) could not recall the subject of conversation that night except to state that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had asked (P) about going to school and getting married in the U.S. (P) does not recall interacting with MOHDAR, AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR the next morning. (P) advised that at some point during their stay AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR picked up the bag they had left and took it with them. (NOTE: (P)'s recollection of how he met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR again in Los Angeles, after they moved to San Diego, is noteworthy. In (P)'s first interview he states that they simply all met at the KFM. In the second interview (P) adds a phone call from AL-HAZMI prior to meeting at the KFM. By the third interview, (P) has dropped the meeting at the KFM and states that they merely called him and then met at (P)'s apartment.)

[redacted] [redacted] A couple of months after this meeting, (P) recalled receiving a phone call from AL-HAZMI stating that he was coming up to Los Angeles to look into going to school there. (P) stated that AL-HAZMI met (P) at (P)'s home and stayed there that night. The next morning (P) came over and went with AL-HAZMI to a nearby community college to make inquiries about studying. (P) explained that (P) went with AL-HAZMI instead of (P) because (P) was going to that school and had the time to go with AL-HAZMI. Agents queried (P) if this was why (P) was invited to meet AL-HAZMI and

AL-MIHDHAR for dinner, to which [redacted] (P) said that it might have been but he couldn't recall.

FATHI AIDARUS

[redacted] [redacted] Agents showed [redacted] (P) a picture of [redacted] (P) (a copy of which is attached hereto). [redacted] (P) stated that this individual is [redacted] (P), although he has a slight accent (NFI). [redacted] (P) met this individual at the Masjid Al-Ribat in San Diego. [redacted] (P) could not immediately recall his name, but confirmed that it was [redacted] (P) once agents stated the name. [redacted] (P) was a [redacted] (P)" originally from [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) added that he does not know [redacted] (P) very well and has not had contact with him recently.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/16/2008

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)

ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted] (G), (S)
Name:
Squad:

SSN: [redacted] (G), (S)
Name:
Squad:

SSN:
Name: [redacted] (S)
Squad:

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/16/2008

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] For your information only.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

(G)

[redacted] For your information only.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

CINCINNATI

(G)

[redacted] For your information only.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

(G)

[redacted] For your information only.

Set Lead 6: (Discretionary) NEW YORK

(G)

[redacted] [redacted] Consider the information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination, coordinate with (G)

♦♦

FD-542 (Rev. 04-06-2007)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035
DATE: 08-20-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 03/25/2010

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

San Diego **Attn:**

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

[redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] [redacted]

OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted]

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted]

OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted]

ANWAR NASSAR AULAQI,
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 04-06-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] To report results of interview of (P) (P).

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] On 03/10/2010, writers, along with (S) (S), met (P) at a hotel in La Jolla, CA. Writers showed (P) a number of photographs and discussed related topics regarding them.

[redacted] [redacted] The New York Office has conducted an interview of (P) in the past with (S) of the San Diego Office. During the course of the interview he has stated that he had knowledge of subjects involved with OPERATION ENCORE, particularly, two of the 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAZMI, along with FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and (P). During this investigation new information has been discovered that (P) could provide some insight into, particularly ADEL AL-SADHAN and MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY.

[redacted] (P) was asked about any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between (P) (P) and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). (P) stated that he was told by (P) that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. (P) did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other then to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. (P) did request (P) to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. (P) would see (P) with the two men at the mosque almost everyday, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

[redacted] (P) states he was told by (P) that the two men were living at his house on (P). (P) stated to (P) that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with (P)s other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. (P) was unaware when (P) had requested that of his sister.

[redacted] (P) recalls a conversation that he had with (P) shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A.

[redacted]

regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that (P) told (P) that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. (P) asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. (P) stated to (P) that he just needed to take them there. (P) did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings.

[redacted] A couple of weeks after the arrival, and assignment of (P) to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, (P) met (P) at the mosque. (P) asked (P) where the two men were that he wanted to introduce to (P). (P) stated that they had left L.A. He stated that they had a "referral" in San Diego, so they went down there. (P) states that was the first time that he had seen (P) without the two men.

[redacted] In June of 2000, after the night prayer at the mosque, (P) walked into the parking lot and saw (P) with three other men. (P) introduced (P) to Al-Mihdhar, Al-Hazmi, and Mohdar Abdullah (which he identified from a photo). (P) stated that all of them were going to (P) house for dinner and asked (P) to join them for dinner. (P) said that he had to get home to his wife, but may meet with them later. (P) stated one of them, and he is unsure who, stated that they would be at a hotel later. (P) can not remember which hotel they were in. (P) then remembers Al-Thumairy exiting the mosque and greeting the men in the parking lot with a hug. (P) then left the parking lot and went home. At approximately 10:00 pm, (P) leaves his house and travels to the hotel that the men had told him earlier they would be at. He arrived at the room (unknown what the room number was) and was greeted by Al-Mihdhar. Mohdar and Al-Hazmi were on separate beds and Al-Mihdhar was praying on the floor. There came a time, that someone(identity unknown) came to the door and was greeted by Al-Mihdhar. The two men left the room, but shortly afterwards Al-Mihdhar returned stating he had to make a call. Al-Mihdhar was gone for an unknown amount of time, but when he returned, he was asked by Al-Hazmi if everything was alright, and he answered yes. (P) stayed in the room with them until approximately 2:00 am. He stated that during the night, he was asked a number of questions by Al-Hazmi about his background and family history. (P) stated that he felt uncomfortable with the line of questions, but didn't want to be rude, so he answered them.

[redacted] (P) was asked where he was during the events of September 11, 2001. (P) stated that he was in (P) at the time. He states that the trip was planned for about a month prior. He doesn't have a recollection of the date of his trip. He does recall, however, that it was (P)'s father and brother that drove him to the airport for his flight to (P). It is at this time during the interview that (P) states that (P) was in (P) during the events of 9/11 also. He stated that (P) left for (P) first and that, he drove (P) to the airport for his flight to (P) That is a fact that was unknown to the investigators. (P) stated that they were in (P) together and departed Yemen not long after 9/11. He was unable to remember the dates of their travel.

[redacted] (P) is available for recontact if the need for another interview arises.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] 03/25/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

(G)

[redacted] [redacted] Read and clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] Read and clear.

◆◆

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035
DATE: 08-19-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/21/2010

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Cincinnati **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

From: New York

[redacted] (G), (S)

[redacted]

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)
(Pending)
(Pending)
(Pending)

Title: OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted]

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: [redacted] To report information received during an interview of (P).

Details: [redacted] On 05/13/2010, (S), (S) of the New York Office, and AUSA (S) of the Southern District of New York met with and interviewed (P) (P) in the presence of his attorney (P) at (P)'s office, located at (P).

[redacted] Investigators began the interview thanking (P) for agreeing to participate and letting (P) know that while the primary purpose of the interview was for information, and the investigators could make no guarantee that information garnered would not be used for future prosecution or investigation of (P).

[redacted] (P) recalls first meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR as he (P) was exiting the KING FAHAD MOSQUE (KFM) after prayers. (P) along with around 15 to 20 other individuals were walking out

[redacted]

when AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR came up to him, introduced themselves and asked if the prayer was over. (P) replied that it was, but he would show AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR inside the KFM. (NOTE: There is some contradiction in (P)'s recollection of this first meeting. In the first interview of (P) by the FBI, (P) states that he meets AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the KFM while entering to pray. In the next two interviews, (P) states that he meets AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR as he is exiting the KFM.)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stated that they were from Saudi Arabia. So, (P) decided to introduce them to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, the Imam of the KFM, as he was also Saudi. (P) stated that when he told AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR that he would introduce them to SHEIK FAHAD, (FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY), that the two men were very hesitant to meet AL-THUMAIRY. This caught (P) by surprise because he thought that the two men would welcome meeting another Saudi, particularly, the Imam of the mosque. (P) agreed that Al-THUMAIRY was not "really a friendly person," adding that he seemed "arrogant." (P) was asked why he would introduce AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY considering he knew other Saudis at the

KFM and AL-THUMAIRY did not seem like the "friendliest Imam." To which, [redacted] was not able to provide an explanation. (NOTE: During the first interview and this interview (the fourth) [redacted] states that he introduces AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY the first time he meets them, however, during the second and third interviews [redacted] states that he introduces them during the second meeting.)

[redacted] After introducing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to AL-THUMAIRY, [redacted] walked a short distance away and began his personal prayers. While [redacted] was praying, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR spoke with AL-THUMAIRY. [redacted] estimated that they talked for about 10 minutes. After finishing his prayers, [redacted] walked over to where AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were talking with Al-THUMAIRY. Then, [redacted] walked out of the KFM with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. [redacted] emphatically stated that he did not hear any of the conversation and at no time did he exchange any words with AL-THUMAIRY, other than to introduce AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.

[redacted] As the three left the KFM together, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told [redacted] that they were staying at a hotel downtown, but would like to move closer to the community. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stated they planned on studying English in the U.S. and wanted to live close to the local Muslim community. (P) stated that he offered to show AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR a few motels located on Sepulveda Blvd., which were close to the KFM. (P) was asked why he would show them motels rather than apartments near the KFM. (P) stated that they wanted to stay in a motel. (P) was then asked why AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR would choose to live in a motel and not an apartment if their plan to study English and integrate into the community was more long-term. (P) again could not offer an explanation as to their behavior, adding that he didn't question their actions.

[redacted] (P) was asked if the two men, Al-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, ever stayed at the apartment behind his house that his sister lived in. (A), (G) [redacted] (P) was told that investigators received information that (P) asked his sister to move in with another family member in order to have an apartment available for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. (P) stated that he couldn't remember that, but he couldn't see himself asking his sister to move out so someone else could move in. (P) did state ,that on one occasion, AL-HAZMI did stay there overnight while he was in Los Angeles.

[redacted] After pointing out a few of the motels, (P) AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walked north on Sepulveda Blvd. and then headed east on Venice Blvd. toward Midvale Avenue. (P) showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR a few local "Mediterranean restaurants" and grocery stores. (P) stated that the "Mediterranean restaurants" he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were immediately east of Midvale Avenue on Venice Blvd. (NOTE: This location is the exact place where both the Mediterranean Deli and Mediterranean Restaurant were located. According to KAYSAN BIN DON, when he (BIN DON) and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI first met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR it was in the Mediterranean Restaurant (after first quickly stopping in the Mediterranean Deli) on Venice Blvd. immediately east of Midvale Avenue (F) [redacted] (F)

[redacted] (P) as asked why he was showing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR "Mediterranean restaurants." Writer followed up by asking

(P) if he was familiar with and used the terms "Arabic or Middle Eastern." (P) replied that he was familiar, to which writer then asked why (P) had used the word "Mediterranean" to describe the restaurants he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR instead of "Arabic or Middle Eastern." (P) replied that he had meant "Middle Eastern." (NOTE: In the first two interviews of (P), he refers to the restaurant as an "Arabic restaurant," not a "Mediterranean restaurant." In the third interview, (P) does not specify the type of restaurant he shows AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.)

[redacted] Investigators asked (P) whether they then ate at any of the restaurants he showed AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. (P) replied that he did not eat with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. However, (P) then immediately added that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR may have ordered food, but that he didn't order anything. (P) advised that they may have ordered the food "to go" or they may have quickly eaten the food. Agents then asked again if (P) ate with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the restaurant, to which (P) replied that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR "probably got something to eat" and they "probably ate it at the restaurant," but that he (P) did not order anything.

After visiting the restaurant, (P) pointed out a nearby grocery store on the same block to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.

[redacted] (P) was asked whether they exchanged phone numbers or agreed to meet again. (P) advised that he provided his home phone to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and told them he would see them in the mosque. (P) does not recall exactly how they parted but he (P) walked home from the restaurant.

[redacted] It was asked of (P) what he knew about AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR after the first meeting. (P) replied that he knew they were from Saudi Arabia and that they had come to the United States to study English. (P) advised that when they first met, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told him they had only been in the United States a couple of days. (P) was asked as to why he was providing assistance to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, to which (P) replied that it was common among Muslims to assist others in the community, especially travelers. Agents queried (P) how many other times prior to meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, did he (P) assist other Muslims from the mosque. (P) replied "this was the first time." Writer queried (P) how many times since meeting AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, did he (P) assist Muslims from the mosque. (P) replied "never."

[redacted] (P) stated that the next time he saw AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was a "couple of days later at the mosque." (P) was walking into the KFM when he "ran into" AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR who were also coming in to pray. After praying the three exited the KFM together. (P) then accompanied AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to their motel located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Washington Blvd. and Venice Blvd. in Culver City. (P) estimated that it was a five to ten minute walk from the KFM. (P) went into their room for a short while and then returned home. (P) does not remember what hotel it was.

[redacted] After another "couple of days," (P) met with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR again. (P) could not recall if AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR had called him at home or if they had all met at the mosque again. In either case, (P) drove AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to a local grocery store, "probably only a couple of blocks from the mosque," in (P)s car. (P) advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR bought some groceries and then they all returned to their motel room. Writer queried (P) why he would drive them to a grocery store that seemed to be within walking distance of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel room. (P) replied that he had his car with him at the KFM so he decided to drive them. When agents reminded (P) that he had just stated AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR may have called him at home to pick them up, (P) replied that he couldn't remember. (P) was then asked whether he drove AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR because they planned on buying "a lot of groceries," to which (P) replied that they didn't buy very much at the grocery store.

[redacted] The next time that (P) recalls being with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR is when they asked if (P) would drive them to the downtown area of Los Angeles, so AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR could take a bus to San Diego. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told (P) that they wanted to visit San Diego to see if they would prefer to live there. (P) advised AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR that he would not be able to take them "all the way downtown," because of (P)'s work. (P) offered to instead call and find out if there was a bus terminal closer to Culver City. (P) placed a call from the payphone in front of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel to the bus company (P) sated that it was GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY). According to (P) the bus company told him there was another terminal in Santa Monica that would have buses going to San Diego. (P) asked about the schedule for the following day and provided the information to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Writers queried (P) as to why he would use a payphone and not his own phone or AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel phone. (P) could provide no explanation except to say that they must have needed to use the phonebook. (P) was asked if he had a phonebook at home or if there was a phonebook in AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's motel room, to which (P) replied "yes" to both. Investigators then asked if (P) had ever called flight schools for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR from that payphone or any payphone, to which (P) replied that he had not.

[redacted] The next day (P) picked AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR up at their motel and dropped them off at the bus terminal in Santa Monica. (P) could not recall how they "checked out" of the motel. (P) stated that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR left a suitcase with him, stating that they would pick it up at a later date. After dropping

AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the bus terminal, [redacted] (P) did not hear anything from them for "a week or so" and then received a call from AL-HAZMI. AL-HAZMI told [redacted] (P) that they had decided to stay in San Diego and would come and get their bag at a later date. At this time in early 2000, [redacted] (P) advised that he didn't know anyone in San Diego.

[redacted] [redacted] During the interview, [redacted] (P) was able to recall at least 5 specific occasions when he was with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Yet, as [redacted] (P) himself admits, although he cannot recall exactly, he likely saw them a couple of additional times at the KFM. This would mean that [redacted] (P) saw them almost every other day during their time in Los Angeles. [redacted] (P)'s contact with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at this level of frequency appears to contradict his characterization of their interaction.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) was asked how he felt when AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR left Los Angeles. [redacted] (P) appeared befuddled by this type of question, as he began to stammer and looked repeatedly to his attorney for guidance. When writers asked [redacted] (P) if he was happy or relieved, [redacted] (P) immediately stated that he was "relieved." [redacted] (P) appeared to relax considerably at that moment, slouching more into his chair and leaning back from the table. During much of the earlier questioning [redacted]s lower jaw quivered, his hands shook and he played with a water bottle.

[redacted] [redacted] does not recall hearing anything from AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR for "a couple of months or so," and then received a call from AL-HAZMI stating that both he and AL-MIHDHAR were coming up to Los Angeles. [redacted] believed that this was probably around the summer of 2000.

[redacted] [redacted] advised that he and [redacted] met AL-HAZMI, AL-MIHDHAR, and MOHDAR ABDULLAH (MOHDAR) at [redacted] home on Midvale Avenue. Writers queried [redacted] how AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR knew where [redacted] lived, to which [redacted] replied that he had shown them before. [redacted] was then asked when [redacted] had shown them, as he had earlier stated that he merely pointed in the direction of his home, up Midvale Avenue. [redacted] had no answer. [redacted] could not recall what kind of car the three had driven from San Diego but stated that he believed MOHDAR was driving because "he always drove." That night MOHDAR, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed at the home of [redacted]'s sister, which was located in the same apartment complex as (P)'s. (P) could not recall the subject of conversation that night except to state that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had asked (P) about going to school and getting married in the U.S. (P) does not recall interacting with MOHDAR, AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR the next morning. (P) advised that at some point during their stay AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR picked up the bag they had left and took it with them. (NOTE: (P)'s recollection of how he met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR again in Los Angeles, after they moved to San Diego, is noteworthy. In (P)'s first interview he states that they simply all met at the KFM. In the second interview (P) adds a phone call from AL-HAZMI prior to meeting at the KFM. By the third interview, (P) has dropped the meeting at the KFM and states that they merely called him and then met at (P)'s apartment.)

[redacted] A couple of months after this meeting, (P) recalled receiving a phone call from AL-HAZMI stating that he was coming up to Los Angeles to look into going to school there. (P) stated that AL-HAZMI met (P) at (P) home and stayed there that night. (P) also stated that he recalls that Al-HAZMI made a call on his sisters phone that night using a calling card. [redacted] (P) did not know who or where Al-HAZMI called.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) stated that the next time that he saw AL-HAZMI or Al-MIHDHAR was when their picture appeared on television after 9/11.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) and his attorney will make themselves available for any recontact needed to further this investigation.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 06/21/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

[redacted] read and clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO

[redacted] read and clear

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

CINCINNATI

AT CINCINNATI

[redacted] read and clear

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 10-21-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

-1 of 1-

Official Record
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/16/2014

MOHDAR MOHAMMED ABDULLAH, date of birth (P-1) mobile telephone number (P-1) contacted the interviewing agent telephonically from telephone number (P-1).

ABDULLAH was very concerned about his future prospects of being able to learn about or meet the child he believes he had with (P) (understood by the interviewing agent to be (P). ABDULLAH reiterated his feelings that (P) only kept the child from him at the behest of the US Government.

ABDULLAH stated that the contact he has in the Swedish Security Service, Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO) was currently away on vacation, and that he felt communicating his concerns through them would take too much time. ABDULLAH has tried to contact (S) (understood by the interviewing agent to be (S)), but no one picked up the telephone. ABDULLAH did not leave a message. He requested that the interviewing agent inform (S) that ABDULLAH would like to speak with him, and provided a number, as noted above.

ABDULLAH stated that he is confident in who he is as a person, that he has always been honest with the FBI, and that he remains available to recontact by agents.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 01/10/2014 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)

[redacted] File # [redacted] (F) Date drafted 01/16/2014

by [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/22/2014

MOHDAR MOHAMMED ABDULLAH, date of birth (P-1) 1979, was interviewed at the Scandic Victoria Tower Hotel, Stockholm, Sweden. Officers of the Swedish Security Service, Sakerhetspolisen (SAPO), were also present for the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, ABDULLAH was advised by the Swedish officers of information as required by Swedish law, to include the purpose and nature of the interview.

ABDULLAH immediately advised that his primary concern was his immigration status in Sweden. Specifically, he had been told by SAPO that his request for status had been denied for unknown reasons, and that he would be deported from Sweden. ABDULLAH stated that he would listen to agents' questions, but would not provide information until his immigration status had been resolved.

ABDULLAH stated that he had previously undergone polygraph examination regarding his relationship to individuals associated to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. He had initially been told by (C-1) (C-1) that he had passed the polygraph examination, and was later told that the result were inconclusive.

ABDULLAH was shown the text of the email sent by him to San Diego Union Tribune newspaper reporter (P) on October 2, 2006, referring to the surveillance video taken at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on June 10, 2000 (hereafter the "LAX video"). This email stated that "I could not make the face of the third person whether he was Khalid or their friend who was residing in LA. They introduced me to him when we were here as a person they had known before coming to San Diego." ABDULLAH stated that he believed the LAX video had been released in the media, and that it had been shown in a television news broadcast. He was informed by interviewing agents that the video had not been released, and that the news report had only verbally referenced the video.

ABDULLAH then stated that he had first heard of the LAX video through (P) and that he was unsure whether he had seen the video at the time the email had been sent. He thought that maybe the friend he had been referring to in the email as residing in Los Angeles was (P).

Investigation on 12/19/2013 at Stockholm, Sweden (In Person)

File # (F) Date drafted 12/19/2013

by (S)

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who had stayed at the hotel in Los Angeles with ABDULLAH, Nawaf AL HAZMI, and Khalid AL MIHDHAR on the night of June 9, 2000, prior to the trip to LAX the next day. ABDULLAH did not remember (P) travelling to LAX with them, or meeting them there.

ABDULLAH was then shown the LAX video. He identified himself, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR. He stated he did not recognize the unknown individual (hereafter the UNSUB) who was initially standing in front of them at the security line and who appeared to be holding a camera. ABDULLAH noted that the UNSUB does not talk with him, AL HAZMI, or AL MIHDHAR in the video. ABDULLAH claimed he had been shown pictures in a previous interview where he, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR had been standing next to the UNSUB for approximately twelve seconds in front of a departures status board at LAX to check the gate they were to go to. They did not interact with the UNSUB at that time, either.

ABDULLAH advised that he, AL MIHDHAR, AL HAZMI, (P) (known to interviewing agents to be (P)), and (P) attended the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles the night of June 9, 2000. He advised that the King Fahd Mosque Imam, Fahad Al Thumairy, was also possibly present during their visit. ABDULLAH advised that he had visited the King Fahd Mosque again the next day on June 10, 2000, but he did not recall whether it was before or after the trip to LAX. He did not remember any other persons than himself, AL HAZMI, and AL MIHDHAR travelling to LAX on June 10, 2000. He recalled driving to Los Angeles in a car belonging to AL HAZMI or AL MIHDHAR.

ABDULLAH stated that the UNSUB appears Arab, in his opinion. However, he stated that he did not know the identity of the UNSUB and had never met him, as he was sure AL HAZMI and AL MIHDHAR would have introduced the UNSUB if they knew him as per custom in the Arab culture. ABDULLAH was informed that absent any assistance he could provide, the last investigative step available to the FBI to identify the UNSUB would be to potentially publicly release the LAX video. ABDULLAH requested that his face be obscured if the video was released, and he reiterated that he did not know the UNSUB.

ABDULLAH inquired about the status of his son, and asked for pictures of him. ABDULLAH was informed that since the individual was a minor, the sharing of any information about him had to be approved by his legal guardian.

ABDULLAH then reiterated his position that he could not talk until he knew his immigration status in Sweden, and that he had always been cooperative when questioned by any agency.

Prior to his departure from the hotel, ABDULLAH asked the SAPO Officer who escorted him out if he could meet (S) by himself in the hotel lobby. (S) met ABDULLAH in the lobby of the Scandic Hotel, and ABDULLAH again stated that he wanted information about his son. He additionally stated that should the LAX video be released, it may put him in danger and he again requested his face be blocked in it. He was informed that in the event of a release, his face would not be obscured. ABDULLAH asked if the FBI was sure that every possible method of finding the UNSUB had been explored. He recommended checking the records of the long-term parking area near LAX, which is where he, AL MIHDHAR, and AL HAZMI parked their car when they went to LAX on June 10, 2000.

ABDULLAH stated that if the UNSUB knew AL MIHDHAR and AL HAZMI or was a member of Al Qaeda, he would be a very dangerous individual who should be caught. ABDULLAH requested another meeting with (S) the next day, on December 20, 2013. While leaving the hotel, ABDULLAH stopped the SAPO Officer and informed him that ABDULLAH next intended to travel to the Swedish immigration office nearby to check his status.

Serial #: (F)
Type: EC
From: SAN DIEGO
To: COUNTERTERRORISM
CINCINNATI
LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO

Document Title: (A), (G), (J-1) (P)
(P)

Approval Date: 1/10/2007

Classification: [redacted]

Contents

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 01/10/2007

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (S)
(S), (G)

Cincinnati Attn: (S)
(S), (G)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)
(F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Interview and debrief of (P)

Administrative: (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Background: [redacted] (O-1) (O-1) reported that Mohdar Abdullah, captioned subject, described how he accompanied Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi to the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) from San Diego, California. Once they arrived in Los Angeles, California, the group went to King Fahad Mosque, where they met (P) (LNU), described as an individual from (P) At this point, another individual entered the conversation, who was of (P) descent that Abdullah could not recall the name. Abdullah claimed that both these individuals knew Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi previously and invited them to supper.

Details: [redacted] On 01/09/2007, (S) FBI-SD and (S) FBI-LA, interviewed (P) date of birth (P) at a public restaurant located on Alvarado Road, La Mesa, California. This was the second interview of (P) who was familiar with the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. (P) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) hereinafter (P) attended prayer at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM), and after prayer he remained for socialization the evening of the above mentioned incident. (P) would benefit from socializing with

Muslim brothers at the Mosque after prayer in order to gain sales commission opportunities. At the time, (P) was employed at the (P) as a (P) He was a close associate of Shaikh Fahad of the KFM. Fahad would refer customers to (P) who were interested in (P) from the (P). Fahad was known to refer wealthy individuals, NFI, from Saudi Arabia who were particularly interested in making (P) (P) These wealthy Saudi individuals were friends and guests of Fahad and the KFM. (P) felt it was not unusual when his best friend, (P) suggested (P) meet these Saudi individuals who were visiting the KFM. (P) also pointed out that the Saudi's were with a guy (P) (P) (P). Again, (P) could not recall the names of the Saudi's nor could he identify photo's of the men. (Agent's notes: FBI investigation later learned that the Saudi individuals were Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi, who were accompanied by Mohdar Abdullah. Also, FBI investigation identified (P) as (P) aka (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(P)

[redacted] Abdullah invited (P) to go to dinner with him and the two Saudi's. (P) politely declined and stated he had a prior commitment with his wife and her children. However, (P) acquired where Abdullah and the others were staying and told Abdullah he would join them later in the evening. Abdullah and the two Saudi's did not have a cellular telephone to exchange numbers with (P) (P) drove his car to the hotel located in Culver City on Venice Boulevard near a gas station. (P) could not recall the name of the hotel but described the hotel as old, with a old sign in front because it still advertised free color TV. (Agent notes: (P) was shown an area map of the hotel by the interviewing agents in which (P) pointed out the exact location of the hotel).

(P) went to the front desk and asked for Abdullah's room number. When (P) arrived at the room one Saudi was praying on the floor in a continuous prayer. The other Saudi was reading a book, NFI, on the bed. (P) (P) and Abdullah again began casual conversation (P) (P) The conversation lead to Abdullah asking (P) for some advice regarding the United States. Abdullah wanted to know from (P) how (P) was getting along with the western culture and continuously living in the United States. Abdullah wanted (P) to talk about life with a wife in the United States. Also living or having a wife who had not converted to Islam. Abdullah inquired as to being a student at a University and what the school work entailed. Abdullah then changed his disposition and the conversation with focus on Abdullah, Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, blending in with westerners in the United States. Abdullah wanted (P) to give suggestions or examples of fitting in and blending with people in the United States. (P) did not deny making suggestions or examples of fitting in and blending with people in the United States, however when asked, he could not recall any of the suggestions or examples he gave to Abdullah. (P) did not opine in a derogatory manner on what Abdullah meant when he said blending in with westerners. (P) also did not feel his suggestions or examples he gave to Abdullah were derogatory or nefarious in nature. (P) said the night ended with the same situation as when he arrived at the room. The Saudi's did not stop praying or reading to engage in conversation with (P), Abdullah or (P) The Saudi's did not speak to (P) nor show any interest in Alzamari or the conversation. (P) left the hotel room and went home without making any future plans of having some sort of contact with Abdullah or the Saudi's.

[redacted] The next time (P) saw one of the Saudi's was approximately two weeks after the first encounter mentioned above. Again, (P) was socializing after evening prayer at the KFM when he was approached by the Saudi. The Saudi was very business like and asked (P) to take him to the University that (P) was attending. The Saudi wanted (P) to assist him in going to the enrollment office and translate the English enrollment forms from the University. The Saudi told (P) he wanted to enroll in college but he did not mention what courses he was going to take. That night (P) told the Saudi to meet him at the administration office on the campus of (P) (P) gave the Saudi directions on how to get there and where the office was located on campus. (P) told the Saudi to meet him there at 11:00 a.m. after (P) got out of class. Again, the Saudi did not have a cellular phone number or any contact information to exchange with (P) The next day at 11:00 a.m., the Saudi showed up to meet (P) in front of the administration office. The Saudi was standing outside the office waiting when (P) walked up. Alzamari inquired as to how the Saudi got to the office in which the Saudi said he rented a car. (P) did not see the rental car at the University. The topic was not discussed of where, what city, the Saudi rented the car or what hotel or location the Saudi stayed the night. (P) did not ride with the Saudi nor did the Saudi ride with (P) in his car. (P) accompanied the Saudi into the administration office. The office employee, described as an American female, NFI, began explaining the enrollment procedures, policies and fees of the University regarding foreign students to the Saudi. (P) claimed the office employee spoke in English and the Saudi understood. (P) does not recall but believed the Saudi might have filled out a preliminary enrollment application. The Saudi took the enrollment packet from the office employee and left. (P) stated the Saudi became very angry and upset with the office employee over the amount of fees foreign students are charged to enroll. (P) could visibly see that the more the Saudi talked about it the more furious he became. (Agents note: On 01/10/2007, FBI-LA conducted a preliminary records check with the admissions office on the campus of (P) for (P) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi, which resulted in positive results. Preliminary computer checks revealed that Al-Hazmi submitted an application to the University on 06/20/2000. Checks for (P) reveal he was a student at the University during the time period mentioned by (P) (D)
(D)
FBI-LA will report full details via future EC).

[redacted] (P) recalled the Saudi coming to the KFM the second time mentioned above driving alone in the rental car mentioned above. (P) recalled the car was white in color, described as a small car and appeared to be a foreign make. (P) believed (P) was standing with him at the KFM at might also be able to describe the Saudi's rental car. (P) stated Sheikh Fahad was with him and (P) and entered into a separate conversation with the Saudi after (P) and the Saudi spoke. It was (P)s opinion that Sheikh Fahad showed an unusual interest in the Saudi. However, it was well known at the KFM that Fahad had extreme interest in anyone coming to the KFM who was Saudi Arabian as if he was the responsible person for the Saudi's. Fahad would ask any Saudi visitor details as to their activities and purposes of visiting KFM and the United States. (P) was unaware of any details as to what Fahad discussed with the Saudi mentioned above.

[redacted] After the time spent with the Saudi, to include the other Saudi and the individual from Yemen at the hotel, (P) and (P) both felt the Saudi demanded that people serve him and his needs. (P) felt this same way at the University admissions office. When the Saudi became angry at the female he demanded (P) to speak to the female and straighten things out in the Saudi's favor. (P) opined that this was the way of the Saudi Arabian culture to treat (P)s as if they are lower in status because the menial jobs in Saudi Arabia were usually filled by people from (P)

[redacted] (P) discussed (A), (G), (J-1) on an individual named Shaikh (P) who was described as the number two scholar in the Islamic world, NFI. (P) would visit the KFM and at one point lived in the Los Angeles area for a period of time, believed to be the same time period as when (P) was employed at (P). An individual named (P) was responsible for making the apartment rental arrangements for (P) (P) placed his name on all the rental leases and the utilities for (P)s apartment. (P) nationality was (P) but he lived most of his life in (P) (P) followed the Salifi teachings and was an advocate of education. (P) would have regular discussions with Shaikh (P) until (P) told (P) not to visit or speak to the Shaikh so frequently.

[redacted] (P) attended the KFM everyday until the KFM obtained a restraining order against (P) in which he was not allowed back. (P) and a Syrian individual, NFI, began to have a problem with the Saudi's controlling the KFM. (P) wanted the KFM to be open to all ideas of Muslim's and give everyone the opportunity to give lectures and lead classes at the KFM. The KFM became angry with

(P) and obtained the restraining order after the time when (P) told everyone attending prayer at the KFM not to give any donations until the KFM made changes. (P) wanted the KFM to change and follow the teachings of Ibm Tammiyah, NFI.

(P) advised that he received a personal check from Shaikh Fahad shortly before (P) traveled to (P) (P) could not recall the exact date or year. The check was in the amount of $300.00 or $600.00. Fahad gave the check to (P) in order to give to the family of a deceased mutual friend from (P) (P) could not recall the friend's name, but stated this friend died on the Egyptian airline that crash several years ago. (P) remembered cashing the check at Ralph's Grocery Store before he left for (P) (P) gave the money to the family while in (P) This friend was married to an American woman in Los Angeles but (P) could not recall her name.

(P) denied having any further contact with the three individuals mentioned above, Mohdar Abdullah, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi, after the events mentioned above. (P) did admit he made inquires in San Diego as to the whereabouts of Mohdar Abdullah in 2003 when (P) moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, California. (P) asked people, NFI, at the Abu Bakr Mosque and the Masjid Ar Ribat if they knew Abdullah but to no avail. (P) denied having contact or seeking out Mohdar Abdullah while visiting (P). (P) did mention that Mohdar Abdullah (P)
(P)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/24/2007

On 01/23/2007, (P) aka (P) (P) date of birth (P-1) (P), Place of Birth (P), Social Security Number (SSN) (P-1) California Driver's License (P-1) Alien Number (P-1) home address (P) (P) Ohio, cellular telephone (P-1) email address (P-1) was advised of the identities of the agents and purpose of the interview. (P) provided the following information:

(P) first entered the United States in June, 1995 through San Francisco. (P) who was single, moved in with his uncle and sponsor, (G), (P-1) (P) lived there for approximately one year, during which he was employed at a Burger King restaurant and took English classes. He then moved in with another uncle, (G), (P-1) (G), (P-1) While living there, (P) played soccer and made some friends who offered to let him move in with them. He moved in with three roommates at (P) (P) San Jose.

(P) roommates were (P), (P), and (P) . He was displayed photographs of these men and confirmed their identities. All three men were Sudanese and worked as security guards for Guardsmark Security. According to (P) (P) and (P) were flight students who had begun learning to fly in Sudan and were continuing their training in the U.S. They did not get their pilot's license while (P) lived with them. (P) went for one flight lesson with (P) and his American instructor. (P) stated that there was never any connection between these men and the two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf and Khalid.

In 1997, (P) traveled to (P) and married his wife, (P) and then returned to the United States without her.

In 1999, (P) moved to (P) Los Angeles, California. His parents and two sisters lived with him for a time at this address. He was living at this residence on September 11, 2001.

(P) was shown photographs of 9/11 Hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and was asked how he knew them. (P).

Investigation on 01/23/2007 at Cincinnati, Ohio

File # (F)

Date dictated

by (J-3), (S)

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stated that he first met Nawaf and Khalid in early 2000 during an evening prayer at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) in Culver City. (P) would usually attend sunset or evening prayers at KFM and would walk from his apartment at (P) Los Angeles, California. (P) met Nawaf and Khalid as he was standing by the doorway of KFM greeting people. Nawaf and Khalid had only been in the country for a couple of days. Nawaf and Khalid told (P) that they were new students in town from Saudi Arabia and were looking for a place to stay. After the prayer, (P) introduce Nawaf and Khalid to Imam Fahad (Althumairy), the only Saudi he knew at KFM. (P) told Althumairy that Nawaf and Khalid were new Saudi students in town and they were looking for a place to stay or roommates. At that time, (P) departed and did not listen to the conversation that took place between Imam Fahad and Khalid and Nawaf. (P) described Imam Fahad as a very quiet person who only comes into the mosque two minutes before prayers, says the prayer and then may talk to some individuals afterwards.

(P) saw Khalid and Nawaf for the second time at KFM a couple of days later after another prayer. Khalid and Nawaf told (P) that they were currently staying downtown, but wanted to move closer to the community by KFM. (P) took Nawaf and Khalid by a couple of hotels that he pointed out along Washington Boulevard. (P) did not remember the names of the hotel, but he recalled visiting them after they decided which one to stay at. (P) could not remember any details about the hotel. (P) did not help Nawaf and Khalid register at the hotel. Nawaf and Khalid also asked (P) about the location of grocery stores and restaurants in the area. (P) took them to an Arabic restaurant and store on Venice Boulevard. (P) spoke to Khalid and Nawaf in Arabic, but described them as very quiet individuals. They did not speak very good English, but wanted to take ESL courses. (P) stated that he did not provide any information on where they should attend classes. (P) did not know if they actually attended any English classes.

(P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid asked for his telephone and that they called his house. (P) did not remember if he called Nawaf and Khalid at any time including when they stayed at a hotel near KFM.

On another occasion, Khalid and Nawaf told (P) that they intended to move to San Diego and asked (P) to drop them off at a bus pick-up area. (P) did not assist in obtaining tickets for Khalid and Nawaf for their trip to San Diego, but drove them in the morning to bus stop in a place between Santa Monica and Los Angeles. Nawaf and Khalid knew when the bus trip was scheduled. (P) thought they were catching a Greyhound bus to San Diego. When asked why Khalid and Nawaf wanted to move to San Diego, they told him it was a beautiful city and did not provide any further information on why they were moving. (P) recalled that they only had bags of clothes when he drove them to the bus stop.

[redacted] stated that Nawaf and Khalid called him to let him know that they had made it to San Diego. [redacted] does not recall any other information from that telephone call.

[redacted] was asked if Nawaf or Khalid ever asked him about flight schools, or their real purpose of their time in the United States to commit terrorist acts, to which he replied no. [redacted] advised that he never talked to Nawaf or Khalid about politics, current events, including the situation in Palestine or Usama Bin Laden (UBL).

[redacted] stated that he did not get calling cards for Khalid or Nawaf and never saw them use one.

During the time that he met Khalid and Nawaf, [redacted] was working in downtown Los Angeles working for [redacted] at California Hospital which was a 15-20 minute commute from his home. At that time, [redacted] drove a 1980s [redacted] that he bought in 1997.

[redacted] stated that the next time he saw Nawaf and Khalid was a few months later during evening prayers at KFM. Nawaf and Khalid were with a Yemeni individual who they stated was a friend from San Diego and introduced him as Mohdar. [redacted] then introduced Mohdar to one of his Yemeni friends identified as [redacted]. After prayers, [redacted] invited the group back to dinner at his apartment for dinner. [redacted] thought that Mohdar drove Nawaf and Khalid that night, but was not sure. [redacted] recalled Nawaf and Khalid enjoyed being in San Diego, but Khalid was leaving the next day to go back to Yemen and visit his family. [redacted] stated that Mohdar was a student in San Diego. [redacted] described Mohdar was being more talkative than Khalid and Nawaf.

[redacted] was asked where his family was during the dinner he had with Nawaf, Khalid, Mohdar and [redacted] [redacted] stated that his family also had another place right next door to where he lived, but could not recall the exact address or number.

[redacted] also recalled a time where Nawaf came up a day before he went to see a college with [redacted] JOHAR stated that Nawaf stayed at his apartment that night, where they talked and watched TV, and then Nawaf went to bed. Nawaf was driving a relatively new vehicle on that trip. JOHAR was asked if Nawaf used his telephone, to which he replied that he could not remember but stated that Nawaf probably did. [redacted] stated that he did not see Nawaf again after he spent the night in his house.

When asked if Nawaf wanted to get married, [redacted] stated that Nawaf wanted to, but discussed this topic more with [redacted]

[redacted] stated that it wasn't until a couple of months after the 9/11 attacks that he recognized photographs of Nawaf and Khalid in the news and realized that they were hijackers. [redacted] did not come forward to the authorities because he was very scared. [redacted] did not know of anyone around the mosque that discussed the 9/11 attacks.

(P) stated that his best friend in Los Angeles when he lived there was (P) Because there was not a big (P) community there, he did not have many friends.

When (P) first moved to Los Angeles, in 1999, Imam Fahad was not present when he first started going to a mosque on Palms in Venice. It wasn't until KFM was built that he knew of Imam Fahad.

(P) acknowledged that he worked for the (P) in Santa Monica in 2000, but during the probation phase, (P) stated that he was not fast enough moving mail and was terminated after a couple of months.

(P) was shown CDL photographs of OMAR ALBAYOUMI and (P) (P). (P) did not recognize ALBAYOUMI, but did recognize (P) but stated he did not know him very well and just saw him at KFM. (P) was asked to explain the telephone calls between (P) home and his home. (P) stated that his mother knew (P) wife and that they would get together often.

In 2000, (P) became a naturalized US citizen. After (P) naturalized, he requested a name change for his United States passport from (P) to (P) because (P) full name is (P) When (P) first arrived to the United States in June, 1995, he was known as (P).

In late 2001 or early 2002, (P) moved to a community in San Diego known as (P) with his father, mother and two sisters. (P) moved to San Diego because (P) account at the hospital he was working at in Los Angeles, but then they picked up an account at Mercy Hospital near University of California San Diego. (P) mother had previously visited San Diego and she encouraged the family to move there. (P) also took a part time job with (P) as a (P) near Federal and 47th Avenue.

In 2002, (P) wife also arrived in the United States for the first time.

(P) lived at the (P) for a year between 2002-2003 and then moved to (P) San Diego, which was off the I-805 freeway when he was approved for low-income housing. While in San Diego, (P) drove a (P) which he later shipped to (P).

When (P) was living in San Diego, he attended both the Masjid Al-Ribat and Abu Bakr mosques. (P) knew an Egyptian Imam known as (P) at the Masjid Al-Ribat. (P) used to play soccer with the Eritrean and Somali community on El Cajon Boulevard near a post office. (P) advised that there were a lot of young Somali men who attended Masjid Al-Ribat. (P) has attended Eid Celebrations at the San Diego Convention Center.

One Somali individual [redacted] was friends with in San Diego was [redacted] is a couple of years younger than [redacted] and he lives at [redacted] San Diego with his wife and two children. [redacted] met [redacted] at a Somali store located near 54th and University Streets. [redacted] works for [redacted] Rental Car at the San Diego airport. [redacted] last talked to [redacted] over the telephone a couple of weeks ago. [redacted] may visit [redacted] and his family in the near future.

[redacted] also knew another Somali individual in San Diego by the name of [redacted] who had a hot-dog stand by High Tech School. [redacted] is not married.

In February, 2006, [redacted] transferred via an internal job opportunity to a [redacted] facility in [redacted] where he took a position as a quality control [redacted]. Not only did this position offer him the opportunity to use his education (he has a degree in [redacted] from Sanaa University in Yemen), it also offered more money in an area where the cost of living was lower. [redacted] lived at [redacted] Ohio, for about two months before moving to [redacted] Ohio. He subsequently purchased a house at [redacted]. [redacted] said that he paid $11,000 in cash (money he had saved) for the house which needed a lot of work. He currently owns this house and while he is repairing it, he and his family live a short distance down the street in a second floor apartment at [redacted] (corner of [redacted], Ohio. [redacted] is registered in the state of Ohio, but has not gotten around to changing his California Driver's License.

[redacted] stated that he is not familiar with the name [redacted]. (Agent's note: This name and some variations of it, as well as the date of birth [redacted] 1971, SSAN [redacted] and a number of addresses, are closely associated with [redacted] name in a number of databases, to include Lexis-Nexis, Accurint, and Choicepoint. It was thought that [redacted] possibly used the names as aliases.) [redacted] did not recognize an Ohio driver's license photograph of a person identified as [redacted] and stated that he does not know anyone by that name. He further stated that he has never lived at any of the following streets in [redacted]. [redacted] could not explain his connection to this person but speculated that it may have resulted from someone finding his lost green card. In 1997 or 1998, while he was living in San Jose, [redacted] lost his green card. He reported the loss to INS and was reissued a new card.

[redacted] father's name is [redacted] and his mother's name is [redacted] [redacted] has [redacted] sisters: [redacted] and [redacted] is lives in [redacted] with her husband, [redacted] who is [redacted]. [redacted] and [redacted] got married in [redacted] [redacted] lives in [redacted] with her grandmother. [redacted] is in [redacted], but is marrying an [redacted]. [redacted] father is currently visiting [redacted] sister in [redacted] and his mother is in [redacted] visiting the other sister. [redacted] has an older brother that is a [redacted] and another brother who resides in [redacted]. [redacted] father won the visa lottery and received a Diversity-Visa and then sponsored his family to come into the United States.

[redacted] described himself as a good Muslim. [redacted] is Sunni Muslim, but has not been to Hajj.

Because of the war between [redacted] and [redacted], [redacted] and his family were refugees for some time and moved to [redacted]. [redacted] attended elementary school in [redacted] when he was 7-13 years old.

In 1991, [redacted] graduated from the University of [redacted] with a [redacted] Degree.

[redacted] currently does not have a hard-line home telephone number, but he and his wife use cellular telephones. [redacted] has a laptop computer that he connects to the internet through a cable modem.

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DATE 08-20-2021 BY (S) NSICG

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at
File # Date dictated
by

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01/29/2007

On 01/26/2007, (P) aka (P), [redacted] (P), date of birth (P-1) 1967, Place of Birth (P) Social Security Number (SSN) (P-1) California Driver's License (CDL) (P-1) Alien Number (P-1) home address (P-1) (P), Ohio, cellular telephone (P-1), email address (P-1) walked agents through various places that he was with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in Los Angeles, Culver City and Santa Monica, California. (P) recalled the following events:

(P) stated that he first met Nawaf and Khalid in early 2000 outside of King Fahad Mosque (KFM). (P) was leaving from afternoon prayers when Nawaf and Khalid greeted him. Nawaf and Khalid told him that they were new students in town from Saudi Arabia and they had come to KFM because they knew it to be a Saudi mosque. (P) told Nawaf and Khalid that the afternoon prayers were over, but escorted them inside and watched them pray. After praying, Nawaf and Khalid told (P) that they were staying in a hotel downtown, but wanted to move closer to the community. (P) showed Nawaf and Khalid a couple of hotels on Sepulveda Boulevard just west of Washington Boulevard. (P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid did not have any bags with them on this occasion. On this occasion or another occasion, (P) then walked the two to an Arabic Restaurant and Grocery Store on the corner of Venice and Midvale Avenues. (P) stayed at the restaurant with them while they ate. (P) then walked home to (P) (Los Angeles, California) and did not see Nawaf or Khalid leave.

The next day or day after, (P) saw Nawaf and Khalid again at KFM before prayers started. After the prayer, (P) introduced Nawaf and Khalid to Imam Fahad because he was the only other Saudi (P) knew at KFM. ((P) positively identified a picture of FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY as Imam Fahad). (P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid only talked to Imam Fahad for five minutes. Nawaf and Khalid then invited (P) to go back to the hotel they found.

(P) walked with agents to the hotels on Sepulveda Boulevard between Washington and Venice. (P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid stayed in a hotel that one could drive right up to and faced the street in a room on the second floor. (P) believed that Nawaf and Khalid either stayed at the motels identified as Deano's, (3868 Sepulveda Boulevard, Culver City, California), or Astro Motel, (3850 Sepulveda Boulevard, Culver City, California. (P) stated that he was 70% sure it was the

01/26/2007 Los Angeles, California
(F)
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Astro Motel, Room 23 and 30% that it was Deano's Motel. After viewing Room 23 at the Astro Motel, (P) recalled that Nawaf and Khalid offered him some milk out of a small refrigerator. Room 23 of the Astro Motel contained two beds and a small refrigerator.

On another occasion, (P) had a discussion with Nawaf on the telephone or in person, and he told (P) that he and Khalid were going to San Diego to see the city and the Muslim community and if they liked it, they would stay down there. Nawaf asked (P) for his help in trying to get a bus ride down to San Diego. (P) believed that the evening before Nawaf and Khalid left or the morning of, (P) called Greyhound bus from the payphone outside of Deano's and Astro Motels to determine the nearest bus stop for Nawaf and Khalid to travel to San Diego. (P) then drove the two with their bags to an area located on 2nd Street in Santa Monica, between Colorado and Broadway. Nawaf asked (P) to keep one of their bags, just in case they did not like San Diego and had to return. (P) stated that the bag was a dark hand-bag and he did not look in it or know what the contents were. (P) dropped the Nawaf and Khalid off because he had to go to work. (P) did not help Nawaf and Khalid buy bus tickets or see them board a bus. (P) was driving a (P) at this time.

A couple of days later, Nawaf called (P) to tell him they made it to San Diego and gave him their phone number which (P) recalled had an 858 area code. Nawaf stated that he would get the other bag when he came up to Los Angeles at a later date. (P) stated that the total amount of time he first came to know Khalid and Nawaf before they left was approximately one week.

(P) recalls talking to Nawaf a couple of times over the phone, but he never called him. On one occasion, Nawaf called (P) to tell him that they had moved and now had a 619 area code number and that they would be coming up to Los Angeles. That day, (P) told his friend (P) that he had guests coming into town. (P) and (P) met Nawaf, Khalid and Mohdar (Abdullah) at KFM during prayers. Afterwards, the group went back to an apartment that (P) was staying in at that time (identified as (P) Los Angeles, California) for dinner. (P) stated that this residence belonged to his sister, (P) and her husband, (P), but they were out of town. (P) did not think his sister and husband had a computer in their house. (P) stayed in this apartment for a couple of weeks while his father, mother, and two sisters were living in (P). None of (P) family ever saw the group.

(P) could not remember what kind of car Nawaf, Khalid and Mohdar were driving that night, but stated that it was not an American car. During the dinner, (P), Nawaf and Mohdar discussed marriage. The group also talked about Khalid's trip back to Saudi Arabia to visit his pregnant wife. Nawaf took his other piece of luggage back from (P) that night.

(P) did not see Nawaf, Khalid or Mohdar the next day.

A few days later, Nawaf called (P) and stated that he was coming up to Los Angeles again. This time, Nawaf met (P) at his apartment at (P) at night. (P) thought that Nawaf was driving a dark, non-American car. (P) could not remember if (P) met them at his apartment that night. Nawaf spent the night, and (P) could not recall if Nawaf made any telephone calls. The next day, Nawaf met (P) at the school he was attending. (P) did not see or talk to Nawaf again.

(P) was asked if Nawaf or Khalid ever talked about jihad, flight training, Palestine, or politics to which he replied no. (P) did not know anyone who traveled to Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Pakistan for training or religious instruction.

(P) was shown various photographs and provided the following information:

(P) recognized a CDL photograph (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1). (P) and (P) have known each other since they both lived in (P) (P) mother and (P) mother are best friends and the families used to visit each other when (P) lived in Orange County.

(P) recognized a CDL photograph of (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1). (P) knew (P) from KFM and stated that he was married and had a daughter. (P) sister is friends with (P) wife. (P) advised that the last time he saw (P) was when his family traveled to San Diego to visit (P).

(P) recognized a CDL photograph of (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1), but did not know his name. (P) stated that this individual was (P) and worked at KFM.

(P) did not recognize the following individuals: (P) (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1) (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1); OUALID BENOMRANE (date of birth (P-1) (P), CDL (P-1); ANWAR AULAQI; (P); (P) (P), and the UNSUB in the 06/10/2000 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Video.

(P) provided the following additional biographical data: (P) stated that he attended a high school called (P) in (P) (P). After graduating from the University of (P) in 1991, (P) remained in (P) for 2 years teaching (P) in a middle school. In 1993, (P) spent one year with his family in (P) and then returned to (P) for a short time in 1994 and then received news that he had obtained a United States DV visa from the lottery.

(P) sister (P) and her husband (P) currently live at (P-1)

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/31/2007

Investigation on 08/29/2007 at West Chester, Ohio

File # (F)

Date dictated

by (J-3), (S)

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On 08/29/2007, (P) (P) date of birth (P-1), Place of Birth (P) Social Security Number (SSN) (P-1) California Driver's License (CDL) (P-1) Alien Number (P-1) home address (P-1) (P), Ohio, cellular telephone (P-1) email address (P-1) was interviewed in the presence of his attorney, (P) of Sams Fischer Packard Schuessler LLC, at 8738 Union Centre Blvd, West Chester, Ohio, 45069, telephone (P-1), fax (P-1), email (P-1) regarding his contact with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in the Los Angeles area in 2000. (P) provided the following information:

(P) stated that he first met Nawaf and Khalid at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) in Culver City during afternoon prayers. Nawaf and Khalid told (P) that they just arrived to the United States a couple of days ago. Nawaf and Khalid did not state the purpose of their visit, but (P) believed that they were just visiting the US. At the time, Nawaf and Khalid were staying in a hotel in downtown Los Angeles and they expressed a desire to move closer to KFM. (P) showed them three motels on Sepulveda Boulevard between Washington and Venice Streets.

The next day, (P) saw the two again at the afternoon prayers at KFM. After the prayers, (P) introduce Nawaf and Khalid to Imam Fahad Althumairy. The conversation lasted was only for a couple of minutes. After departing KFM, Nawaf and Khalid told (P) that they got a room at one of the motels (P) recommended on Sepulveda Boulevard. (P) was surprised that they got a room already, because he was expecting to help them register for one because of their limited English abilities. (P) stated that Nawaf and Khalid stayed in a room on the second floor in the back left corner. The door was on the right side of the room and the window of their room faced the street. (P) recalled that there was one bed and one refrigerator in the room.

On another occasion, (P) met Nawaf and Khalid and showed them where a grocery store and restaurant on the corner of Venice and Midvale that was close to his apartment. (P) stated that he pointed down the street to where his apartment was to Nawaf and Khalid but they never went inside his place when he first met them.

The fourth time (P) saw Nawaf and Khalid was at the motel. Nawaf and Khalid stated that they heard in the community that San Diego was a beautiful city and they were thinking about going down there. Nawaf and Khalid asked (P) if they could get down there by bus. (P) went out to the payphones outside of Deano's/Astro Motels and looked up a number for Greyhound. (P) called Greyhound and found a bus stop that he could drop them off in West Los Angeles. (P) did not know of anyone specifically that Nawaf or Khalid talked to about going to San Diego.

A day or two after the discussion about going to San Diego, (P) picked up Nawaf and Khalid at the motel before his work and dropped them at a bus station in Santa Monica. Nawaf told (P) that they would go down there (San Diego) and check it out, and if they liked it, they would stay down there, but if not, they would come back. Nawaf asked (P) to keep a bag for him and he would get it on another occasion.

(P) estimated that Nawaf and Khalid were in Culver City between a week and two weeks during that time. (P) would usually pray the afternoon prayer at KFM every day if he was around. (P) did not see Nawaf and Khalid every day he was there to pray though. Nawaf and Khalid had cash with them. (P) never saw Nawaf or Khalid make a phone call or having a phone card in their possession. Nawaf and Khalid did not ask (P) for any assistance in finding a bank, getting calling cards, or asking about schools or English classes during the initial period of time when he met them. (P) did not see Nawaf or Khalid interact with any other individuals during this time in Los Angeles except for introducing them to Althumairy. Nawaf and Khalid never went inside (P) apartment during this time. (P) never saw Nawaf or Khalid with a camera.

(P) stated that Nawaf called him a couple of weeks after they got to San Diego and let him know that they were going to stay down there. Nawaf told (P) that he would get the bag next time they came up to Los Angeles.

The next time (P) heard from Nawaf and Khalid is when they called him to tell him that they were coming up to Los Angeles. (P) invited them to his home on Midvale Avenue. (P) told his best friend, (P) that he had a couple of Saudi friends would be coming up from San Diego to visit. Nawaf, Khalid and a Yemeni individual Mohdar (Abdullah) showed up at (P) apartment. (P) stated that (P) and Mohdar quickly hit it off because they were both from Yemen. During the night, the five individuals talked about marriage, schools and Khalid's departure. This was the first time that (P) heard Nawaf's interest in attending school. At the time (P) was attending school and Nawaf was asking him a lot of questions about it. Nawaf and Khalid took their bag back from (P) on that night.

The next time (P) saw Nawaf was a week later when he came up to Los Angeles and spent the night at (P) sister's apartment. (P) stated it was possible that Nawaf made a call from his house on that night. After that night, (P) never saw or heard from Nawaf again.

(P) was asked if Nawaf or Khalid stayed at any other place when he first met them. (P) stated that they stayed at one of the two motels he showed agents in January, 2007. The only other people (P) saw Nawaf and Khalid interact with was Fahad Althumairy, (P) (P), and Mohdar Abdullah.

(P) only told his parents and sister about his interaction with Khalid and Nawaf after 9/11. (P) stated he was too scared to go to the authorities and tell them about his meeting them.

(P) was confronted with the fact that the motel registry has not matched up with what (P) previously told agents. (P) could not explain why that would be the case as he was sure that Nawaf and Khalid stayed in a motel that he previously described to agents.

(P) did not recognize California Driver's License (CDL) photographs of (P) (P)

(P) stated he would be amenable to taking a polygraph because he had nothing to hide. (P) a attorney stated that he would have to talk to his client on the issue of taking a polygraph.

(P) was informed that it was very possible that he would be interviewed again by other agents regarding his contact with Nawaf and Khalid.

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08/08/2011

On May 18, 2011 and May 19, 2011, MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID, also known as MOHDAR ABDULLAH (Mohdar), date of birth (P-1)/1978, was interviewed in (G) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (S) and New York City Police Department (NYPD) (S) were present in the room and conducted the interview. FBI (S) and NYPD (S) (S) were in a position to observe the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Mohdar voluntarily provided the following information:

After graduating from high school in Yemen, Mohdar traveled to the United Kingdom for approximately three weeks. He then returned to Yemen and, shortly thereafter, took a flight to visit Italy. While in Italy, Mohdar called some school classmates who were in Canada. These classmates encouraged him to attend college in Canada. Mohdar applied and received an acceptance letter from Algoden College in Ottawa, Canada. He did not apply for college through the Embassy in Yemen. Mohdar's father sponsored his move to Canada and paid all the college tuition.

While residing and attending college in Ottawa, Canada, Mohdar attended the Central Mosque. He could not provide the name of the Imam, but commented he was of Libyan descent. Mohdar did not meet and was not acquainted with (P) while residing in Canada. Mohdar insisted that he met (P) only after arriving in San Diego, California in 1999. Both Mohdar and (P) attended the Masjid Abu Bakr and the Masjid Ar Ribat while residing in San Diego.

Mohdar knew both Nawaf al Hazmi (Hazmi) and Khaled al Mihdhar (Mihdhar). Mohdar was first introduced to Hazmi and Mihdhar by Omar al Bayoumi (Bayoumi) who was a Saudi financier of the local Saudi-sponsored mosques. Mohdar described a perception in the community that Bayoumi was associated with the Saudi intelligence services. Others in the Islamic community would say to stay away from Bayoumi because he spies for the Saudi government.

Mohdar was introduced to Hazmi and Mihdhar after prayer service in January 2000 at the mosque where Bayoumi was an administrator and had an office. Bayoumi called Mohdar and invited him to an evening meal at the mosque. Bayoumi walked into the room with Hazmi and Mihdhar

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and then, after talking to Imam Anwar Aulaqi, Bayoumi walked over to Mohdar and introduced Hazmi and Mihdhar as two Saudi students who did not speak English and were new to San Diego. Bayoumi told Hazmi and Mihdhar that this was Mohdar. Mohdar understood this to indicate that Bayoumi had previously had a conversation with Hazmi and Mihdhar about him. Bayoumi asked Mohdar if he could help Hazmi and Mihdhar. Mohdar then sat next to Hazmi and ate a meal.

Mohdar clarified to investigators that he was not instructed to look after Hazmi or Mihdhar while they were in the United States, but was asked by Bayoumi. Mohdar is a man and therefore nobody tells him what to do, and all the help he provided to Hazmi and Mihdhar was of his own accord.

Mohdar developed a friendship with Mihdhar and Hazmi and offered continued assistance to them, particularly by acting as an intermediary when it came to dealing with language barriers. He would translate for Hazmi and Mihdhar and help them fill out documents. Mohdar made a phone call to a flight school for Mihdhar. He did not help Hazmi and Mihdhar get social security cards or driver's licenses, but did help Hazmi and Mihdhar fill out the paperwork for driver's licenses. Hazmi and Mihdhar lived in San Diego and Hazmi also worked at the gas station where Mohdar worked. Mohdar also helped them try to exchange a set of airplane tickets which transited through Bangkok for a direct flight to Saudi Arabia, but was not successful.

Mohdar had conversations with both Hazmi and Mihdhar about jihad on many occasions. Sometimes they had these conversations sitting on the picnic tables outside the gas station where they worked. The men would talk about the fighting in Chechnya and the plight of the Palestinians. They would watch internet videos of the fighting in Chechnya and the oppression of Muslims by Russia. They discussed the U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya and Hazmi and Mihdhar would both justify the attacks as part of jihad. The three men also discussed Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Hazmi and Mihdhar praised UBL as a jihadi. Mohdar told Hazmi and Mihdhar he did not agree with the attacks on the embassies.

Mohdar did his own internet research about UBL. He continued to have discussions with Hazmi and Mihdhar about jihad, the war against Islam, and the oppression of Muslims, focusing on events such as the presence of American troops on Muslim land, particularly in the holy land of Saudi Arabia. Mohdar said that during these conversations with Hazmi and Mihdhar, the three men also discussed training camps.

Mohdar also spent a lot of time with Hazmi after Mihdhar departed the United States. Hazmi had jihadi, anti-Jew, and anti-American views. Mohdar attended two protests on issues surrounding Israel and the Palestinians, including accompanying Hazmi to a pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli protest in Balboa Park in San Diego in 2000. Hazmi talked to Mohdar about wanting to be a pilot and attending flight school. Hazmi gave Mohdar a telephone number to a flight school and requested that Mohdar call and make inquiries on behalf of Hazmi. Hazmi said he wanted to work for the Transportation Department of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Mohdar continued to assist Hazmi in his daily affairs even after the discussions about Hazmi's views.

Mohdar spent a lot of time with Hazmi on a daily basis. He did not see Hazmi do anything suspicious while in San Diego. Hazmi was in the United States as a student, but he did not go to school. Mohdar described Hazmi as a strict Islamic fundamentalist, noting that Hazmi would not even shake a woman's hand because it was against his Islamic beliefs. Hazmi wanted to marry a Syrian woman and went to see the Minister of Interior in Saudi Arabia, who told Hazmi he could not marry the woman. While in San Diego, Mohdar assisted Hazmi in seeking a woman to court and marry on dating websites, such as www.match.com. Mohdar believes Hazmi was seeking a female with whom to have sex. Mohdar was not aware of any females with whom Hazmi had contact through these dating websites. Mohdar and Hazmi often entered into discussion regarding the fundamentals and strict teachings of Islam. In one instance, Mohdar had a discussion with Hazmi as to why Hazmi was clean shaven and did not have a beard. Hazmi told Mohdar that he had his reasons why he did not wear a beard, but did not elaborate.

Mohdar asked Hazmi why, if Hazmi did not like being in the United States, he didn't leave. Hazmi did not answer this question. Hazmi mentioned UBL by name in several of these conversations. Hazmi made the association between Bin Laden and the Embassy bombing in Tanzania. During this conversation, Mohdar thought back to when the Navy ship, the USS Cole, was attacked in 2000.

Hazmi told Mohdar that something needs to be done to fight the jihad, and went as far as to say that they should do something. Mohdar did not think Hazmi meant they should be terrorists. He believed that Hazmi meant they should train and fight abroad, like the Muslim men who trained and fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya in the past. Mohdar did not realize Hazmi was trying to recruit him.

Mohdar recognized a photograph of Fahad al Thumairy (Thumairy) and admitted knowing Thumairy. Mohdar traveled from San Diego to Culver City, California, to attend prayer at the King Fahad Mosque. His first trip to Culver City was with two close friends named [redacted] [redacted] and Samir Abdoun. [redacted] knew the location of the King Fahad Mosque and gave Mohdar directions. This occasion was the first time Mohdar met Thumairy. At the time, Thumairy was the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque.

On his next visit to the King Fahad Mosque, Mohdar was with [redacted] LNU. Mohdar could not recall [redacted] last name. He described [redacted] as a Yemeni citizen and a neighbor of his while they both resided in Sanaa, Yemen. [redacted] was a doctor who had attended medical school in Germany and was in San Diego for a visit at the time. [redacted] stayed with [redacted]. Mohdar and [redacted] rented a car and traveled together to Los Angeles, California to attend prayer at the King Fahad Mosque. Mohdar and [redacted] later went to a Yemeni group meeting in Long Beach, California.

On his third visit to the King Fahad Mosque, Mohdar visited a separate mosque that was affiliated with the Tablighi Jamaat Group. This separate mosque was in the same area of Los Angeles, California, as the King Fahad Mosque. Mohdar did not indicate who was with him on this trip. In June 2000 he attended the King Fahad Mosque with Hazmi and Mihdhar.

Thumairy knew Hazmi and Mihdhar. Mohdar knew this because he was present when Thumairy, Hazmi and Mihdhar were together at the King Fahad Mosque in Los Angeles.

Mohdar traveled to Los Angeles three times with the hijackers before the September 11, 2001 attacks. On June 9, 2000, Mohdar accompanied Hazmi and Mihdhar from San Diego, California, to Los Angeles, California, in order to take Mihdhar to the Los Angeles Airport (LAX). Hazmi drove the two men in his car, with Mohdar and Mihdhar as the only passengers. Mihdhar told Mohdar that he was leaving the United States for Yemen to go to see his wife and infant child. In the late afternoon of June 9th, Mohdar, Hazmi and Mihdhar visited the King Fahad Mosque for prayer and then met with Thumairy. During the time Mohdar, Mihdhar and Hazmi were meeting with Thumairy in the parking lot of the mosque, an individual named (P) walked up and greeted Hazmi and Mihdhar. It appeared to Mohdar that Hazmi, Mihdhar and (P) were well acquainted with each other. Another individual named (P) (P) also walked up and greeted Hazmi and Mihdhar. (P) and (P) were good friends. (P) was originally from (P) and (P) was from (P). (P) was better acquainted with Hazmi and Mihdhar than (P) was, and (P) had a more prominent role interacting with them. This was the first time Mohdar met (P) and (P) Thumairy, (P) already knew Hazmi and Mihdhar by this time, probably from when Hazmi and Mihdhar had resided in Los Angeles.

After the greetings took place in the parking lot, Thumairy invited Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Mohdar to the library at the King Fahad Mosque. The library was located in a house across the street from the mosque. Mohdar was present at the meeting in the library but could not overhear the conversation between Hazmi, Mihdhar and Thumairy because the conversation took place when Mohdar was not in listening range. Mohdar was behind the three while they were walking to the library and did not hear what they were talking about. This meeting in the library area lasted approximately two hours.

After the visit at the library and King Fahad Mosque, Mohdar, Hazmi and Mihdhar were invited to eat dinner at (P) residence. Mohdar could not recall exactly who invited him to eat dinner, but believed it was (P) Mohdar described this dinner as a goodbye dinner for Mihdhar, who was leaving the United States the following day. Mohdar rode in the car with Hazmi and Mihdhar to (P) residence. Mohdar did not recall if Hazmi knew how to get to (P) residence, but (P) did not travel with them and they did not follow (P) to the residence.

(P) father may also have been at the residence and joined them for dinner. Thumairy was also present at the dinner, having arrived on his own. (P) did not attend the dinner because he had to eat at his own house. (P) joined Mohdar, Hazmi and Mihdhar later that same evening at their hotel to socialize. (P) did not join Mohdar, Hazmi and Mihdhar in their hotel room.

On the morning of June 10, 2000, before leaving for LAX, Hazmi and Mihdhar met again with Thumairy at the library across the street from the King Fahad Mosque. Thumairy, Hazmi and Mihdhar entered the library. Mohdar remained outside at this time and could not provide any information on the content of the conversation.

Mohdar did not know the identity of an unknown individual in the previously documented security video taken at LAX airport in 2000. He had not seen anyone during his trip to the airport and, even after being shown the surveillance tape, he did not recognize the individual. Mohdar had nothing to offer regarding the unidentified individual and insisted he was not able to provide any information about this person. He has consistently stated in the past that he could not identify this person and has never known who the individual in the video was.

During one trip to Los Angeles, Mohdar, Hazmi and Mihdhar stayed in a hotel in Culver City, close to the King Fahad Mosque. In the middle of the night, Mohdar observed either Hazmi or Mihdhar leave the hotel room. Mohdar asked where the person was going and the person responded that he had to make a phone call. Mohdar did not ask anything further and did not see anyone else leave with him or whether he met anyone while he was out of the room.

On one visit to the King Fahad Mosque, Mohdar also became acquainted with a Yemeni male named Ramez Noaman (Noaman). Noaman told Mohdar about a group of Yemenis who met regularly in Long Beach, California, and invited Mohdar to attend a meeting. Noaman accompanied Mohdar and Hisham to this meeting. Noaman was in the United States as a student from Yemen, attending college at San Diego State University in San Diego, California. Noaman and Mohdar continued to attend these Yemeni group meetings together and Hazmi accompanied them to one meeting. Hazmi did not know anyone else in the group.

Mohdar knew some of the Yemeni males that attended these group meetings because they went to high school together in Sanaa, Yemen. Sheikh Anwar Aulaqi had attended meetings of this Yemeni group and had led prayers there.

Mohdar met (P) family at the Masjid Ar Ribat in San Diego, California. (P) introduced Mohdar to (P) and her family members.

(P) mother asked Mohdar to look after (P) including driving her back and forth to work at an (P) in San Diego.

He never had any conversations with (P) about Hazmi or Mihdhar.

Mohdar had been introduced to (P) at (P) house. (P) and her mother were instrumental in making the arrangements for the marriage ceremony between Mohdar and (P) (P) mother had wanted to have Mohdar marry one of her daughters. Mohdar said he never had any type of sexual relations with (P) Mohdar indicated (P) family was (P), but then stated they were (P) in response to questions about their nationality. He then referred to (P) family as (P). Mohdar met (P) family at the Ar Ribat Mosque and helped them out because they were new to the country.

The marriage ceremony between Mohdar and (P) was held in the parking lot of a Denny's Restaurant in San Diego. Mohdar could not recall the date of the ceremony, but indicated that (P) and possibly her mother attended. Mohdar denied that (P) bought a ring for him to give to (P)

Mohdar married (P) several weeks before 9/11, but did not (P) until the night of September 10, 2001. He received consent to marry (P) from (P) mother and then got married in an Islamic wedding ceremony where there were two witnesses. Mohdar and (P) were married in accordance with Islam by an official from the Masjid Ar Ribat. Mohdar could not recall the name nor the identity of the official who performed his wedding ceremony. The witnesses to the marriage ceremony were Mohdar's best friend, (P) (P). and Yazeed Al Salmi.

Mohdar spent the night of September 10th, 2001 in a hotel. That night, he brought (P) to the hotel (P) (P) Later that night, he took (P) home to her mother's house. Mohdar then went back to the hotel to spend the night, because he had paid for the whole night and the hotel was closer to his school than was his apartment.

Mohdar woke up on September 11, 2001 and received a call from (P) mother, who was crying and saying that New York is on fire. Mohdar asked to speak to (P) and then found out something was going on in New York. He turned on the television and saw the twin towers, but thought at first the events were an accident. He then took a shower and went to class at Grossmont College. Mohdar saw everyone waiting outside of the school and when he asked what was going on, someone said classes were cancelled because of what was happening. He then went to the Masjid Ar Ribat and was also turned away from entering the mosque. Mohdar got upset that the mosque was closed and confronted the caretaker. The caretaker said to go home and that the mosque was closed because of what happened.

Mohdar was not at (P) family house any time on September 11th, 2001. Mohdar did not make or receive a telephone call from (P) family house on the day of 9/11/2001. He did make a call to the Lemon

Grove Mosque on the day of 9/11/2001.

Mohdar re-contacted (P) and her family approximately two years ago via email and online chat rooms. The latest contact was approximately six months ago. Within the last two months, he had been in contact with (P) mother via instant messenger. Mohdar re-contacted the (P) family because he was searching for information related to the possibility that he had fathered a child with (P) which (P) denied. (P) mother told Mohdar that (P) was lying about the birth records of her child and that the child was actually Mohdar's. He went through (P) to gain information about (P)

Mohdar also discussed the topic of fathering (P) child with (P) He confided in (P) because the two go way back together in the San Diego Muslim community. Mohdar trusted (P) because of the history they have together and a friendship that goes back for more than ten years. (P) stood behind him and supported him while he was in jail after the 9/11 attacks.

Mohdar received a phone call from a man named Nawaf in August, 2001, but it was not Nawaf al Hazmi. Mohdar received the call from (P) (P) left a message on Mohdar's home answering machine asking if he was with us and if Mohdar was going to come with them. Mohdar understood this to refer to whether he was going to accompany (P) to Los Angeles, California, from San Diego. Mohdar had had an in-person conversation with (P) three days earlier about traveling together from San Diego to Los Angeles. Mohdar did not respond to the message, did not go to Los Angeles with (P) and never spoke to (P) again.

Mohdar was on his way to drop off (P) at work when he was arrested in 2001. He never mentioned anything to (P) regarding any of the events of the 9/11 attacks.

Mohdar was introduced to Anwar Aulaqi (Aulaqi) through Aulaqi's younger brother. Mohdar was friends with Aulaqi's brother, Omar Aulaqi (Omar), back in Yemen. He knew the Aulaqi family from Yemen where they lived a few houses down from his family's house.

When Mohdar was living in Canada, he wanted to come to the United States to find work. He was told by someone in Canada that he could come to the United States and then claim asylum. Mohdar called Omar who said to call his brother, Aulaqi, regarding going to San Diego. Mohdar asked Aulaqi if he would sponsor Mohdar coming to San Diego, and Aulaqi agreed to do so. Mohdar first met Aulaqi in 1999 when Aulaqi picked up Mohdar at LAX airport, upon Mohdar's first arrival in the United States. It was Omar's idea for Aulaqi to pick up Mohdar at LAX.

Mohdar attended the Ar Ribat Mosque in San Diego when Aulaqi was the Imam. Aulaqi was a great, charismatic speaker. The youth looked up to Aulaqi. Mohdar looked up to Aulaqi as well, but changed his view in 2005 when they did a news interview together for Al Jazeera in Yemen. Mohdar's view had changed by this time and he did not agree with Aulaqi's radical views about terrorism and jihad. Mohdar is not convinced everything the media is saying about Aulaqi is right.

Hazmi and Mihdhar attended the Ar Ribat Mosque and spoke with Aulaqi on numerous occasions. Aulaqi also attended and gave sermons at the Yemeni group events in Long Beach. Aulaqi was at the Yemeni group meeting in Long Beach at the same time Hazmi attended.

The reason Aulaqi left the United States was because he got a tip that the FBI was working a prostitution case against him. Aulaqi decided to leave before the case advanced. Mohdar could not provide the current location or whereabouts of Aulaqi. He last spoke in-person with Aulaqi in 2005, after he and Aulaqi were interviewed together by a reporter from the Al Jazeera news organization. That interview was based on information released by the 9/11 Commission in the United States.

Mohdar last talked to Aulaqi on the telephone at the end of 2008 with (P). (P) was in Sanaa, Yemen, going to Arabic language school and working as an English language teacher at the American Center. (P) and Mohdar associated on a regular basis in Sanaa. In 2008, (P) asked Mohdar if he could put him in contact with Aulaqi. Mohdar told (P) he could, however, Mohdar would have to talk with Aulaqi in order to see if it was okay to give Aulaqi's telephone number to (P). Mohdar contacted Aulaqi and relayed that (P) wanted to speak with Aulaqi via cellular telephone. Aulaqi remembered (P) from the time they spent together in San Diego, California, and gave the approval to have Mohdar give (P) his telephone number. (P) telephonically contacted Aulaqi and they engaged in conversation. Aulaqi agreed to meet (P) in-person, but the situation in Yemen made it difficult for (P) to travel to Aulaqi. (P) could not go to where Aulaqi was without having a good reason for being there. Aulaqi told (P) that he would have to send a driver for (P) The meeting was put on hold and (P) contact with Aulaqi stopped for about a month and a half.

(P) approached Mohdar again and asked to be put in contact with Aulaqi a second time. Mohdar got the approval from Aulaqi and (P) called again. Aulaqi and (P) talked again about meeting, but it never happened. Mohdar did not know why the meeting did not take place. Mohdar was not going to accompany (P) to the meeting. Mohdar obtained Aulaqi's cellular telephone number through Aulaqi's brother in Yemen, (P) Mohdar provided (P)'s cellular number as (P). Mohdar explained he did this favor for (P) because he felt obligated to (P) for standing by him during his arrest and deportation process after the 9/11 attacks. Because of (P) loyalty, Mohdar praised (P) and considers him as a close friend and a brother-in-Islam.

Mohdar was not willing to broker contact with Aulaqi for the investigating agents and said he is done with all of this stuff. He would not broker an introduction to Aulaqi for investigators even when offered compensation.

After Hazmi left San Diego in December 2000, Mohdar talked with Yazeed Al Salmi (Yazeed) at their apartment on Saranac Street in San Diego, California. At the time, Yazeed's uncle worked for the Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Yazeed's uncle told Yazeed that Hazmi was wanted for questioning by Government officials in Saudi Arabia. Yazeed did not provide Mohdar with any additional information related to this conversation.

Mohdar speculated that Hazmi was wanted for questioning because Hazmi talked badly about the Royal family in Saudi Arabia. Another individual named Omar Al Bayoumi (Bayoumi) was also critical of the Royal family in Saudi Arabia. Mohdar sat and socialized with a bunch of friends at a table outside the Texaco gas station in San Diego on many occasions. This was where Mohdar and Hazmi worked while residing in San Diego. On one occasion, Mohdar and his friends were talking about well-known Islamic shaikhs and scholars. Hazmi talked about a dream he had where the day of judgement was near. Hazmi also talked about how oppressive the Royal family was to the people of Saudi Arabia. Hazmi said the gates of Mecca would be opened by jihadis.

While Mohdar was incarcerated for his immigration issues, he met two individuals in jail named (P) and Black. At no time did Mohdar admit to either man that he had knowledge of the 9/11 attacks beforehand or say that the U.S. deserved what happened on 9/11/2001. Mohdar made sarcastic comments about the 9/11 attacks because when he got to prison, everyone said he was the one involved in 9/11. He would jokingly agree with people in a sarcastic way, but (P) and Black lied about him to help themselves get out of jail.

Mohdar traveled to Indonesia in the past few years. Mohdar feels he has not been well treated over the past ten years. In the past ten years he has been spoken to by the U.S. FBI, CIA, and the Canadian, Italian, Jordanian, and Emirati governments. Mohdar felt he had offered his assistance to the U.S. government early on, specifically naming (S), but was betrayed by the U.S. legal system. Mohdar has no intention of testifying about any information involving himself, nor any information provided in this interview.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 01/05/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

San Diego **Attn:**

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To report results of 01/04/2007 interview with (P).

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** 05/22/2002

Details: [redacted] (O-1) reported that Mohdar Abdullah described how he accompanied Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) from San Diego. Once they arrived in Los Angeles, the group went to King Fahad Mosque (KFM), where they met (P) (LNU), a (P). (P) LNU

[redacted]

looked surprised to see Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi and they started to chat. It was explained to Abdullah that both knew (P) before when they used to live in Los Angeles. At this point, another individual entered the picture, an (P) that Abdullah could not recall the name. He too knew Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi previously and he invited them over to his place for supper.

[redacted] On 12/29/2006 (S) contacted (S) (S) to determine if he knew of any (P) individuals by the name of (P) that was around KFM between 1999-2001. (P-1) advised that there was a (P) individual known as (P) who was a regular attendee at King Fahad Mosque during 2000-2002. (P) LNU used to work at (P) in the (P) on the corner of (P) In 2003, (P) LNU disappeared and was thought to be in San Diego. (G) described (P) as in his 20's-30's, light skinned. (P) used to be roommates with (P) (date of birth (P-1) (P) CDL (P-1) and (P) LNU at (P) (P) Culver City, California 90232. (P) is (P) and works as a (P) in Hawthorne off on (P) and (P) in Hawthorne. (P) LNU was an associate of Fahad Althumairy.

[redacted] After researching the (P) Culver City address, (P) LNU is possibly identified as (P) (P), date of birth (P-1) (P) CDL (P-1) SSN (P-1), latest DMV address (P) San Diego, 92111, current vehicle registration address (P) (P) La Mesa, California, 91941.

[redacted] (P) was an individual who had financial transactions with Fahad Althumairy (Subject of (F) [redacted] A search of ACS revealed that (P) is indexed in (F) serial (F) as being the registered owner of a 1989 Gold Mercedes vehicle with license plate (P-1) address (P) Hawthorne, California, that was seen in the vicinity of (P-1) on 03/21/2003. This surveillance was observing Mohammed Al-Muhanna (Subject of (F) .

[redacted] (P) is also referenced as the subject of an FD-71 Complaint in (F) Serial (F) dated 08/05/2003.

In the complaint, (P) was fired as (P) for (P) for poor performance and inconsistencies on his application. At the time, the address of (P) was (P-1), Escondido, CA (P). (P) was later determined to be the phone number of a Yemeni jewelry company. The Field Supervisor for (P) Solutions, was interviewed regarding this matter ((F) Serial (F), dated 08/13/03) and he did not have any derogatory information (P)

[redacted] On 01/03/2007, (S) provided SAC concurrence for travel by Los Angeles agent to the San Diego Field Office.

[redacted] On 01/04/2007, (S) and (S) (S) interviewed (P) date of birth (P-1) (P) place of birth (P), California Driver's License number (P-1), Social Security Number (P), cellular telephone (P) at his residence, (P) La Mesa, California. Later in the day, (P) called (P-1) to inform agent that he had additional details to add from the morning interview. (P) provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) was shown photographs of Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi. At first, (P) stated that the individuals in the photographs looked familiar and then remembered a Yemeni individual he met at King Fahad Mosque (KFM) years ago after the evening prayer (approximately 7:00 pm) who was accompanied by two Saudis. (P) could not recall their names. (P) was introduced to these individuals by one of his friends at KFM known as (P) (P) stated that the Yemeni individual was (P) (P) stated that one of the Saudis was returning to Yemen to visit his wife and daughter the following day. The other Saudi was very interested in (P)'s course work at (P). (P) invited the Yemeni individual and the two Saudis to eat. (P) declined but thought they went to a Bangladeshi place on Venice Boulevard that had an open buffet. (P) believed that (P) previously knew the Yemeni and Saudis from an earlier visit to Los Angeles. Later in the evening at approximately 9:00 pm, (P) went to the motel room the Yemeni individual and the Saudis were staying at and talked with the Yemeni for a couple of hours. The Saudis were praying and reading books. They did not engage in conversation with (P). (P) does not recall asking the group about their dinner. (P) did not see the group the next day at KFM.

(P) was living at an address on (P) in Los Angeles when this meeting took place. (P) and (P) would typically walk to and from the mosque together, but on the night they met the Yemeni individual and the Saudis at KFM, (P) did not walk back from the mosque with (P). (P) explained that he had to get home to his wife after prayers.

[redacted] A couple of weeks later, one of the Saudis met with (P) at KFM and asked him to assist him in applying for a English class at (P). (P) stayed while one of the Saudis (thought to be identified as Nawaf Al-Hazmi) had an interview with a female clerk. (P) does not recall the results of the interview and that was the last time he saw this Saudi individual.

[redacted] (P) is a couple of years older than (P) (P) moved to San Diego and now lives in (P) and is employed by (P) in a management position. (P) (P)'s phone number in San Diego was (P-1) but (P) believes that he still uses this number in (P). (P)'s father is from (P) and his mother is from (P). (P) grew up in (P) and that is the reason why (P) shares a connection with him.

[redacted] (P) described (P) as 5'9", thin build, dark-skinned, late 30's and is an American citizen. (P)'s sister still lives in Los Angeles and is married to an (P) individual named (P) LNU.

[redacted] (P) moved to San Diego before (P), and then convinced him to move there as well.

[redacted] (P) to help agents contact or get information from (P) on meeting the Yemeni and Saudi individuals at KFM. Agents instructed (P) not to contact anyone regarding what was discussed.

[redacted] (P) has lived at his current address for approximately one year with his three children and their mother

(P) (P) works as a (P) with (P) days a week and works for (P) as a (P) on the weekends. (P) has a green card and is awaiting his citizenship papers.

[redacted] Author's note: Agents observed a (P) (License Plate number (P-1) outside of (P)'s residence.

[redacted] When (P) lived in Culver City at the (P) (P) he roomed with three other people in the three bedroom apartment: two (P) and (P) LNU and (P) LNU and an (P) named (P) LNU.

[redacted] (P) suggested that agents contact his former roommate, (P) LNU who got involved with everyone at KFM. (P) saw (P) LNU in Los Angeles during this past Christmas.

[redacted] (P) prayed at KFM everyday while he was living in Los Angeles. (P) recalled one African Imam and one Saudi Imam at KFM while he was there. The Saudi Imam was named Fahad LNU. Fahad used to send customers to (P) when he worked at (P) because he gave them discounts.

[redacted] When (P) was living in (P), he was contacted by an FBI agent named Thomas a couple of times, but has not talked to him recently.

[redacted] (P) is divorced from his wife, (P-1). (P-1) has two children.

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 01/05/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] At [redacted] (G): For your information, read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] At [redacted] (G): For your information, read and clear.

♦♦

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2021 BY (S) NSICG

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File #

Date dictated

by

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03/07/2002

Qualid Moncef Benomrane, date of birth (P-1) 1976, place of birth Tunis, Tunisia, address (P) Santa Monica, CA, telephone number (P) was interviewed at the INS detention facility located at 300 N. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, CA. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Officer (P-1) After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview Benomrane provided the following information:

Benomrane was born and raised in Tunis, Tunisia. He first came to the United States on 01/25/1999 on a visitors Visa. He arrived with his mother who stayed for approximately two weeks and then left back home to Tunisia. Shortly after he arrived in Los Angeles he enrolled in a English language school called Concord English Language. After studying there for ten month he began taking computer science classes at West Los Angeles College. Benomrane's goal is to complete his education in the United States, save some money, and then return to Tunisia. Benomrane stated he is currently being sponsored by a Saudi Arabia named (P) LNU in his attempts to obtain a green card. (P) is approximately forty years old and owns a computer/internet company. (P) drives a (P). He began sponsoring Benomrane in April 2001.

Prior to living at his current address he lived at (P) Avenue in Los Angeles. He lived with a (P) from Sudan. (P) is approximately twenty nine years old, dark complexion, with very short hair. (P) is currently still living on (P) however he is still in Saudia Arabia following the Haj. (P) attends the King Fahad Mosque.

Currently, Benomrane is working as an independent taxi cab driver. A (P) provides often times provides fares for Benomrane. Additionally, Benomrane pays (P) $120 a month for insurance. (P) lives one or two houses away from the corner of (P) and (P) on (P).

Benomrane has also worked at Arco gas stations located at Vermont and Imperial Avenues, and at another Arco located at Sunset and San Vicente Avenues. Benomrane has also sold carpets on the street or swapmeets in the past until he was given a citation for doing so and placed on probation. He would buy his carpets at United Imports located of the 710 freeway.

03/06/2002 Los Angeles, CA

(F)

(S)

Benomrane speaks Arabic, French, and English.

Benomrane has never been to Europe or the Middle East. He has also never been to Pakistan or Afghanistan. Benomrane claims to have never received any military or terrorist training.

Benomrane stated he is a practicing Muslim who prays five times a day, and expressed repeatedly that Islam is peaceful. He stated that he never drinks, goes to bars or clubs, and does not smoke.

Benomrane expressed hatred for the Taliban/Al Qaeda and said that they were not Muslims.

Benomrane stated that he did not believe that Muslims were involved in the 09/11/2001 attacks on America. He said that Muslims are simple people who just pray and could not have been involved in such a complex operation.

Benomrane said that he felt extremely sad about the events of 09/11/2001. He said that he has never heard anyone express joy over the terrorist attacks, and has never heard any say that they want to harm the United States because of our current involvement in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Currently, Benomrane worships at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City. He said that the Mosque director is named (P) and he is from Ghana. He said the Imam is Sheik Fahad.

Approximately five to seven months ago he went to Las Vegas with (P) LNU (known to investigators as (P) . (P) is also from (P) . They drove to Las Vegas in (P) (P) . (P) works as (P) at (P) off the 710 freeway.

He went to Las Vegas one other time. Benomrane could not recall exactly when this trip occurred, but he went with (P) as well. While on this trip he met a person named (P) LNU.

Approximately four to five months ago Benomrane went to San Francisco with (P) LNU (known to investigators as (P) and (P) . They rented a van and drove to San Francisco. They stayed for one night and went sight seeing the next day. They went on the trip because (P) was due to return to Tunisia and had not seen San Francisco while in America.

Benomrane also traveled twice to San Diego. Both times he visited Sea world. The first time that he went was with (P) (P) from Sudan. They visited no other places in San Diego while on this trip.

With regards to the second trip that Benomrane took to San Diego he remembered it as an after thought. He said he remembered his second trip to San Diego in the context of two Saudi Arabian nationals who flew into LAX airport and subsequently went to King Fahad Mosque. When asked to provide the sequence of events regarding the two Saudi Arabian nationals Benomrane provided the following:

Benomrane had heard that two Saudi Arabian men arrived at LAX and where met by a person unknown to Benomrane. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. Benomrane stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and Palm St.

One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis Benomrane was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque Sheik Fahad introduced Benomrane to the two Saudis and asked Benomrane if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak english. Benomrane agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.

The next day the Saudis called Benomrane and asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. Benomrane picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around Santa Monica, took them to the beach, and to Hollywood. That day they ate at the Cheesecake Factory and the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day Benomrane took them back to their apartment complex.

Two to three days later the Saudis called Benomrane again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. They said they would pay Benomrane $200 plus gas and food for the day if he took them. Benomrane agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given $100 and told he would get the remainder after the trip. Benomrane stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a gas station. Benomrane could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. They spent the entire day at Sea world and then returned to Los Angeles. While at Sea world the three of them never met anyone. There were occasions though where Benomrane used the restroom by himself and left the two Saudis alone.

One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles Benomrane called them to receive the remainder of his money. The Saudis told him that Sheik Fahad would give him the rest of the money.

When asked by investigators who else knew about the two Saudis Benomrane replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by Sheik Fahad to keep the presence of the two Saudis to himself. Benomrane did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told Sheik Fahad to take care of the Saudis.

Benomrane was told by Sheik Fahad that the Saudis were here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. Benomrane said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if Benomrane knew for a fact that they returned to Saudi Arabia he replied no and that he was just told that they had left Los Angeles.

Benomrane could not remember the Saudis names, but remembered one was approximately twenty one years old and the other was approximately twenty-five years old. Benomrane stated over and over that the two Saudis came to Los Angeles prior to 09/11/2001.

The following is a list of Benomrane's friends and associates:

(P) - (P) He is Tunisian. Wired Benomrane $2000 to bail out (P) from INS custody in Los Angeles.

(P) LNU-Flew down from San Jose to help bail (P) and (P) from INS custody. (P) is (P) uncle. (P) is Tunisian.

(P) -Lives at (P), Santa Monica, CA. Works for (P) (P) in West Los Angeles. Tunisian.

(P) -Met at Arco gas station. Tunisian.

(P) -Tunisian. Manager at (P) (P) in West LA.

(P) -Tunisian. Met selling (P) Drives a (P).

(P) -Tunisian. Met at the (P). Works as a (P) off the 710 freeway.

(P) -Tunisian. Went back to Tunisia. Plans to go to Canada in the future.

(P) - Tunisian. (P). Met at King Fahad approximately one year ago. Friends with (P), (P) LNU, and (P)

(P) -Tunisian. Friends with (P) Met at King Fahad. Last saw him on 03/03/2002.

(P) LNU-Tunisian. Lives on (P) in Hollywood. Works for (P).

(P) -Tunisian. Works (P) in Beverly Hills.

(P) LNU-Tunisian. Works at a store called (P) in Hollywood.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/24/2002

Qualid Moncef Benomrane, date of birth (P-1) (P) place of birth Tunis, Tunisia, address (P) Los Angeles, Ca. Telephone number (P), was interviewed at the Santa Monica Jail facility, Santa Monica, Ca. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Detectives (S) and (S). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing detectives and the purpose of the interview, Benomrane provided the following information:

Benomrane advised that he has been in contact with the following people during his current detention for immigration violations;

(P) He advised that he used to live with (P) at (P) (P) is a sudanese and has been in the U.S. for approximately 10yrs. He drives a (P) and is a graduate of (P) and is an (P) He graduated from (P) in 1999 or 2000. He indicated that (P) is currently not employed. He believed (P) father's name was (P). Qualid indicated that he went to Las Vegas with (P) and his family and also went to Las Vegas with just the two of them on a separate occasion. The dates of these trips were unknown to him.

(P). (P) also lived at (P) and (P) (P). He indicated they have (P) in this company and did not know the exact number of (P) He advised that he knew (P) because they came from the same city (Tunis) in Tunisia.

(P). (P) lived at (P) and was working at a restaurant until about 3-4 Months ago. He stopped working because he was caught by INS working without a permit. Qualid indicated that when he talked to (P) advised him that (P) was worried about being deported and that the time is nearing for his deportation. When asked why they would talk about (P) when Qualid indicated he is not friends with (P), he indicated that they were "just talking". He was asked what he thought of (P) and the fact that his brothers were detained by the Tunisian government for being members of an anti-government group in Tunisia. He indicated that he does not know how they think so he cannot judge them. He was asked if hypothetically he knew someone with an extremist view and knew that someone wanted to kill others in the name of Islam how he would think

Investigation on 5-23-02 at Santa Ana Jail

File # (F) Date dictated

by (S)

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of them. He indicated that he did not believe in killing others in the name of religion.

(P) (P) and Benomrane used to sell carpets together and lived at (P) (P) is married to an American who is muslim. (P) and Benomrane used to get their (P) from a store by the (P). The owner of the store is only known to him as (P) He believes he is Palestinian or Jordanian.

(P) Known to investigators as (P) He indicated (P) is studying computers and is married to an American woman who is pregnant. She is Christian. He stated (P) came back from the Hajj about one month ago. While at the Hajj (P) met up with (P). Benomrane did not know how (P) got the money to go to the Hajj; only that he got it from a friend. He did not take his wife with him.

Benomrane was asked about his travels outside of the Los Angeles area. He indicated when he went to Las Vegas with (P) he remembered that he phoned a guy by the name of (P) He said he met him when he used to work at Venice Beach. While they were enroute to Vegas he phoned him and met with him for lunch. He could not remember what the conversation was about and only believed they talked about regular things. He stated that (P) (the friend he phoned and then met in Vegas) works as a cab driver in Vegas for an unk cab company.

Other names he could provide included (P) He knew him from his home town and this was the person he lived with when he first came to the U.S. He also told him how to get a student visa to stay and helped him get into the Concord English School. Another person was (P) who currently works in Culver City at (P) (P).

He was asked again about (P) He indicated he was the cab driver from Chicago who wired him the money (About $3,000) to help get (P) out of custody. He was unable to provide further on him.

He was also asked about who came down from San Jose and he indicated it was a person by the name of (P) LNU. He said (P) was the son of (P) sister. He could not provide any further information on him.

During his last interview he was asked to identify a set of pictures. He indicated at this that that he did not recognize any of the pictures. When asked this time why he set two of these pictures to the side apart from the others, he indicated that he thought that he may recognize these two but was not 100% sure. He said they looked familiar and may have been (P) brother. He only knows (P) from (P). He knows that he lives in Orange County, is about 31 or 32 years old and is married to a Palestinian woman.

Also brought up at his last interview was the fact that he drove two Saudi nationals to San Diego at the behest of Sheik Fahad. During this interview he clarified the description of the two men and indicated that one of the two were "heavy" or "fat". He also indicated that they stayed at the apt on Sepulveda Blvd with their sick father. The initial trip he took them on was to the Culver City/Los Angeles area and at this time thier father was with them. On the trip to San Diego/Sea World it was just the two sons that went.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-25-2020 BY (S) NSICG
Per FOIA review conducted on 12/13/2006.

06/17/2004

On June 14, 2004, YAZEED AL-SALMI was interviewed by (S) (S) at the (G) at Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview AL-SALMI provided the following information:

AL-SALMI was requested to recount his relationship with NAWAF AL-HAZMI and describe how they became acquainted. YAZEED AL-SALMI dpob: 2/16/1978 in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, arrived in the United States (US) in August 2000 to attend Grossmont College in San Diego to study accounting. AL-SALMI arrived in New York and continued to San Diego where he checked into the Comfort Inn until he could find a cheaper place to live. AL-SALMI visited the Islam Center where he met a man named ABDULSATAR who rents rooms to students. This apartment/room was located at Lemon Grove. Approximately 3-4 days after he arrived, he moved into this apartment where he first met NAWAF AL-HAZMI, which was approximately 3-4 days after he has arrived in San Diego. AL-SALMI stayed at this apartment for one and one-half months where he payed $400 per month rent. AL-SALMI payed cash for rent to ABDULSATAR. AL-HAZMI has already been living in this apartment, renting a room, and has been in San Diego since approximately January 2000. AL-HAMZI came to San Diego from Los Angeles. AL-SALMI described AL-HAZMI as very quiet, someone who spent most of his time in his room and someone who did not talk about himself very often. AL-SALMI recalls only going out in the company of AL-HAZMI on two occasions; one to visit the insurance company to register his vehicle and the second time was for pizza. AL-SALMI advised that KHALID ALMEDAR was a good friend of AL-HAZMI and possibly a roommate at one time. AL-SALMI stated the last time he saw AL-HAZMI was approximately 10 months prior to 9/11 attacks (September 11, 2001) and he did not speak with him at the time.

AL-SALMI advised he went to Bank of America with ABDULSATAR to open an account. AL-SALMI did not remember the account number or how much money he deposited. This bank was located in Lemon Grove, very close to his apartment. AL-SALMI stated that at a later date when he moved to La Mesa he opened another bank account at Washington Mutual. AL-SALMI did not remember the back account number.

Before AL-SALMI traveled to the US, AL-SALMI's father advised him to get traveler checks so he would not have to carry all cash.

6/14/2004 Hradec Kralove, Czech Rpub

(F)

(S)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/01/2015

[redacted] (S), FBI, and (S) HSI, met in person with (P), DOB (P-1) (P), in a first floor conference room at a public hotel. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, (P) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) first entered the United States in 1975 as a college student on an F-1 visa. (P) attended college at the (P), (P) California. He obtained a bachelor's degree as a (P).

[redacted] In 1979, (P) began employment with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (KSA), (P) in Santa Ana, California. (P) worked as a (P) (P) under the Ministry of (P) and was paid by (P) (P) in the KSA. (P) immigration status changed to having a diplomatic visa issued to him at that time. The individual who helped (P) obtain employment with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (KSA), Education Mission, mentioned above, was identified as LNU (P). (P) was a roommate of Zaharani in college at (P). (P) described (P) as a Saudi Arabian student on a Government scholarship from Saudi Arabia. (P) returned to the KSA after graduation from USC and began employment with the Saudi National Guard.

[redacted] In 1981 (P) was sent to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for approximately four months to attend an instructional conference in (P) (P). (P) returned to the United States in September 1981 but was relocated to (P). This was the main office for the Education Mission located in (P), in which (P) continued in the same position as previously in Santa Ana. After (P) returned to the United States from KSA in September 1981, an individual named Sobhi Al Harthi, described as a Saudi National, was responsible in (P) gaining his position mentioned above in (P)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (B,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 03-15-2019

(G)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Investigation on 11/13/2015 at Garden Grove, California, United States (In Person)

File # (F) Date drafted 11/16/2015

by (S)

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[redacted] In June 1983, after being introduced to the Consulate General at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (CKSA), in Los Angeles, California, (P) began employment at the CKSA as a (P). (P) duties were to distribute Islamic information pamphlets (P) (P) in the Los Angeles area. (P) also held the position of (P) for the CKSA in (P) (P). (P) was responsible for assisting in any daily affairs (P). (P) duties also included managing (P) (P) assisting in any prevention of drug or alcohol use and maintaining the Saudi (P) were in the United States.

[redacted] In (P), the CKSA (P) (P). (P) was not given a reason as to why (P) (P) commented that it was the Saudi norm (P) because he was of (P) descent and (P) a true Saudi Arabian.

[redacted] (P) for approximately one year (P) (P) He then began employment in San Diego, California, as a (P) located next to the (P) (P) also called the (P)

[redacted] In 2009, (P) returned to the Los Angeles area and began a part time job with the (P). (P) was let go from this job in September 2011 due to not renewing his contract. (P) was unemployed until August 2014 when he began employment as a (P) in (P) California.

[redacted] In the end of May 2015, (P) returned to (P) California, where he currently resides at (P-1) (P) California, (P), cellular telephone number (P-1) (P) resides with his wife (P-1) (P-1) (P-1). (P) is currently unemployed and is living off social security assistance and some savings. (P) denied receiving any financial assistance from the CKSA (P) (P). (P) married (P-1) who is also originally from (P) in 1976 and they have (P) grown children from this union.

[redacted] (P) denied working in any capacity as a political or media representative at the KSA Consulate Office, to include any other offices he worked in. (P) denied having contact with the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia located in Washington, D.C. while working at the CKSA in Los Angeles. (P) worked (P) under the Vice-Consulate at the CKSA which (P) identified as Mohamed Al Salum. When (P) began employment at the CKSA the Consul General was named Abdul Hamid Al Sardi. When (P) (P) in 2006 the Consul General was named Abdul Al Harthi, who was a cousin to Sobhi Al Harthi, mentioned above.

[redacted] (P) has had recent travel outside the United States. In 2012, (P) traveled to (P) for (P) engagement party. In 2014, (P) again traveled to (P) wedding. On each of these flights (P) had a layover in Dubai, UAE.

Primary Case: (F)
Case Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE - MOHDAR
Serial Number (F)

Serialized: 09/18/2017

Category: Full Investigation
Initiated: (G)
Details
Serial #: (F)
Type: EC

From: LOS ANGELES
To: COUNTERTERRORISM
LITTLE ROCK
NEW YORK
(G)
LOS ANGELES

Document Title: [redacted] TO REPORT RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH OUALID

Approval Date: 6/17/2008

Classification: [redacted]

Contents

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/17/2008

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (G)
(S), (G)

San Diego Attn: (G)
(S)
New York Attn: (G)
(S)
Little Rock Attn: (S)

Los Angeles Attn: (S)
(S)

From: Los Angeles
(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)
(F)

Title: (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

[redacted] MOHDAR ABDULLAH

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To report results of interview with OUALID BENOMRANE.

(G)

[redacted] Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: [redacted] On 06/11/2008 (A), (G), (J-1) OUALID BENOMRANE was interviewed at a Swedish Police Station in Kristianstad, Sweden by (S) and a member of SAPO (Swedish Intelligence Agency). BENOMRANE was first approached by SAPO in the lobby of the police station. The SAPO representative spoke to BENOMRANE in Swedish while escorting BENOMRANE and the other interviewers to a private meeting room. The SAPO representative then introduced the three other interviewers to BENOMRANE. BENOMRANE was advised by agents that he was not in any criminal or legal trouble, and that his assistance was being sought relative to people he may have known in Los Angeles during the time period of 1999-2002. BENOMRANE was agitated, advised that he was ready and impatiently wanted to know what questions the interviewers had for him.

[redacted] Writer advised BENOMRANE that she was with the Los Angeles Police Department, to which BENOMRANE replied "so". Writer advised BENOMRANE that she had interviewed BENOMRANE previously in Los Angeles while he was in custody, to which BENOMRANE replied that he did not remember that incident. BENOMRANE just wanted to "close the case" of that time period in his life. BENOMRANE loved Los Angeles, including the lifestyle and his ability to make money in the U.S., but did not want to remember the time he spent in custody. The SAPO representative advised that BENOMRANE's wife had just recently given birth to a daughter the week before. It was also discussed that BENOMRANE's (P-1)

[redacted] BENOMRANE attended an English Language School in 1999. Writer asked BENOMRANE if that particular school was the Concord Language School and BENOMRANE confirmed that it was. The school was attended by many different types of people, including, Tunisians, Koreans, and Japanese. BENOMRANE's first job opportunities in Los Angeles included working as a cashier at an AM PM gas station located at Exposition and Vermont. He also worked for a security company run by a Libyan male named (P) BENOMRANE's security jobs included security at the Los Angeles mosque located at Exposition and Vermont, known to writer as the Masjid Ibn Alkhattab. BENOMRANE later worked at another AM PM Gas Station in the Hollywood area. Through out the interview, BENOMRANE's memory was sketchy. He remembered basic information and when asked about specifics, ie: names of individuals, names of Streets, BENOMRANE would confirm the more specific information provided by the agents.

[redacted] A Tunisian male that BENOMRANE met while in Tunisia named (P) (A), (G), (J-1) helped BENOMRANE get a job as a taxi driver for Metro Cab. An Iranian male named (P) owned Metro Cab. BENOMRANE received his taxi license from the city of Santa Monica in 2000 or 2001. Three to four months later, BENOMRANE bought his own taxi and worked for Sunshine Taxi Cab. BENOMRANE paid the company 120 dollars a week. During that time period, BENOMRANE prayed at what he referred to as the Culver City Mosque (known to writer as the King Fahd Mosque).

[redacted] BENOMRANE was shown photos of (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohdar ABDULLAH (A), (G), (J-1) and Fahad ALTHUMAIRY (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). BENOMRANE was asked if he recognized any of the photographs as people who participated in a wedding ceremony that BENOMRANE possibly attended as a witness in the summer of 2000 or 2001 at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles. BENOMRANE only recognized the photograph depicting Fahad ALTHUMAIRY, but not in connection with a wedding ceremony. BENOMRANE denied knowing the other three individuals and could not remember attending a wedding as described above. BENOMRANE identified ALTHUMAIRY as the imam of the King Fahd Mosque who led the prayers. BENOMRANE did not associate with ALTHUMAIRY outside of the mosque because it didn't look good for ALTHUMAIRY to associate with a man without a beard in Santa Monica where there were many temptations. BENOMRANE did not believe that ALTHUMAIRY believed in violence against the U.S. ALTHUMAIRY knew that BENOMRANE was a taxi driver and referred two men from Saudi Arabia who did not speak English to BENOMRANE. The two men stayed at an apartment building on Sepulveda Blvd while in Los Angeles and asked BENOMRANE to take them to shopping areas. BENOMRANE gave them a business card and they called him directly for a second fare. On the second occasion where they needed a driver, the requested a trip to Sea World in San Diego. This was the first of many referrals BENOMRANE received from ALTHUMAIRY. ALTHUMAIRY also referred customers to three other Tunisian taxi drivers who were BENOMRANE's friends: (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), (P) (LNU) and (P) (believed by writer to be (P) (P) subject of (A), (G), (J-1)).

[redacted] BENOMRANE was shown a photograph of (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1) BENOMRANE identified (P) as an Algerian who used to eat at a restaurant on Venice Blvd in Los Angeles called Gaby's Restaurant. BENOMRANE said that (P) "talked funny" and did not have immigration papers. (P) was friends with another Algerian named (P) LNU(known to writer as (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1)) who was housed in the

Santa Ana jail during the same time period as BENOMRANE. BENOMRANE saw (P) while he was in Dubai. While in Dubai, (P) told BENOMRANE he wanted to leave Algeria and start a new life.

[redacted] BENOMRANE stated after the U.S. deported him to Tunisia, he was interviewed by representatives of the Tunisian government three or four times before he received permission to travel to Dubai. The Tunisian government determined that he was not a threat and he had no problems with the government in Tunisia. BENOMRANE however, was no longer satisfied living his life in Tunisia after all of the opportunity and money making ability he had in the U.S. He decided to move to Dubai where there was more opportunity. BENOMRANE met his current wife in Dubai, who he described as Palestinian, but a resident of Sweden. He met his wife through his wife's sister who worked in a cabin crew of an airline. BENOMRANE described Dubai as a great city, but with no guarantees. He did not associate with any Arabs while in Dubai. Simple travel to visit his family in Tunisia required permission from his supervisor, which bothered BENOMRANE. While in Dubai BENOMRANE was approached by what he

(P-1)

[redacted] BENOMRANE was shown a photograph of Mohammed AL-MUHANNA (A), (G), (J-1) BENOMRANE described AL-MUHANNA as the imam that replaced ALTHUMAIRY at the King Fahd Mosque. BENOMRANE did not believe that AL-MUHANNA believed in violence against the U.S. When asked to compare ALTHUMAIRY with AL-MUHANNA, BENOMRANE was hesitant and said that they were the same, but that he preferred to listen to AL-MUHANNA'S prayers because he had a nicer voice.

[redacted] BENOMRANE was shown a photograph of (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1) BENOMRANE met (P) at the King Fahd Mosque and described him as a Palestinian who thought differently than BENOMRANE and his friends. (P) did not like America and wanted to return to Jordan. BENOMRANE and his friends would sometimes eat with (P) at a restaurant, but BENOMRANE distanced himself from (P) because of the way (P) spoke. BENOMRANE did not want to discuss violence or politics; subjects that (P) seemed to want to talk about. The interviewing agent reminded BENOMRANE that (P) was his sponsor in the United States, and BENOMRANE immediately verified that to be true. BENOMRANE stated that he now remembered that (P) (P) owned a (P) and sponsored BENOMRANE because BENOMRANE was taking computer courses for college. (P) sponsorship did not help BENOMRANE with his immigration status while in the U.S. (P) was friends with (P) (known to writer as (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)), a quiet Syrian who owned the a (P) near (P) Avenue. (P) prayed at the King Fahd Mosque and talked to BENOMRANE about football. (P) did not talk about violence or politics.

[redacted] Investigators again asked BENOMRANE if he recognized the photograph of Mohdar ABDULLAH and whether or not BENOMRANE attended a wedding in the Los Angeles area. BENOMRANE advised that he did not recognize ABDULLAH, that he did not know anyone from the San Diego area and he did not remember ever going to a Texaco gas station in the San Diego area. BENOMRANE was asked if he was familiar with the arabic term of tazkia and whether or not tazkia was used when BENOMRANE assisted the two male Saudis by driving them around town at the request of ALTHUMAIRY. BENOMRANE asked if interviewers actually meant salat instead of tazkia, to which the interviewers replied no. BENOMRANE laughed and stated that he did not think tazkia was an Arabic word. BENOMRANE admitted that yes, it was customary to help a Muslim brother if it required only a little effort, but something bigger, that required more effort, like driving the two brothers around would only be done if BENOMRANE was paid the money owed to him. He had a business and making a living was very important to him.

[redacted] BENOMRANE still keeps in touch with (P) and (P) BENOMRANE spoke to (P) on the telephone last week to tell him about the birth of his daughter. (P) is still a taxi driver and married to an American woman who has four babies from a previous relationship. (P) has been waiting five years for a green card and wants to return to Tunisia to visit his mother. (P) is a funny person and not like (P) is divorced from an American woman and has a nine year old daughter. He married a (P) woman two years ago and she still lives in (P) (P) is over thirty and a businessman.

[redacted] BENOMRANE was shown the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) surveillance video depicting the Unsub possibly conducting reconnaissance at the Los Angeles International Airport while Nawaf AL HAZMI and Mohdar ABDULLAH escorted Khalid AL MIHDHAR to his flight leaving the U.S. on 06/10/2000. BENOMRANE appeared to actively concentrate on the video, but stated he could not say yes or no to recognizing the Unsub because the picture was not very clear. BENOMRANE stated that he did not want to lie to the investigators, that is why he could not say yes or no. BENOMRANE asked to see photographs, which were provided to him. BENOMRANE still could not say yes or no, but stated from his appearance, the Unsub could possibly be Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian. BENOMRANE said he did not recognize the Unsub based on the photographs provided.

[redacted] As the interview ended, BENOMRANE expressed to investigators that he just wanted interest in the time he spent in Los Angeles to be over. He did not want to be approached by law enforcement in the future, because he had his new life in Sweden with his wife and his baby daughter. BENOMRANE repeated again how he just wanted "the case to be closed". BENOMRANE was visibly upset and close to tears. BENOMRANE mentioned that this was the first time he was advised that the reason for his arrest in Los Angeles was for violation of his immigration status. BENOMRANE said that while in custody in Los Angeles, the FBI told the judge that he took pictures of the bridge in San Francisco and that he wanted the bridge to be bombed. BENOMRANE's current explanation to investigators was he only spent one night in San Francisco at a Travel Lodge motel, just to visit the city.

[redacted] BENOMRANE has lived in Sweden for two years, and currently resides in (P-1) [redacted] Sweden. He is currently working two jobs; one as a janitor in a nightclub, and the other at a food store which is similar to Food For Less in the U.S. BENOMRANE's wife works at a clothes store and they have a future goal of purchasing a house in Sweden. BENOMRANE attends a mosque in (P-1) [redacted] and prays almost every day. BENOMRANE does not have a car and uses a bicycle for transportation. His current email address is (P-1) [redacted] and his telephone number is (P-1) [redacted]

[redacted] The following photographs were also shown to BENOMRANE with negative results: Anwar Aulaqi, Omar Al Bayoumi, (P) [redacted] Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Nawaf Al-Hazmi, (P) [redacted] and (P) [redacted]

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINTON, DC

(G) [redacted]

Set Lead 2: (Info)

(G) [redacted]

(G) [redacted] Read and Clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] (G) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[redacted] (G) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

LITTLE ROCK

AT LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] Read and clear.
**

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DATE 08-20-2021 BY [redacted] NSICG

10/08/01

On October 08, 2001, YAZEED AL-SALMI (AL-SALMI) was interviewed in the offices of the United States Attorney, Southern District of New York. Also present for the interview were AUSA [redacted] [redacted] and AL-SALMI's attorneys [redacted] and [redacted]. AL-SALMI was interviewed in English pursuant to the execution of a proffer agreement. AL-SALMI provided the following information:

At the outset of the interview, AL-SALMI recalled that only NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AL-HAZMI) and AL-SALMI were listed on NAWAF's automobile insurance policy. After some time to think, however, AL-SALMI recalled that RAMEZ NOAMAN (NOAMAN) was also listed on NAWAF's policy.

AL-SALMI advised that NOAMAN attended San Diego State University and that NOAMAN worked at a gas station. AL-SALMI knew NOAMAN from the Al-Rybatt Mosque. At one point, AL-SALMI recommended that NOAMAN insure his car with Farmers Insurance company, the same insurance company (NFI) that AL-SALMI and AL-HAZMI had used to insure their cars.

AL-SALMI brought NOAMAN to see [redacted] (LNU) at Farmers Insurance, who recommended that NOAMAN insure his car on the same policy used by AL-SALMI. While NOAMAN and AL-SALMI were at the company, NAOMAN paid for insurance. AL-SALMI believes that NOAMAN knew AL-HAZMI and that AL-HAZMI was also listed on the automobile insurance policy.

On one occasion, [redacted] assisted AL-SALMI with a project for a business class AL-SALMI was taking. In exchange for [redacted] assistance, AL-SALMI would refer other individuals to [redacted] for insurance and would give people [redacted] business cards.

In approximately August, 2000, when AL-SALMI first arrived in San Diego, he went to the Boubaker Mosque and requested assistance. AL-SALMI was referred to OMAR AL-BAYOUMI.

AL-BAYOUMI took AL-SALMI to visit ABDUSATAR (known to the FBI as ABDUSATAR SHAIKH) who rents rooms. AL-SALMI moved into ABDUSATAR's residence on August 10, 2000. Prior to moving into

10/08/01 New York, New York

[redacted]
[redacted]

10/08/01

ABDUSATAR's residence, AL-SALMI stayed at a Comfort Inn.

AL-SALMI is aware that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI is employed by Saudi Aviation with AL-SALMI's uncle. AL-SALMI advised that he did not know AL-BAYOUMI before AL-SALMI was referred to AL-BAYOUMI by the mosque.

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/01/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** Penttbom
(S)

San Diego (G)
(S)

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (G), (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

[redacted]

Title: Penttbom

Synopsis: To document results of inquiry to parking ticket records in the city of Los Angeles.

Details: On 10/15/2004, writer telephonically contacted (S) (S) of the Los Angeles City Department of Transportation. (S) conducted a check of the following vehicles to determine

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 04-24-2019

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

if parking citations were issued to described vehicles in the year 2000:

3JFZ283 (1998 blue Toyota Corolla, previously registered to Nawaf Alhazmi).

4HPH316 (red Geo Metro previously registered to Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah).

The inquiry produced negative results.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO

For information only.

♦♦

[redacted]

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DATE 08-20-2021 BY (S) NSICG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File # Date dictated

by

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09/21/2001

YAZEED AL-SALMI, a male born (P-1) 1978, was interviewed at his residence at (P-1) La Mesa, California 91941. Prior to the interview, Al-Salmi was advised of the official identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. During the interview Al-Salmi was asked for consent to search his automobile, the areas of (P) that were his, and his wallet. He agreed to give consent and signed consent forms to that effect. (The original consent forms have been placed in the 1A section of this file.) During the interview, Al-Salmi provided the following information:

Al-Salmi provided identification to the interviewing agents consisting of California Driver's License number (P-1) which describes him as (P-1) tall, (P-1) pounds, with black hair and brown eyes. He also provided a Grossmont College identification card with his photograph and the letters FA00. In addition, he provided Saudi Arabian passport number (P-1) having the name Yazeed S.A. Al-Salmi. Al-Salmi explained that the middle initial "S" represents his father's name, (P-1) and the middle initial "A" represents his grandfather's name, (P-1) The passport contained a student visa issued by the United States on July 11, 2000, and expiring on July 10, 2002. The visa control number is (P-1) The passport showed that Al-Salmi arrived in the U.S. on August 8, 2000; that he had two trips to Egypt, one from January 13 to January 17, 2000, and one from January 26 to June 8, 2000. Al-Salmi explained that he had traveled to Egypt to look into enrolling in school there. During his first trip to Egypt the school had not been open, so Al-Salmi had to make a second trip.

Al-Salmi is currently enrolled as a student at Grossmont College studying accounting and his tuition is $2,000 per semester. Al-Salmi explained that he does not work because he is not allowed to under the U.S. student visa. He is trying to obtain good grades so that he can get a scholarship from the Saudi Arabian government.

Al-Salmi owns a 1989 Nissan Sentra automobile, California license plate number (P-1) He bought the car approximately two weeks after he arrived in San Diego from a man named (P) Last Name Unknown (LNU), who works at a (P). (P) LNU now works at a (P) in La Mesa, possibly on University Avenue. Al-Salmi purchased the car for $1,300 and thought he had paid too much.

9/20/2001 La Mesa, CA.

(F)

(S)

9/21/2001

There are several roommates living in (P) with Al-Salmi. One of them is (P) who is also a student at Grossmont College and attends English classes. Al-Salmi believes that (P) has a green card. (P) works weekends as a (P) (P) and moved in to (P) in (P). (P) drives a dark brown (P). (P) has three older brothers who live in San Diego and Al-Salmi believes that all of them are married and have children. He also believes that they may all be citizens of the U.S. Al-Salmi described (P) as being about 20 years old. (P) and Al-Salmi share a bedroom in (P). The computer in that bedroom belongs to (P). Al-Salmi is able to use the computer. Al-Salmi does not believe that (P) has a cell phone.

Another roommate in (P) is (P); Al-Salmi was unsure if (P) was the correct last name and referred to his roommate as (P) (Investigation later determined that this is probably (P) dob: (P-1) (P), California Driver's License Number (P-1) Al-Salmi described (P) as a naturalized citizen of the U.S. and as being in his 40s. (P) works selling (P) at the swap meet in Spring Valley (on (P), at (P) (approximately (P) per month), and at the (P). Jamal also sells (P) at (P) including (P) in San Diego. (P) is not a student at Grossmont College. When he sells (P) on (P), he works from a small tent next to (P) (P) has lived in (P) for approximately two-and-one-half to three years. Jamal's cell phone number is (P-1)

Another roommate in (P) is (P) (LNU) who is from (P) and is approximately 25 years old. Again, Al-Salmi was unsure how to spell his name. (Later investigation determined that this is probably (P) dob: (P-1) (P)) Talal is a Grossmont College student who has been in the U.S. on a student visa for about five months. He moved into (P) last month and is currently sleeping in the living room of the apartment.

Another roommate in (P) is (P) Al-Salmi was again not certain of the spelling of his name. (Investigation later determined that this is probably (P), dob: (P-1) (P), California driver's license number (P-1) which shows a residence address of (P)) (P) obtained a green card through an immigration lottery and works at a swap meet in Orange County two days per week. Al-Salmi believed that (P) was probably out looking for a job at the time of this interview. Karawia has a wife in Egypt and has lived in (P) for approximately three years. The telephone number for (P) is (P), and it is listed under (P) s name.

The last roommate is (P) LNU, whom Al-Salmi believes may possibly have the last name of (P) and who may be from (P). Again Al-Salmi was not certain of the spelling of (P)'s last name. (Later investigation determined that this is probably (P), dob:

(P-1) (P) (P) is employed at a (P) and works a shift that begins at approximately 10 or 11 p.m. and ends at approximately 7 or 8 a.m. Al-Salmi did not know (P)'s whereabouts at the time of this interview. (P) has lived in (P) for two-and-one-half to three years. The telephone number at (P) where Abdoun works is (P)

Al-Salmi was asked about the name (P) and responded that an individual with that name lives in (P) (P) with his wife. (P) does not reside in (P)

Al-Salmi was asked if he recognized the name Omar Bakarbashat and Al-Salmi said that he did. Bakarbashat used to live in (P) (P) and Al-Salmi recalls that Bakarbashat claimed to have ghosts inside his body. This would cause Bakarbashat to "go crazy" every once in a while. Al-Salmi did not believe that Bakarbashat had a medical problem that caused these fits. Al-Salmi's roommates know Bakarbashat and have talked about Bakarbashat's occasional strange behavior. Bakarbashat used to work at a Texaco station.

Al-Salmi was shown a photograph of Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Al-Salmi recognized him and called him Omar Abu Emad. Al-Salmi was asked by the interviewing agents to write this name on the photograph together with his signature, which he did. (The signed photograph has been placed in the 1A section of this file.) Al-Salmi knows Al-Bayoumi from the Islamic Center on Balboa Avenue. Al-Bayoumi lives with his family and has two or three children. Al-Salmi has not seen him for five or six months. Al-Salmi recalls overhearing Al-Bayoumi telling a group of people in front of the Islamic Center that he was going to the United Kingdom.

Al-Salmi was asked if he recognized the names (P) and Hani Hanjour. He did not recognize either name.

Al-Salmi was shown a group of photographs of other individuals. (Copies of the photographs have been placed in the 1A section of this file.) Al-Salmi recognized photograph Number 1 as being an acquaintance of his, Nawaf M. Alhazmi. Al-Salmi has also seen Alhazmi's picture on the news being described as one of the airline hijackers involved in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Al-Salmi and Alhazmi both rented rooms at a house on Mt. Vernon Street in Lemon Grove, California. Al-Salmi rented the room from a man named Abdu-Satar, whom Al-Salmi described as being a nice guy who rents rooms to students. Al-Salmi was unsure how to spell Abdu-Satar's name and could not provide the exact street address on Mt. Vernon Street, but described how to reach the house. One should travel down Skyline and take a left on Mt. Vernon Street. Go all the way down Mt. Vernon Street and it is a house on the right side of the street at the end. Al-Salmi provided telephone number 671-8808 for the individual he called Abdu-Satar. Later, Al-Salmi provided the business card of Dr. Abdussattar Shaikh, Citizen's Review Board on Police Practices, 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 916, San Diego, California 92101, telephone number

(619) 236-6296. Al-Salmi identified him as being the person Al-Salmi called Abdu-Satar.

Abdussattar rented out three bedrooms in his house; Al-Salmi lived in one and Alhazmi lived in another. Alhazmi was living at the Mt. Vernon Street address when Al-Salmi moved in, and was still there approximately one month later when Al-Salmi moved out. It was Al-Salmi's understanding that a friend of Alhazmi's had been sharing Alhazmi's room with him, but the friend no longer lived there when Al-Salmi moved in.

Al-Salmi described Nawaf Alhazmi as being shy and not very fluent in English. Alhazmi did not talk about himself very often. When personal things were being discussed, he would not join in the conversation or offer any personal information about himself. He was from Saudi Arabia and Al-Salmi had seen him at both the Mosque on Saranac Street and at the Islamic Center. Al-Salmi left the Mt. Vernon Street house after only one month because the rent was too expensive. It cost him $400 a month and he was not allowed to work in the U.S. and earn money.

After Al-Salmi moved from the Mt. Vernon Street house to [redacted] (P) Alhazmi visited [redacted] (P) a few times. Al-Salmi recalls that Alhazmi would come to [redacted] (P) to visit Al-Salmi's roommate [redacted] (P). Alhazmi was invited to the apartment to have tea after they all prayed at the mosque. This is considered the polite thing to do. When Alhazmi came to [redacted] (P) they prayed together as a group. Al-Salmi believes that Alhazmi visited [redacted] (P) in November 2000.

Al-Salmi also recalled an incident when Abdussattar asked Al-Salmi if he knew where Alhazmi had gone. Evidently Abdussattar had received a note from Alhazmi saying that he was moving to San Francisco or Arizona. He had not told anyone he was leaving prior to his departure.

Al-Salmi did not understand how Alhazmi was able to stay in the U.S. because he did not attend school and did not seem to have a job.

Al-Salmi was shown a picture of a blue 1988 Toyota which he identified as Alhazmi's car. It was Al-Salmi's understanding that when Alhazmi left San Diego, he had taken his car. (A copy of the photograph of the car has been placed in the 1A section of this file.)

Al-Salmi recalls noticing that Alhazmi did not use the telephone at the Mt. Vernon Street house, even though the phone could be used by the residents. Alhazmi would go outside and use a pay telephone and make his calls on a calling card.

Al-Salmi recognized Alhazmi's photograph in the newspaper after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and could not believe that Alhazmi had been one of the hijackers. Alhazmi's English was so bad that Al-Salmi did not believe he could have taken lessons to fly an airplane.

After being asked for any additional information that he could provide about Alhazmi, Al-Salmi advised that he did not know Alhazmi very well and had no further knowledge of him.

Later, Al-Salmi was shown a Cancellation Notice from Farmers Insurance Group that had been recovered from Al-Salmi's vehicle by agents searching it pursuant to Al-Salmi's consent. The notice was addressed to Nawaf Alhazmi, [redacted], Lemon Grove, California, and referred to a 1989 Nissan. (A photocopy of the Cancellation Notice is attached to this FD-302.) Al-Salmi explained that the 1989 Nissan referred to on the notice was his vehicle; he had his vehicle insured on Alhazmi's insurance policy. This arrangement was the idea of the insurance agent who handled Alhazmi's policy. Al-Salmi could not get affordable insurance on his own, so the female insurance agent suggested that he insure his car under Alhazmi's policy. When asked why he did not advise the interviewing agents of this arrangement with Alhazmi, Al-Salmi stated that he had forgotten about it.

The other photographs shown to Al-Salmi were photographs of the following: Salem Alhazmi, Khalid M.A. Almihdar, Hani S. H. Hanjour, Majed Masha An Moqed, Abdul Aziz Al Omari, Wail M. Al Shehri, Waleed M. Al Shehri, Mohamed Atta, Satam M.A. Al Suqami, Hamza Saleh Alghamdi, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohald M. Alshehri, Ahmed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed, Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Abdullah Alnami, Ziad Samir Jarrah, Hashim Mohsen Alattas and [redacted]. Al-Salmi did not recognize any of them.

Al-Salmi gave the interviewing agents permission to look inside his wallet which contained, among other things, a small address book. The agents went though the address book with Al-Salmi and he provided the following information on each entry:

- Abdulah Mohdhar, [redacted], San Diego, California 92115, telephone [redacted], is someone Al-Salmi knows from a Texaco station in El Cajon.

- [redacted] is a [redacted] who goes to Grossmont College. Al-Salmi keeps his name in order to get homework assignments from him.

- [redacted], telephone number [redacted] is an [redacted] Al-Salmi knew in Egypt who was studying at American University in Cairo. Al-Salmi met him during one of his trips to Egypt to enroll in school.

- [redacted] telephone number [redacted] is the owner of the swap-meet business where [redacted] one of Al-Salmi's roommates, works.

-

(P), telephone number (P) is also involved in the swap meet where his roommate (P) works in Orange County.

- (P), telephone number (P) is also involved with the Orange County swap meet.

- (P) telephone number (P) is a classmate at Grossmont College.

- (P) telephone number (P) is in charge of (P)

- (P), telephone number (P) is a woman who works at a travel agency that he has dealt with.

- (P), telephone number (P) address (P) Anaheim, California, is another travel agent.

- (P), telephone number (P) is a (P) who goes to San Diego State University and lives near the mosque.

- (P) telephone number (P) is a friend of Al-Salmi.

- (P) telephone number (P) address (P) is a (P) who Al-Salmi was asking for advice about what to do if he wanted to get married.

- (P) telephone number (P) is a classmate of Al-Salmi at Grossmont College.

- (P) telephone number (P) is also a classmate.

- (P), telephone number (P) is someone Al-Salmi knows from (P)

- (P) telephone number (P) is a woman who works at (P) near the Texaco station on Spring Street where Al-Salmi goes to visit with his friends.

Al-Salmi further described (P) as a woman he likes and called her his fiance. When asked her last name, Al-Salmi could not remember it. When asked why he could not remember the last name of his fiance, Al-Salmi stated that he calls her his fiance because, as a Muslim, he is not allowed to have a girlfriend. Muslim law only allows him to be close to the woman he is married to. He likes (P) and thinks she is attractive. He could not remember her last name because he does not think of people by their last names, only by their first names.

Later in the interview, a marriage license dated September 12, 2001, license number (P-1) was found in Al-Salmi's wallet with his name and the name of Jacquelyn Lee Fisher, (P), La Mesa, California 91941, telephone number (P). Al-Salmi identified her as the (P) he had been talking about. When asked again why he could not remember the last name of a woman he has a marriage license with, Al-Salmi said that it would not actually be a real marriage to him until it was done under Islam.

With Al-Salmi's consent, the interviewing agents went through the papers in his wallet. In addition to the marriage license described above, the following items were found:

- the address (P) Rochester, New York 14627-6430, and the name (P) telephone number (P). Al-Salmi met him at the American University in Cairo.

- Al-Salmi's checking account number, (P-1) with a wire transfer number of (P-1)

- a piece of paper with the number (P) which Al-Salmi described as (P)'s ID number to log onto the computer at the San Diego State University student computing center.

- the card of (P) telephone number (P), a lecturer at the mosque.

- telephone number (P) that Al-Salmi believed to be for someone having to do with immigration, with the number (P-1) next to it.

- the card of (P) from (P) telephone (P)

- a sheet of paper with the name (P), (P-1)/(P) address (P) La Mesa, California 91941; telephone number (P)

- a telephone calling card from Q-West with the dial number (P-1) and the access number (P-1)

- an old bank account number of (P-1) was found with a bank routing number of (P-1)

After obtaining consent from Al-Salmi to search the apartment, he was asked which areas of the apartment he lived in. Al-Salmi said that two of his roommates lived in the living room area of (P), and nothing in the living room belonged to him. Al-Salmi indicated that the kitchen was a common area that all the roommates used. The bathroom closest to the living room was the bathroom that Al-Salmi used and it contained a black shaving kit bag and a brown shaving kit bag. Al-Salmi identified the black shaving kit bag as his. The apartment contained two bedrooms and Al-Salmi shares the back bedroom with [redacted]. Most of the things in the bedroom were identified by Al-Salmi as belonging to [redacted] Al-Salmi identified to the agents his own twin bed, a maroon night stand to the left of his bed that he used and the left one-third of the closet that Al-Salmi said contained his things.

Pursuant to Al-Salmi's signed consent and his identification of the areas of the apartment that were his, agents searched the kitchen; the front bathroom, including the black shaving kit bag but not the brown one; the areas of the back bedroom in and around Al-Salmi's bed; the maroon night stand next to the bed; and the left one-third of the bedroom closet. During the search of the apartment a hotel receipt was found that indicated that Al-Salmi had stayed at the Comfort Inn, 8000 Parkway Drive, La Mesa, California, arriving on August 7, 2000, and checking out on August 10, 2000. Al-Salmi described this as showing the first time he arrived in the United States. He stayed at the Comfort Inn for a few nights until he found a cheaper place to live. He then moved to the house on Mt. Vernon Street.

Pursuant to Al-Salmi's signed consent, agents searched his wallet and the following items were seized:

1. A business card from the Student Computing Center at San Diego State University with Arabic writing and a handwritten telephone number [redacted] on the back.

2. A letter in Arabic that Al-Salmi said came from his mother.

3. A piece of paper with information about [redacted]'s bank account number [redacted] at Washington Mutual Bank. Al-Salmi said he had gotten this information from [redacted] in anticipation of having to repay [redacted] [redacted] was going to pay Grossmont College on Al-Salmi's behalf, but this did not end up happening.

4. A receipt showing a sale of foreign currency from Saudi American Bank in Saudi Arabia, dated August 19, 2001, and appeared to be in the amount of US$7,000. Al-Salmi said this was money that his father gave to him.

The following information about Al-Salmi's family was obtained from him. Al-Salmi's father, [redacted] age 55, lived in Tennessee from 1979 to 1983-84 during which time he obtained a degree in electrical engineering. He currently works for a chemical company in Saudi Arabia called Sceco, P.O. Box 57, Riyadh 11411. Al-Salmi's mother is [redacted], aged 44; his brothers are [redacted], age 25, [redacted] age 16; and his sisters are [redacted], age 14, and [redacted], age 9.

During the interview Al-Salmi stated that he wanted to take a polygraph to prove to the interviewing agents that he was not lying.

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2026
DATE: 07-12-2021

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription 06/10/2011

Investigation on June 1, 2011 at New York City
File # (F)
by (S)
Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On June 1, 2011, at approximately 1:00 P.M., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (S) New York City Police Department (S), and (S) were present at the proffer session of (P) [redacted] by Assistant U.S. Attorneys (S) and (S). Also present were (P) attorney, (P) [redacted], and his assistant (P) (P)

[redacted] confirmed that there was no need for an interpreter as (P) command and understanding of English were sufficient. AUSA (S) explained the proffer immunity agreement, which was then signed and witnessed by relevant parties.

(P) declared that she was born in (P) and then spent time in Kenya. (P) came to the United States when she was approximately 17 years old and moved directly to San Diego, California. (P) came to the United States with her mother, sisters, two of her brothers, but without her father. (P) attended high school in the United States for one year or less, college for two or three years, pursuing a degree in International Business, then got married. (P) now has two children. Before her marriage, (P) worked as a cashier at (P).

(P) could not recall her original meeting with Mohdar Abdullah (Abdullah), but expressed with certainty that she did not know him before arriving in San Diego. (P) could not recall the exact time period of her first meeting with Abdullah either, but estimated it was during the summertime, one or two months before Abdullah's arrest in October, 2001. (P) declared that she met Abdullah through "friends-in-common." Specifically, (P) stated that her mother asked an "old neighbor" for help finding someone who could assist in communicating with a travel agency in English, as well as "someone to trust" who would take (P) to and from work. In response, this neighbor told (P) mother about Abdullah. (P) could not provide any descriptive details of the neighbor and did not know the neighbor's name. (P) did clarify that the neighbor did not live right next door to the (P) [redacted] residence.

(P) stated that sometimes Abdullah drove her to and from work at (P). There was one week in particular when Abdullah

(S)

[redacted]

was unavailable, but (P) could not recall exactly which week, nor why Abdullah was indisposed. Later in the interview, (P) noted that this week was before September 11, 2001. Abdullah had promised to find someone "respectful" to take (P) to work that week. (P) noted that Abdullah had identified his friend Omar to drive (P) this week and on other occasions when Abdullah was unavailable. Omar spoke to (P) mother on the telephone before driving (P) the first time. (P) could not remember Omar's last name, but recalled it ending with "kashat." When asked if (P) was referring to Omar Bakarbashat (Bakarbashat), (P) said yes.

(P) stated that neither Abdullah nor Bakarbashat were paid for driving her around. Sometimes (P) mother would provide food to Abdullah. (P) explained this was an appropriate gesture, as Abdullah was single. (P) noted that Abdullah never ate inside her residence, stating that, "he was not allowed." (P) further stated there were "no men allowed to come to our house we don't know."

(P) noted that she used to pay other friends from work to provide her ((P) lifts to and from the (P) location.

During this period, (P) was working full-time, but could not recall her schedule. (P) did recall that her schedule varied. (P) described two possible shifts at her work: a morning shift that ended around 3:30 P.M. or 4:30 P.M. and an afternoon shift that ended at night. (P) also stated that Abdullah worked at a gas station sometimes.

(P) stated that, despite spending time with Abdullah in his vehicle, (P) "cannot call Abdullah a friend." (P) indicated that Abdullah did not speak to her much and, instead of conversing in the car, Abdullah would often play religious tapes in Arabic. (P) stated she understood the tapes because Arabic is her native language. At this point, (P) interjected that (P) has "two native languages," further stating the two languages are Arabic and (P).

(P) noted that Abdullah may not have thought she ((P) was very religious, as she wore pants and make-up at the time. (P) recalled that once Abdullah "threw in my [her] face" the fact that she was not religious enough, but (P) ignored the insult.

(P) stated that the only conversation she had with Abdullah that "sticks out," took place in the car, just before Abdullah's arrest. At this time, (P) noted that Abdullah's car was very messy. Twice, (P) asked Abdullah why his car was messy and Abdullah ignored her question. When (P) asked Abdullah a third time, she described Abdullah making a "shush" sound, indicating that (P) should be quiet. (P) noted that she was offended by Abdullah and responded, "Don't shush me." At this point, Abdullah responded, "They listen." Abdullah was arrested in the car shortly thereafter. When Abdullah was arrested, (P) stated that she thought that his arrest "probably had something to do with 9/11."

[redacted] recalled that when Abdullah picked her up or dropped her off, she and Abdullah were the only two passengers in the car. [redacted] stated that she never called Abdullah; rather, when he dropped [redacted] off at work, she would tell him what time to return and pick her up. If [redacted] was late leaving work, Abdullah would wait in the car for her to finish.

[redacted] denied any romantic relationship with Abdullah, stating that he was "not my type." [redacted] stated she never saw Abdullah outside of the car rides he provided her with, except once, at the marriage ceremony incident with [redacted] in a Denny's Restaurant parking lot. [redacted] could not recall the date of the marriage ceremony, but noted it was before Abdullah's arrest.

[redacted] noted that Abdullah had raised the topic of getting married and had spoken with [redacted] [redacted] mother about it. Abdullah had asked about marrying [redacted] or one of her sisters. [redacted] stated that her mother told Abdullah that she [the mother] could not force any of her daughters to marry Abdullah and "that was it" on the topic of Abdullah marrying one of the [redacted] sisters. [redacted] could not recall who suggested that Abdullah marry [redacted], but stated it was not her mother's suggestion.

[redacted] recounted that [redacted] was originally friends with [redacted] fourth sister [redacted] and that [redacted] and [redacted] attended the same high school. [redacted] grew close to the [redacted] family when she became Muslim. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] had been coming to the [redacted] residence for about one year around this time period.

[redacted] stated that Abdullah had seen [redacted] one day at the [redacted] residence when [redacted] was with [redacted] after school. Abdullah asked who [redacted] was and [redacted] mother responded that [redacted] was [redacted] friend, adding "I treat her like one of my own." [redacted] later added that Abdullah had seen [redacted] coming from the school bus with [redacted] once when he (Abdullah) was dropping [redacted] at her home. [redacted] could not recall the exact date Abdullah had first seen [redacted] but noted it was a few months before Abdullah's arrest.

[redacted] stated that her mother never spoke about [redacted] and Abdullah's relationship.

[redacted] indicated that the marriage ceremony took place when it was getting dark out, approximately around 6:30 P.M. or 7:00 P.M. In response to questions, [redacted] noted that she was off from work the evening of the ceremony and that her work schedule changed often, so she was sometimes off work on Monday evenings. During the marriage ceremony, [redacted] stated that she remained in Abdullah's car with her sister [redacted] out of earshot of the group. From the car, [redacted] saw someone speak some words and Abdullah and [redacted] talk and then hug. Following the ceremony, Abdullah re-entered the vehicle and offered juice to (P) and (P) (P) noted that Abdullah said that he and (P) were officially married. (P) noted that she responded to Abdullah in Arabic, stating, "This is not the right way," further explaining that she meant the ceremony was not a proper Muslim ceremony as it had not taken place at a Mosque. (P) noted that Abdullah was angered by this comment and would no longer speak to her. (P) recalled that Abdullah then drove her ((P) and (P) home. (P) could not identify the man who had officiated the ceremony. In response to questions, (P) stated that (P) did not stay at the (P) (P) home that night.

(P) stated that the marriage ceremony "wasn't right," later describing it as the "unright way," and not a correct, Islamic marriage, such as she had expected. (P) further stated that she did not know what to call the ceremony, but specifically would not call it a wedding, and that the ceremony was "something weird." (P) confirmed that she believed Abdullah's goal in having the ceremony was to marry (P) (P) stated that (P) left the gathering with Abdullah the night of the ceremony.

(P) indicated that she spent time with (P) including going shopping, and that (P) "brain was mature." (P) also noted that after the marriage ceremony, Abdullah still drove her to work, but not every day. Bakarbashat and another friend from work also drove (P) during this time.

In response to questions about a purchase at Walmart on September 10, 2001, (P) noted that she liked to get "toys and things" for her siblings at Walmart. When presented with a receipt indicating that a ring was purchased at Walmart using a credit card under (P) name on September 10, 2001, (P) was unable to comment. When asked directly if the signature on the receipt was (P) (P) interjected that the question was "too general." (P) then requested some time to confer with his client alone and investigators and AUSAs departed the conference room.

When informed that (P) and (P) were ready, AUSAs and investigators returned and recommenced the interview. (P) stated that sometimes, although not necessarily during the time in question, (P) credit card had been stolen and used by other individuals. (P) stated that the signature on the September 10, 2001 Walmart receipt "may be" her signature, noting that when she goes shopping, she "doesn't sign my 100% signature." (P) further stated that she never went to Walmart to buy a ring for (P) never went to Walmart to buy a ring for Abdullah to give to (P) and does not remember ever going to Walmart to buy a ring. (P) stated that she did not provide her credit card for Abdullah's use during this time period either. Additionally, (P) stated that she did not have any conversation with Abdullah the night of September 10, 2001.

(P) noted that during the time period in question, she did work the evening shifts at (P). These shifts ended at 10:00 PM, but often it took some time afterwards to close the store. (P) indicated that on these days, she left work around 10:30 PM.

In response to questions on the attacks of September 11, 2001, (P) first stated that she was working when she learned of the attacks. Shortly afterwards, (P) stated she had first heard about the attacks at home. (P) stated she was confident that Abdullah had not driven her to or from work on September 11, 2001 and that she did not see Abdullah nor (P) on that day. (P) indicated it was approximately one week later that Abdullah again drove her to work.

In response to questions about an incident (P) had described to investigators during a January 7, 2011, (P) provided the following details: one day in 2001 Abdullah had dropped (P) off at her home after work, where her family was watching a television program related to the 9/11 attacks. Abdullah saw the television program, "got mad and threw the phone against the wall." The phone was a cordless telephone attached to a land-line and was broken into "two pieces" during this incident. (P) also noted that Abdullah had cursed. (P)'s mother then "kicked" Abdullah out. (P) stated she had finished work early on this occasion, so her sisters were still in school during the above described incident. While (P) could not recall the exact date of these events, (P) stated she was "absolutely sure" it was not September 11, 2001.

(P) noted that she has not "spoken a word" to Abdullah since his arrest and "never got any contact with this guy." (P) stated that neither her mother, her sister (P) nor (P) nor Bakarbashat had ever indicated to her that Abdullah was trying to get in touch with her. (P) further clarified that Abdullah never tried to contact her or left any messages, except for before her second son was born (around five years ago), when Abdullah sent (P) an email at her address (P-1) In the email, Abdullah apologized "about everything" and asked for (P) help verifying whether (P) was pregnant and had "had a child by him." (P) stated that her response to Abdullah was, "I'm a married woman now, don't contact me." (P) indicated that she did reach out to (P) to inquire whether the child was Abdullah's, stating to (P) "You eat with us, you sometimes spend the night with us, why you keep secrets from us?"

(P) noted that (P) currently lives close to (P)'s mother's residence and that sometimes (P) asks (P) mother to babysit (P)'s children. (P) stated that she stopped speaking to (P) approximately one year ago. (P) also noted that her sister, (P) no longer speaks with (P)

(P) indicated that she attended two mosques in San Diego, the Islamic Center of San Diego (on Balboa Avenue) and the Rabat, which was located close to her family's old home.

(P) agreed to look at photographs provided by [redacted] investigators. Investigators showed (P) photographs of Omar al-Bayoumi (F) Fathi Aidarus (F) Anwar Aulaqi (F) Khalid al Mihdar (F) and Nawaf al Hazmi (F) [redacted] (P) stated she "100%" could not identify any of the individuals in the photographs. (P) then stated that Detective (S) had previously shown her the photograph of (P) but that she still did not recognize the individual.

AUSA (S) concluded by noting that (P) (D) [redacted]. (P) requested a copy of the proffer immunity agreement, as well as (D) and was provided with both documents. The interview closed with (S) noting that (P) testimony still contained significant anomalies and (P) should be prepared to answer questions at a future time, should investigators deem it necessary.

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2026
DATE: 10-25-2021

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 10/09/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Personal Attn:** AD Dale Watson **Attn:**

[redacted] (G)

Investigative Services

Los Angeles
New York
Washington Field Office

[redacted] (G)

From: San Diego

[redacted] (G)

Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: [redacted] Obtain information from officials at the Saudia Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California and Embassy in Washington, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Administrative: [redacted] Re telcall between SAC San Diego Division and Deputy Director (DD) Thomas J. Pickard FBIHQ, dated October 7, 2001 and SAC San Diego Division telcall to AD Dale Watson FBIHQ, dated October 9, 2001.

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for Assistant Director (AD) Dale Watson is one copy of Omar Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000, one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S) dated September 21, 2001, one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S), dated September 25, 2001, one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S), dated September 28, 2001 and one copy of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM), dated October 10, 2001. Enclosed for WFO is one copy of Omar Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000, one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S) dated September 21, 2001, one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S), dated September 25, 2001, and one copy of an FD-302 re the interview of [redacted] (S), dated September 28, 2001. Enclosed for Los Angeles is one copy of the phone book.

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 10/09/2001

Details: [redacted] As a result of the investigation being conducted at San Diego it has been determined that Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi played an important role in helping terrorists, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar assimilate into San Diego. Al-Bayoumi allowed them to stay at his apartment at the Parkwood Apartment Complex, prior to obtaining their apartment at the same complex approximately two weeks after they entered into the United States through Los Angeles, California. Since the terrorists did not have credit history or bank accounts Al-Bayoumi was listed as the guarantor and co-signer on their apartment, and on at least one occasion paid for their rent. Additionally, he helped set up a bank account for Al-Mihdhar.

[redacted] While Al-Bayoumi resided in the United States he attended numerous schools and in December 1997, graduated from Alliant International University (AIU), formerly United States International University, San Diego, California with a Master's Degree in International Business Administration. When Al-Bayoumi transferred from West Coast University, San Diego, California to (AIU) in January 1997, [redacted] (S), [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) Newport Beach, California wrote a letter dated January 22, 1997, stating that [redacted] (S) was supporting Al-Bayoumi by providing $4,000 a month. This information was incorporated on an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant (F-1) Student Status - For Academic and Language Students.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (S) was subsequently interviewed, and as a result of that interview advised that even though [redacted] (S) was requested, by an unknown representative of the Civil Aviation Administration of Saudi Arabia to provide a $4,000 per month stipend, [redacted] (S) refused to do so. [redacted] (S) did, however, furnish letters to numerous schools, on Al-Bayoumi's behalf, stating that he and his company were subsidizing Al-Bayoumi. As a direct result of the above information, a Criminal Complaint was filed on or about September 27, 2001, in the Southern District of California, charging Al-Bayoumi with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

[redacted] In May 1998, Al-Bayoumi applied for an Executive Doctorate In Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-Bayoumi stated that he has been employed by the CAA for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering.

[redacted] In reviewing the documents obtained from CWRU a letter, dated May 20, 1998 from Dr. Jamil Shami, Director, Academic Affairs, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, National Guard Office, 3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 207, Washington, D.C., was sent on Al-Bayoumi's behalf. The letter stated that Al-Bayoumi was a candidate for a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] On September 21, 2001, a representative from United Parcel Service advised that their records indicate that on January 18, 2001 a delivery was made to [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (S), San Diego, California, where Al-Bayoumi resided, from the Saudi Arabian Embassy, 601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.

[redacted] On September 25, 2001, [redacted] (P), [redacted] (P) of the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, 2675 Fletcher Parkway, El Cajon, California, was interviewed and [redacted] (P) advised that he was shown a copy of a check Al-Bayoumi provided for $500 to the mosque drawn from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, dated December 14, 2000. Written on the check was a notation in Arabic that [redacted] (P) said indicted the check was for food. Al-Bayoumi stated he received the check from Los Angeles, California.

[redacted] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S.

Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[redacted] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[redacted] Dr. Jameel Alshami (202) 944-3344;

[redacted] Saudi Embassy WA. (202) 342-3800, AbdulAziz Assaleh (202) 342-3700 and F (202) 944-5982; Khalid Asswailem (202) 944-3140 and C (202) 494-2777. Saudi Consulate (310) 479-479-6000 F (310) 479-2752, Islamic Affairs x240, Abdullah Awaad x241, Sami Assadhan x246, and Saad Al Jebreen, 2045 Sawtelle Blv., LA, CA 90025.

[redacted] Additionally, seized during the search were various personal and business documents, business cards and scraps of paper with names and telephone numbers of individuals. Included in this information were names and telephone numbers associated with the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C. and are as follows: Mohammad Al-Sheik and Abed Al-Sulieman with the following telephone numbers (202) 298-8869, 8817, 8850 and 8738. Also obtained was a notation for the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, telephone number (310) 479-6000 and the name (P) [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (U) (F), 10/09/2001

[redacted] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[redacted] On October 6, 2001, an ACS indices and IIIA search was conducted on (A), (G), (J-1) and were met with [redacted] negative results, however the following is a list of references in ACS, regarding (A), (G), (J-1) and an important reference in [redacted] IIIA, see Per-No 584612, regarding (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(F) (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (U) (F), 10/09/2001

~~(S)~~ On October 8, 2001, an ACS indices and IIIA search was conducted on (A), (G), (J-1) with negative results, however (S) there was an ACS reference on (A), (G), (J-1) (S) (A), (G), (J-1) (F), IIIA negative and an ACS reference on (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (F) IIIA (S) negative.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 10/09/2001

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] AD Watson is requested to seek [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) from the Department of State, and coordinate the interview of diplomats from the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles.

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

LOS ANGELES

[redacted]

AT LOS ANGELES

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 4:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 5:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

♦♦

Multiple Subjects:

OPERATION ENCORE

(F)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Fahad al-Thumairy
(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi
(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah
(F)

Iyad al-Rababah
(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani
(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi
(F)

(G)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Update (as of 20 March 2014):

- **19 March 2014 – Interview of (P), Iyad Al-Rababah's (P) at her place of employment (P) in Paramus, NJ. (P) advised that she has been in contact with Al-Rababah, currently in Jordan, as recently as one month ago, and maintains regular contact with him by telephone. (P) agreed to a future interview to provide additional details on her relationship with Al-Rababah, her knowledge of Al-Rababah's former roommate (P) and Al-Rababah's current living situation in Jordan.**

- **17 March 2014 – Fox News provided internet link to a 28 minute interview of (P) in (P), NJ in September 2011. Interview will be reviewed (D), (P) (D), (P)**

- **06 March 2014 - Case team meeting with FBI Newark regarding Encore subject (P) Several leads pertaining to (D), (P) were discussed to include, (P) relatives in PA, (P) Iyad Al-Rababah. and (P)**

- **28 February 2014 – SVTC with San Diego case team re Encore background regarding significance of San Diego subject Mohdar Abdullah, and San Diego based connections to Encore.**

- **26 February 2014 - Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA (S) (D), (P)**

- **24 January 2014 – Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA** (S) (D) (D)
- 19-20 December 2013 – (G), FBI LA, FBI WFO interview Mohdar Abdullah (F) (F) (G)
- December 2013 – SDNY advised that defense counsel (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 05 November 2013 – (G) advised they would seek to arrange an interview with Al-Mansoori at the US Embassy in (G)
- 14 October 2013 – (J-3)
- October 2013 – (A), (G), (J-1)
- 19 August 2013 (C-1)
- 13 August 2013 – SDNY advised that (P), (D) (P), (D)
- 09 July 2013 - (P), (D)
- May/June 2013 - Coordination with USAO SDNY regarding (P), (D)
- 13 May 2013 – SDNY advised that (P) is represented by counsel and that discussions are under way for a proffer of (P) at SDNY in June 2013.
- 1 May 2013 - (J-3) (J-3)
- 18 April 2013 FBI Newark agrees to turn over (F) (P) to New York for investigation under Operation Encore.
- 11 April 2013 SDNY confirmed positive contact made with a defense attorney (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 08 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting provided by Al-Rababah.
- 05 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting and background of Al-Rababah.
- 20 March 2013 meeting with SDNY, was held regarding investigative approach on (P) DHS's appeal of the U.S. Immigration judge's order granting asylum to (P) was issued a final denial.
- March 2013 - (D) (D)

- February 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) to conduct an interview of Mohamed Al-Mansoori (A), (G), (J-1)

- 25 January 2013 - Encore Case team met with SDNY AUSA (S) SDNY AUSA (S) and DOJ main attorney (S) During the meeting, SDNY and DOJ were advised of case developments.

- 30 November 2012 - (C-1)

- [redacted] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA (S) and DOJ attorney (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request of (G) AUSA (S) will explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah (G)

- [redacted] 10 September 2012 - (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to (C-1) (C-1) advised on 10 September 2012 that (C-1) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, (G) will coordinate with SDNY (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

- [redacted] (P) her mother (P) father (P), and mother's sister (P) were sentenced on (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a $2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases agains (P) and (P) (G) including (P) Upon successful denaturalization, (P) (G) will be served with Notice to Appears (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.

- (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012 (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer, (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) investigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.

- [redacted] In August 2012 (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) an (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed Mana's current residence. (G) is planning to approach (P) for an interview of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.

- (P) (F) an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. (P) s reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists (G) in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of (P)

- [redacted] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. (C-1) (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy (F) and Adel al Sadhan (F) as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.

- [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, (F) and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is to (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[redacted] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

[redacted] (C-1) In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO, [redacted] (C-1) The FBI has also provided [redacted] with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[redacted] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdar to a young woman named [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) and her family are [redacted] (P) although they claimed to be [redacted] (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

[redacted] On [redacted] (P) 2012, [redacted] (P) her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of [redacted] (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, [redacted] (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that [redacted] (P) s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing [redacted] (P) s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. [redacted] (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on [redacted] (P), 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[redacted] Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2028
DATE: 10-05-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/23/2003

To: Boston **Attn:** (G), (S)
Counterterrorism **Attn:**
(G)

New Haven **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] (G)

Synopsis: [redacted] Summary of FAHAD AL THUMAIRY's Wells Fargo Bank account number (P-1) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002.

[redacted] (G)

Details:

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] Background of Investigation

[redacted] Allegations were made by a source that USAMA BIN LADEN was using the KING FAHAD MOSQUE, located in Culver City, California, to launder money in the United States. FAHAD AL THUMAIRY was the Imam at the KING FAHAD MOSQUE.

[redacted] Account Information

[redacted] Records for Wells Fargo Bank (WFB) account number (P-1) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 were reviewed. The account was held in the name FAHAD AL THUMAIRY, ALBER ACCOUNT. The address (P-1) [redacted] Los Angeles, CA 90034 was used for the account from 06/1999 through 03/14/2000. The address (P-1) Culver City, CA 90232 was used for the account from 03/15/2000 through 11/15/2002.

[redacted] Summary of flow of funds

[redacted] [redacted] The account appears to primarily serve the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients, all who are connected to Hamas.

[redacted] $369,497 was received into the account during the specified time period. Three large wire transfers (approximately $120,000 each) comprised a majority of money deposited into the account. Two of these transfers were from KHALID BIN NASSER ALASSAF (Saudi American Bank a/c# unknown). The other transfer was received from ABDULAZIZ FAHAD ABDULAZIZ ALSAUD (Saudi American Bank a/c# unknown). Each time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted. At that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated.

[redacted] The checks and cash withdrawals ranged in amounts, but were generally in the range of $1,000 to $13,000. No cash withdrawal exceeded $9,006. The following payees received a total of $360,015 disbursed from the account (of $369,497 total deposits):

[redacted] (P) (Bank of America a/c# illegible - possibly (P)) received 14 checks totaling $66,000.

[redacted] (P) may be the same person as (F) [redacted] (P) a Hamas fundraiser.

[redacted]

To: Boston From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F) 07/23/2003

[redacted] (P)
[(1)Great American Credit Union, San Diego a/c# illegible - possibly (P) or (P), and (2) Union Bank of California a/c# illegible - possibly (P)] received 15 checks totaling $64,500.

[redacted] (P) may be the same person as (F), (A) [redacted] (P) who has been associated with Hamas members and members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). (P) has been identified as an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) (P). (S)

[redacted] AMANA FOUNDATION (Bank of America a/c# (P)) received 13 checks totaling $90,000.

[redacted] AMANA FOUNDATION may be the same AMANA FOUNDATION (P) (P) AMANA FOUNDATION and several other organizations (P) are being or have been investigated for committing various crimes and providing proceeds of the crimes to overseas accounts where the funds are allegedly used to purchase weapons for the tribal conflicts in Somalia and in support of International Terrorism.

[redacted] (P) [(1) Fleet, MA a/c# unknown, (2) Sovereign Bank New England a/c# possibly (P), (3) Citizens Bank MA for deposit to account of HADDAD TRAVEL INC (P)] received 12 checks totaling $58,500;

~~(S)~~ (P) may be the same person as (F) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) (P) a Hamas supporter. (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) when (P) relocated to Bridgeport, Connecticut. ABUNAR is referenced in (F) [redacted]

[redacted] Cash withdrawals and checks payable to FAHAD AL THUMAIRY totaled $81,015.

[redacted] **List of All Deposits**

[redacted] Eight deposits totaling $369,497.00 were made to the account between 06/10/1999 and 06/21/2001. Every deposit is listed below:

[redacted] on 06/10/1999, a $120,000.00 wire transfer was received from the account of KHALID BIN NASSER ALASSAF at Saudi American Bank;

[redacted] on 09/20/1999, a cash deposit of $6,000.00 was made to the account;

To: Boston From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F), 07/23/2003

[redacted] on 09/20/1999, a $3,000 check was deposited from (P) (P) WFB account number (P) ((P)'s address listed on the check was the same address as AL THUMAIRY, 3757 Kelton Ave., #208, Los Angeles, CA 90034. (P)'s telephone number was listed as (P);

[redacted] on 02/18/2000, a $300 check was deposited from FAHAD AL THUMAIRY, WFB account number (P);

[redacted] on 04/10/2000, a $10 cash deposit was made;

[redacted] on 11/08/2000, a $119,993.50 wire transfer was received from the account of ABDULAZIZ FAHAD ABDULAZIZ ALSAUD at Saudi American Bank;

[redacted] on 01/31/2001, a $200 wire transfer was received from the account of HUSSAIN MADHI S. ABU MALHA at Commercial Bank of Qatar;

[redacted] on 06/21/2001, a $119,993.50 wire transfer was received from the account of KHALID BIN NASSER AL ASSAF at Saudi American Bank.

[redacted] **List of All Withdrawals**

[redacted] AMANA FOUNDATION (Bank of America a/c# (P)) received 13 checks totaling $90,000. The individual check amounts and clearing dates (date that the check cleared AL THUMAIRY's account) are listed below:
$6,000 on 08/06/1999;
$6,000 on 08/06/1999;
$6,000 on 10/01/1999;
$6,000 on 10/01/1999;
$2,000 on 01/04/2000;
$12,000 on 12/21/2000;
$12,000 on 02/08/2001;
$6,000 on 03/28/2001;
$8,000 on 09/07/2001;
$6,000 on 01/17/2002;
$6,000 on 01/22/2002;
$13,000 on 06/03/2002;
$1,000 on 10/16/2002.

[redacted] (P) (Bank of America, a/c# illegible - possibly (P)) received 14 checks totaling $66,000. The individual check amounts and clearing dates are listed below:
$7,500 on 08/02/1999;
$9,000 on 09/22/1999;

$3,000 on 11/26/1999;
$1,500 on 01/04/2000;
$3,000 on 11/20/2000;
$3,000 on 11/22/2000;
$3,000 on 11/22/2000;
$4,500 on 01/16/2001;
$4,500 on 01/16/2001;
$4,500 on 03/28/2001;
$6,000 on 08/08/2001;
$4,500 on 01/16/2002;
$4,500 on 01/17/2002;
$7,500 on 05/15/2002.

[redacted] [redacted]
[(1)Great American Credit Union, San Diego a/c# illegible - possibly [redacted] or [redacted], and (2) Union Bank of California a/c# illegible - possibly [redacted]] received 15 checks totaling $64,500. The individual check amounts and clearing dates are listed below:
$9,000 on 08/03/1999;
$3,000 on 10/12/1999;
$3,000 on 10/19/1999;
$3,000 on 12/02/1999;
$1,500 on 01/03/2000;
$3,000 on 11/22/2000;
$3,000 on 12/04/2000;
$3,000 on 12/06/2000;
$4,500 on 01/18/2001;
$4,500 on 01/19/2001;
$4,500 on 04/02/2001;
$6,000 on 08/10/2001;
$4,500 on 01/22/2002;
$4,500 on 01/25/2002;
$7,500 on 05/16/2002.

[redacted] [redacted] [(1) Fleet, MA a/c# unknown, (2) Sovereign Bank New England a/c# possibly [redacted], (3) Citizens Bank MA for dep HADDAD TRAVEL INC [redacted]] received 12 checks totaling $58,500. The individual check amounts and clearing dates are listed below:
$9,000 on 08/16/1999;
$9,000 on 09/27/1999;
$3,000 on 11/29/1999;
$1,500 on 01/04/2000;
$4,500 on 12/04/2000;
$4,500 on 12/07/2000;
$4,500 on 01/26/2001;
$4,500 on 02/05/2001;

$4,500 on 04/13/2001;
$6,000 on 08/22/2001;
$3,500 on 05/30/2002;
$4,000 on 05/30/2002.

[redacted] Cash withdrawals and checks payable to FAHAD AL THUMAIRY totaled $81,015. The amounts and dates of withdrawals are listed below:
$9,000 on 08/10/1999;
$9,000 on 09/13/1999;
$8,000 on 09/28/1999;
$3,000 on 11/19/1999;
$1,500 on 12/22/1999;
$9,000 on 11/16/2000;
$9,000 on 01/11/2001;
$4,500 on 03/27/2001;
$6,000 on 08/03/2001;
$6 on 08/06/2001;
$9,000 on 01/08/2002;
$9,006 on 01/11/2002;
$3 on 05/08/2002;
$4,000 on 05/08/2002.

[redacted] FAHAD AL THUMAIRY (Wells Fargo Bank a/c# (P)) received one check in the amount of $1,000, which cleared on 09/28/1999.

[redacted] (P) (deposited at bank with ABA# (P)) received one check in the amount of $300, which cleared on 02/02/2000.

[redacted] (P) (Bank of America a/c# (P)) received one check in the amount of $200, which cleared on 02/26/2001.

[redacted] Documentation was not received from the bank for two checks, one for $3,000 on 11/03/199 and another for $4,000 on 12/02/1999.

To: Boston From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 07/23/2003

LEAD [redacted] **:**

Set Lead 1: (Info)

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MA

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

NEW HAVEN [redacted] (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

NEW HAVEN

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2027
DATE: 08-25-2021

[redacted]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/11/2002

To: Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

[redacted] **Case ID #:** [redacted] (F) (Pending)

Title: [redacted] FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY (NON-USPER)
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Information obtained from Avalon Westside Apartments.

[redacted] (G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (Non-USPER)

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Details: [redacted] On 09/10/2002, (P) (G) of Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments, 3636 S. Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, telephone number (310) 398-2794, provided the following information:

[redacted] [redacted] Fahad Al-Thumairy, DOB (P-1)/1971, is the current lessee of Apartment 2-202. The address of (P) is a.k.a (P), Los Angeles, California. The current lease on 2-202 began on 04/18/2002, and is currently on a month-to-month basis. Al-Thumairy is listed as the only resident.

[redacted] [redacted] The initial deposit for (P) was made with two checks: 1) from Al-Thumairy, address (P) Culver City, California, Wells Fargo Bank account number (P-1)9960; and 2) from Faisal Al-Muhanna, (P), Long Beach, California, 90814, Wells Fargo Bank account number (P-1)8757.

[redacted] [redacted] In the lease for (P) Al-Thumairy lists Faisal Al-Muhanna as the emergency contact, at the (P) address above, telephone number (P). Al-Thumairy lists his employer as the Saudi Consulate where his boss is "Khalid" and his salary is $5000/month.

[redacted] [redacted] Al-Thumairy is assigned parking space number 289 on Level two of the parking structure. It is near the south end of the level on the western wall, and is visible from the sidewalk

[redacted]

through the security grates. This space is a tandem parking space, allowing two cars to double park front to back. A second parking pass for Apartment (P) is assigned to (P) [NFI].

[redacted] [redacted] On 09/10/2002 at 4:50 p.m. there were no vehicles in parking space 289. (P) looked in the access system and determined that the card assigned to Al-Thumairy was last used on 09/09/2002, and the pass assigned to (P) was last used on 09/10/2002.

[redacted] [redacted] The "Lessee Information Sheet" in the current lease packet is dated 07/03/2001, and was filled out during Al-Thumairy's July 2001 application for Apartment (P)

[redacted] [redacted] Apartment (P) appears to be the first apartment Al-Thumairy rented in his name at Avalon Westside Terrace, as this lease packet is the only one containing the full applications and checks produced by the management. Subsequent leases appear to be "pre-approved."

[redacted] Apartment (P) was jointly leased by Al-Thumairy and Al-Muhana, who both listed their address as (P) (P) Culver City, California. On the lease they are both shown as residents. The move in date was 7/10/2001, and the move out date was 08/14/2001. On the "Application for Residency", Al-muhanna is listed as the primary resident, and lists his telephone number as (P) -7776. Al-Muhanna indicated that he works for the Saudi Embassy in

Washington, D.C., (202) 944-3574, as a "Trainer." As proof of support, Al-Muhana provided a proof of support letter from Dr. Mazyed I. Almazyed, Saudi Embassy, indicating that Faisal Ahmed Hamed Muhana is the recipient of a Saudi scholarship as an undergraduate Manufacturing Engineering student at California State University, Long Beach. The letter lists Al-Muhanna's address as (P) (P) Long Beach, California, 90814.

[redacted] [redacted] Al-Thumairy is the emergency contact, and lists his address as (P) Culver City, telephone number as (P) The checks which appear to have paid the application fee, deposit and the move in payments were all from Al-Thumairy on the above noted bank account ((P-1)9960). A letter from Wells Fargo in the file states that the account ((P-1)9960) balance on 05/08/2001 was $37,559.20, and on 06/08/2001 was $17,119.58, with deposits of $6,322.24 and withdrawals of $26,761.86 for the month. A letter in the file from Khaled Al-Swailem, Director, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, WDC, indicates that Fahad I Al-Thumairy is employed by the embassy at a salary of $60,000 per year. However, the file also contains copies of checks drawn on the account of (P), (P), Glendale, California, 91201. (P) is listed nowhere else in the lease, and his association with Al-Thumairy is unknown.

[redacted] [redacted] On the same day that he applied for (P), Al-Thumairy and Al-Muhana also leased apartment (P) aka (P) (P) Los Angeles, California. The

[redacted]

move in date was 07/03/2001 and the move out date was 08/15/2001. Again, both of them are listed as the residents. Al-Thumairy also paid the move in costs with a check drawn on his account (P-1) 9960).

[redacted] [redacted] Al-Thumairy and Al-Muhana also leased apartment (P), with a move in date of 12/27/2001 and a move out date of 02/13/2002. Again, all move in costs were paid for by Al-Thumairy with checks drawn from account ((P-1) 9960).

[redacted] [redacted] (P) also spontaneously provided the names of the following possibly suspicious residents. (P) moved out of apartment (P) on 09/09/2002. (P) resides in apartment (P). (P) resides in apartment (P), and moved in on 07/09/2002. (P) formerly lived with (P) (P) in apartment (P) between 04/09/2002 and 07/08/2002.

[redacted] [redacted] Telephone Applications shows hundreds of hits for telephone numbers (P)-0777, (P)-2666, and (P) 7776. The numbers belong to Cingular wireless.

◆◆

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 08/05/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (S), (G)

New York **Attn:**

From: Los Angeles

[redacted] (G)

Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] PENTTBOM

MC 182

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 07-11-2019

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: [redacted] To provide PENTTBOM with results of leads set to Los Angeles to follow up on information obtained during an interview of FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Reference: (F)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] The purpose of this communication is to provide New York with the results of follow-up investigation on information obtained during the interview of FAHAD AL THUMAIRY on 02/23/2004 and 02/24/2004. AL THUMAIRY was interviewed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by staff from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission.

[redacted] In the interview, AL THUMAIRY identified individuals who traveled to Los Angeles to seek medical treatment and provided information on where they resided, including (P-1) (phonetic), (P-1) (phonetic), and the father of (P-1) (phonetic). AL THUMAIRY said (P-1) and his family resided at (P-1) (P-1) located at (P-1), Los Angeles, California, during his stay. Al THUMAIRY arranged for the rental of an apartment at the Avalon Terrace Westside for (P-1)

[redacted]

(P-1) and his son during the summer of 2001. AL THUMAIRY paid for (P-1) rental and was later reimbursed by him.

[redacted] New York requested that Los Angeles review Avalon Westside Terrace Apartment records to determine if (P-1) (P-1) or (P-1) rented or sublet an apartment with AL THUMAIRY, determine if (P-1) was a patient at UCLA Medical Center, and review AL THUMAIRY's bank records to determine if he paid for and was reimbursed for (P-1) apartment.

[redacted] Per referenced insert (F) (F), on 04/20/2004, 9/11 Commission investigators interviewed (P), who (P) a business which manages medical care for international patients at Los Angeles' area medical facilities, including UCLA and Cedars-Sinai Medical Centers. (P) was asked if he could recall a patient or patients, prior to 09/11/2001 that came to Los Angeles from Saudi Arabia. The patient would have been treated for liver disease and been accompanied by two sons or a son and a son-in-law. (P) noted that liver disease is a common ailment of Saudis and many come to the United States to be evaluated for transplant surgery. (P) further stated that many Saudi males drink illegally produced liquor which is surreptitiously produced. This consumption of ethanol causes many older Saudi males to develop cirrhosis of the liver. Because alcohol consumption is illegal in Saudi Arabia, many well-to-do Saudis seek medical care for cirrhosis and related diseases in the United States.

[redacted] (P) searched his records and identified a patient by the name of (P-1) as fitting this criterion. (P) reviewed the record and located the treatment summary for (P-1). (P) said (P-1) was a patient of Dr. (P) at UCLA Medical Center. Dr. (P) evaluated (P-1) as a candidate for liver transplant, because (P-1) was in the early stages of liver failure. (P) said the consultation report indicated (P-1) son and son-in-law met with Dr. (P) when he discussed treatment options with (P-1). (P) explained that prior to 09/11/2001, patients coming to the United States for medical treatment could designate a companion. This companion would be able to obtain the same B1/B2 two-year visas as the patient. (P) records showed the designated companion for (P-1) was (P-1), who is identified as (P-1) son-in-law. (P) provided the 9/11 Commission investigators with photocopies of the United States' visas for (P-1) and (P-1). (P) (P) was asked if he had any record of (P-1) son. (P) said Dr. (P) consultation report notes (P-1) son was present for the consultation. However, the son was not the designated companion. The son would have been able to enter the United States on a B2 tourist visa, as contrasted with the more long term B1 business visa. Only one person may be designated as a companion for each patient and in the case of (P-1) it was his son-in-law. It was (P) (P) practice to only maintain copies of the travel documents for the patient and the companion.

[redacted] (P) noted he had a dinner party for a group of patients at the Westside Apartments, formerly known as the Avalon Westside Apartments in July 2001. This was during the period of time (P-1) was in the Los Angeles area for his liver transplant consultation. (P-1) was living in an apartment at the Avalon Westside Apartments. The records reflect the apartment number was (P-1). AL-THUMAIRY attended the party along with (P) patients. AL-THUMAIRY was not specifically invited, but was welcomed when he arrived. (P) (P) could not remember whether he saw (P-1), (P-1) or AL-THUMAIRY speaking with one another at the party. (P-1) returned to Saudi Arabia in September 2001. He did not receive a liver transplant, but did respond to medical treatment provided at UCLA Medical Center. (P) said (P-1) was alive and living in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) was asked if he managed the care of a patient by the name of (P-1) who may have had some association with AL-THUMAIRY. (P) searched his records and found he had two patients with the name (P-1). One patient was (P-1) and the second patient was (P-1) (P-1). (P-1) was a patient at Cedars-Sinai Hospital.

[redacted] (P-1) was a patient at UCLA and his companion was his son, [redacted] (P-1), a professor at King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (P) did not have any specific recollection that either patient had an association with AL-THUMAIRY, although both may have met or had pastoral calls from AL-THUMAIRY.

[redacted] Los Angeles reviewed rental records for the Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments for any listing, reference, or name variant for the following individuals: [redacted] (P-1), [redacted] (P-1) (P-1) There were no matches or similar names found. Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments required that tenants provide the names of all occupants on the lease agreement. Additional occupants or long term visitors were required to be added on a separate form. None of the listed individuals were found on any lease records or on the records for apartments leased by AL THUMAIRY and FAISAL AL MUHANA.

[redacted] The information provided by AL THUMAIRY regarding the "father of [redacted] (P-1)" and [redacted] (P-1) is consistent with [redacted] (P) description of [redacted] (P-1) and his son-in-law [redacted] (P-1). Additionally, [redacted] (P) said he attended a dinner party for a group of patients in which AL THUMAIRY was present in apartment [redacted] (P-1) in the Avalon Westside Apartments in July 2001. [redacted] (P) records indicate [redacted] (P-1)

(P-1) was living in apartment (P-1) during that time. Rental records show that apartment was leased by AL THUMAIRY and AL MUHANA from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001.

[redacted] A review of AL THUMAIRY's Wells Fargo Bank account records, to include cancelled checks, found no indication he paid for or was reimbursed for (P-1) (or (P-1)) apartment rental. It should be noted AL THUMAIRY's bank records reflected a large volume of cash deposits and withdrawals.

[redacted] Los Angeles considers this lead covered.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted] (G)

[redacted] For information.

Set Lead 2: (Discretionary)

NEW YORK

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] Take appropriate action as deemed necessary.

◆◆

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2028
DATE: 07-12-2021

[redacted]

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08/18/2003

OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, Saudi passport (P-1) was interviewed in (C-1) Present during the first interview session was FBI (S) (S) in case Arabic translation was necessary; however, both interview sessions were conducted entirely in English. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, AL-BAYOUMI provided the following information.

AL-BAYOUMI has worked for the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) for approximately twenty-seven years, and currently works in the finance/budget department. AL-BAYOUMI was sent to the United States in approximately 1995 to study English and to obtain advanced educational degrees. AL-BAYOUMI explained that this undertaking was part of a program aimed to educate Saudi Arabian citizens abroad and to have them retain their employment upon return to Saudi Arabia. Before traveling to the United States, AL-BAYOUMI was transferred to Dallah Avco, a subcontractor of the PCA, through which he was to receive both a salary and a stipend to cover tuition fees, housing, and other living expenses. During his time in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI received both a salary as well as an additional stipend. While later attending school in the United Kingdom, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive funding for his tuition.

Depending on the budgetary situation, AL-BAYOUMI was sometimes told that funding for his tuition and/or living expenses were to be drawn directly from his salary. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the specific dates or periods of time during which he was told to pay for his tuition or housing from his salary. At other times, AL-BAYOUMI received additional funds, separate from his salary, to pay for his tuition and/or housing. During these periods of time, his additional stipend would be increased. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the specific dates or periods of time during which he received an increased stipend.

AL-BAYOUMI identified the name HAMID AL-RASHID as an official of PCA, but advised that AL-RASHID was not his supervisor. AL-BAYOUMI does not personally know AL-RASHID. AL-BAYOUMI did not recognize the name or photograph of SAUD AL-RASHEED [Note: This black and white photograph of SAUD AL-RASHEED, dressed in traditional Saudi Arabian

08/04-06/2003 (C-1)

(F)

(S) (S)

[redacted]

attire, was obtained from an image of his Saudi Arabian passport. A copy of the photograph of SAUD AL-RASHEED is attached to and made part of this FD-302. A copy of this photograph is also enclosed in a FD-340 within the case file].

While living in San Diego, Al-BAYOUMI was contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB, a Saudi individual who had attended school in San Diego, regarding the mosque used by the Kurdish population in San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the date that he was contacted by AL-HABIB. AL-HABIB informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the 10,000 USD for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. AL-BAYOUMI became the facility supervisor of the mosque, named the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, on a volunteer basis and kept an office in the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI was not paid for his position at the mosque.

AL-BAYOUMI was not employed in San Diego other than his volunteer position at the mosque. While in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had last attended Keller Graduate School where he took courses in the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) program. AL-BAYOUMI did not finish the CPA program because he did not like the field of accounting. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the exact dates of his attendance at Keller Graduate School.

In early 2000, AL-BAYOUMI and ISAMU (LNU) traveled from San Diego to Los Angeles in order for AL-BAYOUMI to submit passport applications for himself and his family to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. ISAMU was described as a white American convert to Islam who was approximately twenty-two years old [Note: this individual is known to investigators to be ISAMU DYSON]. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the exact date of this trip to Los Angeles, but recalled that it was in the beginning of 2000. AL-BAYOUMI had called the Consulate prior to traveling to Los Angeles and was told that each applicant needed to submit three photographs. Because AL-BAYOUMI only had two photographs of himself, he and ISAMU stopped on the way to Los Angeles in order for AL-BAYOUMI to obtain another photograph. ISAMU directed AL-BAYOUMI to a location where ISAMU knew they would be able to obtain a photograph. AL-BAYOUMI had his picture taken in a photo booth, and they proceeded to the Saudi Arabian Consulate. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the location at which he had his picture taken.

AL-BAYOUMI and ISAMU entered the Consulate and AL-BAYOUMI submitted the passport applications to a female employee. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the name of this employee. AL-BAYOUMI was informed that the applications would be processed and the passports mailed to him within two to three days. While at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI also picked up Islamic books and children's books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque in San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI visited the Consulate approximately once or twice per year to pick up books. AL-BAYOUMI usually had contact with SAAD JEBREEN [phonetic] in the Islamic Affairs section of the Consulate, but AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the name of the person from whom he obtained the books on that day. AL-BAYOUMI described this person as a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia.

After leaving the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and ISAMU continued on to a halal restaurant at which AL-BAYOUMI had previously eaten with his family. After discovering that the restaurant was "closed down", AL-BAYOUMI and ISAMU went to another nearby halal restaurant where they ate lunch. While walking out of the restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI overheard two males speaking Arabic. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia [Note: these two individuals are known to investigators to be KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI]. They informed AL-BAYOUMI that they had arrived in the United States approximately one month prior to study English. Neither KHALID nor NAWAF mentioned where they were residing in Los Angeles, but they may have spoke about plans to travel to San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI told them that he lived near the mosque in San Diego, and that they could contact him if ever in San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall if he provided his telephone number. The conversation lasted for approximately five minutes.

Before meeting them in the restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI had never seen nor heard of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and/or NAWAF AL-HAZMI. AL-BAYOUMI was not introduced to KHALID and NAWAF by any other individual, rather he just happened to meet them in the restaurant. AL-BAYOUMI was not instructed to visit that specific restaurant on that day, nor was he instructed to meet KHALID and NAWAF in Los Angeles.

After leaving the restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and ISAMU spoke of visiting the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City because ISAMU was eager to see the building. AL-BAYOUMI, however, could not recall how to get to the mosque and they instead proceeded directly back to San Diego. Previously, AL-BAYOUMI had visited the King Fahad Mosque once or twice per year. On one of these occasions, AL-BAYOUMI visited the King Fahad Mosque with his eldest son [redacted] (P-1) and DR. ABDUSATTAR SHEIKH.

AL-BAYOUMI identified the name and photograph of FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY as an Imam at the King Fahad Mosque, but denied knowing that AL-THUMAIRY was employed at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles [Note: This black and white photograph of AL-THUMAIRY was obtained from his U.S. visa application. A copy of the photograph of AL-THUMAIRY is attached to and made part of this FD-302. A copy of this photograph is also enclosed in a FD-340 within the case file]. AL-BAYOUMI did not see nor talk to AL-THUMAIRY on the day that he and ISAMU traveled to the Consulate in Los Angeles. In addition to AL-THUMAIRY, a black African male was also an Imam at the King Fahad Mosque. AL-BAYOUMI did not recognize the name or photograph of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA [Note: This black and white photograph of AL-MUHANNA was obtained from his U.S. visa application. A copy of the photograph of AL-MUHANNA, dressed in traditional Saudi Arabian attire, is attached to and made part of this FD-302. A copy of this photograph is also enclosed in a FD-340 within the case file].

Less than one week after the trip to Los Angeles, KHALID and NAWAF arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) and asked the Imam if OMAR was around. AL-BAYOUMI believed that (P) was the name of the Imam. The Imam responded that OMAR would be in later to pray. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall if he met KHALID and NAWAF at the mosque or at the apartment complex later that day, nor could he recall the exact date that KHALID and NAWAF arrived at the mosque. When they did meet, KHALID and NAWAF told AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to rent an apartment in the area of the mosque.

AL-BAYOUMI accompanied KHALID and NAWAF to the management office of Parkwood Apartments, at which AL-BAYOUMI and his family were residing. AL-BAYOUMI assisted KHALID and NAWAF in filling out the apartment rental application, as their English skills were very poor. At the direction of the manager, AL-BAYOUMI listed his name on the application and also the name of his friend (P) (LNU) as a reference. The manager instructed AL-BAYOUMI to list (P) as a reference because (P) had resided at Parkwood Apartments for an extended period of time. AL-BAYOUMI filled out the rental applications in the names of KHALID, NAWAF, and himself, and listed his own address as the previous residence of both KHALID and NAWAF even though they had never lived there. KHALID and NAWAF each signed their own signatures on the applications, and AL-BAYOUMI signed his own signature on the application and as guarantor.

AL-BAYOUMI identified his own handwriting and signature on copies of the three rental applications and the guarantee form [Note: these copies are enclosed in a FD-340 within the case file]. AL-BAYOUMI did not completely read the terms of agreement to signing as the guarantor, but did so to help out KHALID and NAWAF as newcomers to the community. AL-BAYOUMI advised that it was common practice in their community and in the mosque to assist individuals new to the area. When AL-BAYOUMI first moved to San Diego, an individual named (FNU) (P) had assisted him in obtaining an apartment rental. AL-BAYOUMI therefore did the same for KHALID and NAWAF. Other than KHALID and NAWAF, AL-BAYOUMI did not recall assisting any other individuals in obtaining an apartment rental.

KHALID and NAWAF attempted to pay cash for their rent and security deposit, but the management office would not accept cash payment. After the manager advised that they needed to open a bank account, AL-BAYOUMI offered to assist them in doing so. AL-BAYOUMI therefore accompanied KHALID and NAWAF to a local branch of Bank of America at which AL-BAYOUMI had an existing account. KHALID and NAWAF opened a bank account with a large amount of cash. AL-BAYOUMI did not know the exact amount of cash that KHALID and NAWAF possessed, but believed it may have been between 4000 USD and 8000 USD.

KHALID and NAWAF also needed to obtain a bank check to pay for their rent and security deposit at Parkwood Apartments, however, the bank teller informed them that they could not obtain a check as new customers who had no credit history. The teller suggested that they deposit cash into AL-BAYOUMI's existing account and draw the check upon AL-BAYOUMI's account. Upon obtaining the check from AL-BAYOUMI's account, KHALID and NAWAF immediately provided AL-BAYOUMI with the same amount of cash as the bank check and AL-BAYOUMI deposited the money into his account. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall if he accompanied KHALID and NAWAF back to the manager's officer when they submitted the check.

AL-BAYOUMI never paid rent or otherwise provided money to either KHALID or NAWAF. KHALID and NAWAF did not stay at AL-BAYOUMI's apartment at any time. AL-BAYOUMI did not know if they stayed anywhere else in San Diego before moving into their own apartment. A Syrian individual named (P) [phonetic] (LNU) owned a recreational vehicle (RV) which he kept in the parking lot of the ICSD, but AL-BAYOUMI did not have knowledge of either KHALID or NAWAF ever staying in the RV. KHALID and NAWAF had met (P) at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI described (P) as having some mental problems.

Approximately two to four days after KHALID and NAWAF moved into Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI was planning a dinner in honor of a sheikh from Norway who had lectured and provided his services at the mosque during Ramadan. The sheikh was known by the Kurdish members of the mosque and visited the mosque for two consecutive years. AL-BAYOUMI planned on holding the dinner at the mosque, but others felt that the mosque was out of the way and people therefore would not attend. AL-BAYOUMI then decided to hold the dinner at Parkwood Apartments. Because the female guests would be in his own apartment with his wife, AL-BAYOUMI asked KHALID and NAWAF if the male guests could congregate in their apartment because there was empty space and no furniture in their apartment. KHALID and NAWAF agreed that the dinner could be held in their apartment.

During the dinner, KHALID and NAWAF stayed in the back room of their apartment despite being invited to sit with the other individuals in attendance. Although they stayed in the back room, KHALID and NAWAF did converse with other individuals who circulated throughout the apartment. An individual [NFI] who had led prayers at the mosque and who was returning home was presented with a plaque during the dinner. (P) was also presented with a plaque from AL-BAYOUMI's son in appreciation of (P) assistance with his studies. The sheikh did not receive a plaque because he had been provided a salary in return for his services. The dinner in honor of the sheikh was the only dinner held at KHALID and NAWAF's apartment and the only dinner held by AL-BAYOUMI during the time that KHALID and NAWAF lived at Parkwood

Apartments. AL-BAYOUMI did not host any kind of "welcoming" party in honor of KHALID and NAWAF.

AL-BAYOUMI recalled that the dinner was videotaped with his video camera, but that some individuals did not want to appear on the videotape. When asked about his reportedly constant use of his video camera, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he enjoyed videotaping events such as family gatherings, lectures, and dinners in order to remember the events. However, AL-BAYOUMI would not describe himself as constantly using his video camera.

AL-BAYOUMI recalled that KHALID and NAWAF submitted a notice-to-vacate form shortly after moving in to Parkwood Apartments because they felt it was too costly to live there. AL-BAYOUMI did not fill out the notice-to-vacate form on their behalf, nor was he present when KHALID and NAWAF submitted the form. AL-BAYOUMI did not know the date on which KHALID and NAWAF submitted the form. When shown a copy of the notice-to-vacate form, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he did not recognize the form and that his handwriting did not appear on the form [Note: this copy is enclosed in a FD-340 within the case file]. AL-BAYOUMI was aware that KHALID and NAWAF were planning to move into the apartment of HASHIM AL-ATTAS, a student in San Diego who was going to be returning to Saudi Arabia. AL-BAYOUMI had known AL-ATTAS for a long time through school and would see and call him often. AL-BAYOUMI did not know how KHALID and NAWAF knew AL-ATTAS.

AL-BAYOUMI did not recognize the name [redacted], but thought that AL-ATTAS may have used his telephone to call [redacted] since HARB was AL-ATTAS' landlord. Neither KHALID or NAWAF ever used AL-BAYOUMI's cellular telephone, nor did they ever enter his apartment and use his telephone. AL-BAYOUMI did not call [redacted] on their behalf, nor did he assist KHALID and NAWAF in any way to move into AL-ATTAS' apartment. While he was not certain, AL-BAYOUMI recalled hearing that KHALID and NAWAF had moved into AL-ATTAS' apartment for two weeks, then returned to their apartment at Parkwood Apartments. AL-BAYOUMI was in Washington, DC, during that time.

AL-BAYOUMI had departed San Diego for Washington, DC, a couple of weeks after KHALID and NAWAF moved into Parkwood Apartments. While in Washington, DC, AL-BAYOUMI attended two or three consecutive seminars at George Washington University over a period of approximately 15-25 days. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall the dates on which these seminars took place. These seminars were held in the Watergate building. After completing the seminars, AL-BAYOUMI returned to San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI then departed San Diego for Saudi Arabia, where he stayed approximately two months for his employment. Al-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego during the times he traveled to both Washington, DC, and Saudi Arabia.

Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, Al-BAYOUMI recalled hearing that KHALID and NAWAF had moved from Parkwood Apartments to the residence of DR. ABDUSATTAR SHEIKH. AL-BAYOUMI did not know when KHALID and NAWAF first met SHEIKH, nor how they were introduced.

AL-BAYOUMI did not know why they had decided to move out of Parkwood Apartments and into the residence of SHEIKH. After they moved out of Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI saw KHALID and NAWAF at the mosque on one or two occasions.

As AL-BAYOUMI was traveling during much of the time that KHALID and NAWAF lived at Parkwood Apartments, he did not have a great deal of contact with either of them. On a few occasions, AL-BAYOUMI and his eldest son (P-1) visited their apartment to say hello. During these visits, KHALID and NAWAF often would joke with each other by pushing or shoving. AL-BAYOUMI did not like how they acted towards each other and did not want his son to observe such conduct. Because of their behavior, AL-BAYOUMI stopped visiting their apartment.

AL-BAYOUMI could not recall any one or more individuals in San Diego with whom KHALID and NAWAF spent a significant amount of time. AL-BAYOUMI did not know of any individuals who assisted KHALID and/or NAWAF in obtaining driver's licenses or any other forms of identification, but AL-BAYOUMI noted that everyone at the mosque is always willing to help newcomers to the community. AL-BAYOUMI did not recognize the name (P).

AL-BAYOUMI did not introduce either KHALID or NAWAF to MOHDAR ABDULLAH, but believed that they knew each other from the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI recalled seeing ABDULLAH with KHALID and NAWAF at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI did not instruct ABDULLAH to translate or to contact flight schools on their behalf, nor did he direct ABDULLAH to provide them with any assistance.

AL-BAYOUMI identified the name of OSAMA BASNAN as an acquaintance whose wife is friends with AL-BAYOUMI's wife. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he himself did not care much for BASNAN, but their wives were close friends. AL-BAYOUMI did not introduce BASNAN to KHALID and/or NAWAF, but recalled seeing them together at the mosque.

AL-BAYOUMI did not know either KHALID or NAWAF to have worked while in San Diego. AL-BAYOUMI was not sure if both KHALID and NAWAF attended the local community college to learn English. AL-BAYOUMI recalled seeing KHALID and NAWAF working out in the exercise room at Parkwood Apartments on one or two occasions. AL-BAYOUMI never saw either KHALID or NAWAF use a computer, and he never spoke with either KHALID or NAWAF about computers or the internet. AL-BAYOUMI did not recall ever emailing either KHALID or NAWAF.

AL-BAYOUMI never spoke to either KHALID or NAWAF about politics, to include jihad, martyrdom, or anti-American sentiments. Neither politics nor radical views were allowed to be discussed at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI never discussed marriage or family with either KHALID or NAWAF. AL-BAYOUMI was not aware that KHALID and NAWAF had attended flight training while living in San Diego, and neither KHALID nor NAWAF ever spoke to AL-BAYOUMI about flight training.

AL-BAYOUMI again departed San Diego alone in 10/2000 and traveled to the United Kingdom where he enrolled in the doctorate program in business ethics at Aston University. AL-BAYOUMI planned to attend school for two years in the United Kingdom and finish the third year with his dissertation in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. AL-BAYOUMI returned to San Diego, where his family was still residing, between semesters at Aston. In the summer of 2001, upon the completion of the children's school year, AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children moved with him to the United Kingdom.

[redacted] (C-1), AL-BAYOUMI spoke with DR. NASSER [phonetic], with whom he was associated through school. NASSER subsequently called the Cultural Attache at the Saudi Arabian Embassy on behalf of AL-BAYOUMI. The Cultural Attache tried to contact AL-BAYOUMI but could not get in touch with him. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently spoke with Embassy employee TALAL MOSLAMATI [phonetic]. AL-BAYOUMI had consulted with the Embassy because the British authorities wanted to audiotape and videotape their interviews with AL-BAYOUMI, and AL-BAYOUMI sought the advice of the Embassy on allowing them to do so.

[redacted] (C-1) AL-BAYOUMI did not finish the second year of the doctorate program. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had to drop out of the program because his computer and other materials were taken during the search of his residence [Note: AL-BAYOUMI became visibly upset while talking about dropping out of the doctorate program]. AL-BAYOUMI left the doctorate program and subsequently completed the master's program in business ethics in 2002. After finishing the master's program, AL-BAYOUMI and his family returned to Saudi Arabia.

Other than his salary and stipends, AL-BAYOUMI did not receive any other money from the government of Saudi Arabia. AL-BAYOUMI did not have advanced knowledge of the terrorist attacks that took place on 09/11/2001. AL-BAYOUMI has never attended training camps or received any training from Al Qaeda, nor is he affiliated with any individuals involved in terrorism or with any terrorist activity . AL-BAYOUMI advised that he is not a member of any terrorist organization.

When asked about media reports that he is an intelligence officer, AL-BAYOUMI advised that such reports were "absolutely not true" and that he was not a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he is an innocent person and just wants to clear his name. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he respects America and American people, and that his children consider themselves to be American. AL-BAYOUMI stated that his youngest daughter is a "Bush supporter" who cheers for Bush when he appears on television.

When asked of his willingness to submit to a polygraph examination, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he was not familiar with the polygraph and that he did not understand the concept of a polygraph examination. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he would most likely consult an attorney before submitting to a polygraph examination.

Through interview, investigation, and observation, the following information was obtained regarding AL-BAYOUMI:

Name:	Omar Ahmed Mustafa Al-Bayoumi
Aliases:	Abu Emad
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1957
Place of Birth:	Saudi Arabia
SSN:	(P-1)
Passport:	Saudi (P-1)
Marital Status:	Married - wife Manal Bagader, DOB (P-1) 1968, POB Saudi Arabia
Children:	(P-1)
Physical Description -	
Height:	Approximately 5 feet, 8 inches
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Brown
Attire:	White thobe, red/white ghutra

(Rev 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 08-20-2021

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 04/20/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S) [redacted]

Los Angeles **Attn:**

From: New York

PENTTBOM (G), (S) [redacted]

Contact:

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F) [redacted] [redacted]

Title: PENTTBOM

MC 182

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] [redacted]

(Rev 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: Request Los Angeles conduct investigation in regards to information obtained during the interview of FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY.

Reference: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Details: On 02/23-24/2004, FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY was interviewed [redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) by [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P) of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission (reference [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) The interview was conducted in the presence of writer and NYPD [redacted] (S) of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team, [redacted] (C-1) [redacted] [redacted] (C-1) [redacted] AL-THUMAIRY then returned for a second interview on the night of 02/24/2004, again conducted in the presence of the representatives of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team [redacted] (C-1) [redacted]

As FBI Los Angeles is aware, investigation is ongoing in order to determine the location of residence and activities of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) during their apparent stay in the Los Angeles area from 01/15/2000 to approximately 02/04/2000. Of predominant interest throughout this investigation are the "two Saudi males" that were introduced to OUALID MONCEF BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY (F) (S) (F) [redacted]

For background information, BENOMRANE advised that he had heard that the two Saudi males had arrived at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them. The apartment was identified by BENOMRANE as having been at the Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments. According to BENOMRANE, AL-THUMAIRY asked BENOMRANE to assist the two Saudi males during their time in Los Angeles because they could not speak English. BENOMRANE agreed and gave his taxicab business card to the two Saudi males. BENOMRANE advised that over the next few days after meeting the two Saudi males, he drove them on two separate occasions around the Los Angeles area and to Sea World in San Diego. BENOMRANE was not able to provide a specific date or time period of when he met the two Saudi males, other than advising that it happened before 09/11/2001. BENOMRANE also advised that the two Saudi males spent approximately one month in Los Angeles.

BENOMRANE advised that he had been told by AL-THUMAIRY that the two Saudi males were in Los Angeles to visit their sick father. BENOMRANE first advised that their father was in a local hospital; BENOMRANE later stated that their father stayed in their apartment and that their father had accompanied them on the day that BENOMRANE drove the two Saudi males around the Los Angeles area. [Note: To date, there is no evidence or intelligence indicating that the father of either KHALID AL-MIHDHAR or NAWAF AL-HAZMI, or another elder male individual, accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to Los Angeles].

In order to assist in the identification of the two Saudi Arabian males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY, and to confirm or deny if they were in fact KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, additional investigation was conducted in Los Angeles. Due to BENOMRANE's reporting that the Saudi males were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them, there has been speculation that AL-THUMAIRY had been the individual responsible for having rented their apartment at the Avalon Terrace Westside. Investigation thus determined that AL-THUMAIRY simultaneously rented two apartments at the Avalon Terrace Westside during the summer of 2001; specifically, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001.

When interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, among other areas of questioning, AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any individuals whom he knew to have traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment and any individuals whom he may have assisted with lodging or other necessities while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY advised that as a result of his positions at the Saudi Arabian Consulate and at the King Fahad Mosque, he sometimes was asked for guidance in such matters (i.e. lodging) for visiting Saudi Arabian citizens. AL-THUMAIRY recalled that (P-1) [phonetic] traveled with his ill father [NFI] from Saudi Arabia to Los Angeles in approximately 1999 to receive treatment at the UCLA Medical Center. (P-1 and his father had visited the King Fahad Mosque and had asked AL-THUMAIRY for advice regarding where to reside while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY made recommendations to (P-1) and his father regarding geographic areas in which they could reside. AL-THUMAIRY did not know where (P-1) and his father ultimately resided, but knew that they had stayed near UCLA Medical Center. AL-THUMAIRY advised that (P-1) and his father stayed in Los Angeles for approximately three months.

AL-THUMAIRY also recalled that (P-1) [phonetic] traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment at UCLA Medical Center, although AL-THUMAIRY could not provide any date of (P-1) visit. (P-1) resided at the Avalon Terrace Westside with his family, to include his four or five children. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he did not assist (P-1) in obtaining the apartment lease at Avalon Terrace Westside.

AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any individuals for whom he rented apartments at Avalon Terrace Westside, specifically, during the summer of 2001 when AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and apartment 120 from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001. AL-THUMAIRY initially did not recall having arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for anyone other than himself during the summer of 2001;

[redacted] (C-1) [redacted]

AL-THUMAIRY advised that he received a telephone call during the summer of 2001 from [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (P-1) informed AL-THUMAIRY that he was traveling to Los Angeles to receive a liver transplant at UCLA Medical Center and needed a place to stay, preferably with a kitchen, with his son. AL-THUMAIRY recalled the name of [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P-1) son to be either [redacted] (P-1) or [redacted] (P-1). [redacted] (P-1) and his son arrived in Los Angeles approximately one week after the telephone call.

AL-THUMAIRY stated that he arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for [redacted] (P-1) and his son [Writer's Note: as stated above, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment 120 from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001]. AL-THUMAIRY signed the rental contract and wrote a check to pay for the initial rent payment, and informed the leasing office that someone else would be residing in the apartment. (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY by depositing either cash or traveler's check into AL-THUMAIRY's Wells Fargo Bank account.

A search of ACS, conducted by writer, revealed two accounts held by AL-THUMAIRY at Wells Fargo Bank. A summary of Wells Fargo Bank account number (P-1) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 did not appear to reflect any transactions that could be attributed to either the rental check paid by AL-THUMAIRY to Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments or the reimbursement by (P-1) and his son (F) [redacted] [redacted] (F). A financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account number 0372-419960 was submitted to the case file as an attachment and could not be viewed through ACS (F) (S)

(P-1) visited UCLA Medical Center and was told by the medical staff to return to Saudi Arabia because he was not ready for the liver transplant. (P-1) and his son resided in the apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for approximately one and one-half months. Before they returned to Saudi Arabia, (P-1) and his son accompanied AL-THUMAIRY to the leasing office to terminate the lease. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he also returned to Saudi Arabia soon after, on approximately 08/20/2001. He subsequently learned that (P-1) passed away before returning to UCLA Medical Center for the liver transplant.

While the above information is being forwarded for the information of recipients, there is certain information that necessitates follow-up investigation to determine the veracity of AL-THUMAIRY, as well as to determine the identity of the Saudi males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE and any association between the Saudi males and AL-THUMAIRY.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if an individual named (P-1) [phonetic] resided there with his family of four or five children.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY rented an apartment for [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] and his son during the summer of 2001 (specifically, determine if AL-THUMAIRY's rental of either apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 or apartment [redacted] (P) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001 was actually for [redacted] (P-1) and his son).

Set Lead 4: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center to determine if [redacted] (P-1) [phonetic] visited from Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2001 for a liver transplant consultation.

Set Lead 5: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct a review of the records of Wells Fargo Bank account # (P-1) to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY paid the rental fees of (P-1) and his son via check to the Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments in the summer of 2001, and to determine if (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY via deposit of cash or traveler's check to the same bank account [redacted] (F) which includes a financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account # (P-1).

♦♦

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2034
DATE: 10-05-2021

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/30/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (S)
San Diego **Attn:**
New York **Attn:**

From: San Diego
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID
aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

[redacted] FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] ANWAR NASSER AULAQI
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: [redacted] Additional information for investigation regarding support for 9/11 hijackers KHALID ALMIDHAR and NAWAF ALHAZMI in Southern California.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] 07/30/2009

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Writer conducted research regarding former San Diego subject OMAR ALBAYOUMI (F) pertaining to his [redacted] registration at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, CA. ALBAYOUMI had reportedly registered at two different hotels on the same date in 01/2000, prior to hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR arriving in Los Angeles.

[redacted] Research revealed a FD-302 dated 01/15/2002 (see [redacted] (F) serial 99427) regarding investigation conducted in Culver City, specifically at the Travelodge Hotel, 11180 Washington Place, telephone number 310-391-5988. Investigation showed ALBAYOUMI was registered at the hotel on 01/09/2000, but checked out after only about twenty minutes. On the same day, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Halfmoon Hotel, 3958 S. Sepulveda Blvd, Culver City (apparently having gone to the wrong hotel initially). In addition, ALBAYOUMI was registered at the same Travelodge from 12/20/1999-12/21/1999 along with ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN (ALJRAITHEN). The contact information listed for the 12/99 registration was ALBAYOUMI's (address and telephone).

[redacted] Research regarding ALJRAITHEN in IDW yielded (G) (G), which indicated the following: traveler ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN, date of birth (S)/1961, country of citizenship and residence Saudi Arabia, passport number (S), traveled by air to port of entry New York on 12/12/1999. (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) His intended address was Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, CA.

[redacted] IDW also yielded (J-3)

[redacted] According to (O-1) ALJRAITHEN arrived on 12/12/1999 at 0742 via Saudi Arabian Airlines. He does not appear to have arrived in the U.S. since this trip.

[redacted] The foregoing information was provided to SA (S) (S) for further investigation since ALJRAITHEN was registered at the hotel with ALBAYOUMI about a month before hijackers ALMIDHAR and ALHAZMI arrived in Los Angeles. Writer is familiar with the telephone activity of the hijackers' support network in Southern California, and as such is aware that suspect phone activity began around the time of this visit by ALJRAITHEN. In addition, SA (S) outlined the concept of "taskia" in an EC dated 12/11/2007 (F), which basically refers to one person "vouching" for another. (J-3) (J-3) his trip must have been of great importance. It is possible that ALJRAITHEN provided the taskia for ALMIDHAR and ALHAZMI, ensuring that when the hijackers arrived the following month they were taken care of by a network of individuals in Southern California, including FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY, FAISAL ALMUHANNA, OMAR ALBAYOUMI, and ANWAR AULAQI.

[redacted] [redacted] Interesting telephone activity was noted in the two days prior to ALBAYOUMI's meeting with ALJRAITHEN. Although there are additional calls worth analysis leading up to, during and after the time of the meeting, several from 12/18/1999 and 12/19/1999 pertaining specifically to San Diego are described below.

12/18/1999 - FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY's telephone (P) called:

(D)

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] It appears there was an important visitor staying at the Days Inn, Golden Triangle during this time. Given just the phone calls outlined above, it seems that ALBAYOUMI, AULAQI, ALTHUMAIRY, and ALMUHANNA were all involved with this visitor. Since ALJRAITHEN's whereabouts while he was in the U.S. are as yet unknown (with the exception of the time he spent with ALBAYOUMI noted above), it is possible he spent time in San Diego.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) [redacted] 07/30/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] For information.

◆◆

[redacted]

OPERATION ENCORE

(F)

Multiple Subjects:

Fahad al-Thumairy
(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi
(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah
(F)

Iyad al-Rababah
(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani
(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi
(F)

(G)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Updates and Initiatives (as of 5 October 2012):

- [redacted] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA (S) and DOJ attorne (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request o (G) AUSA (S) ill explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah in (G)

- [redacted] 10 September 2012 - (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to (C-1) Legat Copenhagen advised on 10 September 2012 that (C-1) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, (G) will coordinate with SDNY to (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

- [redacted] (P) her mother (P) father Aiderous (P), and mother's sister (P) were sentenced on (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a $2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases against (P) (G) ncluding (P) Upon successful denaturalization (P) (G) will be served with Notice to Appears (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.

- [redacted] (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012, (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) nvestigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.

- [redacted] In August 2012, (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) an (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed (P) s current residence. (G) s planning to approach (P) for an inter of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with a (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.

- [redacted] (P), (F), an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. (P) is reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists. (G) in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of (P)

- [redacted] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. (C-1) (C-1) (C-1) (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy (F) and Adel al Sadhan (F), as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.

- [redacted]) (A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, (F) nd currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[redacted] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1) In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO, (C-1) The FBI has also provided (C-1) with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[redacted] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdar to a young woman named (P). (P) and her family are (P) although they claimed to be (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

[redacted] On (P), 2012, (P), her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that (P)s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing (P)s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on (P) 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[redacted]Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 06-12-2020

[redacted]

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Indexed Record | Map

Key	Values
Common Record Attributes	
Applicant ID	(P-1)
Classification Level	[redacted]
Data Set	I-94 Arrival/Departure Records
Data Source	Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Display Name	I94 Record - ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN (P-1)
DIVS Last Updated Date	01/23/2017 05:54:55 PM
FBI Resident Agency	LOS ANGELES FO
Field Offices	LA - Los Angeles
Id	(P-1)
01. BIO INFORMATION	
Identification Number	(P-1)
Applicant Name	ALJRAITHEN, ABDULLAH
Date of Birth	(P-1) 961
Gender	M (1% confidence)
Country of Citizenship	SAUDI - Saudi Arabia (SA)
Country of Residence	SAUDI - Saudi Arabia (SA)
Intended Address	HOLIDAY INN LOS ANGELES, CA 90001
Latitude, Longitude	34.051861,-118.417642
02. TRAVEL INFORMATION	
Mode of Travel	1-AIR
Arrival Carrier	SN - SABENA
Arrival Flight Number	00039
Admission Number	(P-1)
Admission Class	(J-3)
Admission Date	12/12/1999
Port of Entry	NEW YORK NY
Visa Issuing Date	(J-3)
Visa Issuing Post	(J-3)
Passport Number	(P-1)
Number of Extensions	(J-3)
Itinerary	99355002
EDS Arrival Status	A - ADMITTED INTO U.S.
04. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION	
FIPS	06037
Inspector ID	(S)
MSA Type	P
MSA Code	4480
(A), (J-1), (G), (H)	
Latitude	34.051861
Longitude	-118.417642
FBI Field Office	LA - Los Angeles

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

FBI Resident Agency	LOS ANGELES FO

05. SYSTEM/TRACKING INFORMATION

Current Classification	[redacted]
Last Update Date	07/24/2011

Additional Record Attributes

Activity Other Information	(A), (J-1), (G), (H)
Admission Classes	(J-3)
Admission Date	12/12/1999
Analyst Markings	Not Applicable
any_geocode	34.051861,-118.417642
Carrier Name	SN - SABENA
Case Classifications	(G)
Country of Citizenship	Saudi Arabia
Country of Residence	Saudi Arabia
Data Type	• Email • Foreign Student • Phone • Travel
Date Of Birth	(P-1)1961
First Name	ABDULLAH
Flight Number	00039
General Indicators	A - ADMITTED INTO U.S.
Ingest Date	08/30/2005 10:04:48 PM
Issued Dates	(J-3)
Issuing Post	(J-3)
Itinerary	99355002
Keyword Filters	Contains Geolocation
Last Name	ALJRAITHEN
Port of Entry	NEW YORK NY
Subject Address	HOLIDAY INN LOS ANGELES, CA 90001
Subject Date Of Birth	(P-1) 1961
Subject DOB Years	1961
Subject Gender	M
Subject Name	ALJRAITHEN, ABDULLAH
Subject Other ID	Admission Number: (P-1)
Subject Other Information	99355002
Subject Passport Number	(P-1)
Transaction Dates	12/12/1999
Travel Mode	AIR
Visa Issuance Date	(J-3)

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[redacted]

Official Record

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 09-15-2020

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/29/2016

[redacted] On September 15, 2016, Dr. Abdusattar Shaikh, date of birth (DOB) (P-1) telephone number (P-1), e-mail address (P-1), was interviewed at his residence at (P-1) (P-1) Lemon Grove, California 91945, by Federal Bureau of Investigation (S) and NYPD (S) (S) After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, Shaikh provided the following information:

[redacted] In 1999 Shaikh placed a notice in the Islamic Center of San Diego aka Abu Bakr Mosque which advertised for roommates. While in the Mosque Shaikh observed (P) LNU from Afghanistan with another individual. (P) LNU pointed to Shaikh and identified him as the individual seeking roommates. The individual with (P) was Nawaf Al-Hazmi. Soon after Shaikh was introduced to Al-Hazmi, both Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdar moved into Dr. Shaikh's residence in Lemon Grove, California.

[redacted] Al-Hazmi spoke and understood some English, while Al-Mihdar only spoke and understood Arabic. Shaikh would speak English to Al-Hazmi in order to communicate. Shaikh assisted Al-Hazmi by taking him to a Bank of America to open a bank account. Shaikh was asked if anyone visited or provided assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar while they were living with Shaikh and Shaikh remembered Omar Al-Bayoumi visiting Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar at the Lemon Grove residence. Shaikh stated Al-Bayoumi would speak Arabic with Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar and therefore Shaikh would not understand the substance of their conversations.

[redacted] Shaikh observed Al-Bayoumi frequently using a video camera to take video of people at the mosque. Shaikh believed Al-Bayoumi was an Agent of the government of Saudi Arabia. Al-Bayoumi helped build a Kurdish mosque in El Cajon, California which burned down in the early 2000's. Shaikh was invited to Al-Bayoumi's residence on one occasion for dinner.

[redacted] Shaikh only observed Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar visit the Lemon Grove Westview Mosque on two occasions. Shaikh did not observe either Al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdar at the Al-Ribat Mosque. Shaikh believed there was a Syrian spy during an unidentified time period in the Al-Ribat Mosque.

[redacted]

Investigation on 09/15/2016 at San Diego, California, United States (In Person)

File (F) [redacted] Date drafted 09/22/2016

by (S)

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[redacted]

[redacted] Al-Hazmi asked Shaikh to assist him in finding a job as well as a Mexican wife, but Shaikh did not assist Al-Hazmi with finding a wife. Al-Hazmi had a car and Shaikh gave Al-Hazmi the extra tires he had at his residence. Al-Hazmi also had a cell phone and did not use Shaikh's landline telephone.

[redacted] When Al-Hazmi left Shaikh's home he told Shaikh he was moving to San Jose to study English. Shaikh stated he later received an e-mail from Al-Hazmi that stated Al-Hazmi was in Arizona. Al-Mihdar only lived in Shaikh's home for one month, but Al-Hazmi stayed for approximately six months before leaving and telling Shaikh he was moving to San Jose. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar told Shaikh they were in the United States to learn English, but Shaikh did not believe they were going to school as they claimed. Shaikh did not recall Al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdar ever mentioning flight school.

[redacted] Shaikh has had many roommates over the years to include (P) (P), Omar Bakarbashat, and (P) LNU. Shaikh also hosted two Saudi scholars, Mutaib Al-Sudairy and Adel Al-Sadhan. Shaikh stated the scholars stayed with him after he saw their suitcases in the office of the mosque and offered them a place to stay. In approximately 2002 or 2003 Shaikh traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and visited with Al-Sudairy.

[redacted] Shaikh was asked if he recognized the names Mohdar Abdullah, Anwar Aulaqi, Musaid Al-Jarrah, Fahad Al-Thumairy, (P), (P) (P), (P), (P), (P), (P), and (P). Shaikh stated Mohdar Abdullah came to Shaikh's house on at least one occasion with Al-Hazmi. Anwar Aulaqi was associated with the Al-Ribat Mosque. Shaikh had a meal with Aulaqi and Aulaqi's father and tried to convince Aulaqi to stay in San Diego. Shaikh recognized the name (P) as an individual from the Al-Ribat mosque, but Shaikh had no social interaction with (P). Shaikh also recognized the name (P) as someone from the Al-Ribat mosque. Shaikh did not have social interaction with (P), but did mediate a dispute between (P) and an unidentified individual over money. Shaikh did not recognize the names Musaid Al-Jarrah, Fahad Al-Thumairy, (P), (P), (P), (P) or (P) (P).

[redacted] Shaikh was shown photos of (P), Ahmed Mosa Al-Zahrani, Musaed Al-Jarrah, Fahad Al-Thumairy, and (P). Shaikh did not recognize (P) or Musaed Al-Jarrah although Shaikh said they had a familiar faces. Shaikh thought Fahad Al-Thumairy was the (P) LNU that had previously been Shaikh's roommate. Shaikh did not recognize the photographs of Ahmed Mosa Al-Zahrani or (P).

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(F)
[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] Shaikh never heard anyone speaking about Jihad while at any mosque. In Shaikh's opinion if anyone knew of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar's plans to conduct a terrorist attack it would have been Al-Bayoumi given the body language and hushed tones he used when speaking to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdar which indicated to Shaikh a secret understanding.

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 09-30-2020

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File #

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01/13/2011

On 01/07/2011, [redacted] (date of birth [redacted] [redacted], was interviewed in a public place by [redacted] FBI-JTTF San Diego, and New York Police Department [redacted] [redacted] FBI-JTTF New York. After advising [redacted] of the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information.

[redacted] met Mohdar Abdullah (previously identified as Mihdar Mohammad Al-Mihdar Zaid) in July 2001. At that time, [redacted] was introduced to Mohdar by [redacted] (previously identified). [redacted] younger sister had introduced [redacted] to Islam in the Spring of 2001 and [redacted] converted to Islam shortly thereafter. [redacted] and [redacted] younger sister were classmates at [redacted] High School in San Diego, California. [redacted] described herself back in 2001 as naive, stupid and unaware of the ways of her new religion. [redacted] looked to [redacted] and her family members for guidance in Islam.

[redacted] would regularly visit [redacted] family residence in San Diego, California. [redacted] did not have any interaction with [redacted] father, who was supposedly a doctor. During a visit in late August 2001, [redacted] said the situation with Mohdar changed from him just being an acquaintance to him being more of a boyfriend. Mohdar began an assertive pursuit of her by taking an active role in courting [redacted] At that time [redacted] was pushed or persuaded to marry Mohdar by [redacted] and [redacted] mother. [redacted] now feels she was given instructions to marry Mohdar by [redacted] and [redacted] mother in order for Mohdar to gain citizenship in the United States. [redacted] was aware that Mohdar was from Yemen but at the time she did not know Mohdar's Immigration status in the United States.

Mohdar and [redacted] met in July 2001 but Mohdar did not ask [redacted] to marry him until the day of 09/10/2001. [redacted] was sixteen years old in 2001. [redacted] told Mohdar she was sixteen years old and he would have to get her mother's permission to marry her. According to [redacted] Mohdar attempted to get permission from [redacted] mother but she was reluctant to consent to the marriage due to [redacted] young age. [redacted] stated Mohdar was well aware she was only sixteen years of age and they both knew Mohdar would have a hard time getting consent to marry from [redacted] mother.

01/07/2011 San Diego, California

[redacted] [redacted] not dictated

[redacted]

[redacted]

In September 2001, (P) Mohdar, (P) [redacted] mother and (P) s sisters all ate together at a Denny's restaurant in San Diego. After the meal a wedding ceremony took place in the parking lot of the Denny's restaurant. All the before mentioned people were in attendance as witnesses to the marriage. The marriage ceremony was performed by an acquaintance of Mohdar. (P) was not acquainted with this person who performed the ceremony. (P) understood the marriage ceremony was going to be performed in accordance with the Islamic culture or norm. (P) and Mohdar were married in Islam by this unknown individual with all the witnesses present. (P) said the marriage was not recorded with the San Diego County records office and had not been recognized by the United States. (P) was told by (P) and (P) s mother that she had to abide by the Islamic marriage now that (P) had converted to Islam. Interviewing agents asked (P) if Mohdar purchased and gave her a wedding ring for this marriage. (P) said she never received any ring by Mohdar or anyone related to this marriage.

On the night of 09/10/2001, Mohdar took (P) (P) (P) stated she and Mohdar (P) (P) Mohdar never took (P) to his place of residence nor did they live together. (P) time spent with Mohdar was driving around San Diego in Mohdar's small red car. Mohdar would pick (P) up at her mother's residence where she resided or at her high school. (P) remembered they would go eat ice cream and on several occasions Mohdar took (P) to his work. At the time, Mohdar worked at a Texaco gas station. (P) was not aware of many private details of Mohdar's life because he would never elaborate on any of them. (P) described Mohdar as being unclear with any of his explanations.

Approximately one or two weeks prior to 09/10/2001, (P) described Mohdar to have a drastic change in behavior. (P) described his behavior as being paranoid, nervous, anxious and very preoccupied about something going on in his life. When asked, Mohdar said he had a lot on his mind and it was giving him a headache. When (P) first met Mohdar he was nice and easy going so (P) knew something was wrong with Mohdar because of this change in behavior or character.

After 09/11/2001, (P) did not hear from Mohdar for several days. He was supposed to come over to her mother's residence to talk about his relationship with (P) and the events of 9/11 but he never showed. (P) stated Mohdar did not discuss any information with her related to the events of 9/11.

In 2008 and again in 2009 Mohdar telephonically contacted (P) on her cellular telephone to tell her he wanted custody of (P) child. Mohdar threatened to take (P) child away from her because he insisted he was the father of her child. Mohdar also telephonically contacted (P) current spouse and threatened him with the above. (P) affirmed strongly that she did not become pregnant with a child by Mohdar. (P) maintains that on the night of 09/10/2001 (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) nor did they live together as husband and wife. (P) first child was born in 2003 and her second after that. (P) does not know how Mohdar obtained her cellular telephone number or the number to her current spouse. (P) successfully divorced Mohdar while he was in jail after being arrested in September 2001. This incident caused (P) to prove to her husband, (P) and (P) mother that she did not have a child by Mohdar. (P) relayed to investigators that (P) s mother made (P) put her hand on a Quran and swear over the Quran that she did not have Mohdar's child, which (P) did.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 09-30-2020

[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/25/2011

Investigation on May 17, 2011 at San Diego
File #
Date dictated
by

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On May 17, 2011, at approximately 11:20 AM, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (S) (S), New York City Police Department (S) and (S) at (P-1) (P-1) the home address of (P) dob (P-1) (P) After being advised of the identities of the investigating agents, (P) agreed to talk with investigators.

Investigators informed (P) that they, as well as the Assistant United States Attorney (S) had attempted to contact (P) lawyer repeatedly over multiple weeks and had not received any response. (P) then made what appeared to be one or multiple phone calls behind the closed front door of her residence.

(P) re-engaged the investigators and advised that she had left a message for her lawyer. (P) was advised that investigators were requesting an interview with her (P) and her lawyer (if she so chose). (P) was further advised that (D) (D)

(D)

(P) advised that she had tickets purchased for her family to travel to Lebanon on June 4, 2011 for three weeks. (P) indicated that her husband was from (P) and that she, herself, was from (P) (P) was informed that if she were issued the Grand Jury subpoena and failed to appear, a warrant would be issued for her arrest upon her return to the United States. At this point, investigators reiterated to Ismail that she was not being served with the Grand Jury subpoena at this time.

(P) was advised that Mohdar Abdullah was undergoing a concurrent interview by FBI Special Agents and Task Force Officers (G)

(P) indicated satisfaction that Abdullah was undergoing such questioning. (P) then accused Abdullah of "making stuff up" about her. Without prompting, (P) claimed never (P) her marriage to her husband (later identified as (P-1)

(P) was advised that in previous interviews, (P) had made contradictory statements to investigators. In response, (P) indicated that she was willing to speak with investigators and resolve any concerns. (P) offered to meet with investigators in the presence of her husband, even if her lawyer were not available. Investigators advised (P) that her interests may be best served if her lawyer were present.

Upon investigators' request, (P) provided a cellular telephone number for her lawyer and confirmed her understanding that she was not being served with a Grand Jury subpoena at the current time. (P) reconfirmed her commitment to meet with the investigators in the next two days. The interview concluded with (P) assurance that investigators would hear from her lawyer shortly to arrange a meeting time.

(F)

(S)

[redacted]

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REASON: 1.4 (C)
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(Rev. 06-04-2007)
009dig01.ec

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/09/2008

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (G), (S)

Los Angeles Attn:

New York Attn:

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (F)

[redacted] **Title:** [redacted] (G), (P)

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Interview of (P)
(G)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Details: [redacted] On 12/28/2007, (P) hereinafter (P), was interviewed in a public place in San Diego, California. Present during the interview was FBI-SD, (S) (S), FBI-LA, (S) and (S) (S), Anaheim Police Department. The interview with (P) was pre-arranged and agreed to by (P) in which he voluntarily provided the following:

[redacted] [redacted] (P) met and became acquainted with Mohdar Abdullah, (F) at the end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999 in San Diego, California, while they attended together college courses at (P) Community College. The relationship began due to (P) helping Abdullah learn the English language and Abdullah teaching (P) the Arabic language. (P) did not recall being a board member of the (P) at (P) College during the time period (P) and Abdullah took classes together. (P) also did not remember Abdullah being on the association board, stating the President of the (P) was always a female student. (P) did acknowledge he and Abdullah were active members of the (P) during that time period of 1999 and 2000. (P) considered Abdullah a close friend at the time, however, that relationship no longer exists because he has not had any contact with Abdullah since Abdullah left San Diego. (P) negatively characterized his troubles with the United States Government/FBI and his association with two of the 9/11 hijackers based on his association with Abdullah.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) initially described his contact with two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, (American Airlines, Flight 77, Pentagon), as only occurring twice. The original meet between (P) and the hijackers occurred in 2000 at the Masjid Ar Ribat, San Diego, California, in the audio/video/library room of the Mosque. (P) and Mohdar Abdullah traveled together from (P) College to the Masjid Ar Ribat to attend prayer. When (P) and Abdullah arrived at the Mosque, Nawaf and Khalid were already at the Mosque in the above mentioned room. (P) and Abdullah entered the room and (P) remembered shaking the hijacker's hand. The conversation that occurred in the presence of the hijackers was in reference to (P) and Abdullah being verbally attacked by an unknown individual before entering the Mosque. Because the hijackers did not speak or understand the English language, Mohdar Abdullah translated for (P). (P) described to Nawaf, through Abdullah, that they were handing out

[redacted]

pamphlets with Islamic and membership information for the (P) College (P) and were approached by an unknown individual outside the Mosque who verbally attacked them. Nawaf responded to the story by quoting a verse, NFI, out of the Quran which advised (P) and Abdullah to ignore the person and go about your business without entering into a confrontation with that person. After the conversation, they all went into the Mosque and attended prayer. (P) remembered Nawaf and Khalid had taken it upon themselves to organize the audio/video/library room of the Mosque. The room had previously been disorganized until the hijackers came to the Mosque. (P) was not aware and did not believe the hijackers were tasked with that project.

[redacted] The second contact also occurred at the Masjid Ar Ribat. The second occurrence was only with Nawaf Al-Hazmi, (P) understood Khalid Al-Mihdhar was married and had left San Diego to be with his wife, NFI. (P) was again present with Abdullah at the Mosque to attend prayer. After the sunset prayer, (P) and Abdullah walked over to where Nawaf was praying and entered into casual conversation. (P) could not recall the details of the conversation but remembered the duration was approximately one or two minutes. (P) commented Nawaf did not appear to be overly devout in his religion. (P) was not aware of Nawaf ever discussing world politics or political causes of the world, commenting Nawaf was quiet and soft spoken.

[redacted] (P) recalled the topic of Mohdar Abdullah taking the hijackers to the LAX airport when Khalid departed the United States. (P) denied accompanying Mohdar Abdullah and the hijackers to the LAX airport from San Diego to Los Angeles, California, and he could not provide any details of the trip or the time period. (P) was asked what was explained to him as to why the hijackers had come to the United States. (P) did not know why they came but commented the hijackers did not do anything but just hang out, NFI. (P) stated he did not know much about the hijackers because he did not regularly attend the Masjid Ar Ribat because he also attended the Masjid Abu Bakr due to the proximity of his residence.

[redacted] (P) denied playing soccer or socializing with the hijackers at a park near the Masjid Abu Bakr. (P) admitted playing soccer on an organized team and also playing pick up games but never with Nawaf or Khalid. (P) contradicted being described as a close associate of the hijackers. During the interview, (P) (P) stated he only met the hijackers on two occasions, described above. After the interview was complete and (P) left the interview area, he telephonically contacted (S) in which the cellular telephone was passed to (S) (P) stated after thinking about the description that (P) was a close associate of the hijackers, it might have been misinterpreted by individuals working at the Texaco Gas Station in La Mesa, California. (P) regularly went to the Texaco Gas Station to purchase gas, snacks and visit his friends, to include Mohdar Abdullah, on a social basis who were working there at the time, in 2000. Nawaf Al-Hazmi worked at the Texaco Gas Station for a short period of time, so (P) (P) concluded that because he socialized at the Texaco and Nawaf worked there it could be interpreted by others in the San Diego Muslim community that they were close. (P) claimed not to have socialized with Nawaf at the Texaco Gas Station. (P) justified this because Nawaf could not speak English and (P), at that time, could not speak Arabic. Again, (P) stated Mohdar would have had to translate any conversation with Nawaf.

[redacted] (P) regularly associated with Mohdar Abdullah at his apartment, at the time, which was on Saranac Street, in San Diego, located near the Masjid Ar Ribat. (P) did not get the feeling that something nefarious was going on at the apartment between the Mohdar, the hijackers or any roommate at the apartment. (P) did not see the hijackers socialize at the above mentioned apartment. (Agent note: It should be noted the hijackers did not reside at the Saranac apartment, however, it has been reported Nawaf went to the apartment to occupy his time on the computer, socialize and watch television on a regular basis). (P) identified Abdullah's roommates at the Saranac apartment as: (P) (A), (J-1), (G) Samir Abdoun, (Abdoun was deported to Algeria), (P) (A), (J-1), (G) (P) (A), (J-1), (G), and Omar Bakarbashant, (Bakarbashant was deported to Yemen). [redacted]

[redacted] Because of the numerous roommates at Mohdar's apartment he complained to (P) about needing to move out. (P) (P) offered Abdullah a room to rent at his father's, (P), apartment on (P) in San Diego. Because (P) father needed the extra income, Abdullah was allowed to rent a room at the apartment complex on (P) in the beginning of 2001. Because (P) parents were divorced, custody of (P) and his younger brother (P), was shared by the parents. (P) resided at both parents residences on a rotating basis. As stated above, (P) has discontinued any type of relationship with Mohdar Abdullah advising the last contact was by telephone in which the conversation was described as dry. (P) could not remember the date of the contact. The conversation was in regards to Mohdar wanting to buy a brand, Caterpillar, equipment from the United States and ship these machines to Yemen. (P) did not participate in the business deal. Abdullah seemed to (P) as being heart broken about having to leave the United States.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) was acquainted with Omar Al Bayoumi, (F), from attending the Masjid Abu Bakr and visiting with Al Bayoumi at his office located at the Masjid Mehdina in El Cajon, California. (P) understood Al Bayoumi was an administrator, NFI, at the Kurdish Mosque, Masjid Mehdina. (P) also commented that everyone, NFI, in the San Diego Muslim community thought Al Bayoumi was a spy for the Saudi Government. Al Bayoumi would video tape every event that took place in the community which was of concern to many. (P) denied attending a party for the hijackers at the hijackers apartment which was hosted by Al Bayoumi and he could not provide any details of that event. In time, Al Bayoumi asked (P) to tutor Al Bayoumi's son in English and with school homework. (P) agreed and would tutor the son at Al Bayoumi's apartment on a regular basis. (P) commented that Al Bayoumi was frequently not at home when he would tutor the son. (P) could not provide any further information regarding Al Bayoumi, during that time period. (P) has not had any contact with Al Bayoumi in years.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) has not had contact with a former associate, Jehad Mostafa, (A), (J-1), (G) The last contact was when Mostafa emailed (P) from Yemen while he was attending Arabic language school and teaching English to Arabic speakers in Sanaa, Yemen. (P) did not believe the rumors in the San Diego Muslim community that Mostafa was a Muhajidin in Somalia. (P) could not provide any further details regarding Mostafa. (P) has had recent contact in San Diego with Jehad's (P) and a mutual friend, (P), (A), (J-1), (G), but (P) or (P) did not mention anything regarding Jehad, NFI.

[redacted] (P) did not see Anwar Aulaqi, (F) [redacted] as evil. (P) did comment that Aulaqi was not a scholar and could not give Fathwa's. A Fathwa should come from an Elder scholar who has studied in an accredited Islamic University and had years of studying the Quran. (P) association and interaction with Aulaqi, while Aulaqi was the Imam of the Masjid Ar Ribat in San Diego, came when (P) was a young teenager. Because of the above, (P) (P) could not provide details regarding Aulaqi. (P) has not had contact with Aulaqi since he left San Diego.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/09/2008

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] [redacted] For information only.

◆◆

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2044
DATE: 09-30-2020

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Date of entry 05/10/2019

[redacted] home address [redacted] [redacted] Fullerton, CA, social security number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted], was interviewed at her apartment. Also present for the interview was [redacted] New York Police Department. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agent and Detective and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] met her current husband, [redacted] on Facebook. He was not present for the interview as he had traveled home to [redacted] to tend to his sick mother.

[redacted] was born in [redacted] and lived there until she was three, at which point her whole family moved to the San Diego area (National City). She later moved to Orange County because of her ex-husband's job. [redacted] father was in the Army. He moved to Alaska after divorcing [redacted] mother and now resided in [redacted], CA.

[redacted] had the following siblings:

1. [redacted] - youngest sibling, brother - Lived in [redacted], CA and was self employed in carpet and tile installation
2. [redacted]
3.

[redacted] attended elementary, middle and high school in the San Diego area. She started high school at [redacted] High School, but later switched to [redacted] High School, where she graduated. She also attended [redacted] College where she earned a certificate in [redacted]

[redacted] met MOHDAR ABDULLAH (ABDULLAH) around July 2001 through her friends at [redacted] High School. That summer she took a video production class with [redacted] her best friend, and [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] lived in Lemon Grove, CA. ABDULLAH used to give [redacted] rides to work at [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 04/16/2019 at Fullerton, California, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/23/2019

by [redacted]

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(P) in Mesa, CA. ABDULLAH, (P) (P) and (P) all hung out as a group.

(P) had questions and curiosity about Islam. She was raised a Christian from a Pentecostal church; her uncle was a pastor in Mexico. After (P) converted to Islam it took (P) four years to accept her change in religion, which (P) felt was due to the events of 9/11. (P) and (P) now had a good relationship. In order to convert to Islam, (P) gave a testimony in front of (P) who was her witness. She later gave the same testimony at a mosque.

ABDULLAH worked at a gas station and (P) used to visit him there. He was not in school that she could recall. He told her that he was 23 years old, but later found out that he was actually 26 or 27. (P) never met any of ABDULLAH's friends except one individual that she could not recall his name, but perhaps could have been named OMAR. He was large heavyset male with mixed complexion and also from Yemen. This friend wanted to marry (P) but she said no. (P) had never been to ABDULLAH's apartment. They only met at ABDULLAH's work or would go out to eat. When they dated, ABDULLAH stalked (P) in that he used to follow her and seemed obsessed with her.

(P) and ABDULLAH got married at the end of August 2001, on a Thursday or Friday, at a Denny's restaurant next to the Mosque Rebat in La Mesa, CA. Present for the ceremony was (P) ABDULLAH, (P) (P) and ABDULLAH's two Arab male friends, who came separately, and were described as tall, light skinned with beards. The male friends did not introduce themselves. The ceremony, which lasted five to ten minutes, took place in English and no rings were exchanged. (P) did not feel this was a valid wedding. After the ceremony, (P) ABDULLAH, (P) and (P) had dinner; ABDULLAH's two male friends did not join them.

After the ceremony and dinner, ABDULLAH dropped (P) and (P) off at their house, at which point ABDULLAH and (P) went to a hotel. (P) did not have a curfew and did what she wanted. ABDULLAH met with (P) subsequent to the ceremony.

ABDULLAH was in the United States on a visa. He wanted (P) to marry him in order to get status/citizenship in the United States; however because (P) was only 16 years old, she legally could not do anything until she was 18 years old. ABDULLAH wanted to go to a courthouse to make the marriage official. (P) and (P) probably knew ABDULLAH's intentions. (P) felt manipulated by (P) (P) and their mother to help ABDULLAH. It was a regret she had in life.

ABDULLAH got arrested a couple of days after 9/11 and (P) did not speak with him or hear from him after that. He sent her letters from jail, but (P) never saw them. (P) only knew ABDULLAH for three to four months before he was arrested. 9/11 was hard on Islam, but (P) high school gathered Muslims together to talk about what happened and to make sure they were not threatened.

(P) later got in trouble with (P) and (P) for telling the FBI that ABDULLAH was from Yemen and not Somalia. (P) and (P) had a falling out approximately five year ago when (P) s parents got arrested and the FBI raided their house. (P) blamed (P) for this happening and they have not spoken since. (P) and (P) s family still resided in the San Diego area.

ABDULLAH tried to contact (P) and her various friends of her via Facebook using six different profiles. ABDULLAH believed that (P) s oldest son was his, but this was not true. (P) who works for the not-for-profit group (P), was contacted by ABDULLAH toward the end of 2018. He also contacted her ex-husband's uncle, as well as, (P) telephone number (P) and her husband. (P) (P) telephone number (P), reached out to (P) via Facebook Messenger, however (P) did not know who this was and did not respond.

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 10-29-2020

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 01/07/2011

Investigation on Jan 07, 2011 at San Diego, Ca

File # (F)

by (S)

Date dictated

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On 01/07/2011 at approximately 0930 hrs. the investigators and (P), dob (P-1) (P), met at a Starbucks Coffee on Poway Road in San Diego, Ca. (P) stated the following:

(P) stated that Mohdar's friend Omar would also drive her to work when Mohdar wasn't available. (P) stated that Mohdar, Omar and (P) were never together at the same time.

(P) was asked about Mohdar's personality when they met compared to his behavior in August 2001 and after September 11, 2011. (P) stated that Mohdar was very quiet and didn't speak to her much during the car rides. She would occasionally ask if anything was wrong. There were times Mohdar responded and other times staying silent.

(P) stated that Mohdar's mood changed dramatically towards the end of August 2001. Mohdar seemed to be in a rush to get married. At this time, (P) stated, that she introduced him to (P), a white convert to Islam. (P-1) was a 15 year old girl at the time Mohdar met her. (P) stated that (P) was a friend of her's, and her sisters from school.

(P) stated that Mohdar and (P) were married in an Islamic ceremony, but had no further details about it.

(P) stated that Mohdar became increasingly paranoid at the beginning of September 2001. As (P) stated before, Mohdar would drive in the car and "act weird" according to (P). When asked about his mood, Mohdar would ignore (P).

On the morning of September 11, 2001 Mohdar arrived at (P) residence. Present at the residence were (P) mother and sister. On the television were the events that were taking place in New York at the World Trade Center and in Washington D.C. at the Pentagon. The television news reports, at that time, were showing the images from the terrorist attack in those cities. Mohdar entered the house and requested to use the phone when he saw what was on the television. (P) said it was alright to use her phone in the house. (P)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File # Date dictated

by

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home telephone number at that time was (P). Mohdar began a conversation with an unknown person on the phone speaking only in Arabic. (P) stated that she could not hear the conversation. Mohdar began screaming in Arabic into the phone, and then Mohdar threw the phone into the wall shattering it. (P) and her mother questioned Mohdar's actions. Mohdar did not respond. Mohdar then stood in front of the television, which continued to show the events of September 11th terrorist attacks. Mohdar began to yell at the television in English " What the fuck, What the fuck?, What the fuck?" Mohdar then left the residence.

The next time (P) saw Mohdar was approximately 2 weeks after the morning of September 11th, when Mohdar picked up (P) for work. (P) states that Mohdar was acting more paranoid then in past weeks. (P) asked Mohdar what was wrong, and Mohdar raised his finger to his lips and told (P) to stay quiet, saying "Shhhhh, people are listening and watching". (P) stated "what do you mean?" Mohdar replied "you know". It was at that time that Mohdar was taken into custody by the F.B.I. (P) was questioned and released at the scene. (P) was later interviewed by the FBI about her relationship with Mohdar.

On multiple occasions, throughout the interview, (P) advised investigators to speak to (P), meaning (P). (P) stated that "she knows more then me".

Jan 07, 2011 San Diego, Ca

(F)

(S)

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 09-30-2020

[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on at

File #

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by

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02/24/2011

On 2/24/2011 at approximately 3:30 PM, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (S) and (S) (S) and (S) met with (P), dob (P-1) (P) at (P) residence (P-1) (P-1) San Diego, CA, 92129. After being apprised of the identities of the investigating agents, (P) provided the following information:

(P) was asked follow-up questions related to an interview conducted on January 7, 2011. (P) recanted statements she had made to the above investigators during said interview. Specifically, (P) denied that Mohdar Abdullah was at (P) mothers' residence on September 11, 2001. (P) further denied that Abdullah had made any calls from the telephone in her mothers' residence on that date. Investigators repeated to (P) the statements she had made during the January 7, 2011 interview. Again, (P) denied that Mohdar had been present at her mother's house on September 11, 2001, further stating that she could no longer remember the date on which the events she described in the previous interview had taken place. Investigators explained that (P) reversal of statements appeared to be deceptive. (P) stated that she "didn't care" and would be contacting a lawyer who would be in touch with investigators. This concluded the interview.

02/24/2011 San Diego, CA

[redacted]

(F)

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

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Investigation on at
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01/30/2012

Ellsworth Black, date of birth (P-1)/1954 , social security account number (P-1), place of birth Belize, home telephone number (P-1), was interviewed by (S), (S) (S), (S), and (S) in (G) [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Black advised of the following.

Black was incarcerated at the Correctional Corporation of America (CCA), San Diego Correctional Facility as a result of immigration charges in 2003 prior to being deported out of the United States.

In 1992 Black was involved in a bank robbery at a Citibank branch in Roland Heights, CA. Black advised that he entered the bank and asked for $3000, which was more money than he had in his existing account there. Black was issued a check for $3000 and went to a check-cashing business where his attempt to cash the check was denied. The following Monday, Black returned to the bank and after unsuccessfully attempting to cash the check, was arrested and charged with bank robbery.

Black identified (P-1), (P-1), (P-1) (P-1) as the organizers of the bank robbery. Black pled guilty to bank robbery in California State Court and advised that (P-1) was not charged. Black was incarcerated in Mira Loma Detention Center, West Lancaster, CA following his arrest and conviction and was released from custody in 1993.

Black was employed by Teledyne as a manufacturing engineer in 1990.

Black was later arrested in 1998 for illegally attempting to enter the U.S. in San Ysidro, CA. Black's prior felony conviction is what led to his arrest. From 1998 - 2002, Black was undergoing removal proceedings and living in a rental apt. in Torrance, CA. In 2002 Black was ordered deported but was ultimately released in 2003 because he was advised that the government failed to proceed with his removal within the required time period.

Black advised that he had an additional arrest for petty theft after he was charged with stealing merchandise from a Home Depot. The

12/19/2011 (G)

[redacted] (F)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

representatives of Home Depot did not wish to press charges against him but because of his prior felony record he was charged and was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Black was placed into removal proceedings in 2005 or 2006 following this arrest and was deported to Belize on February 15, 2006.

While in the U.S., Black testified as a witness in multiple state court trials in California.

In 2003, while incarcerated at CCA San Diego, Black agreed to share his cell with an inmate named Omar. Black had learned from the prison guards at CCA that Omar was rumored to be involved in the 9/11 plot.

During conversations with Omar, Black was advised that Omar wasn't personally aware of the 9/11 plot but a fellow inmate, Abdullah was. Omar further advised that prior to his incarceration, he met Abdullah through Shamir, who also was an inmate at CCA. Abdullah and Shamir formerly shared an apartment together in San Diego, CA before 9/11/01. Omar advised Black that he had been sleep deprived and was repeatedly questioned by law enforcement authorities about his knowledge of 9/11.

Omar advised that Abdullah spoke of being told by two of the hijackers prior to 9/11/01 that he (Abdullah) will witness something that he will not believe. Black also identified (P) and (P) as inmates who were involved in the discussions at CCA about the 9/11 plot.

Black recommended that Omar provide a statement to the authorities regarding his knowledge, and what he heard others say about the 9/11 plot.

Black had discussions with Abdullah, Shamir, (P), and (P) in addition to Omar, while at CCA.

Black was told by Abdullah that "What we did was to show the U.S. that they are not so powerful." Abdullah further added that the US wants to take oil away from us and we will not allow them.

Black advised that Abdullah was married in San Diego and was awaiting the issuance of a green card.

Omar, (P), and Shamir, were all critical of both Abdullah and (P).

Shamir advised Black of an incident that occurred while he (Shamir) was living in the apartment with Abdullah and others. During this incident, Shamir was pretending to be asleep in the apartment that he shared with Abdullah. Shamir then overheard Abdullah speaking with the two guys from San Diego (later described by Black as two hijackers) about obtaining fake identification. Abdullah advised them that he

[redacted]

would arrange for transportation for them to obtain the fake identification from another person named Abdullah (Abdullah2). Abdullah 2 would then drive them from San Diego to Huntington Park or MacArthur Park in Los Angeles where they would obtain the fake identification.

When Shamir confronted Abdullah over what he overheard while pretending to be asleep, Abdullah recalled the exchange and told Shamir that he thought he was asleep. Shamir advised that he was reluctant to come forward with this information because of the potential retribution that he would face from his home country of Algeria.

According to Black, the incident involving Shamir pretending to be asleep occurred approximately two weeks before 9/11/01.

Abdullah admitted to Black that he had advance notice of the 9/11 plot but never confirmed that he knew specific details or the date on which the attack was scheduled to take place.

Omar advised Black that there was a steady flow of cash coming into the apartment in San Diego that he shared with Abdullah that was used to cover expenses. Shamir advised Black there were large quantities of cash brought to their apartment in $50 and $100 bill denominations that were then picked up. Omar further advised Black that the two guys from San Diego staying with Abdullah, later described as the hijackers, were taking flying lessons.

Omar moved into the apartment with Shamir and Abdullah approximately one week before 9/11/01 and was sleeping in his car prior to moving in. Omar was working in a convenience store and befriended Shamir who was a regular customer there. Shamir invited Omar to stay in their apartment and later introduced Omar to Abdullah. Omar further advised Black that Shamir was not living there long enough to have become aware of any substantive details about the 9/11 plot.

Black advised that Omar stayed in the apartment for approximately one week, Shamir stayed there for approximately two weeks, and Abdullah stayed there for a much longer period of time.

Abdullah advised Omar and Shamir that the lease for the apartment was paid in full and that they could stay because the two guys, later described by Black as the two hijackers, were leaving. Omar expressed regret to Black for ever setting foot inside the apartment and said he would have been better off remaining in his car.

Black confronted Abdullah at CCA and told him he could have prevented the 9/11 attacks from occurring. Black advised that Abdullah responded that he did not care. Abdullah became aware of generalities about the plot and knew that it required the use of fake identification in order to board an aircraft. Shamir thought that the plot was going to entail the hijacking of airplanes and directing them outside of the U.S.

[redacted]

Shamir also confronted Abdullah at CCA and accused him of having prior knowledge of the 9/11 plot. Abdullah never came back to the prison yard, the place where the group discussions about 9/11 occurred, after this particular discussion.

Abdullah met many people related to his activities in San Diego at the mosque. Abdullah told Black there are many more people in the U.S. who are ready to commit themselves to the cause against the U.S. Abdullah told Black that he had an Italian passport and may have been from Algeria.

Black first met Omar as a result of their prison lodging arrangement and later met the other inmates who were connected to Omar after being introduced to them by Omar. Black was known throughout CCA as being highly educated and was sought out for legal advice and assistance by other inmates at CCA. Black assisted (P) and (P) (P) on researching their legal cases but did not want to provide any assistance to Abdullah, Shamir, or Omar.

Abdullah said to Black that he was told by the two guys, identified as the hijackers by Black, that something big was going to happen. He added that the two guys were taking flight lessons and were studying in Arizona.

Black did not hear of any discussion regarding computers being used inside the apartment.

Black did not hear about any other past terrorist plot in addition to 9/11. Black advised that Abdullah said in 2003 at CCA that military ships in the Mediterranean would be targeted in the future.

Black advised that Abdullah and his associates would often eat at a restaurant near the mosque but did not know what was discussed during the meetings at the restaurant.

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/01/2012

Investigation on 12/20/2011 at (G), (P)
File # (F)
Date dictated
by (S)

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Ellsworth Black, date of birth (P-1) 1954 , social security account number (P-1) place of birth Belize, home telephone number (P-1) was interviewed by (S) . (S) (S) , (S) , and (S) in (G) (G) After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Black advised of the following.

Black provided the following full names for the individuals he discussed during his interview on 19 December 2011: Mohdar Abdullah, Shamir Abdul, Omar Basharat, (P) , described as the driver who did not have any knowledge of the 9/11 terrorist plot, and (P) (P) .

Black saw Abdullah Mohdar (Mohdar) on two separate occasions while incarcerated at Correctional Corporation of America (CCA), San Diego Correctional Facility. Black would speak with Mohdar through the vent in their adjoining cells at CCA. Mohdar told Black that he is part of a crusade against the west and Israel. He told Mohdar that the Roman Empire lasted for 400 years, the United States has only been in existence for 200 years, and the U.S. will fall.

Black is 57 years of age and was born in Belize City, Belize. He entered the United States in 1972 on a B2 visa and became a permanent resident with a green card in 1977. In 1977 Black married a US citizen named (P-1) who was born in Texas. He worked as a car wash manager and at Great Western Car rental. He then left and obtained employment at Xerox for approximately nine months. After that, Black moved to West Corinna, CA and was hired as a line supervisor by Mattel. In 1978, Black was transferred to a Mattel plant in Mexicali, CA. Black was then hired by the Arwood Corporation as a layout inspector where he worked for approximately five years until 1984. Black began studying at the University of California Poly Pomona to become a class A inspector for Casting (molding). Later in 1984, Black entered into employment with Teledyne and earned his Bachelors of Engineering degree while employed for them as a Layout Inspector. Black was later promoted to a Quality Control Inspector.

In 1986, Black's wife (P-1) was incarcerated. In 1989, Black and his wife separated. In 1992, Black's employment with Teledyne was terminated following his arrest on bank robbery charges. After being released from prison in 1992, Black sought work

[redacted]

with an employment agency and spent most of the next two years traveling in Mexico during which time he worked as a host at a hotel in Cancun, Mexico.

In 1996, Black and his wife, (P-1), were divorced. On 01/07/1996, Black returned to the U.S. and smuggled his future second wife, (P-1) into the country. In 1997, Black married (P-1) (P-1) who was born in Mexico. Black and (P-1) had a daughter named . In 2001, Black and (P-1) separated but have never filed for divorce. Black has a total of eight children with seven different women.

Upon returning to the U.S. in 1996, Black obtained employment with Rocker Industry as an Inspector and worked there until 1999. Around this time, Black was arrested on a shoplifting charge, convicted, and sentenced to two years imprisonment. After serving 13 months in prison, Black was placed into detention pending removal based on his prior criminal history. Black was later imprisoned at CCA and appealed the removal proceedings against him. Black was released from custody in 2005 because, according to a captain at CCA, too much time had elapsed without action being taken on his removal proceedings.

Black was lodged in a segregation unit at CCA due to his prior testimony as a witness in multiple criminal trials. There were 36 other inmates in segregation. Black advised that it was possible to communicate with other inmates through the vents at CCA. Black would stand on the toilet to whisper and communicate through the vents and would also talk to others through his cell door.

Black also described the use of "kites" by inmates to communicate with each other. The inmates would write a message on a piece of paper, fold it up, tie a string around it and then pass the message between floors.

The inmates assigned to the segregated unit at CCA spent 23 hours a day in their cells and received one hour a day of recreation time from Monday through Friday. Black would spend his recreation time doing push-ups, jumping jacks, and speaking with the other inmates.

Black was aware of four inmates within the segregation unit who were there for their association with 9/11. Black advised that (P) was in the segregation unit because of his gang affiliation. (P) was in the segregation unit because he was described by Black as a drug trafficker who was willing to testify.

Black first heard of the 9/11 involvement by the four inmates in segregation from a guard at CCA. Black advised that he helped fellow inmates conduct legal research to assist their cases and had previously worked at a prison library during an earlier period of incarceration. Black assisted (P) with legal research on his case and in return (P) would provide Black with items from the prison commissary. Black also assisted (P) with his case.

Black identified (P), Omar, Shamir, and Abdullah as his friends at CCA. Black developed a friendship with Omar after he was asked to share a cell with Omar within the segregated unit. When speaking about Omar's connection to 9/11, Black asked Omar how he became involved with 9/11. Omar replied that Shamir and Abdullah had more to do with it and that he (Omar) had nothing to do with it. Black later met Shamir and Abdullah during recreation sessions in the prison yard. Black advised that he was older than the inmates that he befriended at CCA.

Black described a meeting between himself, Abdullah Mohdar, Omar Basharat, and Shamir in the prison yard. Omar was complaining that he wanted to go home and Black commented that Omar had lost a lot of weight. Black was advised that Shamir and Abdullah knew alot more about what happened on 9/11 than Omar. Shamir told Omar, "I know I brought you there," in reference to the apartment that Omar, Shamir, and Abdullah lived in with two of the hijackers prior to 9/11. Omar replied to Shamir that he believed that Shamir had honorable intentions when offering Omar the chance to stay in their apartment. Shamir then said to Abdullah, in reference to one night at the apartment, that he (Shamir) was pretending to be asleep in the apartment but overheard a conversation between Abdullah and the two hijackers about obtaining false identification. Abdullah advised Shamir that he thought he was asleep. Shamir then told Abdullah that he heard everything that was said. Black then said to everyone that many people died on 9/11 as a result of the attacks. Shamir concurred and said I know. Abdullah then said words to the effect of what are you going to do it is done.

Black mentioned a second conversation that he had with Shamir, Omar, and Abdullah at the basketball court in the recreation yard of CCA. (P) and (P) were also present but they were playing basketball. Initially, Shamir and Omar were speaking in Arabic. Black approached them and asked Shamir if there was anything that prevented him from coming forward with his knowledge about 9/11. Shamir replied that if he was to come forward or "snitch," he would immediately place his family and kids in danger. Abdullah then approached and Shamir asked Abdullah how can he sleep at night, in reference to his involvement in 9/11. Abdullah replied that he has to.

On a separate occasion, Omar, Shamir, and Black were speaking to each other at CCA. Shamir said to Black that he didn't know they were going to do that, in reference to the 9/11 attacks. Shamir thought they were going to commit a hijacking. Shamir added that Abdullah knows everything about the attack. Black encouraged Shamir to come forward with what he knows about the 9/11 attacks. Black enlisted Omar to assist in attempting to convince Shamir to come forward. Shamir later said to Abdullah that you (Abdullah) are the one who is most responsible for this, in reference to the predicament they were in and to their links to 9/11. In response Abdullah made reference to a crusade.

Black was asked about his knowledge of other topics related to 9/11. He advised that he was told of large quantities of U.S.

[redacted]

Currency that were brought to the apartment consisting of stacks of 50 and 100 dollar bills that were stuffed in envelopes. Black also advised that two of the hijackers lived inside the apartment in San Diego for a period of time. Shamir told Black that when the guys (hijackers) came there was money around the apartment. Shamir told Black that Abdullah explained to him (Shamir) that he (Abdullah) delivered what he was told to deliver.

Shamir further advised Black that he believes Abdullah knows more about the 9/11 plot then he is revealing because of his involvement with money transactions at the apartment and his work in arranging for the two hijackers to obtain false identification which Shamir understood was for the purpose of getting onto airplanes. Shamir told Black that he commented to Abdullah that he was slow in obtaining the false identification documents. Abdullah replied to Shamir that he got them "so whats the big deal." Black advised that Shamir was not aware at the time what the ultimate purpose was in obtaining the false identification documents.

Shamir told Black in front of Abdullah that the false identification documents were for the two guys on 9/11 in reference to the hijackers.

Black was asked about the number of discussions he had with other inmates concerning 9/11. Black responded that over a 2-3 week period he made 8 trips to the prison recreation yard and during those trips had approximately 6-8 conversations regarding 9/11.

Black advised that he wrote a letter in 2003 detailing what he had heard about the involvement of his fellow inmates in the 9/11 plot. Black was not assisted in writing the letter and upon its completion turned it over to the prison librarian whose name was either (P) or (P).

Black learned from Shamir and Abdullah that the two hijackers who lived in their apartment undergoing pilot training but does not know the exact role they played in the 9/11 attacks.

Black described Omar as quiet, Shamir as talkative, and Abdullah as arrogant and someone who would often brag. Shamir told Black that he was shocked on 09/11/01 to learn what had happened and that Abdullah's reaction to the 9/11 attacks was one of wonder.

Abdullah did not like or want to live under western influence and claimed that the Roman empire fell after 400 years, therefore the U.S. government, which has lasted only 200 years, would also fall.

Shamir commented to Black that he had a comfortable life in the apartment in San Diego and that he was provided with food and did not have to pay for rent or utilities.

Abdullah did not advise Black of the date the two hijackers left the apartment in San Diego. Shamir and Abdullah both advised Black that the two hijackers told Shamir and Abdullah that they could remain in the apartment for the duration of the lease because it was already paid in full.

Black advised that he has taken two polygraph examinations based on the information he provided related to 9/11 and he has passed both of them.

Enclosure(s): Attached to and made a part of this communication in a 1A envelope are the original interview notes recorded by (S)

(A), (J-1)

FD-36 (Rev. 1-31-2003)
ComputerInfoKSM2.wpd

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA: **PRECEDENCE:**

CLASSIFIC[redacted]**TION:**

SAMNET [redacted] **IMMEDIATE** [redacted]

[redacted]

NEPTUNE **PRIORITY** [redacted]

11/23/2005

IIR SENT VIA ACS **ROUTINE**

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

F T O

Date [redacted]

Approved by: **Case ID #/Serial:**
Original Filename:

******* **FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY** *******

Time Received **SAMNET filename:**
Time of Transmission **MRI/JUL/ISN**

(F)
(F)

TO CIA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
BT

(A), (J-1)

CITE: ////
PASS: (O-1) (S) AND (O-1)

SUBJECT: [redacted] INEXORABLE: INFORMATION REGARDING LOS ANGELES INVESTIGATION ON A POSSIBLE SUPPORT CELL FOR 9/11 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIDHAR (AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77) AND REQUEST THAT KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED (KSM), TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH, SOHAIL ABDUL ANA'N AKA ZOHAIR ABDUL MOHAMMED ABDUL ANAM SHORABI (GITMO PRISONER NUMBER 569), RAMZI BINALSHIBH AND HAMBALI BE QUERIED FOR INFORMATION.

[redacted] LOS ANGELES FBI IS INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE YEMENI SUPPORT CELL THAT MAY HAVE ASSISTED 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77) DURING THEIR TIME IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 01/15/2000-12/08/2000. HAZMI AND MIDHAR ARRIVED AT LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 01/15/2000 AND RELOCATED TO THE SAN DIEGO AREA ON 02/04/2000. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE HIJACKERS WERE IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA BETWEEN THAT TIME, BUT THEIR ACTIVITIES AND

(A), (J-1)

ASSOCIATES WHO MAY HAVE ASSISTED THEM REMAIN UNKNOWN.

[redacted] WHEN MIDHAR DEPARTED THE UNITED STATES ON 06/10/2000, THE IMAGES OF MIDHAR AND HAZMI WERE CAPTURED ON TWO VIDEOS BY THE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (LAX) POLICE VIDEO NETWORK UNIT. ONE OF THE VIDEOS DEPICTS THE HIJACKERS BEING ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUAL BELIEVED TO BE MOHDAR ABDULLAH (SUBJECT OF FFI 315N-SD-64663), WHO ASSISTED THE HIJACKERS DURING THEIR TIME IN CALIFORNIA. THE VIDEO ALSO REVEALS THREE ADDITIONAL MALES (UNSUBS) WHO MAY BE ACCOMPANYING ABDULLAH AND THE TWO HIJACKERS. ONE OF THE UNSUBS APPEARS TO BE CARRYING A CAMERA, HELD AT HIS MID-SECTION, AND AS HE PASSES THROUGH A DIFFERENT MAGNETOMETER THAN THE REST OF THE GROUP, HE TURNS 360 DEGREES, AS IF FILMING THE ENTIRE SURROUNDINGS OF THE HIJACKERS. AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIDEO BY THE FORENSIC AUDIO, VIDEO AND IMAGE ANALYSIS UNIT, ERF, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA, COULD NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE OBJECT BEING CARRIED AS A CAMERA, BUT THE POSSIBILITY COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY LOS ANGELES FBI OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDICATES THESE UNSUBS MAY HAVE BEEN A PART OF A GROUP OF YEMENIS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF KNOWING OR AIDING THE 9/11 HIJACKERS.

[redacted] POSSIBLE IDENTITY OF THE UNSUBS

TO DATE, SEVERAL MAJOR SUPPORTERS OF THE 9/11 HIJACKERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HAVING A BACKGROUND ASSOCIATED WITH YEMEN, FOR EXAMPLE RAMZI BINALSHIB, TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH, AND ANWAR AULAQI. IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY HAVE HAD A CONNECTION WITH YEMEN AND THE HIJACKERS, LOS ANGELES RESEARCHED I-94 DATA FOR INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING WITH YEMENI PASSPORTS WHO ENTERED THE US AT LAX IN 1999 AND 2000. THESE NAMES WERE THEN CHECKED FOR CALIFORNIA DMV PHOTOGRAPHS. TWO OF THE THREE UNSUBS IN THE VIDEO APPEAR TO BE RAMEZ NOAMAN AND [redacted] (P).

[redacted] RAMEZ NOAMAN

[redacted] NOAMAN WAS A MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 9/11 INVESTIGATION. NOAMAN STATED IN AN INTERVIEW ON 09/28/2001 (NY-280350-302 SERIAL 69379) THAT HE WAS INTRODUCED TO MIDHAR AND HAZMI BY MOHDAR ABDULLAH IN MAY 2000. NOAMAN BEFRIENDED MIDHAR AND HAZMI AT THE ABU BAKR MOSQUE IN SAN DIEGO, AND LATER PROVIDED INTERPRETATION SERVICES TO AID THEM IN OBTAINING FLYING LESSONS.

[redacted] WHILE NOAMAN WAS A STUDENT AT SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, HE USED TO TRAVEL TO LOS ANGELES SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH TO MEET WITH A GROUP OF YEMENIS ON FRIDAYS. THIS GAVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SOME OF HIS COUSINS. ON ONE OCASSION, NOAMAN TOOK HAZMI WITH HIM TO MEET THE YEMENI GROUP.

[redacted] NOAMAN IDENTIFIED HIS COUSINS AS [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P)

[redacted] NOAMAN'S SCHOOL ROOMMATE IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA, FUAD OMAR BAZARAH, WAS A FRIEND AND CO-WORKER OF RAMZI BINALSHIHB AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN.

[redacted] FUAD BAZARAH AND RAMZI BINALSHIBH

[redacted] ON 04/07/2004, FUAD BAZARAH (SUBJECT OF FFI 315N-LA-237480) WAS INTERVIEWED BY LOS ANGELES FBI IN POMONA, CALIFORNIA.
BAZARAH ATTENDED THE AL-AHLI HIGH SCHOOL IN SANA'A, YEMEN, FROM 1988 TO 1991. THEREAFTER, FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS, BAZARAH WORKED IN A CLERICAL POSITION IN THE PAID AND REMITTANCE DEPARTMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN IN SANA'A. HIS WORK AT THE BANK REQUIRED HIM TO PERFORM CLERICAL TASKS SUCH AS TYPING. AROUND THE SAME TIME, BAZARAH ALSO ATTENDED THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR ENGLISH FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS TO PREPARE TO STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES.

[redacted] BAZARAH'S FATHER, [redacted] (P-1), WORKED AT ANOTHER SANA'A BANK, THE CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN. OMAR BAZARAH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREI CLIENTS OF THAT BANK.

[redacted] WHILE BAZARAH WAS WORKING AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN HE PAID AND REMITTANCE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYED EIGHT TO TEN PEOPLE, ONE OF WHOM WAS RAMZI BINALSHIBH. BINALSHIBH WAS ALREADY WORKING AT THE BANK IN A CLERICAL POSITION WHEN BAZARAH STARTED. BAZARAH DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG BINALSHIBH HAD BEEN THERE WHEN ARRIVED. SOME OF THE OTHER PEOPLE IN THAT DEPARTMENT INCLUDED [redacted] (P-1)

(LNU), BAZARAH'S SUPERVISOR, AND [redacted] (P-1) (LNU). [redacted] (P-1) ALSO WORKED AT THE BANK, BUT HE WORKED IN A DIFFERENT DEPARTMENT. [redacted] (P-1) ALSO KNEW BINALSHIBH. AT THE END OF THE INTERVIEW, BAZARAH IDENTIFIED A PHOTOGRAPH OF A MAN KNOWN TO INVESTIGATORS AS RAMZI BINALSHIBH AS BINALSHIBH.

[redacted] TIHAMA GROUP HAD AN ACCOUNT AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN, AND THEY HAD OFFICES IN SANA'A. BAZARAH HAD NO PERSONAL DEALINGS WITH TIHAMA AND KNEW THE NAME ONLY FROM WORKING AT THE BANK. BAZARAH WAS NOT AWARE OF BINALSHIBH WORKING FOR OR HAVING ANY KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH TIHAMA.

[redacted] BINALSHIBH WAS THREE OR FOUR YEARS OLDER THAN BAZARAH. THEY INTERACTED WITH EACH OTHER ONLY AT WORK, AND BAZARAH, THEREFORE, DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT BINALSHIBH'S FAMILY OR FRIENDS. DURING CONVERSATIONS AT WORK, BAZARAH TOLD BINALSHIBH ABOUT HIS INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES TO STUDY. BINALSHIBH THEN TOLD BAZARAH OF HIS INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES TO WORK, BUT BINALSHIBH DID NOT SPECIFY THE TYPE OF WORK HE WANTED TO DO OR PRECISELY WHERE IN THE UNITED STATES HE WANTED TO LIVE.

[redacted] BAZARAH SAID BINALSHIBH WAS A "NICE" AND FUNNY GUY WHEN THEY WORKED TOGETHER AT THE BANK. BINALSHIBH WAS RELIGIOUS, BUT NOT TOO RELIGIOUS. BINALSHIBH WAS IN FAVOR OF THE AL-ISLA PARTY AND ITS LEADER, SHEIKH ZINDANI. BINALSHIBH DID NOT LIKE THE LEADER OF YEMEN, AND HE WANTED AL-ISLA TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY AND YEMEN TO BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE. BAZARAH NEVER HEARD BINALSHIBH MENTION BOSNIA, CHECHNYA, OR AFGHANISTAN.

[redacted] ONE OR TWO MONTHS BEFORE BAZARAH ENTERED THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 08/14/1995, BAZARAH AND BINALSHIBH WENT TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TOGETHER IN SANA'A TO APPLY FOR VISAS. THEY PLANNED TO GO THERE TOGETHER GIVEN THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT THEY MADE NO OTHER PLANS TOGETHER REGARDING THE UNITED STATES: BAZARAH INTENDED TO STUDY IN ARIZONA;

BINALSHIBH INTENDED TO WORK AT SOME UNSPECIFIED LOCATION. BAZARAH SELECTED EASTERN ARIZONA AS HIS FIRST CHOICE FOR SCHOOL BECAUSE HIS RESEARCH INDICATED THAT TUITION WAS AFFORDABLE AND THE ACCEPTANCE RATE WAS HIGH.

[redacted] (J-3) (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G) THE BAZARAH'S FATHER WROTE A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR BINALSHIBH TO ASSIST IN BINALSHIBH'S EFFORTS TO SECURE A VISA TO THE UNITED STATES).

[redacted] BINALSHIBH WAS UPSET (J-3) (J-3) HE THEN DECIDED TO PURSUE HIS ALTERNATIVE PLAN OF MOVING TO GERMANY. BINALSHIBH TOLD BAZARAH THAT HE CHOSE GERMANY BECAUSE HE HAD A UNCLE THERE WHO WAS A BRAIN SURGEON. BINALSHIBH HAD IN FACT OBTAINED A CHECHEN VISA PRIOR TO APPLYING FOR A UNITED STATES VISA, WHICH WAS PART OF THE REASON BAZARAH UNDERSTOOD BINALSHIBH'S INTEREST IN GERMANY TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN THAT BINALSHIBH HAD IN MIND ALL ALONG.

[redacted] APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE WEEKS BEFORE BAZARAH TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES ON 08/14/1995, BAZARAH HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD LEFT YEMEN FOR GERMANY. BINALSHIBH DID NOT TELL BAZARAH THAT HE WAS LEAVING. RATHER, BAZARAH DID NOT SEE BINALSHIBH IN THE BANK FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS, AND BAZARAH THEN HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD DEPARTED FOR GERMANY. BAZARAH HAS NOT HEARD FROM OR HAD CONTACT WITH BINALSHIBH SINCE THEIR LAST INTERACTION AT THE BANK IN 1995.

(A), (J-1)

[redacted] BAZARAH LEARNED MORE ABOUT BINALSHIBH AFTER RETURNING TO YEMEN IN OCTOBER 2001, BY WHICH TIME THE PRESS WAS REPORTING ABOUT BINALSHIBH'S ROLE IN 9/11 AND THERE WERE MANY RUMORS CIRCULATING ABOUT HIM. BAZARAH WAS IN YEMEN FROM APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 2001 TO JUNE 2002. WHILE THERE, BAZARAH HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD ONE BROTHER (NFI) AND THAT HIS MOTHER DIED AFTER LEARNING OF BINALSHIBH'S INVOLVEMENT IN 9/11. BAZARAH ALSO HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH WORKED WITH AL QAEDA, THAT HE WAS WITH UBL, AND THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A HIJACKER IN THE 9/11 OPERATION. BAZARAH RECALLED TALKING TO HIS UNCLE SAID BAZARAH IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE REPORTS OF BINALSHIBH WORKING WITH AL QAEDA. HE ALSO HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD EITHER BEEN KILLED DURING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN OR THAT HE HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN PAKISTAN.

[redacted] BAZARAH WAS DEPORTED TO YEMEN IN DECEMBER 2004.

[redacted] NOAMAN'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH BARAZAH, AND BARAZAH'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH BINALSHIHB, MAKES NOAMAN'S INTRODUCTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE TWO HIJACKERS WHILE THEY WERE IN CALIFORNIA APPEAR TO BE MORE THAN COINCIDENTAL. NOAMAN WAS ALSO RELATED TO [redacted] (P) BELIEVED TO BE THE CAMERAMAN IN THE LAX VIDEO, AND ANOTHER YEMENI, [redacted] (P).

[redacted] [redacted] (P) TELEPHONE NUMBER WAS FOUND IN MOHDAR ABDULLAH'S WALLET AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST ON 09/24/2001.

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] IN ADDITION, [redacted] (P)'S TELEPHONE NUMBERS WERE IN CONTACT WITH [redacted] (P) ([redacted] (A), (J-1), (G), THE [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] BALTIMORE INVESTIGATION HAS CONFIRMED THAT [redacted] (P) IS [redacted] (P) KAMAL DERWISH (DECEASED), A.K.A SHEIKH DABWAN, A HIGH-LEVEL AL QAEDA ASSOCIATE. DABWAN WAS KILLED, ALONG WITH FIVE OTHER AL QAEDA ASSOCIATES INCLUDING ABU ALI AL-HARTHI, DURING A [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) ATTACK IN EARLY NOVEMBER 2002 IN YEMEN. DABWAN

[redacted] A), (J-1)

WAS THE LEADER OF A GROUP FROM LACKAWANNA, NY WHO WAS TRAINED AT AN AL QAEDA TERRORIST CAMP IN AFGHANISTAN IN MAY 2001.

[redacted] IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) HAD TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES FOR LONG BEACH AND SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA. LOS ANGELES FINDS THIS FACT CURIOUS AS TO WHY KSM WOULD HAVE A TELEPHONE DIRECTORY FOR LONG BEACH. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, IT APPEARS THAT NUMEROUS YEMENI STUDENTS RESIDED IN LONG BEACH DURING THE 1999-2002 TIME FRAME.

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE ASSISTED BY A YEMENI SUPPORT CELL IN LOS ANGELES, WE REQUEST THAT ALL DETAINEES BE SHOWN ALL THE PHOTOGRAPHS LISTED BELOW FOR RECOGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE.

1. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) POB TAIZ, YEMEN
2. FUAD OMAR BAZARAH, DOB (P-1) /1974, POB YEMEN
3. RAMEZ NOAMAN, DOB (P-1) 4, POB YEMEN
4. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) OB TAIZ, YEMEN
5. [redacted] DOB (P-1) / (P) POB TAIZ, YEMEN
6. [redacted]
7. [redacted] DOB (P-1) (P) , POB YEMEN
8. MOHDAR ABDU DOB (P-1) 7 POB YEMEN
9. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) POB SANAA YEMEN
10. [redacted] DOB (P-1) (P) POB SANAA YEMEN
11. [redacted] DOB (P-1) (P) POB SANAA YEMEN
12. [redacted] O (P-1) (P) , POB YEMEN
13. [redacted] DOB (P-1) (P) OB YEMEN
14. [redacted] DOB (P-1) (P) POB UNITED STATES

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE ASSISTED BY A SUPPORT CELL IN LOS ANGELES, WE REQUEST THAT KSM BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 2. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES? WHO ELSE WAS PRESENT WHILE KSM PREPARED/TRAINED/BRIEFED HAZMI AND MIDHAR FOR THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 3. WHILE HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE IN CALIFORNIA, WERE THEY ORDERED TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU OR ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TO DETERMINE THEIR STATUS (IE HOW THEY ARRIVED, WHERE THEY WERE STAYING)?

[redacted] 4. WHY DID THEY LIST THE SHERATON HOTEL AS THEIR ARRIVAL DESTINATION ON IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 6. HOW MUCH MONEY DID YOU DIRECT HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO HAVE ON THEM WHEN THEY ENTERED THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 7. HOW WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR SUPPOSED TO PAY FOR TAXIS, HOTELS, FOOD, APARTMENTS, ETC? (IE METHOD OF PAYMENT, CASH CREDIT CARD, TRAVELERS CHECKS?)

[redacted] 8. DID HAZMI AND MIDHAR CONTACT YOU (OR ANOTHER PERSON) ONCE THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES? IF YES, HOW?

[redacted] 9. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO USE PAID TELEPHONES, CALLING CARDS, HOTEL PHONES, OR EMAIL TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU (OR ANOTHER CONTACT)?

[redacted] 10. WERE THEY DIRECTED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN

A HOTEL AND IN WHAT AREA OF LOS ANGELES? HOW LONG WERE THEY TO REMAIN IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 11. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 12. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO ATTEND AN ENGLISH SCHOOL?

[redacted] 13. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO A CONSULATE OR EMBASSY FOR ASSISTANCE? IF YES, WHICH CONSULATE OR EMBASSY AND WHO WAS THE POINT OF CONTACT?

[redacted] 14. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID YOU DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND? WAS THERE A POINT OF CONTACT AT THE MOSQUE? IF YES, WHO WAS THE POINT OF CONTACT?

[redacted] 15. HOW DID YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 16. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED?

[redacted] 17. WHO WAS MIDHAR'S AND HAZMI'S POINT OF CONTACT IN SAN DIEGO?

[redacted] 18. DID MIDHAR AND HAZMI CONTACT YOU UPON THEIR RELOCATION TO SAN DIEGO?

[redacted] 19. WERE MIDHAR AND HAZMI DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC MOSQUE IN SAN DIEGO? WAS THERE A POINT OF CONTACT AT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 20. WHO SENT YOU THE LONG BEACH AND SAN DIEGO TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES? DID YOU SHOW HAZMI AND MIDHAR THE DIRECTORIES?

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH (SALEH) AKA BIN RASYAD BIN ATTASH HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT SALEH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. WAS SALEH FAMILIAR WITH HAZMI AND MIDHAR'S PREPARATION FOR THEIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA? IF SO WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE THEY GIVEN?

[redacted] 2. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 3. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted], 4. WHILE HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE IN CALIFORNIA, WERE THEY ORDERED TO COMMUNICATE WITH KSM OR ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TO DETERMINE THEIR STATUS?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 6. WHO WAS ASSISTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 7. WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN A HOTEL?

[redacted] 8. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 9. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID KSM DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND?

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

[redacted] 10. HOW DID KSM KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 11. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF SOHAIL ABDUL ANA'N AKA ZOHAIR ABDUL MOHAMMED ABDUL ANAM SHORABI (GITMO PRISONER NUMBER 569) HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT SALEH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. LOS ANGELES HAS NOTED IN PRIOR DEBRIEFINGS OF SOHAIL ABDUL ANA'N AKA ZOHAIR ABDUL MOHAMMED ABDUL ANAM SHORABI (GITMO PRISONER NUMBER 569), THAT HE IS FROM TAIZ, YEMEN. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED ABOVE ARE ALSO FROM TAIZ, YEMEN, AND ALSO AROUND ARE SIMILAR IN AGE. THEREFORE, REQUEST THAT HE BE SHOWN ALL PHOTOGRAPHS AND QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND CONTACT WITH THOSE INDIVIDUALS.

[redacted] 2. HOW MUCH WAS SHORABI FAMILIAR WITH HAZMI AND MIDHAR'S PREPARATION FOR THEIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 3. WHAT ITEMS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 4. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL?

6. WHO WAS ASSISTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN LOS ANGELES?

7. WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN

[redacted] A), (J-1)

A HOTEL?

[redacted] 8. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 9. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID KSM DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND?

[redacted] 10. HOW DID KSM KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 11. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED TO THEM?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAMBALI HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT SALEH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. HOW MUCH WAS HAMBALI FAMILIAR WITH HAZMI AND MIDHAR'S PREPARATION FOR THEIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 2. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 3. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 4. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL?

5. WHO WAS ASSISTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN LOS ANGELES?

6. WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN A HOTEL?

[redacted] 7. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 8. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID KSM DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND?

9. HOW DID KSM KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

10. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED TO THEM?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF BINALSHIBH HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT RAMZI BINALSHIBH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. DID YOU ASSIST KSM WITH PREPARATIONS FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI'S ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES? IF YES, WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE? IF NO, DID KSM EVER BRIEF YOU ON THE MIDHAR'S AND HAZMI'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 2. WHAT WAS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUAD OMAR BAZARAH?

3. DID BAZARAH'S FATHER [redacted] (P-1) ASSIST YOU IN YOUR 1995 VISA APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 4. WERE YOU IN CONTACT WITH FUAD BARAZAH AFTER HE ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES (IE TELEPHONE OR EMAIL)? WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CONTACT?

[redacted] 5. WHICH YEMENI INDIVIDUALS BESIDES BAZARAH DID BINALSHIBH KNOW IN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] PLEASE DIRECT RESPONSE AND QUESTIONS TO FBI LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE, POINT OF CONTAC [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (G)

BT
////
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

[redacted] (F)

[redacted] (S)

DRAFTED BY: [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

FD-36 (Rev. 1-31-2003)

Cable

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

for HVD 12.9.05.wpd

TRANSMIT VIA: **PRECEDENCE:**
CLASSIFICATION:
SAMNET **IMMEDIATE** [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] **NEPTUNE** [redacted] **PRIORITY** [redacted]
IIR SENT VIA ACS **ROUTINE**
CONFIDENTIAL 12/09/2005 [redacted]
F T O [redacted]
Date

Approved by: **Case ID #/Serial:**
Original Filename:

********* FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY *********

Time Received **SAMNET filename:**
Time of Transmission **MRI/JUL/ISN**
DTG

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO CIA WASHINGTON DC//DO/CTC/PRIORITY/
INFO FBI LOS ANGELES/ROUTINE/
BT
[redacted] (A), (J-1)
CITE: ////
PASS: [redacted] (O-1) AND FBI DETAILEES [redacted] (S) FOR LOS ANGELES DIVISION.

SUBJECT: INEXORABLE - QUESTIONS AND PHOTOS FOR SHOWING TO HIGH VALUE AL QAEDA DETAINEES.

ACTION REQUESTED: [redacted] PLEASE SHOW INFORMATION REGARDING LOS ANGELES INVESTIGATION ON A POSSIBLE SUPPORT CELL FOR 9/11 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIDHAR (AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77)AND REQUEST THAT KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED (KSM), TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH, RAMZI BINALSHIBH AND HAMBALI AND QUERIED FOR INFORMATION. (NOTE: THE PHOTOS WERE E-MAILED TO FBI DETAILEES [redacted] (S) .)

[redacted] LOS ANGELES FBI IS INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE YEMENI

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

SUPPORT CELL THAT MAY HAVE ASSISTED 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77) DURING THEIR TIME IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 01/15/2000-12/08/2000. HAZMI AND MIDHAR ARRIVED AT LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 01/15/2000 AND RELOCATED TO THE SAN DIEGO AREA ON 02/04/2000. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE HIJACKERS WERE IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA BETWEEN THAT TIME, BUT THEIR ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES WHO MAY HAVE ASSISTED THEM REMAIN UNKNOWN.

[redacted] WHEN MIDHAR DEPARTED THE UNITED STATES ON 06/10/2000, THE IMAGES OF MIDHAR AND HAZMI WERE CAPTURED ON TWO VIDEOS BY THE LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (LAX) POLICE VIDEO NETWORK UNIT. ONE OF THE VIDEOS DEPICTS THE HIJACKERS BEING ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUAL BELIEVED TO BE MOHDAR ABDULLAH (SUBJECT OF A FBI INVESTIGATION), WHO ASSISTED THE HIJACKERS DURING THEIR TIME IN CALIFORNIA. THE VIDEO ALSO REVEALS THREE ADDITIONAL MALES (UNSUBS) WHO MAY BE ACCOMPANYING ABDULLAH AND THE TWO HIJACKERS. ONE OF THE UNSUBS APPEARS TO BE CARRYING A CAMERA, HELD AT HIS MID-SECTION, AND AS HE PASSES THROUGH A DIFFERENT MAGNETOMETER THAN THE REST OF THE GROUP, HE TURNS 360 DEGREES, AS IF FILMING THE ENTIRE SURROUNDINGS OF THE HIJACKERS. AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIDEO BY THE FORENSIC AUDIO, VIDEO AND IMAGE ANALYSIS UNIT, ERF, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA, COULD NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE OBJECT BEING CARRIED AS A CAMERA, BUT THE POSSIBILITY COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY LOS ANGELES FBI OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDICATES THESE UNSUBS MAY HAVE BEEN A PART OF A GROUP OF YEMENIS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF KNOWING OR AIDING THE 9/11 HIJACKERS.

[redacted] POSSIBLE IDENTITY OF THE UNSUBS: [redacted] TO DATE, SEVERAL MAJOR SUPPORTERS OF THE 9/11 HIJACKERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HAVING A BACKGROUND ASSOCIATED WITH YEMEN, FOR EXAMPLE RAMZI BINALSHIB, TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH, AND ANWAR AULAQI. IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY HAVE HAD A CONNECTION WITH YEMEN AND THE HIJACKERS, LOS ANGELES RESEARCHED I-94 DATA FOR INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING WITH YEMENI PASSPORTS WHO ENTERED THE US AT LAX IN 1999 AND 2000. THESE NAMES WERE THEN CHECKED FOR CALIFORNIA DMV PHOTOGRAPHS. TWO OF THE THREE UNSUBS IN THE VIDEO APPEAR TO BE RAMEZ NOAMAN AND [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P).

[redacted] RAMEZ NOAMAN:
NOAMAN WAS A MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 9/11 INVESTIGATION. NOAMAN STATED IN AN INTERVIEW ON 09/28/2001 [redacted] [redacted] (F)) THAT HE WAS INTRODUCED TO MIDHAR AND

HAZMI BY MOHDAR ABDULLAH IN MAY 2000. NOAMAN BEFRIENDED MIDHAR AND HAZMI AT THE ABU BAKR MOSQUE IN SAN DIEGO, AND LATER PROVIDED INTERPRETATION SERVICES TO AID THEM IN OBTAINING FLYING LESSONS.

[redacted] WHILE NOAMAN WAS A STUDENT AT SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, HE USED TO TRAVEL TO LOS ANGELES SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH TO MEET WITH A GROUP OF YEMENIS ON FRIDAYS. THIS GAVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SOME OF HIS COUSINS. ON ONE OCASSION, NOAMAN TOOK HAZMI WITH HIM TO MEET THE YEMENI GROUP.

[redacted] NOAMAN IDENTIFIED HIS COUSINS AS [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] NOAMAN'S SCHOOL ROOMMATE IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA, FUAD OMAR BAZARAH, WAS A FRIEND AND CO-WORKER OF RAMZI BINALSHIHB AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN.

[redacted] FUAD BAZARAH AND RAMZI BINALSHIBH:

ON 04/07/2004, FUAD BAZARAH [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted] (A), (J-1), WAS INTERVIEWED BY LOS ANGELES FBI IN POMONA, CALIFORNIA. BAZARAH ATTENDED THE AL-AHLI HIGH SCHOOL IN SANA'A, YEMEN, FROM 1988 TO 1991. THEREAFTER, FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS, BAZARAH WORKED IN A CLERICAL POSITION IN THE PAID AND REMITTANCE DEPARTMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN IN SANA'A. HIS WORK AT THE BANK REQUIRED HIM TO PERFORM CLERICAL TASKS SUCH AS TYPING. AROUND THE SAME TIME, BAZARAH ALSO ATTENDED THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR ENGLISH FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS TO PREPARE TO STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES.

[redacted] BAZARAH'S FATHER, [redacted] (P-1) WORKED AT ANOTHER SANA'A BANK, THE CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN. OMAR BAZARAH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN CLIENTS OF THAT BANK.

[redacted] WHILE BAZARAH WAS WORKING AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN, THE PAID AND REMITTANCE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYED EIGHT TO TEN PEOPLE, ONE OF WHOM WAS RAMZI BINALSHIBH. BINALSHIBH WAS ALREADY WORKING AT THE BANK IN A CLERICAL POSITION WHEN BAZARAH STARTED.

BAZARAH DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG BINALSHIBH HAD BEEN THERE WHEN HE ARRIVED. SOME OF THE OTHER PEOPLE IN THAT DEPARTMENT INCLUDED (P-1) (LNU), BAZARAH'S SUPERVISOR, AND (P-1) (LNU). (P-1) ALSO WORKED AT THE BANK, BUT HE WORKED IN A DIFFERENT DEPARTMENT. (P-1) ALSO KNEW BINALSHIBH. AT THE END OF THE INTERVIEW, BAZARAH IDENTIFIED A PHOTOGRAPH OF A MAN KNOWN TO INVESTIGATORS AS RAMZI BINALSHIBH AS BINALSHIBH.

[redacted] TIHAMA GROUP HAD AN ACCOUNT AT THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN, AND THEY HAD OFFICES IN SANA'A. BAZARAH HAD NO PERSONAL DEALINGS WITH TIHAMA AND KNEW THE NAME ONLY FROM WORKING AT THE BANK. BAZARAH WAS NOT AWARE OF BINALSHIBH WORKING FOR OR HAVING ANY KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH TIHAMA.

[redacted] BINALSHIBH WAS THREE OR FOUR YEARS OLDER THAN BAZARAH. THEY INTERACTED WITH EACH OTHER ONLY AT WORK, AND BAZARAH, THEREFORE, DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT BINALSHIBH'S FAMILY OR FRIENDS. DURING CONVERSATIONS AT WORK, BAZARAH TOLD BINALSHIBH ABOUT HIS INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES TO STUDY. BINALSHIBH THEN TOLD BAZARAH OF HIS INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES TO WORK, BUT BINALSHIBH DID NOT SPECIFY THE TYPE OF WORK HE WANTED TO DO OR PRECISELY WHERE IN THE UNITED STATES HE WANTED TO LIVE.

[redacted] BAZARAH SAID BINALSHIBH WAS A "NICE" AND FUNNY GUY WHEN THEY WORKED TOGETHER AT THE BANK. BINALSHIBH WAS RELIGIOUS, BUT NOT TOO RELIGIOUS. BINALSHIBH WAS IN FAVOR OF THE AL-ISLA PARTY AND ITS LEADER, SHEIKH ZINDANI. BINALSHIBH DID NOT LIKE THE LEADER OF YEMEN, AND HE WANTED AL-ISLA TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY AND YEMEN TO BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE. BAZARAH NEVER HEARD BINALSHIBH MENTION BOSNIA, CHECHNYA, OR AFGHANISTAN.

[redacted] ONE OR TWO MONTHS BEFORE BAZARAH ENTERED THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 08/14/1995, BAZARAH AND BINALSHIBH WENT TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TOGETHER IN SANA'A TO APPLY FOR VISAS. THEY PLANNED TO GO THERE TOGETHER GIVEN THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN GOING TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT THEY MADE NO OTHER PLANS TOGETHER REGARDING THE UNITED STATES: BAZARAH INTENDED TO STUDY IN ARIZONA; BINALSHIBH INTENDED TO WORK AT SOME UNSPECIFIED LOCATION. BAZARAH SELECTED EASTERN ARIZONA AS HIS FIRST CHOICE FOR SCHOOL BECAUSE HIS RESEARCH INDICATED THAT TUITION WAS AFFORDABLE AND THE ACCEPTANCE RATE WAS HIGH.

[redacted] [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] THE BAZARAH'S FATHER WROTE A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR BINALSHIBH TO ASSIST IN BINALSHIBH'S EFFORTS TO SECURE A VISA TO THE UNITED STATES).

[redacted] BINALSHIBH WAS UPSET [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3). HE THEN DECIDED TO PURSUE HIS ALTERNATIVE PLAN OF MOVING TO GERMANY. BINALSHIBH TOLD BAZARAH THAT HE CHOSE GERMANY BECAUSE HE HAD A UNCLE THERE WHO WAS A BRAIN SURGEON. BINALSHIBH HAD IN FACT OBTAINED A CHECHEN VISA PRIOR TO APPLYING FOR A UNITED STATES VISA, WHICH WAS PART OF THE REASON BAZARAH UNDERSTOOD BINALSHIBH'S INTEREST IN GERMANY TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN THAT BINALSHIBH HAD IN MIND ALL ALONG.

[redacted] APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE WEEKS BEFORE BAZARAH TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES ON 08/14/1995, BAZARAH HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD LEFT YEMEN FOR GERMANY. BINALSHIBH DID NOT TELL BAZARAH THAT

HE WAS LEAVING. RATHER, BAZARAH DID NOT SEE BINALSHIBH IN THE BANK FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS, AND BAZARAH THEN HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD DEPARTED FOR GERMANY. BAZARAH HAS NOT HEARD FROM OR HAD CONTACT WITH BINALSHIBH SINCE THEIR LAST INTERACTION AT THE BANK IN 1995.

[redacted] BAZARAH LEARNED MORE ABOUT BINALSHIBH AFTER RETURNING TO YEMEN IN OCTOBER 2001, BY WHICH TIME THE PRESS WAS REPORTING ABOUT BINALSHIBH'S ROLE IN 9/11 AND THERE WERE MANY RUMORS CIRCULATING ABOUT HIM. BAZARAH WAS IN YEMEN FROM APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 2001 TO JUNE 2002. WHILE THERE, BAZARAH HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD ONE BROTHER (NFI) AND THAT HIS MOTHER DIED AFTER LEARNING OF BINALSHIBH'S INVOLVEMENT IN 9/11. BAZARAH ALSO HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH WORKED WITH AL QAEDA, THAT HE WAS WITH UBL, AND THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A HIJACKER IN THE 9/11 OPERATION. BAZARAH RECALLED TALKING TO HIS UNCLE SAID BAZARAH IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE REPORTS OF BINALSHIBH WORKING WITH AL QAEDA. HE ALSO HEARD THAT BINALSHIBH HAD EITHER BEEN KILLED DURING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN OR THAT HE HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN PAKISTAN.

[redacted] BAZARAH WAS DEPORTED TO YEMEN IN DECEMBER 2004.

[redacted] NOAMAN'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH BARAZAH, AND BARAZAH'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH BINALSHIHB, MAKES NOAMAN'S INTRODUCTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE TWO HIJACKERS WHILE THEY WERE IN CALIFORNIA APPEAR TO BE MORE THAN COINCIDENTAL. NOAMAN WAS ALSO RELATED TO [redacted] (P), BELIEVED TO BE THE CAMERAMAN IN THE LAX VIDEO, AND ANOTHER YEMENI, [redacted] (P).

[redacted] [redacted] (P)'S TELEPHONE NUMBER WAS FOUND IN MOHDAR ABDULLAH'S WALLET AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST ON 09/24/2001.

[redacted] (D)

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

[redacted] IN ADDITION, (P)'S TELEPHONE NUMBERS WERE IN CONTACT WITH (P) (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), , THE COUSIN OF (P) [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] BALTIMORE INVESTIGATION HAS CONFIRMED THAT (P) (P) IS (P) KAMAL DERWISH (DECEASED), A.K.A SHEIKH DABWAN, A HIGH-LEVEL AL QAEDA ASSOCIATE. DABWAN WAS KILLED, ALONG WITH FIVE OTHER AL QAEDA ASSOCIATES INCLUDING ABU ALI AL-HARTHI, DURING A (O-1) ATTACK IN EARLY NOVEMBER 2002 IN YEMEN. DABWAN WAS THE LEADER OF A GROUP FROM LACKAWANNA, NY WHO WAS TRAINED AT AN AL QAEDA TERRORIST CAMP IN AFGHANISTAN IN MAY 2001.

[redacted] IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) HAD TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES FOR LONG BEACH AND SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA. LOS ANGELES FINDS THIS FACT CURIOUS AS TO WHY KSM WOULD HAVE A TELEPHONE DIRECTORY FOR LONG BEACH. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, IT APPEARS THAT NUMEROUS YEMENI STUDENTS RESIDED IN LONG BEACH DURING THE 1999-2002 TIME FRAME.

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE ASSISTED BY A YEMENI SUPPORT CELL IN LOS ANGELES, WE REQUEST THAT ALL DETAINEES BE SHOWN ALL THE PHOTOGRAPHS LISTED BELOW FOR RECOGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE.

1. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB TAIZ, YEMEN
2. FUAD OMAR BAZARAH, DOB (P-1) 1974, POB YEMEN
3. RAMEZ NOAMAN, DOB (P-1)/1974, POB YEMEN
4. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) POB TAIZ, YEMEN
5. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) POB TAIZ, YEMEN
6. (P) DOB
7. (P) DOB (P-1) (P) POB YEMEN
8. MOHDAR ABDULLAH, DOB (P-1) 1978, POB YEMEN
9. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB SANAA YEMEN
10. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB SANAA YEMEN
11. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB SANAA YEMEN

12. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB YEMEN
13. (P) (P-1) (P), POB YEMEN
14. (P) DOB (P-1) (P), POB UNITED STATES

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE ASSISTED BY A SUPPORT CELL IN LOS ANGELES, WE REQUEST THAT KSM BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 2. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES? WHO ELSE WAS PRESENT WHILE KSM PREPARED/TRAINED/BRIEFED HAZMI AND MIDHAR FOR THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 3. WHILE HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE IN CALIFORNIA, WERE THEY ORDERED TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU OR ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TO DETERMINE THEIR STATUS (IE HOW THEY ARRIVED, WHERE THEY WERE STAYING)?

[redacted] 4. WHY DID THEY LIST THE SHERATON HOTEL AS THEIR ARRIVAL DESTINATION ON IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 6. HOW MUCH MONEY DID YOU DIRECT HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO HAVE ON THEM WHEN THEY ENTERED THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 7. HOW WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR SUPPOSED TO PAY FOR TAXIS, HOTELS, FOOD, APARTMENTS, ETC? (IE METHOD OF PAYMENT, CASH CREDIT CARD, TRAVELERS CHECKS?)

[redacted] 8. DID HAZMI AND MIDHAR CONTACT YOU (OR ANOTHER PERSON) ONCE THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES? IF YES, HOW?

[redacted] 9. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO USE PAID TELEPHONES, CALLING CARDS, HOTEL PHONES, OR EMAIL TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU (OR ANOTHER CONTACT)?

[redacted] 10. WERE THEY DIRECTED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN A HOTEL AND IN WHAT AREA OF LOS ANGELES? HOW LONG WERE THEY TO REMAIN IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 11. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 12. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO ATTEND AN ENGLISH SCHOOL?

[redacted] 13. WERE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DIRECTED TO A CONSULATE OR EMBASSY FOR ASSISTANCE? IF YES, WHICH CONSULATE OR EMBASSY AND WHO WAS THE POINT OF CONTACT?

[redacted] 14. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID YOU DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND? WAS THERE A POINT OF CONTACT AT THE MOSQUE? IF YES, WHO WAS THE POINT OF CONTACT?

[redacted] 15. HOW DID YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 16. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED?

[redacted] 17. WHO WAS MIDHAR'S AND HAZMI'S POINT OF CONTACT IN SAN DIEGO?

[redacted] 18. DID MIDHAR AND HAZMI CONTACT YOU UPON THEIR RELOCATION TO SAN DIEGO?

[redacted] 19. WERE MIDHAR AND HAZMI DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC MOSQUE IN SAN DIEGO? WAS THERE A POINT OF CONTACT AT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 20. WHO SENT YOU THE LONG BEACH AND SAN DIEGO TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES? DID YOU SHOW HAZMI AND MIDHAR THE DIRECTORIES?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF TAWFIZ MOHAMMED BIN SALEH (SALEH) AKA BIN RASYAD BIN ATTASH HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT SALEH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. WAS SALEH FAMILIAR WITH HAZMI AND MIDHAR'S PREPARATION FOR THEIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA? IF SO WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE THEY GIVEN?

[redacted] 2. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 3. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 4. WHILE HAZMI AND MIDHAR WERE IN CALIFORNIA, WERE THEY ORDERED TO COMMUNICATE WITH KSM OR ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TO DETERMINE THEIR STATUS?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 6. WHO WAS ASSISTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 7. WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN A HOTEL?

[redacted] 8. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] (A), (J-1)

[redacted] 9. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID KSM DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND?

[redacted] 10. HOW DID KSM KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 11. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HAMBALI HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT SALEH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. HOW MUCH WAS HAMBALI FAMILIAR WITH HAZMI AND MIDHAR'S PREPARATION FOR THEIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 2. WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MALAYSIA MEETING (JANUARY 2000) IN ORDER TO PREPARE HAZMI AND MIDHAR TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 3. WHAT WAS KSM'S DIRECTION TO HAZMI AND MIDHAR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 4. WHO WAS THEIR POINT OF CONTACT UPON THEIR ARRIVAL?

[redacted] 5. WHO WAS ASSISTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN LOS ANGELES?

[redacted] 6. WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO GET AN APARTMENT OR STAY IN A HOTEL?

[redacted] 7. SINCE HAZMI AND MIDHAR DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH OR KNOW THE CULTURE THAT WELL, WHO WAS GOING TO ASSIST THEM WITH THEIR DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS?

[redacted] 8. WHAT LOS ANGELES MOSQUE DID KSM DIRECT THEM TO ATTEND?

[redacted] 9. HOW DID KSM KNOW ABOUT THAT MOSQUE?

[redacted] 10. DID KSM GIVE PERMISSION FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI TO RELOCATE TO SAN DIEGO? IF PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, HOW WAS THAT COMMUNICATED TO THEM?

[redacted] IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF BINALSHIBH HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HAZMI'S AND MIDHAR'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WE REQUEST THAT RAMZI BINALSHIBH BE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[redacted] 1. DID YOU ASSIST KSM WITH PREPARATIONS FOR MIDHAR AND HAZMI'S ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES? IF YES, WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE? IF NO, DID KSM EVER BRIEF YOU ON THE MIDHAR'S AND HAZMI'S OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 2. WHAT WAS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUAD OMAR BAZARAH?

[redacted] 3. DID BAZARAH'S FATHER [redacted] (P-1) ASSIST YOU IN YOUR 1995 VISA APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES?

[redacted] 4. WERE YOU IN CONTACT WITH FUAD BARAZAH AFTER HE ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES (IE TELEPHONE OR EMAIL)? WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE CONTACT?

[redacted] 5. WHICH YEMENI INDIVIDUALS BESIDES BAZARAH DID BINALSHIBH KNOW IN CALIFORNIA?

[redacted] 6. When did you first become a member of Al-Qaeda? Was it before you arrived in Germany (the first time) or after that?

[redacted] POCS FOR THIS COMMUNICATION ARE [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) OR [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (G)

BT

////

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:
[redacted] THIS COMMUNICATION RESPONDS TO A REQUEST FROM LOS ANGELES RELATED TO CASE IDS [redacted] (F)
[redacted] (F)

DRAFTED BY: [redacted] (S)

FD-542 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2031
DATE: 10-01-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 03/17/2006

To: Counterterrorism Attn: [redacted] (G), (S)

Washington Field Attn:

San Diego Attn:

From: San Diego
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

[redacted] **Case ID #:** [redacted] [redacted] (F)
[redacted]
[redacted]

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
[redacted] (G)

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI;
IT - AL QAEDA
[redacted] (G)
INFORMATION DISSEMINATED TO THE FIG

Synopsis: Interview of [redacted] (P)
[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2030
DATE: 10-01-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Details: [redacted] On 03/16/2005, (S) and (S) interviewed (P) regarding his knowledge of Mohdar Abdullah.

[redacted] During the interview (P) stated that he was (P) and was born in (P) on (P-1)/1964. (P) first arrived in the United States in 1981 and became a naturalized US citizen in 1984. (P) last visited (P) in 1997. Currently (P) lives with his wife and three children at (P-1) (P-1), San Diego, CA. (P) cell phone number is (P-1) and his home phone number is (P-1). (P) has a SSN # (P-1) and a California driver's license of (P-1).

[redacted] (P) currently owns (P) in San Diego located at the corner of (P). (P) received his (P) license in 1998, and has been at his current location since February 2003. (P) work number is (P)

[redacted] [redacted] A query via ACS revealed the following information for (P)

[redacted] On 08/07/2003, the San Diego Office of the FBI received an anonymous letter reporting alleged criminal activity by (P-1) (P-1) Social Security number (P-1).

[redacted] According to the letter (G), (P-1) was involved in bankruptcy fraud and smuggling money in and out of he U.S. The letter also alleged that (G), 's wife, (G), (P-1), and a (P) of (P) were involved.

[redacted] On 09/23/2003, IA (S) researched the information provided in the letter and determined the incidents reported by the anonymous individual were valid.

[redacted] The information develop identified connections to possible money laundering, drugs and ties to FBI Full Field investigations. At the time, IA (P-1), recommended additional investigation of the activities of (P-1), (P) (P) (P-1).

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted]

(J-2)

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] and his cell phone number were also referenced in (F) which details names and phone numbers found in the wallet of Mohdar Abdullah following his arrest.

[redacted] [redacted] A query of telephone applications (TA) for all 3 Nuhaily's phone numbers revealed significant references (F) (F)

[redacted] [redacted] has 4 brothers currently in the United States as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] described himself as a Muslim, but not a very good Muslim. [redacted] admitted to occasionally drinking alcohol, and that he did not attend mosque services on a regular basis. [redacted] stated that he attends Friday prayer services on an irregular basis, and the last time he attended was 2 weeks ago at the Masjid Ar-Ribat. [redacted] generally attends the Masjid Ar-Ribat because it is closer to his work. However, he stated that he has frequented the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) before.

[redacted] When shown a picture of Mohdar Abdullah, [redacted] identified him as a person he knew as Mohdar. [redacted] stated that he could not remember Mohdar's last name, and that he was not very close to him. [redacted] advised that he remembered seeing this person around the Masjid Ar-Ribat, and occasionally at the ICSD. [redacted] said he thought that Mohdar was a student, and that he used to live in La Mesa. [redacted] believed that Mohdar was from Yemen.

[redacted] [redacted] remembered Mohdar as being very secretive. He remembered that Mohdar was interested in buying (P) from him at one point, but he never did sale Mohdar (P). [redacted] could not remember why he never sold (P) to Mohdar. [redacted] said that he thought that Mohdar was arrested because he had a some type of visa problem, but was not entirely sure. [redacted] has not heard any recent information about Mohdar in the San Diego Muslim community.

[redacted] [redacted] reported that his good friend [redacted] may have lived with Mohdar during the time Mohdar was in San Diego. [redacted] said that [redacted] is from Kenya and works at the (P) in Spring Valley, CA. [redacted] then retrieved [redacted] phone number from his cell phone and advised that [redacted] phone number is (P).

[redacted] [redacted] stated that one time several years ago he went to [redacted] apartment in La Mesa to have lunch with several other people. [redacted] said they all ate lunch together while sitting on the floor of the apartment. He could not remember how many people were there for lunch, or if Mohdar was even there. When pressed for a number he simply said that he could not remember. **San Diego notes:** During this line of questioning [redacted] appeared to be evasive and purposely vague. [redacted] claimed that could not remember who was at the lunch that day, and that he could not remember where the apartment of his good friend was located in La Mesa. After several minutes [redacted] conceded that the apartment was close to the Masjid Ar-Ribat, and that it may have been located on Saranac Street but would not elaborate any further. (D), (G)

[redacted]

(U) A query of ACS revealed that a [redacted] was referenced in (F) and (F) Both serials show that when Mohdar Abdullah's car was returned following his arrest and search of the vehicle that Mohdar, through his attorney, instructed that the car was to be returned to a [redacted]

(D), (G)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (P) was asked during the interview if he remembered who the Imam was at the Masjid Ar-Ribat during the time that Mohdar may have lived with his friend (P) could not remember his name, but described the Iman as being very young, in his 30s, with a thin build, who wore glasses. He described the Imam as being very educated who spoke English very well. (P) heard that the Imam may have attended a university in the US, but did not know which university. (P) said that the Imam was from Yemen.

[redacted] When shown a picture of Sheikh Anwar Aulaqi, (P) identified him as the Imam he was speaking of.

[redacted] (P) advised that even though he attends the Masjid Ar-Ribat he has never felt comfortable there. He stated that the people who attend the Masjid Ar-Ribat are more anti-western in their beliefs then those that frequent the ICSD. (P) said that prior to 9/11 he attended mosque more frequently, particularly the Masjid Ar-Ribat, but after the events of 9/11 his attendance has lessened.

[redacted] At this point, (P) informed investigators that he went paint balling with members of the Masjid Ar-Ribat on one occasion several years ago. He thinks he was invited by his friend (P) (P) stated that only about 10 people from the Masjid Ar-Ribat went. **San Diego notes:** When asked who went paint balling from the Masjid Ar-Ribat (P) stated that he could not remember because there were so many people perhaps contradicting his earlier statement that only about 10 people went. Towards the end of the interview (P) stated the Sheikh Anwar Aulaqi may have been there. When (P) was asked when he went paint balling he first said it was after 9/11, but later said it may have been before 9/11. When (P) was asked where in San Diego they went paint balling he could not recall.

[redacted] (P) did not remember anything special about the paint ball outing. He said it was just a group of people who went paint balling, and that it was not meant to be any type of "training."

[redacted] (P) advised that during that time members of the Masjid Ar-Ribat would routinely go paint balling.

[redacted] (P) also volunteered that prior to 9/11 he used to play soccer with members of the ICSD. (P) advised that the ICSD team would often play members of the Masjid Ar-Ribat on Saturday mornings on a field located near the ICSD. (P) remembered seeing Mohdar playing soccer on a few occasions, but could not recall anyone else from the Masjid Ar-Ribat who played soccer at that time. A significant item of note, as detailed in (F) (F) indicates that 09/11/2001 hijackers Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi both played with the soccer team which met every Saturday at the Islamic Center of San Diego. The two coaches of the team were (P)

[redacted] Currently, (P) plays soccer in an adult league in Chula Vista. He said the league is mostly made up of Mexicans and Arabs.

[redacted] During the interview (P) was asked if he knew, or heard of an individual named (P) (P) stated the he knew a person named (P) who bought (P) from him about 4-5 years ago, but he could not be sure if (P) last name was (P) (P) said that (P) would also play soccer with the ICSD during his time in San Diego. (P) said that (P) had dark skin, and believed that he was from Yemen.

[redacted] (P) was also asked if he knew of a person named (P) (P) stated that he knew 2 individuals named (P) (P) He said that one of them grew up in (P) with him, and currently works in real estate in San Diego. (P) provided investigators with (P) phone number, (P), from his own cell phone.

[redacted] A review of TA yielded negative results for a current subscriber. However, (P) has significant references in the following cases:

(F)

[redacted] (P) stated that other (P) that he knew was from Egypt. (P) said that this (P) has an American wife, and sells perfume for a living. (P) believes that this (P) is currently in Egypt.

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism Attn: [redacted] (S)
From: San Diego
[redacted]e: [redacted] [redacted] (F) , 03/17/2006

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (S)
From: San Diego
[redacted] Re: [redacted] (F) , 03/17/2006

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: (S)
Name:
Squad: (G)

LEAD(s):

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (S) [redacted]
From: San Diego
[redacted] Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] , 03/17/2006

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Read and clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/26/2006

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San (G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,

(A), (J-1), (G)

Synopsis: [redacted] Submission of (A), (J-1), (G) LHM

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Administrative: Enclosed for (G) for dissemination is (A), (J-1), (G) LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject.

Details:

Previous Investigation

(S) INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1), Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/26/2006

submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND HASSAN (P) (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/26/2006

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. (O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[redacted] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigratio harges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[redacted] Mohamed's wife (P) born (P-1) (P) in (P) California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1) telephone number (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[redacted] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[redacted] In July or August 199 (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[redacted] According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P), encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F). According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, Mahir Sharif, submitted declarations from (P), born (P-1)/(P), California drivers license number, (P) La Mesa, California, (P-1), and (P) ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), born (P-1) (P), California drivers license number (P-1) (P), San Diego, California, (P), as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P), San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) the (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of the (P) (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/26/2006

(C-1)

Trial results (C-1)

[redacted] After two trials in 2006, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and is currently being held for possible revocation of his US permanent legal resident alien status and consequent deportation. The first deportation hearing is scheduled for January 31, 2006.

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: (P-1)/1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 01/26/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 03/01/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

[redacted] (S)

Attn:

Attn:

To: San Diego **Attn:**

From: San [redacted] (G)

Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Khatib;
[redacted] [redacted] (G)
[redacted] (G)
[redacted] [redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/26/2004

Details: [redacted] On January 20, 2004, Mohamed was arrested for immigratio raud. Investigation by ICE determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA). WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[redacted] Mohamed was identified (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[redacted] Mohamed has maintained a low profile since the Office of Foreign set Control (OFAC) closed down the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) in Chicago, Illinois. (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) Mohamed has closed his Western Somali Relief Agency.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego D ision Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] These Ministry letters to Muslim "Propagators" in General, and "Propagator Mohamed" in specific, document requests dating in the mid 1990's from the Saudi Government Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance for information collection on Muslims and the Muslim community in Canada, America, and the Carribean. The seized documents do not indicate the end use of the information collected by the Ministry. But, assuming the personal and social information of influential converts (i.e. engineers, ambassadors, government ministers, pilots) was collected for a legitimate purpose, a great concern would be that radical elements within the Ministry could disseminate such legitimate information for illegitimate ends. If this collection effort is an ongoing policy, it stands to reason that Propagators have been reporting on military, law enforcement, and scientific Muslim converts for [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] For the purposes of captioned investigation, Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With regards to Mohamed's employment by the Ministry, in a hand written letter that had an "X" marked across the body of the text to indicate the letter may have been a draft Mohamed writes to Sheik bin Mohamad AlBalihi to complain that he has not received payment for a 15 month period. Mohamed requests that AlBalihi contact the appropriate Ministries to facilitate his reimbursement of salaries for that 15 month period.

[redacted] One letter from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance that was addressed to Mohamed indicated that a housing and travel ticket allowance and a salary was to be paid to those Propagators working under contract outside their countries of origin. The Propagators would lose their housing and travel benefits if they became citizens of the country in which they were working. In several different letters, the Ministry indicates that Mohamed's "contract will be renewed" and provides him with raises or bonuses to "encourage you to double your effort and propagation related activities." One such letter from the Ministry had an enclosed check "as a financial award granted by his Royal Highness Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation, which he (ALSAUD) has authorized for all propagators belonging to this office" (Dawa office in America). This letter provided contact email addresses of ifta@resa.org, www.islamicpage.org, and www.islam.org.sa. The letters were signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] An indication of the extent of Saudi control over their Propagators is given in a letter from the Ministry dated November 18, 1996. The letter was issued by the Ministry "affirming that no propagator should leave his post or take leave without first obtaining a written authorization from the relevant authority. Whoever violates this guideline will be subject to disciplinary action to include termination of service.’’ The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, requesting information about Muslim converts in the Islamic community: an undated and unsigned letter noted that the Director of Dawa activities conducted abroad received information that "during the past few years a number of Christian clerics and well known personalities have converted to Islam. The Director of Dawa is requesting that you provide him with the names of individuals who have converted to Islam in your locality." The letter requests the Muslim converts previous name, occupation and social status; the Islamic name that the person has acquired and the personal attributes of the individual that may be conducive to using him in propagation activities; the type of services that the individual has received and the party that provided the services; the languages in which the individual is proficient; the address of the individual where he can be reached; (the Propagators) impression about how to deal with the individuals who have converted to Islam and what services might benefit them."

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] Another Letter dated November 22, 1995, from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance addressed to "Propagator: Omar Abdo Al-Khatib" requests that Mohamed comply with the Ministry's solicitation of information regarding "certain parties and communities." According to the letter, the Ministry was interested in the Somali and Arab communities of Canada and San Diego. The request was signed by Khalid bin Ibrahim Al-Suwaylim. According to the letter, the report should cover the following points:

1-Description of Community and its size.
2-History of the community and its areas of presence.
3-Reason why the community immigrated.
4-The leaders of the community and its well known figures.
5-Religious dogma of the community.
6-Organizational structure of the community.
7-Financial condition of the community.
8-Literacy rate and educational level of the community.
9-Schools and mosques of the community.
10-Organizations established by the community.
11-Organizations that cooperate with the community.
12-Influence that the community has in its locality.
13-Other observations about the community.

[redacted] In one undated letter from the Ministry to Propagators the conversion of non-Muslims is stressed. According to the letter, "Conversion of non-Muslims who are living in non-Muslim countries into the faith takes on critical importance since they are the inhabitants of the land. Among them is the doctor, the engineer, and the pilot, as well as others. By having these people convert to Islam, the effort to propagate the faith gains a tremendous boost in the country where this activity is being conducted."

[redacted] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about the activities of local mosques, a letter dated March 20, 1996, and addressed to "all Propagators in America, Canada and the Islands of the Carribean Sea" states "due to the fact that a number of Islamic magazines are being published by Islamic centers that you are working with, and in order to strengthen the relation with these centers and to become acquainted with all the various Islamic activities that you are engaged in, we are requesting that you provide us with all the various publications or magazines or newsletters that are being published by the Islamic center or Association that you are working with." The requested material was asked to be sent to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Affairs, IFTA Office, 601 New Hampshire Avenue N.W., Washington DC 20037. The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] A second letter written in February 22, 1997, and also signed by AlSuwaylim, requested that all Propagators in America and the Carribean, "provide the Ministry with everything that is being published in your locality about Islam and Muslims in general and about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, such as books, research papers, articles and media programs."

[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [redacted] wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted]. According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] In a letter from the Ministry dated December 17, 1996, from Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim, an advisory was sent to all Propagators in America and the Islands of the Caribbean Sea. This letter advised that the Ministry "approved the absence of Sheik Fahd bin Ali AlSuwaylim to study English. Sheik Abdulrahman bin Mohammad AlBalihi has been designated to address matters relating to propagation and the propagators. He can be reached at his private telephone number [redacted] or through the switchboard number (202) 342-3700, extension 2266 and extension 2277.

[redacted] [redacted] Raisah Douglas. ICE records indicate that Douglas,

[redacted]

born 11/19/1970, was admitted into the United State on March 22, 2001, until May 21, 2001. Douglas' port of entry was Los Angeles, California, and she arrived on American Airlines flight 7365. Douglas' passport number was L9079185. Asset reporting placed Douglas with Mohamed in San Diego, California, during that time frame.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

To: nt rom: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 02/26/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION

AT Washington, D.C.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

♦♦

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
October 26, 2001

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA , OMAR KHADIB
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Derived From: G-3: Declassify On: X1

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Full Field Investigation (FFI) authorized:

[redacted] The purpose of this communication is to set forth justification for renewal of a Full Field Investigation (FFI) of Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib, a United States Person (USPER), San Diego, CA.

[redacted] Office of Origin: San Diego Division of the FBI is the office of origin in this investigation.

[redacted] Date investigative summary prepared: October 26, 2001.

[redacted] Basis for Investigation: A Full Field Investigation has been authorized by San Diego Division on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that Omar Abdi Mohamed is or may be engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aiding and abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[redacted] Previous Investigation:

[redacted] (G) advised that Omar Abdi Mohamed was born on (P-1) in Somalia. Mohamed was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) Mohamed was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic

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Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P-1) On April 11, 2000, Mohamed submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G) has reported that AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[redacted] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on (G) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] UBL has purchased shares in the Al-Barakaat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Gassim (or Qasim), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and Shaykh Muhammad Utham, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakaat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakaat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in

Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. Omar Khadib and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. Khadib is a close associate of (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) sponsored Mohamed when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including

fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] Current Investigation:

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) a prominent Somali community leader, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must be providing information to the FBI.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] In (O-1) [redacted] in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's

Degree and is working on his Ph.D in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU as another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[redacted] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend of (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues KAHDIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding Omar Abdi Mohamed:

Name: Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P) La Mesa, CA 91941
(P)
Occupation: Director, Western Somali Relief Agency 4979 University Avenue., #C San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-6013 (619) 563-9443
President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted] Objectives: The objectives of this investigation are to: (1) develop additional facts demonstrating that Omar Mohamed continues to be a leader of the AIAI or a splinter terrorist group in the United States, (2) determine if Mohamed is a member of AL-QAEDA, (3) identify other AIAI and AL-QAEDA members and associates of Mohamed and neutralize their support of terrorist activities.

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
October 25, 2002

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA , OMAR KHADIB
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Full Field Investigation (FFI) authorized: (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The purpose of this communication is to provide the closing results of the Full Field Investigation (FFI) of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB, a United States Person (USPER), San Diego, CA.

[redacted] Office of Origin: San Diego Division of the FBI is the office of origin in this investigation.

[redacted] Date investigative summary prepared: October 25, 2002.

[redacted] Basis for Investigation: A Full Field Investigation was authorized by San Diego Division on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED is or may be engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aiding and abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[redacted] Investigative Results:

[redacted] (G) advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (416) 746-4098. MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic

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Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (P-1) The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

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Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

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(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) MOHAMED when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including

fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

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[redacted] (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

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[redacted] (O-1) (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU as another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[redacted] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its Uni States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on nu asions. (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] KHADIB has closed down Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. MOHAMAD CHEHADE is the Director of Global Relief Foundation (GRF).

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	
INS A#:	
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Black
Residence:	(P-1) La Mesa, CA 91941 (P-1)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/24/2005

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San (G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Submission of (A), (G), (J-1) LHM

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Enclosed for (G) for dissemination is (A), (G), (J-1) LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject.

Details: **Previous Investigation:**

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by Imam (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED

[redacted]

submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed an financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [redacted] (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] In (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[redacted] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[redacted] Mohamed's wife (P) born (P-1) (P) in (P) California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1) telephone number (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[redacted] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[redacted] In July or August 1998 (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[redacted] According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[redacted] (C-1)

(C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P) encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F) According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islami African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license numbe (P) La Mesa, California, (P) and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) 315N-SD-67075), born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number B4284713, (P) San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P) San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/24/2005

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of (P) (P)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/24/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGONT, D.C.

[redacted] (G) disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/25/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San (G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Submission of (A), (G), (J-1) LHM

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted** (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) LHM for (G) (G)

Details: __**Previous Investigation**__

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted]

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

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[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [redacted] (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 01/25/2007

(C-1)

[redacted] In (O-1) (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

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[redacted]

leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

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[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

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[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P) encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

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[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was

[redacted]

contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F) According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) born (P-1) / (P), California drivers license number, (P) La Mesa, California, (P) and (P) ((A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), born (P-1) / (P), California drivers license number (P) San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P), San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of (P) (P)

(C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 01/25/2007

[redacted] (C-1)

Trial results

[redacted] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[redacted] In late 2006, AUSA [redacted] (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: [redacted] (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes:
Residence: [redacted] (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
[redacted] (P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/25/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 05/17/2007

To: San Diego **Attn:** (G) (S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Reassign case and all subfiles.

[redacted] (G)

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Details: [redacted] Request case and all subfiles be reassigned go (S) (S)

Previous Investigation

[redacted] INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) among others a the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [redacted] (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] [redacted] (C-1)

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

(C-1)

[redacted] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) that he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. (O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[redacted] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[redacted] Mohamed's wife (P), born (P-1) (P) in (P), California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1), telephone number (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[redacted] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[redacted] In July or August 1998, (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[redacted] According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] Investigation further determined that (P) Fardan of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: ([redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not (P) encouraged (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, (P)
(P)

wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [redacted] (F) According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[redacted] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[redacted] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin

[redacted]

Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[redacted] Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) [redacted] (P-1) (P), California drivers license numbe (P) La Mesa, California, (P), and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number (P-1) (P), San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[redacted] Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P), Suite I, San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) the Kilimanjaro Cafe was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[redacted] (J-2)

[redacted] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi ed is associated as a board member or officer of the (P) (P)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 05/17/2007

(C-1)

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(C-1)

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 05/17/2007

[redacted] (C-1)

Trial results [redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[redacted] In late 2006, AUSA [redacted] (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) (G)

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: [redacted] (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: [redacted] (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: [redacted] (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
[redacted] (P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

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>
(Rev. 01-31-2003)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 08-26-2021

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/22/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
PENTTBOM Investigative Team,
(P)

WFO **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] 3 (F)

Title: [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

PENTTBOM
MC 182
OO: New York

(A), (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) interview of (P).

[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

>

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F) 09/22/2004

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)
(F)

Details: [redacted] On 9/16/04, (S) interviewed (P) (P) outside his residence at (P) (P) CA. (P) is employed at the Royal Consulate General of Saudi Arabia, 2045 Sawtelle Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90025.

[redacted] The following areas were covered during the interview.

Omar Al-Bayoumi and Kayson Bin Don

[redacted] (P) was shown a photograph of Kayson Bin Don but did not recognize him nor his name. (P) was shown a photograph of Omar Al-Bayoumi and initially said that he did not recognize him. When told Al-Bayoumi's name, (P) said that he had heard of him. (P) then said that he may have seen Al-Bayoumi at the Consulate handling matters concerning his passport but that would not concern him (P) because that is not his department. (P) said he does not remember ever meeting with Bin Don and Al-Bayoumi at the Consulate.

[redacted] (P) was shown photographs of Flight 77 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi but did not recognize them. When told they were the 9/11 hijackers, (P) said that he had never met them. He claimed to have no knowledge of Al-Bayoumi meeting with the hijackers.

Ahmed Omar Abu Ali

[redacted] (P) recognized the name of Omar Abu Ali (Omar) as someone (P) at the Saudi Consulate in the early 1980's. Omar is (P), approximately 56 years old. Omar worked in computer programing (P). Omar later transferred to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. and lived in the suburbs. (P) considered Omar a well educated and decent individual. (P) does not have any further contact with Omar but had spoken to him on the telephone seven or eight years ago.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] said Omar's son, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali (Ahmed), would have been a small child when [redacted]. [redacted] did not know Ahmed personally. [redacted] had read in the paper about Ahmed being arrested in Saudi Arabia. [redacted] heard that Omar was shocked that his son had been arrested. [redacted] said that he too was surprised to read of Ahmed's arrest because his father was so well respected.

[redacted] [redacted] did not know Ali Abd Al-Rahman Al-Faq'asi Al-Ghamdi, aka Abu Bakr Al-Azdi.

[redacted] [redacted] has no knowledge of the events of the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Fahd Althumairy and Mohammed Al-Muhanna

[redacted] [redacted] described Fahd Althumairy was a very moderate and correct person who had nothing to do with any terrorists. [redacted] had never heard Althumairy give any speeches to mobilize people to act against the United States. Althumairy actually always called for brotherly behavior among Muslims and worked hard to convince people not to harm anyone. [redacted] was shocked when Althumairy was denied entry back into the United States when he had traveled to Saudi Arabia. [redacted] does not know why Althumairy could not re-enter the United States.

[redacted] [redacted] also described Mohammed Al-Muhanna as a moderate individual. At the King Fahd Mosque, Al-Muhanna only gave sermons on the basic tenets of Islam. He never gave any speeches energizing others to hate Westerners. Al-Muhanna had a disagreement at the King Fahd Mosque which resulted in his leaving his position and the United States.

King Fahd Mosque

[redacted] [redacted] does attend Friday afternoon prayers at the mosque. However he said he rarely goes to the mosque at other times because he is so busy transporting his children back and forth from [redacted] to their universities [redacted] when he commutes.

[redacted] (P) has never heard anyone at the mosque give sermons calling for deaths to Christians and Jews. He has never heard anyone talking about jihad at the mosque.

[redacted] There had been some individuals who split off from the mosque but it had nothing to do with their extreme views. (P) explained that these individuals wanted to create a school which the administration of the mosque did not want due to financial considerations. These individuals then started the school at a small house on Overland Avenue near Palms Boulevard in West Los Angeles. However the location was moved recently. Arabic and the Koran are taught to children at this school. (P) said this is not a mosque but only a school. He did know the names of those who started the school previously but could not remember them now. When asked again who was there, (P) mentioned that (P) from Yemen but (P) heard that he had been arrested for something.

Tabligh Jamaat

[redacted] (P) described Tabligh Jamaat as a sect of Islam whose purpose is to remind negligent Muslims about their duties to the faith. This would be accomplished through small group sessions. (P) acknowledged that there were Tabligh Jamaat members who would come to Los Angeles but he could not recall any of their names. This is not a violent group.

[redacted] (P) was also asked about the Muslim Brotherhood. He said they were a group formed in Egypt in the 1930's. He does not know anyone from this group currently in the United States.

Knowledge of Foreign Countries

[redacted] (P) has never been to Pakistan and is not in contact with anyone there. Sometimes he will meet persons from Pakistan in ethnic stores but he does not know Pakistanis personally. (P) knows of no recent arrivals from Pakistan nor anyone else who is in contact with terrorists or terrorist supporters in Pakistan. (P) is not familiar with Waziristan or Waziribad.

[redacted] (P) has never been to Afghanistan and is not in contact with anyone there.

[redacted] The last international travel [redacted] had taken was to return to his home country of [redacted] in 1991 to visit a brother and sister there.

[redacted] [redacted] had heard of the [redacted] but never had any contact with them and never knew anyone who did.

[redacted] [redacted] is not aware of any locations either in the United States or other countries where one could obtain training in weapons or military tactics. [redacted] himself has never served in the military nor has he received military type training.

Wahhabism

[redacted] When asked about anyone he knew who followed Wahhabism, [redacted] said that description is a misnomer since many people believe that Wahhabis are extremists. He said that actually they are some of the most gentle people because they follow the Koran and the Koran does not encourage violence towards others. [redacted] then began to explain the origins of the Wahhabis.

Other Information

[redacted] [redacted] does not know anyone who has rented or purchased any heavy vehicles. He does not know anyone who has a commercial license to drive heavy vehicles or transport hazardous materials. He has no information about any purchasing or renting airplanes.

[redacted] [redacted] does not know anyone who is in the United States illegally. When asked if he knew anyone who had gained U.S. citizenship through a sham marriage, he said that over two years ago he heard of someone from Algeria, whose name he could not recall, who was deported because of this.

[redacted] When asked if he knew anyone who supported jihad by violent actions, [redacted] said he did not. However he had read about those in Afghanistan who fought against the Russians when they invaded the country. But [redacted] did not know anyone personally. [redacted] said that he does not believe in violence or terrorism as that is not the Muslim way. He knows no one who preaches violence or advocates terrorism. (P) said that his family lives in the United States so he would be against terrorist actions because they could end up being victims. When asked if he would contact the FBI should he hear of anyone who would talk about violent actions, (P) said that he would first try to talk to this individual himself and then enlist the aid of a Muslim religious leader. He finally admitted that he would probably call the FBI.

[redacted] (P) said that he is very busy commuting the (P) (P) each way from his home in (P) to the Consulate. This includes dropping his children off at their college classes. After work, he waits until his children are done with their classes and studies then brings them back home. Therefore he arrives back to his residence late in the evening. When asked why he lives in (P) if he works in West Los Angeles, (P) said that (P) (P). Because of this, (P) said he does not have time to do much else. Therefore he does not do any traveling around California.

[redacted] SA (S) noted that (P) had a degree in (P) but is not working in that field. (P) acknowledged that his work at the Consulate is as (P) and that he just started working for the Consulate long ago and just stayed with it. (Comment: (P) (P) (P).

[redacted] [redacted] (Comment: (G) has reported that at least one of (P) (P-1) (P-1)

[redacted] When asked about his immigration status, (P) said he has legal permanent residence (LPR) status and is working on getting the rest of his family LPR status. He acknowledged that he got his LPR status through the diversity (lottery) program. (P) his children were born in the United States: (P) (P-1)

[redacted] (P) said he would be willing to talk with the FBI again. He gave his number at the Consulate as (310) 479-6000, extension (P). He refused to provide his home telephone number. He said that he has an e-mail address but rarely uses

>

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted] (F) 09/22/2004

it and refused to provide it. (Comment: (P) home telephone number is (P-1)
(P-1)

[redacted] Descriptive Data

Name: (P)
Aka:

Sex: Male
Race: (P)
DOB: (P-1) (P)
POB: (P)
Hair:
Eyes:
Height:
Weight:
CA D/L: (P-1)
SOC: (P-1)
CA SID: (P-1) (P)
(P)

Immigration: (P-1) (J-3)
(J-3)

Citizenship: (P)
Passport:
Address:

Vehicles:

Spouse: (P)

Children:
(P-1)

[redacted]

(P)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT PENTTBOM INVESTIGATIVE TEAM, D.C.

[redacted] Read and clear.

[redacted]

>

[redacted]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] Read and clear.

◆◆

[redacted]

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

[redacted]

Official Record

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

[redacted]

Title: [redacted] Omar Al-Bayoumi visited Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi twice at their residence

Date: 06/10/2016

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041
DATE: 10-04-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CC: (S)

From: SAN DIEGO
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

[redacted] **Case ID #:** (F) [redacted] [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE - [redacted] ZAID, MIHDAR, MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR - AKA MOHDAR ABDULLAH CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Interview of Abdusattar Shaikh regarding Al-Bayoumi

(G)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/26/2007

Details:

[redacted] [redacted] On 06/03/2016, (S) interviewed Dr. Abdusattar U. Shaikh at Zion Hospital, Kaiser Permanente, San Diego, California. Dr. Shaikh is suffering from congestive heart failure and was admitted to the hospital the previous day. Dr. Shaikh called (S) and requested that he be visited.

[redacted] [redacted] During the course of the visit, Dr. Shaikh said he found it hard to believe the Saudi's would hire a stupid person like Omar Al-Bayoumi. Dr. Shaikh told (S) that he knows Al-Bayoumi very well and that

[redacted]

he is stupid. (S) asked if Dr. Shaikh remembers them ever visiting Khalid Al-Midhar and/or Nawaf Al-Hazmi at Dr. Shaikh's residence. Dr. Shaikh recalled Al-Bayoumi visiting them on two occasions and they spoke Arabic. Dr. Shaikh doesn't have full comprehension of Arabic and doesn't recall what they were talking about.

[redacted] [redacted] Dr. Shaikh invited (S) to have lunch in the near future. Dr. Shaikh is hoping to be released soon, although he said he has had about fifteen falls in the previous week due to dizziness from low blood pressure.

[redacted] [redacted] Dr. Shaikh said he recently received another E-mail from (P) (P) of 60 minutes, and that they still want to interview him about 9/11. (Dr. Shaikh owns a house in La Mesa and two of the hijackers lived with him at the residence in 2000.)

♦♦

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2032
DATE: 10-01-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Filing and Security

Primary Case: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Serial Number:

[redacted] **Case Title:** [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE - MOHDAR

Serialized: 09/13/2017

Category: Full Investigation
Initiated: 10/26/2007

Details

Serial #: [redacted] (F)

Type: EC

From: SAN DIEGO

To: COUNTERTERRORISM
SAN DIEGO
WASHINGTON FIELD
LOS ANGELES
NEW YORK

[redacted]

Document Title: [redacted] INTERVIEW REGARDING ANWAR AULAQI, MOHDAR ABDULLAH

Approval Date: 3/2/2006

[redacted] **Classification:** [redacted]

Contents [redacted] (G), (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(G), (S)

(F), (G)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID, aka
Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Synopsis: [redacted] Interview regarding Anwar Aulaqi, Mohdar Abdullah and Sharif ElArbi.

(G)

(G)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) believed Aulaqi to currently be in Yemen. Although described Aulaqi as anti-Western, the only Aulaqi lecture (A), (G), (J-1) remembered being truly anti-Western was the 2002 Ramadan speech Aulaqi gave when he returned to San Diego from the east coast. During the 2002 speech, Aulaqi told the crowd that good Muslims would never live in the United States. Good Muslims would move out of the United States to live in a Muslim country. Aulaqi denounced the west and called the United States infidels, and said that any Muslim who stayed in America would be living in sin. (A), (G), (J-1) didn't know anyone who was [redacted] currently in contact with Aulaqi. (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Aulaqi organized the paint ball outings.
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1) Most of the people who went paint ball shooting were from the Masjid Ar-Ribat. (A), (G), (J-1) some of [redacted] the people who went paint balling took it very seriously and talked of it being training for jihad. The people would run around yelling "Allah akbar," or God is great, like they were fighting jihad. Aulaqi did not say anything about the paint ball shooting being training for jihad. Aulaqi did not encourage or discourage the paint ballers to act like they were training for jihad. Other members of the paint ball group went just to have fun and shoot paint ball guns (A), (G), (J-1) could not remember the [redacted] names of anyone who went shooting paint guns. Although Aulaqi believed it was un-Islamic for Muslims to get their picture taken, he appeared in all of the paint ball group photographs
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) did not believe that there was any real organization to how the cliques of people who attend the mosque were formed. There was no organized youth group or study group. The most influential clique is made up of Arabs who speak Arabic. (P) and Anwar Aulaqi were members of this clique. Their clique likes to have tea in the upstairs electronics room.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) knew Mohdar Abdullah from attending the Masjid Ar-Ribat (A), (G), (J-1) did not know Mohdar personally but he [redacted] saw Mohdar all the time at the Masjid Ar-Ribat. Mohdar (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and was very good friends with (P) Mohdar was one of the paint ballers who yelled "Allah akbar" and acted like he was training for jihad.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) recognized the photograph of Nawaf Alhazmi as someone he frequently saw at the Masjid Ar-Ribat but he wasn't sure of his name. Nawaf and Mohdar were very close. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) believed that (P) was helping either Mohdar or Nawaf learn English. (P) tried to get one of them enrolled in English classes because they didn't know English at all. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) could not be sure if (P) was helping Mohdar or Nawaf. (SD comment: Investigation at San Diego has determined that Abdullah was fluent in English when he arrived in the United States in late 1998. Investigation has also determined that one reason Nawaf Alhazmi failed out of flight school in San Diego was because he couldn't speak English.) (A), (G), (J-1) did not think that [redacted] Mohdar and (P) had worked their way into (P) s clique at the Masjid Ar-Ribat. Although they were friendly with each other, there appeared to be a status difference between (P) clique and (P) and Mohdar. (A), (G), (J-1) described Sharif [redacted] as a pledge who was always trying to get into (P) s fraternity.

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) (S)

(A), (G), (J-1) Albayoumi was a Saudi who lived in San Diego for a while in the late 1990's then moved to England.

(A), (G), (J-1) (S)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) described a well educated bearded member of the Tablighi Jamaat named (P). [redacted] When SA's provided (A), (G), (J-1) with the last name (P) (A), (G), (J-1) immediately recognized the name and confirmed (P) as being [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) considered (P) to be two faced. (P) presented a very moderate Islamic face when he was under public scrutiny, but when he was in private he was anti-Western. (P) gave the prayer lecture at the Muslim Community Center of San Diego on 02/24/2006. (P) told the members of the mosque that they should stay grounded in Islam and be careful not to get too involved in western thinking. Before 09/11/2001, (P) and his friend (P) LNU liked to shoot guns and talk about jihad. (A), (G), (J-1)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] For information only.

(G)

No Entities to display.

(G)

(G)

Routing

Drafted By: (S)
Approved By:

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2026
DATE: 10-12-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Filing and Security

Primary Case:

Serial Number:

Serialized:

Case Title:

Additional Case: (F) [redacted]

Serial Number: (G)

Serialized: 10/29/2001

Case Title: [redacted] [redacted] MOHAMED, OMAR, ABDI

Legal Caveats: Document Restricted to Case Participants

Details

Serial #: (F)

Type: FD302

From: SAN DIEGO

To: NEW YORK

Document Title: (O-1)

Approval Date: 10/30/2001

Classification: [redacted]

Contents 10/31/2001

[redacted]

(F)

(O-1)

(C-1) [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] (C-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (D)

On September 26, 2001, a search was conducted, pursuant to federal search warrant, of the office utilized by Omar Al Bayoumi at the Kurdish Mosque, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. Documents seized during the search include a telephone list with an entry Omar AlKhateeb with telephone numbers, [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also seized were notations on scrap papers for Omar Al Khatib, pager number [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also noted for Omar Al Khatib is an Email address: [redacted] (P-1) Another notation pairs Omar Al Khatib with another name, Al Ghannem or Ghanem, at telephone number [redacted] (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] (G)

Routing

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)
Approved By:

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 04/06/2010

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S) [redacted]

New York **Attn:**

(G) [redacted] **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Washington Field **Attn:**

From: San Diego
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
CT - SUNNI EXTREMIST - MIDDLE EAST

[redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 04/06/2010

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
ADEL MOHAMMED A ALSADHAN
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (J-2)
(J-2)

(G)

[redacted]

(F)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 04/06/2010

(F)

Details: [redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C. for many years. (J-2) (J-2) the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA). The IIASA was a Saudi funded educational institute in Fairfax, Virginia, affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (Analyst note: subjects FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY and ADEL AL-SADHAN reportedly attended IMSIU in the 1990s; AL-JARRAH, in his role at the SAE, reportedly assigned Saudi imams in the United States, including assigning AL-THUMAIRY to the King Fahad Mosque; AL-SADHAN reportedly worked for AL-JARRAH at the SAE, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (J-3)

(F)

[redacted]) (G) (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) was the head of the Islamic Affairs Department at the RESA. (J-2) (J-2)

Background regarding IIASA:

[redacted] Extensive information regarding IIASA is summarized on (F) Relevant excerpts follow: (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]) (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI (O-1) (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

[redacted] (G) stated that the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and (P) (P) with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. (G) was not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

[redacted] Bank records and documents seized from the search of IIASA indicated a significant financial relationship between IIASA and several entities in Mombasa, Kenya. Analysis of information provided by (O-1) indicated that each of these Kenyan entities was associated in some manner with SIRAJUR RAHMAN NADWI. Information provided by (O-1) revealed that in February 2000, a walk-in to a United States Embassy in Africa alleged that NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[redacted] In 2003, NADWI's P.O. Box number, 087764, in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. As of 2003, telephone 25411495803, registered to NADWI, was found in the address book of ABDOLRAHMAN BARZANJEE, an Islamic extremist who is claimed to be the head of Ansar Al-Islam (AI) in Europe. (Analyst note: BARZANJEE was the (A), (G), (J-1); he attended a party in San Diego for Flight 77 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR in 2000 and was paid by OMAR ALBAYOUMI for services as a visiting imam at the Kurdish Community Islamic Center.)

[redacted] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN, (A), (J-1), (G), (D) and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F). ALNOSHAN (J-3) (J-3) and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) (F).

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 04/06/2010

Currency Transaction Reports and (J-2) **regarding AL-JARRAH:**

[redacted] On 01/09/1998, MUSAED AL JARRAH, (P-1) McLean, VA 22102, date of birth (P-1)/1960, cashed out negotiable instruments in the amount of $15,000.00 at Riggs Bank. The account number was 17191595. AL JARRAH indicated the transaction was conducted on behalf of his employer, the Embassy of Saudi Arabia (J-2) (Analyst note: (O-1)

(U) (J-2)

(U) (J-2)

(J-2)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 04/06/2010

(J-2)

[redacted] (J-2)
(J-2)

(J-3)

[redacted] (A), (D), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] (J-2)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 04/06/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

♦♦

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2040
DATE: 08-31-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Official Record

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

[redacted] **Title:** [redacted] Interview of Abdusattar Shaikh **Date:** 10/07/2015

From: SAN DIEGO
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: (F) [redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] [redacted]
(F) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE - [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Abdusattar Shaikh contacted (S) [redacted] and provided information regarding 60 Minutes TV requesting an interview.

(G) [redacted]

(G) [redacted]

Details:

[redacted] [redacted] On Wednesday 09/30/2015, Abdusattar U. Shaikh, DOB (P-1) [redacted]/1935, was interviewed at his residence, (P) [redacted] Lemon Grove, CA, by FBI (S) [redacted]. Shaikh had contacted the FBI and requested the interview be conducted at his residence.

[redacted]

[redacted]
Title: [redacted] Interview of Abdusattar Shaikh
Re: (F) 10/07/2015

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh said he had recently received a card which was placed on the front door of his residence addressed to Dr. A. Shaikh. The card was dated 9/9/15 and read "Hope you're feeling better. Looking forward to talking soon. Best regards, (P) 60 Minutes".

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh said he has continued to correspond via E-mail with 60 Minutes, and they are trying to convince him to be interviewed for their television show. Shaikh has told them he feels too sick to grant them an interview, but he told (S) that he may be lured by a financial incentive, of which he didn't disclose.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh is suffering from what he described as low blood pressure. He said he's been in and out of the hospital eight times over the past year. In December he will become 80 years old and he said he feels very weak. Shaikh said he spends most of his time at home reading. Shaikh has hired a friend who takes him back and forth to his medical appointments.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh said his reason for contacting the FBI is to advise that he is considering going through with the 60 Minutes interview, and he wants to let the FBI know and not be surprised because he doesn't want to upset the FBI.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh didn't mention the reason 60 Minutes is re-exploring his role in the events of September 11.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh told (S) that in 2000, 9/11 Hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi lived in the rooms upstairs in his residence. They would often come downstairs to use his prayer rug near the living room. Shaikh said the two men refused to use his house telephone, even though he gave them permission. Shaikh said that about once a week, they would have a very loud and long argument with each other. He said the arguments were in Arabic, and in that Shaikh doesn't understand Arabic, he didn't know what they were yelling about.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh said he didn't charge them rent and let them know they could live there for free. He said they insisted on paying $300 a month.

Title: [redacted] [redacted] Interview of Abdusattar Shaikh
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/07/2015

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh said he has had other people living at the residence since the above two Saudi hijackers. He said he was victimized financially by two Pakistani brothers who lived there afterwards. The Pakistani's stole several items from his house, and he later learned they had applied for, and received a credit card under Shaikh's name unbeknownst to him. They were able to hide it from him by taking in the mail, some of which he never saw. Shaikh was later advised by the bank that they had charged over $180,000 on the card. Shaikh didn't want to disclose their names to Law Enforcement because he feels vulnerable living alone in his house and fears retaliation if they found out he reported them to authorities. He said they left the U.S., but he believes one of them is returning soon. Shaikh said he may advise [redacted] (S) with their names at a later date.

[redacted] [redacted] Shaikh will remain in touch with [redacted] (S) and advise him of any new developments.

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(Rev. 05-01-2008)
232dig01.cc

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2033
DATE: 02-23-2021

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/19/2008

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

Los Angeles **Attn:**

From: San Diego
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F) [redacted] (G) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

Synopsis: [redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (G)

Background [redacted] In 2004, FBI Los Angeles began reviewing PENTTBOM leads and related investigations. During the investigation, a video surveillance footage from the Los Angeles International Airport, LAX, was discovered that shows Mohdar Abdullah, [redacted] (F), together with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar inside the terminal area at LAX. This footage also shows an unknown male, UNSUB, who appeared to have accompanied the three listed above in the terminal area. The UNSUB appeared to be holding an unidentified object in his hand. To date, FBI Los Angeles' investigation has not identified the UNSUB.

[redacted]

[redacted] FBI San Diego previously made arrangements with (P) and at his request with his attorney, (P) in order to show (P) a photo of the UNSUB for possible identification purposes or related information to the UNSUB. This was based on (P) being an (P) and (P) with Mohdar Abdullah. In addition, (P) met and was acquainted with Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar when they resided in San Diego, California.

Details: [redacted] On 08/14/2008, (S) and (S) FBI-SD, met with (P) in the presence of his attorney, (P) in a public place in San Diego, California. After advising (P) of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, (P) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) met and was an acquaintance of Mohdar Abdullah from associating within the San Diego Muslim community and attending the Masjid Ar Ribat. (P) and Abdullah later (P) apartment on Saranac Street in La Mesa, California, NFI. Mohdar brought Nawaf Al Hazmi to the Saranac apartment for visits. (Agent note: It should be noted, (P), California, during the same time Al Hazmi worked at the Texaco for a short period of time in 2000). (P) stated he was not aware of any prior knowledge of the attacks on 9/11 or any terrorist activities by Nawaf Al Hazmi or Khalid Al Mihdhar. (P) was not aware of any connections to terrorist activities by Mohdar Abdullah or himself. (P) and his attorney did not want to go over questions that have already been asked in the past by the FBI and the United States Attorney's office.

[redacted] (P) was shown two pages of still photo's of the LAX UNSUB mentioned above, taken from the video surveillance tape. (P) said he did not recognize the individual nor could he provide any further details regarding any association of the UNSUB with Mohdar Abdullah or the 9/11 hijackers. (P) did not see the UNSUB at the Saranac apartment mentioned above nor at the residence of the hijackers, at the time in 2000, located on Mount Vernon Street, San Diego, California.

[redacted] (P) and (P) spoke in length of what (P) went through and what he has been going through since (P) (P) back in 2001. (P) discussed conspiracy theories as to who was really responsible for the introduction of the hijackers to San Diego. (P) believed Omar Al Bayoumi had a major role in the introduction of the hijackers to the San Diego Muslim community. (P) was asked if there was anything he realized now that he didn't realize back in 2000 relative to the hijackers terrorist activities while they resided in San Diego. (P) felt it was odd to him that the hijacker's, who were students, always had money and never went to school. (P) was asked, was it strange to him now that the hijacker's always seemed to get around without difficulty when they were not familiar with the Western culture nor could they speak or write the English language. (P) agreed with the question and commented there was always people who would help them, which is not always the case with everyone, NFI. The conversation went on, however, no pertinent information was obtained from this point on.

[redacted] Agents returned to (P) (with a FD-597 receipt), on plastic bag containing some paperwork, pamphlets and what appeared to be a Quran that had smoke and water damage from a fire which occurred at a (P) store where (P) had been working and residing. The store was located in (P), California.

[redacted] On 08/19/2008, (P) telephonically contacted (S) (S) and advised that he, (P) and (P) had been reminiscing about the UNSUB in the photo's shown to (P) on 08/14/2008. (P) asked if the FBI had compared the UNSUB photo to all the employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles in order to determine if the UNSUB was a current or former employee. When asked why, (P) said because it was well known, NFI, that Omar Al Bayoumi regularly visited the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and was in fact an employee of the Saudi Government the entire time period Al Bayoumi resided in San Diego, California. (P) emphasized again that Al Bayoumi played a key role in getting (P) who were detained as Material Witnesses, (agent note: investigation previously identified Material Witnesses as Mohdar Abdullah, (P) (P) Yazeed Al Salmi and Roamez Noman), introduced and involved with the 9/11 hijackers.

[redacted] (P) said he still does not believe the alleged story that Al Bayoumi coincidentally met the hijackers at a restaurant in Los Angeles was true. (P) volunteered a story that he had telephonically contacted the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. to ask for assistance, monetary or legal assistance, with the Material Witnesses at the time (P). (P) spoke with the legal counsel at the Saudi Embassy named Siddique LNU, who said the Saudi Embassy could only assist in the representation of Yazeed Al Salmi, because he was a Saudi citizen. (P) questioned (P) as to why the Embassy could not assist all (P) because all of (P) had become involved with the 9/11 hijackers through a Saudi citizen named Omar Al Bayoumi. (P) told (P) he was very familiar with Omar Al Bayoumi and Al Bayuomi's role, NFI, but (P) continued to deny (P) any assistance with his (P) (P) thought about that statement today and now questioned why (P) was so familiar with Al Bayoumi coming from the legal counsel in the Saudi Arabian Embassy and because of Al Bayoumi's consistent visits to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los

Angeles. (P) again stressed that the statements that he, (P) read about in Al Bayoumi's interview by the U.S. Government exonerates Al Bayoumi of any wrong doing.

[redacted] (P) would not comment if (P) had mentioned any information in connection to the above statements, other than (P) said that he and (P) had talked about the photo's again, NFI.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Discretionary)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] [redacted] If not already performed, compare the LAX UNSUB photo with current or former employees in June 2000 at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California, for possible identification of the LAX UNSUB.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 04-26-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/12/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

[redacted] **Case ID #:** [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] (G)
(A), (G), (J-1), (P)
(USPER)

Synopsis: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(G)

[redacted] **Preliminary Inquiry Instituted:** (G)
(G) .

Details: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (P) Al Salmi and (P) were arrested as material witnesses in the PENTTBOMB investigation.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (P) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

and KARAWIA. As a result of the interview, (A), (G), (J-1) did not provide any [redacted] relevant information regarding the questions outlined in (G) (G)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) Saranac address (P) Mohdar Abdullah, however, he did not recall Nawaf Al Hazmi or Khalid Almidhar visiting the apartment. (P) was told that the FBI had determined that Al Hazmi and Almidhar spent a substantial amount of time with Mohdar Abdullah at the apartment between August and September 2000. (P) and suggested Al Hazmi and Almidhar visited Mohdar Abdullah when he was not at the apartment.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) with Al Hazmi. He described Al Hazmi as a person who didn't talk much and kept to himself. He said that on one occasion he ate lunch with Mohdar Abdullah and Al Hazmi at (P) California. He could not recall the extent of the conversation nor the name of the restaurant.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) advised that he would be willing to be contacted in the future, however, he didn't think he would be able to provide any relevant information.

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 08/12/2004

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT Washington D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) read and clear. (G) for information only.

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[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S), (P-1)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 04-27-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 05/18/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G), (S)

(S)
PENTTBOMB TEAM

Los Angeles **Attn:** (S)

San Diego **Attn:**

From: Atlanta
(G)
Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

[redacted] **Case ID #:** [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
A.K.A. MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDULLAH;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
DO:SD

Synopsis: [redacted] To report results of interview of (P)
(G)
[redacted]

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (G)

Encloses: [redacted] For San Diego are California Department of Motor Vehicles photo's shown to (P) to include, Mohdar Abdullah, Omar Bakarbashat, Ellsworth Black, (P) and (P). Also for San Diego are notes from the interview of (P) inmate history as provided by Atlanta Federal Prison.

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Atlanta
[redacted] Re: [redacted] (F), 05/18/2004

Details: [redacted] (P) date of birth (P) (P) address, 601 McDonough Boulevard South East, Atlanta, Georgia 30315 (Atlanta Federal Prison), Inmate number, (P) was interviewed. Also present during the interview was Special Agent (SA) (S) [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, (P) provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) understood English and Arabic. He also spoke English and Arabic. The interview was conducted in both English and Arabic.

[redacted] (P) was married in San Francisco in 2001 to (P) (phonetic). She is currently residing in California along with their seven year-old daughter, (P) He has six brothers and five sisters. He was born in (P) He attended some college in (P) with an emphasis in (P). He has some experience as a chef. (P) has been in the United States for 15 years. He said he "loves" the United States and has no animosity towards the United States nor does he sympathize or associate with any groups or individuals who support terrorism.

[redacted] (P) has been incarcerated in the Atlanta Federal Prison since April 20, 2004. Prior to Atlanta, he was incarcerated in Oklahoma City and El Reno, Oklahoma, San Diego and San Bernadino, California. (P) advised that some of his incarcerations were considered "transfer stations." Since arriving in Atlanta, he has had no visitors and has called no one. He keeps in contact with his wife via mail.

[redacted] (P) advised that he knows captioned subject by the name of "MOHDAR." He knew MOHDAR while they were incarcerated together in the "CCA" Immigration Detention Facility in San Diego, California in 2003. MOHDAR's detention cell number was 107, while (P) cell number was (P). He spoke with MOHDAR infrequently. He did not like MOHDAR and described him as "childish, crazy and he talked too much." (P) was unable to provide any specific examples. He said MOHDAR really wanted to get married to an American woman, though he did not know why.

(P) volunteered the name of a man he called "Mr. Black." BLACK lived in cell number 105 in CCA. He thought highly of BLACK. BLACK helped him write and speak English. He said BLACK told him that he served in the Vietnam war and in Desert Storm. (P) said BLACK also did not like MOHDAR. BLACK told (P) that MOHDAR "talked too much." (P) said MOHDAR gave BLACK some immigration-related papers and asked for assistance from BLACK with some type of immigration problem.

[redacted]

BLACK gave the papers back to MOHDAR and refused to help MOHDAR. (P) said he spoke to BLACK "through the cell walls."

[redacted] (P) described a time in 2003, while incarcerated in CCE, when BLACK, MOHDAR, another inmate and he were outside in the "yard" talking. MOHDAR was talking with BLACK and (P) was talking with another inmate. He overheard MOHDAR tell BLACK that he (MOHDAR) gave a ride to two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers. He told BLACK that he gave "them" a ride from San Diego to Los Angeles. (P) does not know any other details regarding this ride as alleged by MOHDAR. This is the first and last time he heard MOHDAR say anything about a terrorism-related matter. (P) does not recall talking further with either MOHDAR or BLACK about this situation. (P) recalls someone telling him that MOHDAR provided the FBI with the information about giving a ride to two of the 09/11/2001 hijackers.

[redacted] Throughout the course of this interview, (P) was cooperative and repeatedly denied being involved in or knowing anyone involved in terrorist-related activities.

[redacted] (P) was shown five pictures, marked "1" through "5." He identified the photographs as follows:

Photograph #1: "OMAR" LAST NAME UNKNOWN. He said OMAR LNU's last name was difficult to pronounce. He said OMAR knows MOHDAR very well because they are both from Yemen.

Photograph #2: "Mr. Black."

Photograph #3: "Mohdar."

Photograph #4: (P) (phonetic). (P) believed (P) is from (P).

Photograph #5: "MOHAMED" LNU. MOHAMED LNU is from Somalia; has spoken with Mohdar and had some immigration problems.

The following information was obtained from (P) and by personal observations:

Name: (P)
Alias: (P)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Atlanta
[redacted] Re: [redacted] (F), 05/18/2004

DOB: (P-1) (P)
Height: (P)
Weight:
Eyes: (P)
Hair:
Nationality: (P)
City of Birth: (P)
Inmate number (P)
Tattoos: (P)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

[redacted] For information only.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] For information only.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 3: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] For information only.

♦♦

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S), (P-1)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2029
DATE: 04-27-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 09/16/2004

To: San Diego

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)
[redacted]

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD ALMIHDAR ZAID;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] Interview of (P)
[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Details:** [redacted] (P) born (P) (P) social security account number (P-1) (P) La Jolla, California 92037,

[redacted]

home telephone number (P) cellular telephone number (P) (P) was interviewed at his place of business, (P), Inc., (P), La Jolla, California, telephone number (P), on 09/02/2004 by (S) (S) informed (P) that this interview was in regard to certain names he mentioned in a previous interview with him on 10/11/2002 by (S) and (S). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, (P) provided the following information:

[redacted] [redacted] (P) advised (P) who speaks Arabic, was living with weird guys before renting from (P) (P) recalls seeing Khalid AlMidhar, Omar AlBayoumi, (P) and Mohdar Abdullah when (P) visited (P) apartment for dinner one night. (P) did not really talk to anyone at the apartment other than (P). (P) exchanged the usual salutations with all the other men present, and he described AlBayoumi as a "fat guy" who was "crazy". (P) is no longer renting from (P) (P) moved out of (P) property in July 2003. (P) currently resides in Navajo, California.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) advised he will provide (S) with any information (P) obtains from his visits to any mosque, as well as any information he obtains from his friend, (P).

♦♦

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2039
DATE: 04-27-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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OFFICIAL RECORD

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

[redacted] **Title:** [redacted] Interview of (P) **Date:** 07/24/2014

CC: (S)

(G)

From: SAN DIEGO
(G)
Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

[redacted] **Case ID #:** (F) (A), (G), (J-1), (P)

(F) [redacted] [redacted] ANWAR NASSER AULAQI;
- SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST
(F) ALBAYOUMI, OMAR, AHMED -
ZAID, MIHDAR, MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR -
AKA MOHDAR ABDULLAH (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] **Synopsis:** [redacted] On May 13, 2014, (P) was interviewed in person by FBI-SD in San Diego, California.

(G)

Full Investigation Initiated: (G)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. [redacted] interview notes of (P)

[redacted]

[redacted] Title: [redacted] Interview of [redacted]
[redacted] Re: [redacted] 07/24/2014

Details:

[redacted] On May 13, 2014, [redacted] hereinafter [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted], California DL [redacted] SSN [redacted] cellular telephone [redacted] was interviewed in person by [redacted] and [redacted] FBI-San Diego, at the Law Office of [redacted] (attorney for [redacted], [redacted], San Diego, California, [redacted]. This interview was previously arranged via an agreement between [redacted] and FBI-San Diego. [redacted] voluntarily provided the following:

[redacted] In 1989, the first [redacted] immigrants began arriving in San Diego, California. These [redacted]'s initially attended prayer at the Masjid Al Ribat. At the time, the individual who had a huge influence on the [redacted] population in San Diego was [redacted] (previously identified in Pentbom investigation, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] was a [redacted] who was employed as a [redacted] [redacted] and also the owner of the [redacted]. [redacted] was allowed [redacted] for the Masjid Al Ribat. [redacted] does not know exactly how [redacted] became such an influential person at the mosque but thought it ensued because of his influence on the [redacted] immigrants. [redacted] was aware of but could not comment on any details as to [redacted] monthly travel to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California. [redacted] was aware of other leaders for San Diego area mosques, particularly Masjid Al Ribat and the Masjid Abu Bakr, who would make monthly trips to the Saudi Consulate. [redacted] claimed to not have any details of the purposes for these trips.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] directed agents to Omar Al Bayoumi, [redacted] pending), stating Al Bayoumi knew everything related to the 9/11 hijackers. According to [redacted] Al Bayoumi brought Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar, (previously identified as two of the 9/11 hijackers on American Airlines flight 77), down to San Diego, California, from Los Angeles, California. [redacted] saw Al Bayoumi and the hijackers at the Masjid Al Ribat because [redacted] was one of the administrators of the mosque during that time period, circa 2000. (P) (P) has continued to (P) since the establishment of the mosque. (P) did not like Al Bayoumi because he felt Al Bayoumi was not a genuine person nor would he tell the truth. (P) concluded this based on in person conversations and watching Al Bayoumi interact with everyone at the mosque. Al Bayoumi would come once a week to the Masjid Al Ribat and recite poetry. (P) (P) never felt Al Bayoumi was a part of the mosque. However, at one point, ((P) could not remember the date), Al Bayoumi invited about 15 Sheikhs for a two week visit to San Diego. The arrangements for the visiting Sheikhs were handled by Al Bayoumi from the Masjid Abu Bakr. The Sheikhs visited most of the mosques located in the San Diego area. (P) could not recall the identities of the visiting Sheikhs, other than they were all well respected from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (KSA).

[redacted] It was (P) opinion that the KSA no longer allowed it's Saudi Arabian students to attend the Masjid Al Ribat. This was based on the 9/11 hijackers attending the Masjid Al Ribat and the negative attention the mosque endured after the events of 9/11. Additionally, Anwar Aulaqi, (F) pending), was the Imam of the mosque, Mohdar Abdullah, (F) pending), and his roommates being detained by the FBI at that time period for their association with the hijackers. (P) was asked to comment or provide more details in regards to the association between the 9/11 hijackers, Aulaqi, Mohdar and the others. (P) denied knowing any specific information that could assist the FBI in the investigation of the 9/11 attacks.

[redacted] The administrators at the Masjid Al Ribat have obtained a restraining order against an individual named (P) LNU. This person was originally from Jordan who applied with the U.S. Immigration service for a Green Card. The Immigration service has not issued him a Green Card. The administrators don't want (P) to attend the mosque due to his disruptive behavior. (P) was asked to provide more details on (P) in which he could not. (P) would report more information to interviewing agents regarding (P) at a later date.

[redacted] Title: [redacted] Interview of (P)
[redacted] Re: (F) , 07/24/2014

[redacted] (P) feels individuals, who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, are doing what ever it takes to remove (P) from his position at the mosque and take over the Masjid Al Ribat. (P) claimed the Imam's at the Masjid Abu Bakr were the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. (P) did not provide any further information regarding the above statement.

[redacted] The Masjid Al Ribat has fired it's Imam and is in the process of hiring a replacement. The prayer at the mosque will be run by different substitute Imam's until a permanent Imam is found.

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FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] 09/04/2015 Follow-Up Interview with [redacted] (P) **Date:** 09/29/2015

CC: [redacted] (S)

From: SAN DIEGO
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted] ZAID, MIHDAR, MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR - AKA MOHDAR ABDULLAH CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: [redacted] 09/04/2015 Follow-Up Interview with [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (G)

Full Investigation Initiated: 05/29/2002

Details:

On 09/04/2015, [redacted] (P) DOB: [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P) was interviewed during an hour-long break in the courtyard of her her employer's office building located at [redacted] (P-1) San Diego, California. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] (P) provided the following information:

[redacted] (P) advised that she first met Hashim AL-ATTAS at [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) in in San Diego in 1995 or 1996. At the time, [redacted] (P) worked [redacted] part-time for the university's library and AL-ATTAS worked as a computer lab assistant. (P) first met AL-ATTAS when she went to the computer lab to do homework. (P) recalled that AL-ATTAS previously drove an old Ford car and offered to give her a ride. (P) described AL-ATTAS as always smiling, well-loved by everybody and always helping people.

[redacted] AL-ATTAS later moved into a unit in (P) apartment complex. (P) and AL-ATTAS eventually (P) (P).

[redacted] (P) said AL-ATTAS had an older brother named Hussein who attended flight school in Florida. (P) advised that she would be able to identify a photograph of Hussein. AL-ATTAS's mother and younger brother traveled from Saudi Arabia to visit AL-ATTAS in San Diego. His mother and younger brother eventually returned to Saudi Arabia. AL-ATTAS also had an uncle from Saudi Arabia who visited him in San Diego. (P), AL-ATTAS and his uncle went to Disneyland.

[redacted] (P) learned after she and AL-ATTAS (P) that he was already engaged to one of his cousins in Saudi Arabia. AL-ATTAS and his cousin eventually married after he returned to Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] AL-ATTAS did not lead a very healthy lifestyle. He regularly ate junk food and would sit in front of his computer day and night. He would not leave the apartment much except to work. (P) said AL-ATTAS helped people to create websites. (P) said she also discovered that AL-ATTAS (P-1) on his computer. (P) advised that AL-ATTAS was not very wealthy. He had to work while he was in the U.S.

and he made good money. AL-ATTAS claimed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

[redacted] Early in 1999, AL-ATTAS told (P) that he was moving back to Saudi Arabia, explaining that his family was pressuring him to get married. AL-ATTAS and (P) (P), and (P) (P). (P) noted that she left some of her belongings behind (P)

[redacted] (P) and (P) manager for the apartment complex, later went to AL-ATTAS's apartment to retrieve (P) belongings. Two Saudi Arabian men opened the door. (P) commented that he had never seen or talked to the two men. They had placed (P) belongings by the front of the door, and they would not let her in. The two men moved out of the apartment shortly after they moved in. (P) said the two Saudi men left behind a computer and other electronics equipment when they moved out.

[redacted] (P) said she saw pictures of the two men on the news in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. She later confirmed with (P) that the men from AL-ATTAS's apartment had been involved in the 9/11 attacks. Shortly after 9/11, (P) talked to AL-ATTAS either on the phone or via chat. AL-ATTAS told (P) that he met the two Saudi men at the mosque and they needed a place to stay.

[redacted] (P) did not have any knowledge of AL-ATTAS being involved in 9/11, adding that even if he were he would not have said anything to her.

[redacted] In 2002 and 2003, AL-ATTAS tried to call (P) Later on, AL-ATTAS also tried to connect with (P) via Twitter and Facebook, but she declined his friend requests.

[redacted] (P) advised that Omar LNU, (P) LNU and (P) LNU were AL-ATTAS's closest associates when he lived in San Diego. (P) once asked AL-ATTAS where Omar LNU's money came from. AL-ATTAS replied that it came from the Saudi government (NFI). (P) recalled that (P) LNU's girlfriend, (P) LNU, spoke to AL-ATTAS right after 9/11. (P) LNU later moved to the UK.

[redacted] Writer's note: (P) LNU may be identifiable with (P), and (P) LNU may be identifiable with (P) Additionally, (P) LNU may be identifiable with (P) and Omar LNU may be identifiable Omar BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (P) said (P) lived in the same apartment before AL-ATTAS moved in, and the two men later became friends. However, (P) noted that AL-ATTAS and (P) may not have known each other very well. (P) later moved to Portland, OR.

♦♦

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

[redacted]

- 1 -

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (A), (J-1)
REASON: 1.4 (B,C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2027
DATE: 05-21-2021

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

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Investigation on at
File # Date dictated
by

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07/24/2002

On July 16 2002, (P) Voluntarily appeared at the New York Office (NYO), (P) a male white date of birth (P-1) (P) ss# (P-1) address (P) St. Clair Michigan. was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. (P) volunteered the following information:

(P) stated Avco Overseas, a Houston based company purchased its contracts with The Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) through contacts with Sheik Salih Kamel. Kamel is the principal of Dallah Al Baraka and his son Abdullah Kamel runs the Los Angeles office of Al Baraka. (P) is sure Al Bayoumi was receiving monies from Avco but was unaware of the vehicle for transferring these monies to Al Bayoumi. (P) could not remember the name of the individual at Avco who was familiar with the payments to Al Bayoumi.

(P) was present at seven meetings in the United States related to the negotiations of the award of the default Avco overseas contracts. The first meeting was held at the Avco offices in Texas during the month of February 1995. (P) explained that the representatives for Avco had an unexplained interest in the awarding of the new contracts. (P) speculated that this was the result of the corrupt relationship that existed between Salih Kamel and the Avco representatives. The second was also held during the month of February 1995, at the offices of (P) in Newport Beach California. The third meeting was held at (P) during the month of April 1995, at this meeting (P) remembers a letter being issued by Mohammed Al-Salmi of PCA to (P) (P) Of (P) outlining the financial support of Omar Al Bayoumi by [redacted] Ercan and guaranteed by PCA/AE ANSS project account. (note: [redacted] (C-1) (C-1) The additional four meetings all took place at the offices of (P) during the spring and summer of 1995. (P) usually traveled to these meetings in the U.S. with Hamid Al Rashid and Salaam Al Colie. During one of the summer meetings (P) met Al Bayoumi for the first time. (P) thought it possible that Al Bayoumi could have picked up cash from (P) (P) at that meeting.

(P) believes Sheik Salih Kamel is a Saudi national with Pakistani origins, Kamel is also extremely wealthy and has many business interests around the world To include Dallah Al-Baraka Investment and Development. (P) was not aware of any Kamel connection to the non

July 16 2002 NYO/FBI

(F)

(S)

[redacted]

profit organization Sana-Bell Inc. located in Falls Church VA. (P) was not aware of other individuals who were involved in funding Al Bayoumi.

(P) indicated that (P) would have specific details with respect to the payments made to Al Bayoumi by PCA, Avco, and (P) and at times (P) acted as the "bag man" for the PCA. (P) often complained to (P) about this roll. (P) provided a phone number for (P): (P)

(P) didn't possess any information relating to Al Bayoumi's connection to the Culver City or the purchase Madina Mosque other than that Al Bayoumi was involved with a Mosque in some manner.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2025
DATE: 10-05-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI

[redacted]

Telephone Numbers:

(U) The following information was obtained from Telephone Applications (TA) and pertains to toll records loaded in connection with telephones subscribed or utilized by Omar Al-BAYOUMI or his wife, Manal BAGADER.

U.S.

[redacted]

England

[redacted]

(U) A review of the following calls indicate a total of 141 calls made by telephone numbers associated with Omar Al-BAYOUMI to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Washington, D.C. Area.

(U) In connection with calls made to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Los Angeles, California area, there were 34 calls made.

Jan 2000

[redacted]

[redacted]

Area Code 202
Washington, D.C.

202-298-8722
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 7 times from (D) (D) (D) These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 03/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes, with one exception of an 11 minute call.

(U) In addition, one call was made to telephone number from (D) (D) and billing address (D) (D) This call was made on 08/08/1999 and was for a duration of one minute.

(P)
UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from (D) (D) (D) These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 1.6 minutes.

202-298-8806
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

USERS (P) - 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 74009

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) This number was called 4 times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made during the period of 11/24/1999 to 12/07/1998. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

?

202-298-8809
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) This call was made on 07/08/1999 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8813
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 28 times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made during the period of 03/09/2000 to 03/29/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

[redacted] (P)
UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 5 times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made during the period of 02/03/2000 to 03/22/2000. The average duration of calls was 2minutes.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from (D) (D) (D) These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 2.3 minutes.

(P)

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from (D) (D) (D) This call was made on 08/24/2000 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted]

(U) This number was called once from [redacted] This call was made on 12/03/1998 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8861
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 4 times from [redacted] These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-298-8862
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 8 times from [redacted] These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-337-2978
SAUDI ARABIA EDUCATION MISSION
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called once from [redacted] This call was made on 03/21/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

202-337-9450
SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number is the main billing number. One call was made [redacted] This call was made on 03/09/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

[redacted]

(U) This number was called 10 times (D)
(D)
(D) The average duration of calls was 2 minutes with the exception of a 24 minute call on 10/27/1998.

202-342-3700
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 30 times from (D)
(D)
(D) These calls were made during the period of 01/19/2000 to 03/24/2000. The average duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 21 times from (D)
(D)
(D) These calls were made from 07/21/1998 to 07/08/1999. The average duration of these calls was 5 minutes with the longest call being 32 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation of Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-342-3800
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
SUITE 1000
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from (D)
(D)
(D) This call was made on 01/28/2000 and was for a duration of 7 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 3 times from (D)
(D) These calls were made from 07/15/1998 to 12/03/1998. The average duration of these calls were 2 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

[redacted]

[redacted]

202-494-2777
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 2 times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made during the period of 02/18/2000 to 02/19/2000. The average duration of calls was 4 minutes.

(U) In addition, 1 call was made to this number from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) This call was 14 minutes in duration.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Khalid ASSWAILEM (202) 944-3140 and C (202) 494-2777. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-3344
NATIONAL GUARD OF SAUDI
3050 K ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/08/1999 and were for a duration of 13 and 2 minutes, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Dr. Jameel Al-Shami. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-5982
EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA CHANCERY
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/27/1999 and were for a duration of 2 and 1 minute, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a

[redacted]

[redacted]

notation to Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

(P) [redacted]

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and
similarity in line number
this telephone could possibly
be subscribed to the
Saudi Arabian Embassy

(U) This number was called once from ((D) [redacted] (D) [redacted] This call was made on 12/18/1998 and was for a duration of 15 minutes.

Area Code 310

Los Angeles Area

310-479-2752
SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

FACSIMILE LINE

(U) This number was called once from (D) [redacted] [redacted], (D) [redacted]. This call was made on 12/02/1998 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate F. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

310-479-6000
SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

USERS - Abdullah Ext 245
(P) [redacted]

(U) This number was called 11 times from (D) [redacted] [redacted], (D) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] t (D) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 02/10/2000. The average

[redacted]

[redacted]

duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, 13 calls were made from telephone number (D). These calls were made during the period of 07/11/2000 to 12/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 3 minutes with the longest call being 7 minutes.

(U) This number was called 7 times from (D) (D) These calls were made from 11/08/1998 to 01/26/1999 and the average duration was 8 minutes with the longest call being 22 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

Islamic Affairs	X240
Abdullah AWAAD	X241
Sami ASSADHAN	X246
Saad Al-JEBREEN	

(P)

YOSEF M. AL-SUMAIRY
(P)
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

BILLING NEXTEL
SSN (P-1)
US DEPT OF STATE DIPLOMAT

USER (U) (~~S~~) Fahad

(U) There were 3 calls made to this telephone (D) (D). The calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) According to ECF, Al-SUMAIRY is a Consular Officer in the office of the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (P)

SALAH AL-HATLANI
[redacted] (P)
LONG BEACH, CA

(U) There were 2 calls made to this telephone [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D). These calls were made on 12/14/2000 and 12/20/2000 and were 1 minute and 2 minute calls. calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) ChoicePoint indicates Salah ALHATLANI, SSN [redacted] (P-1) works as the Vice Counsel for the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA.

(U) For information, telephone number [redacted] (D) is [redacted] (D) at the same address. This number was called 6 times from Al-BAYOUMI during the period of 12/19/1999 to 01/24/2000.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ECF Searches

(U) The following are chronological summaries of Electronic Case File (ECF) references regarding possible ties of Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Arabian Government, Embassies or Consulates.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7792
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1103
FD302 dated 09/17/01

(U) (P) birth date (P-1) 58, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) identified Omar Al-BAYOUMI as a person who may know Nawaf Al-HAZMI. (P) described Al-BAYOUMI as influential among Saudi Arabian members of the ICSD and provided needed assistance to various students and families who needed his help. He also advised Al-BAYOUMI was a frequent traveler to Saudi Arabia. Lastly, he stated Al-BAYOUMI had moved to England several months ago to attend school in England.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7785
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1101
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7790
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1102
FD302 dated 09/19/01

(U) On 09/18/2001, (P) birth date (P-1)49, was interviewed by SA (S) (P) serves on the Board of Trustees at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD). (P) provided the following information on Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) stated Al-BAYOUMI lived in San Diego for approximately four or five years, and left to attend college in England. (P) stated some people at the ICSD believed Al-BAYOUMI was associated with the Saudi Arabian government. Al-BAYOUMI never had a steady job, though he may have worked a short time for the Saudi Arabian Airlines. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was well connected with the consulate, and seemed to get things done for others. Al-BAYOUMI was involved with funding Al Medina mosque in El Cajon. He acted as an intermediary between the Kurdish community and an

[redacted]

[redacted]

unknown wealthy Saudi Arabian man who donated funds to create the mosque. Some members of the ICSD believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque, no one has taken Al-BAYOUMI's place.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 10044**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1424
FD302 dated 09/19/2001

(U) On 09/18/2001, Mohdar M. Abdullah, (identity requested confidential) birth date (P-1) 78, was interviewed by SA (S) Abdullah advised that Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI was the Manager/Leader of a Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon and was a member of the Aviation Board for Saudi Arabia. Omar introduced Abdullah to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR at the Islam Mosque on Saranac Street, Lemon Grove, California. Abdullah stated Omar was now in London, England, pursuing a Doctorate degree from an unknown university.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1111**
EC dated 09/19/2001

(U) An EC prepared by SA (S) set leads for various field offices to interview former neighbors of Nawaf Al-HAZMI, Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **The EC stated that interviews of Muslims indicated that Al-BAYOUMI had been involved in aviation when he lived in Saudi Arabia and that he did not work while in the U.S., but had more money than he knew what to do with.**

(U) **The EC also provided information from an interview of a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego who identified Al-BAYOUMI as being employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.**

[redacted]

[redacted]

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24879
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2302
FD-302 dated 09/21/2001

(U) On 09/21/2001, SA (S) interviewed (P) (protect identity) who provided information regarding his knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **Information pertaining to his relationship with the Saudi Arabian government were that he often furnished the Islamic Center with copies of the Qu'ran which had been provided to him by the Saudi Arabian Consulate. He also stated that Al-BAYOUMI appeared to have regular contact with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California. Al-BAYOUMI made frequent trips to the consulate during the six years he was known to live in San Diego.**

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 23351
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2117
FD302 dated 09/21/01

(U) On 09/20/2001, SA (S) interviewed Dilek (P), birth date (P-1) (P) (P) provided the following information regarding (P) Hashin Moshen Alattas. When shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, (P) recognized him and said she had seen him many times. Al-BAYOUMI attended USIU to get his master's degree and wanted to move to London to receive a PHD from a business school. Al-BAYOUMI and his family were from Saudi Arabia and possibly lived in the Clairemont Mesa area of San Diego, California. (P) **reported Alattas did not like Al-BAYOUMI and believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi government to watch the actions of Saudis in the United States.**

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 28999
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2546
265A-SD-63930-302 serial 5
FD302 dated 09/22/01

(U) On 09/20/01, (P) birth date (P-1) (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and

[redacted]

[redacted]

shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [redacted] recognized Al-BAYOUMI and said he knew him as "Abuemad", father of Emad. Previously, [redacted] was living in an apartment off Balboa Avenue with Saudi Arabian students [redacted]. [redacted] believed the Saudi students received tuition money from the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would visit the two students at their apartment. Al-BAYOUMI asked [redacted] to be an Iman, at the mosque. When [redacted] was alone Al-BAYOUMI would inquire about [redacted].

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 18085**
FD-302 dated 09/22/2001
Interview of [redacted]
(interviewing agent not identified in ECF)

(U) [redacted] birth date [redacted] [redacted] owns two businesses [redacted] [redacted] Approximately 1995, [redacted] contracted with the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia, which according to [redacted], has connections with Ministry of Defense. A company called Dallah of Saudi Arabia had the contract for operations maintenance and [redacted] supplied the parts. **The CAA asked** [redacted] **to provide financial support to Al-BAYOUMI, when** [redacted] **refused he was told his contract may be jeopardized.** [redacted] did write sponsor letters to universities for Al-BAYOUMI, but stated he never provided Al-BAYOUMI financial support. [redacted] advised he wrote the last letter approximately two years ago.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 1663**
EC dated 09/22/2001

(U) In a EC prepared by SA [redacted] a lead was sent to Legat Riyahd to obtain information regarding Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI. The following information was furnished to the Legat:

lds to Saudia Arabia on Al Bayoumi

- Al-BAYOUMI's claim that he was on a financial scholarship and received support from his government.
- Information pertaining to his employment in the aviation management/financial services of the

[redacted]

[redacted]

Saudi government.

- Interviewees claims that Al-BAYOUMI as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government that he traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1801**
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 16180
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1802
FD302 dated 09/23/01 and 09/24/2001

(U) According to an EC prepared by SA [redacted] [redacted] birth date [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] California, was interviewed and provided information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [redacted] had met Al-BAYOUMI at the Islamic Center mosque (ICSD) in the early 1990s.

(U) Approximately six months ago Al-BAYOUMI announced to members of the ICSD he was moving to the United Kingdom (UK) to pursue his PHD. [redacted] has not had any contact with Al-BAYOUMI subsequent to his departure for the UK. [redacted] recalled Al-BAYOUMI lived in an apartment on Beadnell Way in San Diego even though he never went to his home. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was on a scholarship and was financially supported by the Saudi government. [redacted] did not know what form Al-BAYOUMI received his funding. **Al-BAYOUMI maintained he had friends at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California. Because of Al-BAYOUMI's comments regarding his business, [redacted] believed he may have worked for Saudi princes.** While living in San Diego Al-BAYOUMI attended the University of Phoenix. [redacted] remembered Al-BAYOUMI may have also received a scholarship from Saudi Airlines and worked for them as well.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24631**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2239
FD302 dated 09/24/01

(U) On 09/24/01, Abdussattar Shaikh was interviewed by SA [redacted] (S) Shaikh advised that he is one of the founders of the Islamic Center of San Diego, (ICSD). Shaikh identified a photo of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, whom he became acquainted with in 1994 when Shaikh was teaching at the American Commonwealth University. Shaikh described Al-BAYOUMI as follows: Al-BAYOUMI was in the U.S. using a Saudi Arabian passport, because of his facial features, he is possibly of Egyptian descent. Al-BAYOUMI appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years old. Shaikh believed Al-BAYOUMI always had a significant source of supply of money and observed him driving a new Toyota. **Al-BAYOUMI was charismatic, charming and didn't conceal his attempts to attain leadership roles within the San Diego Muslim community. Al-BAYOUMI had expressed an interest in becoming a citizen, which may have been just a ploy. Al-BAYOUMI socialized with Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR. Al-HAZMI disclosed to Shaikh, Al-BAYOUMI was a spy for the Saudi Government and directed Shaikh not to socialize too much with him.** Al-BAYOUMI attended business classes at the United States International University and was believed to be President of a Saudi Arabian club at the university. Al-BAYOUMI had an office at the Kurish mosque in El Cajon, California, where the leadership neither liked or trusted him and asked him to leave approximately three years ago. Shaikh did not trust Al-BAYOUMI as well and believes he possibly was involved with 09/11/01.

Reference: ***265A-NY-280350-302 serial 25718***
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2396
FD-302 dated 09/30/01

(U) [redacted] (P) DOB [redacted] (P-1) [redacted] (P) was interviewed by SA [redacted] (S) on 09/28/2001. [redacted] (P) stated he first met Omar Al-BAYOUMI about two years ago at the mosque located near Balboa Avenue and the 805 freeway in San Diego, California. [redacted] (P) thought Al-BAYOUMI may be of Egyptian extraction but moved to Jeddeh, Saudi Arabia, prior to moving to the United States. [redacted] (P) believed

[redacted]

[redacted]

Al-BAYOUMI was deceptive and did not trust him. He described Al-BAYOUMI as lacking in formal education and lacking in intellectual capability. Al-BAYOUMI was well known at the mosque near Balboa Avenue and 805 freeway and frequently surrounded himself with men in their twenties. **Al-BAYOUMI would promise to help visiting Islamic students, but his assistance never evolved.** (P) concluded Al-BAYOUMI was asked to leave his position at the Al Medina mosque after irregularities were found in association with his collection and distribution of funds.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3039**
EC dated 10/03/01

(U) On 10/03/2001, SA (S) prepared an EC providing information on (P) (P) was the emergency contact listed on Omar Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement for (P-1) at the Parkwood Apartment Complex. Al-BAYOUMI moved into (P-1) on approximately 09/01/99, and lived there with his wife Manal Bagader and their three children. Rental records indicated Al-BAYOUMI was a student and received financial support from his family.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI had co-signed for highjackers Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR when they rented an apartment at Parkwood and paid their rent occasionally as well. Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR lived with Omar Al-BAYOUMI prior to them renting their own apartment. (P) did not like Al-BAYOUMI personally and was unaware he ((P) was listed as an emergency reference on Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement. **Al-BAYOUMI revealed to (P) he received financial support the Saudi Arabian Government or Saudi Airlines. An individual who requested confidentiality (PC1) reported he believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service and reported on dissident Saudis in the United States.**

Reference: *265A-NY-280350-CD serial 8789*
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3396
EC dated 10/05/2001

(U) An EC dated 10/05/2001, prepared by SA (S)

[redacted]

provided a summary of information furnished by the (C-1) This information was obtained through their interviews of Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI stated that he was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration. Al-BAYOUMI claimed that this company pays him $5,000.00 per month to study for his PHD.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 64787**
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 4763
FD-302 dated 10/07/01

(U) On 10/03/01, (P) (protect identity) was interviewed by SA (P-1), (S) and SA (P-1), (S) (P) described Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI as a "braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia." (P) **stated Al-BAYOUMI would videotape when he went to mosque which led individuals from the Muslim community to believe he was a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer. According to (P), Al-BAYOUMI's social associates included the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate, and known criminals. Al-BAYOUMI has also hosted Saudi visitors. Al-BAYOUMI's character is suspect and he was accused of keeping a $10,000 donation from a Saudi visitor intended for the Kurdish Mosque.**

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-302 serial 55234**
FD-302 dated 10/07/2001

(U) On 10/06/2001, SA (P-1), (S) interviewed Isamu Alva DYSON, birth name Clayton (P) MORGAN, date of birth (P-1) (P) DYSON stated he knew Khalid Al-MIHDHAR, Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI during his period of residing in San Diego, approximately December 1999 to February 2000. DYSON stated he never heard Al-BAYOUMI speak about politics or against the U.S. DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI shared company often. Al-BAYOUMI had indicated to DYSON that

[redacted]

he was some type of engineer for the Saudi Arabian government. He even showed DYSON some type of paperwork indicating same. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was being paid to learn English. Al-BAYOUMI's company, or the Saudi government through his company, was paying for the education. DYSON did not know how much Al-BAYOUMI was being paid. DYSON understood that Al-BAYOUMI had to learn English or he was not going to be promoted any higher in his company.

(U) DYSON said that Al-BAYOUMI's student visa was expired, or ready to expire and was considering crossing into Tijuana, Mexico to get the paper work done. DYSON encouraged Al-BAYOUMI to call the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. **DYSON accompanied Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Consulate where Al-BAYOUMI got his visa paperwork straightened out.**

(U) After the consulate, DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI proceeded to a Mediterranean restaurant near the Culver City mosque. Al-BAYOUMI stated that the Culver City mosque was built by the Saudi Government. DYSON stated that other than when Al-BAYOUMI was meeting behind closed doors at the consulate, Dyson was with Al-BAYOUMI the entire time during the trip.

(U) Information was also furnished regarding the building of the El Cajon mosque. A wealthy man from Saudi Arabia donated the money to build the Kurdish mosque. Al-BAYOUMI did all of the administrative work at the mosque and was the director.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI has introduced DYSON to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and that the resided in an apartment co-signed by Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) DYSON was told by Al-BAYOUMI that his wife was Saudi and came from a rich family.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332**
EC dated 10/09/2001

(U) In an EC prepared by SD [redacted] (S), a request was made to obtain information from officials

[redacted]

[redacted]

at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the Embassy in Washington, D.C. regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) A summary of information extracted from this EC regarding Al-BAYOUMI's association with the Saudi Arabian government indicated (P), President (P) California wrote a letter on 01/22/1997, stating that (P) was supporting Al-BAYOUMI by providing $4,000.00 a month.

(U) (P) was subsequently interviewed, and as a result of that interview advised that even though (P) was requested by an unknown representative of the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia to provide a $4,000 per month stipend, (P) refused to do so. (P) did, however, furnish letters to numerous schools, on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf, stating that he and his company were subsidizing Al-BAYOUMI. As a direct result of the above information, a Criminal Complaint was filed on or about 09/27/2001, in the Southern District of California, charging Al-BAYOUMI with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

(U) In May 1998, Al-BAYOUMI applied for an Executive Doctorate in the Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-BAYOUMI stated that he has been employed by the CAA for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering.

(U) In reviewing the documents obtained from CWRU a letter, dated May 20, 1998 from Dr. Jamil Shami, Director, Academic Affairs, **Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, National Guard Office, 3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 207, Washington, D.C., was sent on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf. The letter stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a candidate for a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia.**

(U) On September 21, 2001, a representative from United Parcel Service advised that their records indicate that

[redacted]

[redacted]

on January 18, 2001 a delivery was made to (P-1) (P-1) San Diego, California, where Al-BAYOUMI resided, from the **Saudi Arabian Embassy, 601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.**

(U) On 09/25/2001, (P), (P) of the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, 2675 Fletcher Parkway, El Cajon, California, was interviewed and (P) **advised that he was shown a copy of a check Al-BAYOUMI provided for $500 to the mosque drawn from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia**, dated December 14, 2000. Written on the check was a notation in Arabic that (P) said indicted the check was for food. Al-Bayoumi stated he received the check from Los Angeles, California.

(U) On 09/27/2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-BAYOUMI as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Medina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-BAYOUMI's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

(U) Listed in Al-BAYOUMI's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

(U) Dr. Jameel Al-Shami (202) 944-3344;

(U) Saudi Embassy WA. (202) 342-3800, AbdulAziz Assaleh (202) 342-3700 and F (202) 944-5982; Khalid Asswailem (202) 944-3140 and C (P-1). **Saudi Consulate** (310) 479-479-6000 F (310) 479-2752, Islamic Affairs x240, Abdullah Awaad x241, Sami Assadhan x246, and Saad Al Jebreen, 2045 Sawtelle Blv., LA, CA 90025.

(U) Additionally, seized during the search were various personal and business documents, business cards and scraps of paper with names and telephone numbers of individuals. Included in this information were names and telephone numbers associated with the **Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C.** and are as follows: Mohammad Al-Sheik and Abed Al-Sulieman with the following telephone numbers (202) 298-8869, 8817, 8850 and 8738.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Also obtained was a notation for the **Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles**, telephone number (310) 479-6000 and the name (P). (U) From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-BAYOUMI showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the **Consulate in Los Angeles** and 37 calls placed to the **Cultural Mission.**

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3331
LHM dated 10/10/01
(Authoring agent not identified in ECF)

(U) Omar AHMED Al-BAYOUMI, aka Omar Al-BAYOUMI, Omar A. Al-BAYOUMI, ABUEMAD, Omar A. M. Al-BAYOUMI, Omar AL-BAYOUMI, birth date (P-1),57, had contact with the following individuals at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C., and the Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California.

Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington, D.C.:
Adbulaziz Assaleh
Khalid Asswailem
Jamil Shami

Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington D.C.:
Mohammad Al-Sheik
Abed Al-Sulieman

Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California
(P)
Abdullah Awaad
Sami Assadhan
Saad Al Jebreen

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3562
265A-NY-280350-BA serial 4557
EC dated 10/11/2001

(U) On 10/11/2001, SA (S) prepared and EC regarding new information reported on (P)

[redacted]

(P) . (D) (D) (D) It is believed Al-BAYOUMI was financially supported by the Saudi Arabian Government and was suspected to be an Intelligence Officer for the Saudi Government as well. It appears Osama Bassnan is to be the replacement for Al-BAYOUMI.

Reference: (S) 199N-SD-63929 serial 24
(S) 199N-SD-63949 serial 9
(S) FFI - (A), (J-1), (G)
EC dated 10/17/2001

[redacted] *On* (A), (J-1), (G) *information was provided to SA* (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI almost daily taking telephone calls from Saudi Arabia. The Emir from the Ministry of Defense, who was in charge of the Air Traffic Control would frequently call Al-BAYOUMI. Al-BAYOUMI registered in school for immigration purposes and to meet new students from the Middle East.

[redacted] Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) was going to Los Angeles to pickup some visitors. Within a day or two after returning from Los Angeles Al-BAYOUMI introduced (A), (J-1), (G) *Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR* . (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G). Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) he had met Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR in a restaurant on his way back from Los Angeles. Al-BAYOUMI invited the two to come to San Diego and they accepted. Al-BAYOUMI did not tell (A), (J-1), (G) if Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR were the visitors he was expecting. Subsequently, Al-BAYOUMI hosted a dinner to welcome Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR to the San Diego Muslim community, Al-BAYOUMI videotaped the event as well.

Reference 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 69403
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 5616
FD-302 dated 10/15/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA (S) interviewed Talal Al-HAMDAN, date of birth (P-1) 1979, the brother of Faisal Al-HAMDAN. Talal stated that his family is from a bedouin tribe once located in Western Saudi Arabia and that the family is not part of the royal family. The family is fairly well known and wealthy. His father, Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN, is one of three Finance Ministry officials employed under the Deputy Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia and is responsible for the Western region of Saudi Arabia.

(U) Talal Al-HAMDAN is subsidized in the U.S. by his father and by scholarship money from the government of Saudi Arabia. While attending George Washington University in Washington, D.C. he resided with a sponsor who was an employee of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C.

(U) In May 1999, Talal moved to San Diego where he resided in a hotel. During his stay he had an argument regarding his bill and an outstanding balance. Talal directed Al-BAYOUMI to pay the bill and Al-BAYOUMI paid the outstanding debt.

Analyst Note - During the period of ... telephone **number (P) was subscribed by Talal Al-HAMDAN, (P) San Diego, California 92124.**

Reference: [redacted] 199N-SD-63929 serial 23
199N-SD-63949 serial 8
FFI - (A), (J-1), (G) (S)
EC dated 10/17/2001

(S)

[redacted] On (A), (J-1), (G) information was provided to SA (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [redacted] [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) believed that Al-BAYOUMI made friends with [redacted] for the purpose of gaining control, rather than friendship's sake. **Al-BAYOUMI was considered by most in the community some type of intelligence agent for the Saudi Arabian government reporting on the** activities of Muslims (particularly Saudis) in the San Diego area. The feeling that Al-BAYOUMI was an agent for the Saudi government was further reenforced by the fact that he held no regular job, but always had plenty of money to prepare lavish dinners at his apartment or apartments of friends. The purpose of the dinners was usually to introduce and welcome newcomers to the local Muslim community or to bid farewell to those leaving. AL-BAYOUMI would always videotape these dinners.

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI told (A), (J-1), (G) that he had traveled up to Los Angeles to pick up someone coming into the country, when by chance he met Al-MIHDHAR and Al-HAZMI. [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] Al-BAYOUMI frequently traveled to the Los Angeles airport to drop off or pickup Saudis visiting southern California.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (J-1), (G) that Al-BAYOUMI was a person know to have connections with the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would travel to Washington, D.C. every one to two months and had a contact in the Dawa (ph) who was related to the civil aviation office of the Saudi Arabian Consulate on Wyoming Street, in Washington D.C. Through this contact, Al-BAYOUMI would be able to items such as Qu'rans or robes much faster than if done through regular request.

(S) Al-BAYOUMI traveled back to Saudi Arabia approximately one a year for approximately two to three weeks. Al-BAYOUMI's stay in the U.S. seemed to be decided on a yearly basis. (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted] Al-BAYOUMI learned that he would be leaving San Diego, but did not know where he would go next. Approximately seven to eight months ago, he knew he would be moving to England (information dated (A), (J-1), (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 72758
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 6477
FD-302 dated 10/19/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA (S), interviewed Faisal Ahmed Al-HAMDAN, date of birth 12/12/1975, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. **Faisal's father is Ahmed Abdulazziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN and is a high-ranking Saudi official who works as a Director within the Ministry of Finance.**

(U) While attending school in San Diego, Faisal Al-HAMDAN listed Omar Al-BAYOUMI as the emergency point-of-contact on his ELS and ALI applications. Faisal identified Al-BAYOUMI as a business associate of his father.

Reference 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3984
EC dated 10/20/2001

(U) On 10/20/2001, SA (S) requested (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G) to conduct an interview of Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN regarding his contact with and knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. **Al-HAMDAN is an official under the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia.** This request was made as the result of San Diego interviews of Faisal and Talal Al-HAMDAN.

(U) The EC noted that Al-BAYOUMI is an employee of the Ministry of Finance, or works under a separate department which answers to the Ministry of Finance. Talal Al-HAMDAN described the relationship between Al-BAYOUMI and his father:

- **Al-BAYOUMI had to get Al-HAMDAN's signature on various documents.**
- **On one of these documents, Al-BAYOUMI requested Al-HAMDAN to provide a reference sponsorship for Al-BAYOUMI's application to the Saudi Government to travel to the U.S. to pursue post graduate**

[redacted]

studies. Al-HAMDAN's father provided this reference or sponsorship.

- At some point in 1998, Faisal and Talal's father instructed Talal to contact Al-BAYOUMI. The Al-HAMDAN brothers met with Al-BAYOUMI at the Abu Baker mosque on numerous occasions from late 1998 to July 2001.

- **Al-BAYOUMI's bank records revealed that on 02/18/1999, a $20,000.00 wire transfer was made from Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN to Al-BAYOUMI.**

- **On 12/16/1999, Al-BAYOUMI paid an outstanding hotel bill for Talal in the amount of $1,349.00.**

- **On at least one other occasion Al-BAYOUMI generated a check to Talal in the amount of $1,450.00.**

- Faisal and Talal were in the process of selling Al-BAYOUMI's vehicle and were instructed to forward the sale proceeds to Al-BAYOUMI's address in England.

Reference	**265A-NY-280350-302 serial 98127** **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 14097** **FD-302 dated 11/21/2001**
	265A-NY-280350-302 serial 36130 **FD-302 dated 10/02/2001**

(U) On 11/19/2001, SA (S) interviewed (P), born in (P). The EC provides extensive education and employment background on (P) (P) was employed at PCA / Dallah and stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a representative that PCA personnel wished to keep in America. (P) **was requested to provide a stipend to Al-BAYOUMI in an amount of $3,500.00 per month.** According to (P), Al-BAYOUMI was already drawing a salary from PCA / Dallah. The PCA person hinted that (P) should pay for Al-

[redacted]

BAYOUMI because Al-BAYOUMI would be in a position to assist (P) in the future. In addition, (P) was requested to furnish Al-BAYOUMI with reference letters.

Reference: **265A-NY-280350-SD serial 12014**
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 85936
FD-302 dated 11/27/01

(U) On 11/15/2001, (P), birth date (P), was interviewed by SA (S) (S) and provided the following information. (P) **once heard Omar Al-BAYOUMI disclosing to others at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) he had friends or contacts at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California.** (P) advised Al-BAYOUMI was extremely close to other ICSD Saudis. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was in the United States on scholarship from the Saudi Airport Authority of Saudi Airlines and Al-BAYOUMI would eventually return to his former job.

Reference (U) ~~(S)~~ **265A-NY-282573-SEC serial 28**
EC dated 01/11/2002

(C-1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

(C-1)

Reference 265A-NY-280350-SD Serial 14812
LHM dated 04/15/2002

(U) An LHM dated 05/15/2002, from San Diego to New York furnished information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI and his employment with Dallah Al Baraka. The

[redacted]

[redacted]

information was received from an interview of [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P).

(U) [redacted] (P) identified Al-BAYOUMI as a "ghost employee" of AVCO Oversees. [redacted] (P) estimated that there were approximately fifty (50) individuals carried on the books and PCA or Dallah and being paid for doing nothing.

[redacted]

Reference [redacted] 199N-SD-64028 serial 23, 72

FBI-CIA Joint Assessment

Issued December 2004

The following document was previously produced in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) pursuant to the protective order with redactions for classification. The cover page, scope note, and the full executive summary are being released at this time.

The remainder of the document is the subject of an ongoing declassification review by other U.S. government agencies and departments consistent with Executive Order 14040 and will be posted publicly at the conclusion of that review.

[redacted]

COLLABORATIVE
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

[redacted] Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

December 2004

Joint Intelligence Report
Prepared by

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Central Intelligence
Agency

[redacted]

[redacted] Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

[redacted] Scope Note

([redacted] This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report (O-1) (O-1).

[redacted] This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at (S) (S) or Section Chief (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center, at (O-1).

[redacted] Executive Summary

[redacted] Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

[redacted] Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Report

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks

Issued July 2004

The following pages were deemed responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) and are within the scope of Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14040. The remaining pages in the Inspector General's report were determined in the course of the litigation not to be responsive in discovery and therefore are outside the scope of the executive order.

U. S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

[redacted]

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks [redacted]

Office of the Inspector General
July 2004

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Information deemed not responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 and outside the scope of Executive Order 14040.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Information deemed not responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 and outside the scope of Executive Order 14040.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Information deemed not responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 and outside the scope of Executive Order 14040.

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[redacted]

We consider it a significant failure for this CIR not to be sent to the FBI. [redacted]

In addition, the evidence shows that the limited information that was provided to FBI Headquarters – that Mihdhar traveled to Malaysia and met with other suspected al Qaeda operatives – was never documented by the FBI in any system that was retrievable or searchable, thus limiting the usefulness of the information that was shared. The FBI's only official record of having received this information was in the hard copies of the January 5 threat update, which was attached to the January 6 executive briefing, and (S) e-mail summarizing information from his discussion with the CIA employee. We discuss this and other systemic problems in our analysis section below. [redacted]

[redacted] Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego [redacted]

1. Introduction [redacted]

The second set of events that may have led the FBI to discover Mihdhar and Hazmi's presence in the United States related to their stay in San Diego. As noted above, on January 15, 2000, Mihdhar and Hazmi boarded a flight in Bangkok, Thailand, for Los Angeles. They were admitted to the United States on non-immigrant visitor visas and authorized to remain in the U.S. until July 14, 2000. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, they traveled to San Diego, California, where they were aided in finding a place to stay by Omar al-Bayoumi. Bayoumi had been the subject of an FBI preliminary intelligence investigation that had been closed. [redacted]

In late May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar rented a room in the residence of a long-time FBI (G) asset.[193] Mihdhar remained in San Diego until

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[193] This kind of individual is often referred to as an "informant" - the common vernacular for an individual providing information to an investigative agency. Within the FBI's foreign intelligence program, they are known as assets. The FBI designates assets as (G) asset is a person the FBI debriefs for information, or someone who the FBI asks to obtain information as a result (continued)

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. Hazmi and Mihdhar's association with Bayoumi [redacted]

Omar al-Bayoumi is a Saudi Arabian national who came to the United States in 1993. In early 2000 he had been living with his wife and four children in San Diego for at least four years. Although he described himself to others in San Diego as a graduate student in business administration, he took classes intermittently and was not enrolled in a program of study. He did not work in the United States and received a monthly stipend of $4,000 plus "other allowances," ranging from $465 to $3,800 each month, from Dallah/Avco, a Saudi contractor to the Presidency of Civil Aviation.[195] Bayoumi was active in the San Diego Muslim community and was involved in the establishment of several mosques in the United States. [redacted]

In September 1998, the FBI's San Diego Field Office opened a preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi based on allegations raised by the manager in the apartment complex where he was living at the time. The manager alleged that Bayoumi had received a suspicious package from the Middle East, and the maintenance worker for the apartment complex had noted strange wires in Bayoumi's bathroom. In addition, the manager reported frequent gatherings of young Middle Eastern males at Bayoumi's apartment on weekend nights. [redacted]

The FBI case agent conducted a limited investigation of Bayoumi, but the preliminary inquiry was closed in June 1999 and was not converted to a full field investigation.[196] As a result, the FBI was no longer investigating Bayoumi at the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar met Bayoumi in February 2000. However, the following paragraphs describe what was later learned about Bayoumi's interactions with Hazmi and Mihdhar. [redacted]

On February 1, 2000, Bayoumi traveled by car from San Diego to Los Angeles, to resolve a visa issue at the Saudi consulate. Bayoumi invited an

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[195] Bayoumi was employed by the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation from 1975 until 1995 and became a contractor for the organization beginning in 1995. [redacted]

[196] In Section IV B 1 (a) of this chapter, we examine the investigative steps taken by the FBI in this preliminary inquiry and assess the appropriateness of the decision to close the inquiry. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

associate, Isama Dyson, to accompany him.[197] Dyson provided the following account to the FBI of the trip with Bayoumi.[198] [redacted]

Dyson said that at the time of the invitation, Bayoumi mentioned a Los Angeles restaurant serving halal food where they could eat lunch after Bayoumi's meeting at the consulate.[199] After Bayoumi spent approximately one hour at the Saudi consulate, he and Dyson went to the restaurant but discovered it had been converted to a butcher shop. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the "Mediterranean Gourmet." Bayoumi and Dyson walked to that restaurant. While they were eating there, Hazmi and Mihdhar entered the restaurant and the four talked in Arabic. Although Dyson had limited Arabic language skills, he said that Bayoumi kept him apprised of the content of the conversation. Hazmi and Mihdhar told Bayoumi that they were in the United States to study English, but they did not like living in Los Angeles. Bayoumi invited the men to visit San Diego and offered to assist them. Bayoumi provided the men with his phone number. Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant, and after stopping at a nearby mosque for sunset prayers, returned to San Diego. Dyson asserted that the encounter with Hazmi and Mihdhar seemed to be a coincidental meeting. [redacted]

Within several days of the meeting, Hazmi and Mihdhar accepted Bayoumi's invitation and traveled to San Diego. In San Diego, Bayoumi arranged for Hazmi and Mihdhar to rent an apartment on Mount Ada road in the same apartment complex where Bayoumi lived. Bayoumi also co-signed

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[197] Dyson is an (P) [redacted] [redacted]

[198] Dyson provided the information to the FBI in an interview after September 11. After the attacks, the FBI opened an investigation on Bayoumi, who no longer resided in the United States, to determine whether he had knowledge of the September 11 plot or had knowingly supported the hijackers. Based on that investigation, Bayoumi was indicted on a visa fraud charge. Bayoumi was outside of the United States at the time of the indictment and has not returned. [redacted]

[199] Halal is an Arabic word meaning "lawful" or "permitted." [redacted]

[redacted]

their lease. Shortly after Hazmi and Mihdhar moved into the apartment, Bayoumi hosted a party to introduce them to the local Muslim community. [redacted]

Within a few weeks of moving into the apartment, Hazmi and Mihdhar filed a 30-day notice to vacate the apartment, apparently to move to another apartment. However, they later rescinded the vacate notice and continued to lease the apartment until June 2, 2000.[200] [redacted]

The apartment manager told the FBI that Bayoumi paid Hazmi and Mihdhar's first month's rent and security deposit because they had not yet established a local bank account and the apartment complex would not accept cash. A review of Bayoumi and Mihdhar's financial records after September 11, 2001, indicate that Bayoumi was reimbursed for this expense on the same day it was paid.[201] [redacted]

3. Telephone call to Yemen from Hazmi and Mihdhar's apartment [redacted]

On March 20, 2000, a long distance telephone call was placed from Mihdhar and Hazmi's Mount Ada apartment to the known terrorist logistics phone number in Yemen [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) (See section III, A, 2 above.) [redacted] (O-1) NSA had been monitoring the Yemen logistics phone, [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) a record of the

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[200] Bayoumi left the United States for some of the time Hazmi and Mihdhar lived in the apartment. INS records do not indicate when Bayoumi left the country, but the records indicate that he obtained a United States visa in Jeddah on May 10, 2000, and returned to the United States on May 31, 2000. Bayoumi left the United States permanently in July 2001 and was living in England on September 11, 2001. [redacted]

[201] [redacted] (D) [redacted] (D) Mihdhar's financial records also indicate that he opened an account with a deposit of $9,900 in cash within seven minutes of Bayoumi's cash deposit, which suggests that they were in the bank together. [redacted]

[redacted]

call was captured in the toll records. After the September 11 attacks, the call was identified through a record check. [redacted]

4. Hazmi and Mihdhar's association with an FBI asset beginning in May 2000 [redacted]

Sometime in May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar moved out of the apartment Bayoumi had found for them on Mount Ada Road and moved as boarders into the home of a long-time, paid (G) [redacted] asset of the FBI's San Diego Field Office.[202] Hazmi and Mihdhar met the asset at the mosque they attended.[203] Mihdhar stayed at the asset's residence until June 10, 2000, when he left the United States. Hazmi resided in the asset's house until December 10, 2000, when he moved to Arizona. [redacted]

a. Background on the FBI asset [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

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[202] The OIG was not able to interview the asset. The Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry had attempted to interview the asset without success. The Committee then submitted interrogatories that the asset declined to answer, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The asset indicated through his attorney that if subpoenaed by the Committee, he would not testify without a grant of immunity. [redacted]

[203] There is some dispute about whether Hazmi and Mihdhar actually responded to an advertisement for boarders posted by the asset or whether they were introduced to the asset. The OIG did not have access to the witnesses who could address this issue. [redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Information deemed not responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 and outside the scope of Executive Order 14040.

5. OIG conclusion [redacted]

In sum, the FBI did not obtain information about Mihdhar's and Hazmi's time in San Diego, either as a result of the Bayoumi preliminary inquiry or from the asset. In the analysis section of this chapter, we evaluate (S) actions with regard to Hazmi and Mihdhar and whether he should have pursued additional information about who was living with one of his assets. [redacted]

C. Mihdhar's association with Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole attack [redacted]

The third potential opportunity for the FBI to acquire information about Hazmi and Mihdhar occurred in January 2001, when a joint FBI/CIA source identified an al Qaeda operative in photographs of the January 2000 Malaysian meetings that Hazmi and Mihdhar had attended. However, the FBI has asserted that it did not learn of the source's identification of the al Qaeda operative at the Malaysian meetings until much later in 2001, just before the September 11 attacks. This section of the report describes the events surrounding this third opportunity for the FBI to focus on Hazmi and Mihdhar. [redacted]

1. Background [redacted]

In May 2000, the CIA and the FBI began debriefing a source (A), (G), (J-1) who provided significant information on operatives and operations related to Usama Bin Laden. The source gave the CIA and the FBI information about an al Qaeda operative known as "Khallad" and described him as being involved

[redacted]

[redacted]

Although these systemic problems affected the flow of information between the FBI and CIA, we do not believe they fully explain the FBI's failure to obtain the critical information on Hazmi and Mihdhar. Employees at both the CIA and the FBI failed to provide or seek important information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, despite numerous interactions between them on issues related to Hazmi and Mihdhar from January 2000 through August 2001. We found these interactions were substantive and that much of the information about Mihdhar and Hazmi was exchanged through these ongoing efforts. Unfortunately, the critical pieces of information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar did not become known to the FBI until shortly prior to September 11. As a former CTC ALEC Station Deputy Chief aptly summarized it to us, "information that should have been shared was not, repeatedly." [redacted]

B. The actions of the San Diego FBI [redacted]

In addition to issues that affected information sharing between the FBI and the CIA, the FBI had other opportunities to find information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks. The time that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent in San Diego was an opportunity during which the FBI could have obtained information about them but did not. As discussed above, Hazmi and Mihdhar entered the United States in January 2000 and moved to San Diego in February 2000, where they resided unbeknownst to the FBI. While in San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar associated with Omar al-Bayoumi, a person whom the FBI had previously investigated, and they also lived with an active, FBI informational asset. Yet, the FBI did not become aware of their presence in San Diego until after September 11, 2001. [redacted]

Because Bayoumi spent a significant amount of time with Hazmi and Mihdhar in early 2000, it is possible that – had a full field investigation of Bayoumi been open at the time – the FBI could have discovered Mihdhar and Hazmi's presence in San Diego and also uncovered the CIA information about their attendance at the Malaysia meetings. Because Hazmi and Mihdhar lived with an FBI asset, it is also possible that if the FBI had documented their presence in San Diego, it would have provided additional investigative leads that could have aided the New York FBI in locating them in August 2001. We therefore evaluated the San Diego FBI's investigation of Bayoumi and the

[redacted]

[redacted]

decision to close its preliminary inquiry on him in June 1999. We also examined the San Diego FBI control agent's decision not to obtain or document information from his information asset about Hazmi and Mihdhar, who were boarders in the asset's house. [redacted]

In examining the San Diego Field Office's handling of the Bayoumi investigation and the informational asset, we also found that, despite the fact that FBI Headquarters had established counterterrorism as a top priority of the FBI in 1998, the San Diego Field Office was continuing to pursue drug trafficking as its top priority in 2001. While the FBI made counterterrorism its top priority on paper, the FBI took few steps to ensure that field offices complied with this directive. We discuss this issue at the end of this section. [redacted]

1. The San Diego FBI's preliminary investigation of Bayoumi [redacted]

As discussed above, Bayoumi is a Saudi national who in January 2000 had been living in the United States for approximately six years, was well-paid by a Saudi company that contracted with the Saudi government, and was involved in setting up mosques in the San Diego area. Hazmi and Mihdhar met Bayoumi in Los Angeles approximately two weeks after entering the United States in January 2000. A few days later they moved to San Diego, where Bayoumi assisted them in obtaining an apartment in the complex where he lived. They lived in this complex for four months. [redacted]

FBI databases show that Bayoumi's name had first surfaced at the FBI in 1995 when he made a $100 contribution to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which allegedly was a front organization for HAMAS. The FBI had an ongoing investigation of the Holy Land Foundation.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

Bayoumi's name resurfaced at the FBI on August 31, 1998, when his apartment manager contacted the FBI to report her suspicions regarding Bayoumi's activities. The manager reported that she had been notified by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in March 1998 that Bayoumi had been sent a

[redacted]

[redacted]

"suspicious" package from the Middle East. According to the manager, the package had broken open and had a number of wires protruding from it. She reported further that the apartment complex maintenance man had noticed a number of wires protruding beneath the bathroom sink in Bayoumi's master bedroom. She reported that there had been large meetings of men, who based upon their dress appeared to be Middle Eastern, gathering in Bayoumi's apartment on weekend evenings. She also complained that several parking spots were being illegally used by the people gathering at Bayoumi's apartment. [redacted]

On September 8, 1998, the San Diego FBI opened a preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi.[278] The assigned agent checked FBI indices for further information regarding Bayoumi and asked the CIA to run traces, but she received no further information from these checks. The agent obtained Bayoumi's rental application and resident file from the apartment complex. [redacted]

The agent contacted the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in reference to the alleged "suspicious" package sent to Bayoumi. A postal inspector advised the FBI agent that "suspicious" did not necessarily mean "nefarious," and the vast majority of suspicious packages were benign. The postal inspector reviewed the report relating to the Bayoumi package and told the agent that the package had been deemed "suspicious" because it had no customs papers or appropriate postage and originated in Saudi Arabia. According to the report, there was no record of any wires protruding from the package, Bayoumi had retrieved the package, and it was no longer called a "suspect parcel." [redacted]

According to the FBI agent, the apartment manager agreed to record the license plate numbers of the meeting participants. However, the manager later

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[278] As discussed in Chapter Two, in accordance with the Attorney General's Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines, a preliminary inquiry could be opened when there was information or allegations indicating that an individual is or may have been an international terrorist or a recruitment target of an international terrorist organization. Preliminary inquiries were permitted to remain open for 120 days and had to be closed unless the FBI obtained sufficient evidence to open a full field investigation. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

advised the agent that meetings had dwindled to a few participants and then stopped all together. [redacted]

The agent asked fellow FBI agents to ask their "logical sources" for information regarding Bayoumi. The sources related the following concerning Bayoumi:

- Bayoumi was married with small children and had recently completed a master's degree program and he was looking for a Ph. D. program, but his test scores were too low. He was approximately 30 years old and unemployed. [redacted]
- Bayoumi was a Saudi who regularly attended the ICSD (Islamic Center of San Diego). He was married with children and was working on a master's or other advanced degree. [redacted]
- Bayoumi reportedly delivered $400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, California in order to build a mosque. Source opined Bayoumi "must be an agent of a foreign power or an agent of Saudi Arabia." [redacted]
- Bayoumi was in the U.S. on a student visa but was applying for a green card. Bayoumi claimed to have a master's degree and was working on a Ph. D. His father was sending him $3,000 a month for support while he was in school. [redacted]

The FBI agent also contacted the INS in reference to Bayoumi's immigration status. An INS special agent advised that Bayoumi was in the U.S. on an F-1 student visa, but his work visa had expired. However, the INS reported that his visa could be renewed. [redacted]

The FBI agent [redacted] (G) preliminary investigation of Bayoumi to await the results of various information checks but received no further substantive information. According to the agent, the only remaining option was to conduct an interview of Bayoumi. After her supervisor consulted with fellow FBI agents who were working on a large, sensitive counterterrorism investigation involving the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the supervisor instructed the agent not to conduct the subject

[redacted]

interview of Bayoumi.[279] The agent told the OIG that she did not believe the decision was inappropriate based on the potential effect of such an interview on the other sensitive investigation.[280] [redacted]

On June 10, 1999, the FBI closed its preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi, and he was no longer actively under investigation by the FBI. [redacted]

The FBI case agent told the OIG that she had no concrete information linking Bayoumi to any terrorist activities. She stated that the allegations that gave rise to the preliminary investigation were not substantiated. With respect to the source reporting that Bayoumi had received large sums of money from overseas, the case agent explained it was not unusual for foreign students, especially from Saudi Arabia, to regularly receive money, even large sums of money. Therefore, the case agent did not consider this to be inherently suspicious. The agent's squad supervisor at the time and other agents on the squad also told the OIG that it was not unusual or suspicious for Saudi students to have received large sums of money from Saudi Arabia. [redacted]

As stated above, one source had provided unverified information that Bayoumi could potentially be a Saudi intelligence operative or source. According to the agent, Bayoumi was allegedly very involved and interested in Saudi affairs in San Diego, and this probably led to the suspicions about Bayoumi's connection to the Saudi government. However, the agent told the OIG that Saudi Arabia was not listed as a threat country and the Saudis were considered allies of the United States.[281] Therefore, Bayoumi's potential involvement with the Saudi Arabian government would not have affected the FBI's decision to close the preliminary inquiry. [redacted]

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[279] The file indicates that the decision not to conduct an interview was due to the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) investigation. This investigation into the Holy Land Foundation included a (A), (G), (J-1) Because Bayoumi had previously made a small contribution to the Holy Land Foundation, and he was very active in the community, the FBI believed that the benefits of interviewing Bayoumi did not justify the risk to the proposed operation. [redacted]

[280] The case agent explained that subject interviews are (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) to obtain information that could produce further investigative leads (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[281] Country threats are defined by the FBI as foreign governments or entities whose intelligence activities are so hostile, or of such concern, to the national security of the United (continued)

The squad supervisor at the time of our investigation, who had been an agent on the squad for several years, told the OIG that before September 11, the Saudi Arabian government was considered an ally of the United States and that a report of an individual being an agent of the Saudi government would not have been considered a priority. Other agents on the squad also said that a source reporting that an individual was an agent of the Saudi government would not have been cause for concern because the Saudi government was considered an ally of the United States. [redacted]

In addition, the case agent explained that with only a preliminary inquiry open, more intrusive investigative techniques could not be conducted because of the restrictions of the Attorney General FCI Guidelines in effect at the time. No meaningful surveillance could be conducted, no bank records or other financial records could be sought, and very little investigative activity beyond fully identifying the individual could be done under the portion of the Guidelines that covered preliminary inquiries. The case agent contended that it was not uncommon for preliminary inquiries to be closed without sufficient information to justify the opening of a full field investigation. [redacted]

In sum, we do not believe that the FBI's actions with regard to Bayoumi and its decision to close the preliminary inquiry were inappropriate. The agent conducted logical investigative steps that were permitted under the Attorney General Guidelines in effect at the time, such as checking FBI records for information, asking other intelligence agencies for information about the subject, and asking agents to query their sources about the subject, but the agent did not uncover any information to support the allegations. The Guidelines did not permit the case agent to engage in more intrusive investigative techniques, such as a clandestine search of Bayoumi's property,

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(continued)
States that counterintelligence or monitoring activities directed against such countries are warranted. [redacted]

obtaining his telephone or financial records, or secretly recording his conversations. [redacted]

Although the Attorney General Guidelines would have permitted a subject interview of Bayoumi prior to closing the preliminary inquiry, the decision not to conduct an interview appeared warranted, given its possible effect on an ongoing significant investigation. [redacted]

2. The FBI's handling of the informational asset [redacted]

As described above, in May 2000 Hazmi and Mihdhar began renting a room in the home of an FBI informational asset. FBI San Diego Special Agent (S) was the asset's control agent since the asset was opened in 1994. The asset had provided the FBI with significant information over the years and was considered a reliable source. He was well known in the Muslim community, (A), (G), (J-1). He often rented rooms in his house to Muslim men in the community who needed temporary housing. At the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved in with him, he had two other individuals renting rooms in his house. Mihdhar lived with the asset until June 10, 2000, when he left the United States, and Hazmi remained as a boarder at the asset's home until December 2000. [redacted]

According to (S) the asset told (S) that two young Saudis who had recently come to the United States to visit and study had moved in as boarders. The asset described them as good Muslims who often went to the mosque and prayed. The asset provided (S) with their first names but little other identifying information. (S) did not obtain any additional information from the asset about the boarders, such as their last names, and he did not conduct any investigation of them. [redacted]

Had (S) pursued information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, he might have uncovered the CIA information about them. In addition, he might have created a record in FBI computer systems about Hazmi and Mihdhar's presence in San Diego, which would have provided the FBI with additional information and avenues of investigation when it began to search for them in

[redacted]

should have been obtained and documented. Some agents stated that they would have pursued more information about boarders living with an informational asset, while others stated that they would not have. Some of the agents stated that they would have noted the fact of the informational asset having boarders in his file. Some agents stated that they would have documented the identities of the roommates in an EC that would have been uploaded to ACS. However, former San Diego Division Special Agent in Charge William Gore told the OIG that he "did not believe anything had been done wrong" in the handling of the informational asset and he did not fault [redacted] for not obtaining the information. [redacted]

While we recognize that no FBI policy addressed this issue and there was a lack of consensus on what should have been done in a situation like this, we believe that it would have been a better practice for [redacted] to have questioned the informational asset about his boarders and obtained their full identities. [redacted] was aware that Hazmi and Mihdhar were relative strangers to the informational asset, and that they were not friends, family, or long-time associates of the asset. [redacted] also was aware that the asset had no direct knowledge of Hazmi and Mihdhar's backgrounds and could not vouch for their character. Moreover, the boarders in the asset's home were in a position to put the asset and the information he supplied to the FBI in jeopardy. Therefore, prudence and operational security would suggest that information about persons living with the asset should have been sought, at least to the extent of learning and documenting their names, and perhaps running a records check on them. [redacted]

If [redacted] had asked more questions about the asset's boarders, he also may have acquired enough information to pursue further inquiry. For example, the asset has stated after the September 11 attacks that Hazmi and Mihdhar did not make telephone calls from his house, and that in retrospect he found this behavior to be suspicious. The asset also stated after September 11 that he had told Hazmi to stay away from Bayoumi because of his alleged association with the Saudi government. Therefore, if [redacted] had asked the asset a few more questions about Hazmi and Mihdhar and acquired this kind of information, it

[redacted]

may have led (S) to conduct further inquiries, particularly since Bayoumi had been the subject of an FBI preliminary inquiry.[284] [redacted]

Moreover, while no specific FBI policy required agents to obtain information about persons living in a house with an informational asset, FBI policies required control agents to continuously evaluate the credibility of their informational assets. Before informational assets are approved, they are required to undergo a background investigation to assess their suitability, credibility, and "bona fides."[285] Certain minimum checks were required, such as a check of FBI indices, local criminal checks, and CIA traces. The policy provided that additional checks "may be deemed necessary," such as querying other assets and running indices checks on immediate family members. In addition, FBI policy provided that an asset's bona fides "should be continually addressed," even after the initial assessment was completed. [redacted]

More specifically, the FBI field office is required to conduct a yearly evaluation of each informational asset and provide the evaluation report to FBI Headquarters. This report is required to contain, among other things, the FBI's number of contacts with the informational asset during the reporting period, a summary of the most significant information furnished by the informational asset, the number of preliminary inquiries and full investigations that were opened based on information provided by the informational asset, and "steps that have been taken to establish asset bona fides since last evaluation." Although (S) would not have been required to obtain additional information about his informational asset's boarders to complete this report, the FBI's policy of continually vetting the credibility of its assets permitted (S) to seek more information about Hazmi and Mihdhar and the other boarders from

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[284] The (A), (G), (J-1) asset was one of the sources who had been queried as part of the Bayoumi preliminary inquiry. Thus, the (A), (G), (J-1) asset knew that Bayoumi had at one time been a person of interest to the FBI. [redacted]

[285] The FBI defines "bona fides" to mean that the asset or informational asset "is who he/she says he/she is;" that the asset "has the position or access the asset claims to have;" and that the asset "is not working for or reporting to a foreign intelligence service or international terrorist organization without the knowledge of the FBI." [redacted]

Primary Case: (F)
Case Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE - MOHDAR
Serial Number: (F)

Serialized: 09/14/2017

Category: Full Investigation
Initiated: 10/26/2007

Serial #: (F)
Type: FD542

From: NEW YORK
To: COUNTERTERRORISM
NEW YORK
(A), (G), (J-1)
LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO

Document Title:
[redacted] TO REPORT INFORMATION GARNERED DURING A DEBRIEFING

Approval Date: (A), (G), (J-1)

Classification: [redacted]

Contents

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (G)
(S)

(A), (G), (J-1) Attn: (S)

San Diego Attn: (S)

Los Angeles Attn: (S)

New York Attn: (G)

From: New York
(G)
Contact: Det. (S)
(S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)
(F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To report information garnered during a debriefing (A), (G), (J-1) confidential human source (A), (G), (J-1) (CHS).

(G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Photocopy of photographs of (P) (P) KHALLAD BIN ATTASH, OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and ANWAR AULAQI.

Details: [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) CHS was debriefed in (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), (S) and (S) (S) and FBI New York JTTF TFO (S)

[redacted] Los Angeles and the King Fahad Mosque

(A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) In response to their request, FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY was sent to be the head imam at the KFM (NFI). Although the request for an imam appears to have been channeled through the Saudi Arabian government, it is unclear at this point the exact succession of events.

[redacted] To facilitate AL-THUMAIRY's entry into the U.S., AL-THUMAIRY was designated an Islamic Affairs Attache in the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs Office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C.

(O-1)

[redacted] By the latter half of 1999, CHS advised that the KFM and its members had started to become more "radical." AL-THUMAIRY had brought in another imam, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA, who according to CHS was "extremely radical" in his religious views. Around this same time, i.e the end of 1999, the KFM received a phone call from an individual in Malaysia. According to (O-1) (O-1) the caller wanted to speak with AL-THUMAIRY. (O-1) (O-1) (O-1) this phone call was regarding the imminent arrival of "two brothers...who needed theirâ assistance." Those "two brothers" were, according to CHS, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR.

[redacted] CHS advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were picked up from the airport by an individual that CHS called the (A),(G),(J-1) Although, according to CHS, this individual was (A),(G),(J-1) but merely an individual who, when tasked by AL-THUMAIRY, would often provide transportation or perform other small tasks for individuals visiting the KFM (O-1) (NOTE: the photograph is of (P) (P) and is attached hereto).

[redacted] Prior to the arrival of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, AL-THUMAIRY provided (P) their flight information. (P) picked AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR up from the airport and brought them to the KFM, where they first met AL-THUMAIRY. (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) (O-1) (O-1) (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) During AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's time in Los Angeles, (P) was asked by AL-THUMAIRY to provide assistance to them in whatever capacity they should need it.

[redacted] According to CHS, members of the KFM would often use the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT and a nearby (to the KFM) STARBUCKS COFFEE as meeting places. (O-1) (O-1) showing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR the location of the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT (see recent interview of (P) by FBI New York on (P) (F)

[redacted] CHS did not have a clear understanding of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's progression from Los Angeles to San Diego nor the reasons behind such a move. (O-1)

[redacted] CHS positively identified the individual in the second photo as someone who had been to Los Angeles and the KFM (NOTE: the photograph is of KHALLAD BIN ATTASH and is attached hereto). (O-1) (O-1) CHS stated that this individual in the photograph had a "limp" or a "bad leg" (NOTE: BIN ATTASH has a prosthetic leg.)

[redacted] San Diego

[redacted] CHS positively identified the individual in the third photograph as AL-BAYOUMI (NOTE: the photograph is of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and is attached hereto). CHS stated that AL-BAYOUMI was at the KFM every Friday for prayers, adding that AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMAIRY were acquaintances. CHS advised that AL-THUMAIRY asked AL-BAYOUMI to take care of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI was with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR on multiple occasions while AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were living in Los Angeles. (O-1) (O-1) AL-BAYOUMI, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were together at the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT and also at the nearby STARBUCKS COFFEE. (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] CHS positively identified the individual in the fourth photograph as ANWAR AULAQI (NOTE: the photograph is of ANWAR AULAQI and is attached hereto). CHS advised that AL-THUMAIRY also asked AULAQI to assist AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR while they were in San Diego. (O-1) (O-1)

Accomplishment Information:

(G)

Claimed By:
SSN: (S)
Name: (S)
Squad: (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

(A), (G), (J-1)

AT (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT (G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Discretionary)

NEW YORK

(G)

[redacted] Consider information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination; coordinate with (G)

Serial #: (F)
Type: (G)

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
To: NEW YORK

Document Title: (A), (G), (J-1)

Approval Date: (A), (G), (J-1)/2009

Classification: [redacted]
Contents
[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(A), (G), (J-1) DOCUMENT

Form Classification: [redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1)
Date: 2009-(G)
Case Agent Name: (S)
Field Office: Washington
Squad: (G)

Date of Contact: (A), (G), (J-1)
Participants/Witnesses: (S)

Type of Contact: In Person
Location
Country: UNITED STATES
City (G)
State: (G)
Date of Report (A), (G), (J-1)

Substantive Case File Number: (F)

(A), (G), (J-1) Reporting:

[redacted] MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SUADI ARABIA
(EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] In 1995, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) IT was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA), a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] AL-JARRAH dealt with KHALIL KHALIL with regard to building and management of the KING FAHD mosque in Los Angles, CA. AL-JARRAH was very close to him, and coordinated everything through him with regard to the mosque and the EKSA.

[redacted] AL-JARRAH was also dealing with someone in San Diego with regard to the Saudi sponsored mosque there, but (A), (G), (J-1) doesnt recall his name.

[redacted] On 01/21/2004, AL-JARRAH was stopped and help in secondary inspection at JFK airport in New York for eight hours. This was the day before the Saudi 16, which were sixteen Saudi teachers that were at the IIASA who (J-3) but were stripped of their diplomatic status by the USG and sent back to Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] After this encounter in New York, AL-JARRAH felt he was being watched, and in early 2005, he was re-assigned back to Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] From 2004-2006, AL-JARRAH traveled to and from the U.S several times and in particular traveled to California and Oregon. AL-JARRAH claimed to have relatives in both states, and (A), (G), (J-1) believes that AL-JARRAH has a brother in Oregon.

[redacted] AL-JARRAH utilized (P) a Palestinian national residing in Virginia, to facilitate things for him in his travels to the U.S (A), (G), (J-1) believes that AL-JARRAH had a romantic relationship with (P) sister in the U.S.

[redacted] AL-JARRAH is now currently assigned to the Saudi embassy in Kula Lumpur, Maylasia. He is in charge of Saudi student groups.

[redacted] AL-JARRAHs current contact information:

(P) (Malaysia cell phone)

(P) (Saudi cell phone)

(P)

[redacted]

Serial #: (F)
Type: TELETYPE

From: COUNTERTERRORISM
To: (O-1)

Document Title: TO REQUEST ACCESS TO (O-1)

Approval Date: A, G, J-1 2010

Classification: [redacted]

Contents
VZCZCFBA685
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUCNFB #0017 0631550
ZNY SSSSS
(A),(G),(J-1) 10
FM FBI WASHINGTON DC
(O-1)
BT
(A), (G), (J-1)
(O-1)

SUBJECT: [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) TO REQUEST FBI ACCESS
(O-1) IN FURTHERANCE OF OPERATION ENCORE.

DETAILS: [redacted] ON (A),(G),(J-1) 2010, JOINT (O-1) SOURCE (O-1)
WAS DEBRIEFED BY THE FBI. (O-1)
(O-1) OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT MUSAED AL-JARRAH. (O-1)
(O-1) AL-JARRAH USED TO WORK IN THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. AL-JARRAH WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY,
PREVIOUSLY IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA, DURING
THEIR TIME IN THE UNITED STATES. AL-THUMAIRY WAS DESCRIBED BY
(O-1) AS BEING KIND, KNOWLEDGEABLE, AND SMART, AND THAT HE DID
NOT
APPEAR TO BE AN EXTREMIST.
HOWEVER, AL-THUMAIRY DID HELP TO BRING A MORE RADICAL INDIVIDUAL
INTO THE MOSQUE, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA, IN LATE 2000 OR 2001.
(NOTE: MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AT THE
SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE WAS ALSO A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, FORMER
IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA.
AL-MUHANNA DEPARTED THE US IN 2003.)

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1) RECOGNIZED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECTS ADEL AL SADHAN AND MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO RECALL THEIR NAMES. [redacted] (O-1) STATED AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY WORKED FOR AL-JARRAH, AND [redacted] (O-1) BELIEVES THEY SPOKE ENGLISH WELL. DURING THE 2000-2001 TIME FRAME, THERE WERE SEVERAL SAUDI MALES, LIKE AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY, WHO WOULD TRAVEL TO CALIFORNIA PERIODICALLY. MANY OF THEM WOULD GO TO CAMPS IN ARIZONA (NFI); SOME OF THEM CAME DIRECTLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA, WHILE OTHERS CAME FROM OTHER LOCATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. [redacted] (O-1) ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 17 INDIVIDUALS IN THIS GROUP. AL-THUMAIRY ALWAYS MET THEM AT A HOUSE TO PRAY, BUT NOT AT THE MOSQUE, EXCEPT FOR FRIDAY PRAYERS. MANY AT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THIS UNUSUAL TREND, AND THE FACT THAT THE MOSQUE HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE TRAVELERS.

[redacted] [redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (O-1) MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AL SADHAN, AL SUDAIRY, AL-JARRAH AND THEIR ASSOCIATES DURING THE TIME THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WHERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, COINCIDING WITH EVENTS SURROUNDING HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S PRE-9/11 ACTIVITIES. [redacted] (O-1)

(NOTE: ACCORDING TO HIS I-94 RECORD, ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, DATE OF BIRTH [redacted] (P) 1961, COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE SAUDI ARABIA, PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] (P) TRAVELED BY AIR TO PORT OF ENTRY NEW YORK ON 12 DECEMBER 1999. [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) AL-JRAITHEN CONTINUED TO LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT OMAR AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CALIFORNIA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. TO DATE, NO DEPARTURE INFORMATION HAS BEEN LOCATED FOR AL-JRAITHEN. NO FURTHER EVIDENCE

OF HIS PRESENCE IN THE U.S. OR OVERSEAS EXISTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN IS A FICTITIOUS NAME.)

(O-1)

[redacted] CONSEQUENTLY, THE FBI IS SEEKING TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT A JOINT INTERVIEW WITH (O-1) FOR (A),(G),(J-1) PURPOSES, FACILITATED AND ATTENDED BY (O-1) (O-1) THE FBI IS WILLING TO CONDUCT THE (A), (G), (J-1) OF (A),(G),(J-1)

[redacted] THE FBI IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO YOUR AGENCY FOR LEAD PURPOSES. AUTHORIZATION FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION TO OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND/OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS MUST BE PROVIDED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS.

[redacted] POC FOR THIS MATTER AT THE FBI IS IA (S) AT (G) OR SSA (S)
(F)

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

File No. (F)

Office of the Legal Attaché
United States Embassy
(G)

28 March 2011

(G)
[redacted]

Re: Mohdar Abdullah

Dear Liaison Officer,

(F)

[redacted] The FBI would like to inform your service of a (A), (G), (J-1) for an ongoing investigation who has requested to meet with the FBI in the near future. The FBI requests your cooperation in allowing us to conduct this interview in (G) in approximately two (2) weeks.

[redacted] For background, (A), (G), (J-1) Mohdar Abdullah, aka Mihdar Mohammad al-Mihdar Zaid, hereinafter Mohdar, met and became acquainted with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the year 2000 while residing in San Diego, California. Mohdar alleged that he was introduced to the hijackers by Saudi citizen Omar al-Bayoumi at a mosque in San Diego. Mohdar was tasked by al-Bayoumi to acclimate the hijackers to United States, particularly San Diego, and help them in their personal affairs.

[redacted]

When al-Bayoumi was interviewed in 2003, he claimed that he did not introduce either al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi to Mohdar, but believed that they knew each other from the Masjid al-Ribat in San Diego, California.

[redacted] According to information provided to the FBI during a series of interviews with Mohdar between 2001 and 2004, which has been neither corroborated nor disproved, Mohdar helped al-Hazmi acquire a California drivers license, made inquiries in obtaining a social security card, made telephone calls on behalf of both hijackers to enroll in flight lessons at a flight school in Florida, made calls to a community college in San Diego to enroll al-Hazmi in a computer class, and helped al-Hazmi enroll in an English language school in San Diego. Mohdar was also employed at a Texaco gas station in San Diego, which was the same gas station where al-Hazmi worked for a three week period in September of 2000.

[redacted] On 09/21/2001, Mohdar was arrested on a material witness warrant regarding his association with and assistance to the hijackers. [redacted] (D)

Subsequently, the FBI took Mohdar into custody and named him in a two-count indictment, charging him with making false statements on U.S. immigration documents and to immigration officials. Mohdar entered into a guilty plea, which was used in a U.S. immigration removal proceeding. On 05/21/2004, Mohdar was removed from the United States and deported to Sanaa, Yemen, where he presently resides.

[redacted] The FBI has been in recent discussions with Mohdar, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) to arrange an interview. With the assistance of [redacted] (G) authorities, the FBI intends to interview Mohdar in [redacted] (G) to gain additional information regarding his past activity related to terrorism and in an effort to obtain criminal indictments against other 9/11 related individuals. The interview will cover a variety of topics not previously known to the FBI, to include the activities and facilitation of the 9/11 hijackers while in Southern California.

[redacted] The FBI proposes this interview be conducted in [redacted] (G) by FBI agents and in conjunction with our Legat office in [redacted] (G). [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Further, the FBI will address any of your service's questions, concerns, or requirements as they relate to Mohdar and our requested interview.

[redacted]

[redacted] As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We would welcome any additional information your Government has developed in regards to this matter.

Sincerely,

(S)

(S)
Legal Attache

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** (A), (G), (J-1)/2003

To: Counterintelligence **Attn:** (S), (G)

(A), (G), (J-1)
Los Angeles

From: Washington Field
(G)
(S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To provide information from (O-1) source.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Preliminary Inquiry Instituted:** 02/24/2003, set to expire 06/22/2003.

Details: [redacted] The following information was provided to WFO on or about (A), (G), (J-1)/03 from a representative of the (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) asset reported in March 2003 that MUSAED AL-JARRAH is the assistant director of Islamic Affairs at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in WDC. (O-1)

[redacted]

(O-1) that AL-JARRAH is heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the U.S., specifically with the Southern California based network of MUHAMMAD AL-MUHANNAH and FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH is in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the U.S. The recent removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may be trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the U.S. through his position at the EKSA. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) into the U.S. and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the U.S. through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the U.S. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the U.S. visiting the Saudi imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the U.S. Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1)

[redacted] Source is a (O-1) source operated by SA (A), (G), (J-1), (S) [redacted] No dissemination outside the FBI should occur without first consulting (S).

To: nterintelligence Washington Field
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted], (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]/2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Discretionary)

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] For information. File copy of communication (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted], if desired.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CA

[redacted] For information. Read and clear.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G) (S) (S) [redacted]

International Operations **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

Riyadh **Attn:** (G) [redacted]

San Diego **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

New York **Attn:** (S) [redacted]

From: New York
(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] (F) -OPERATION ENCORE, (F)
(F) - FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

[redacted]

plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) [redacted] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) [redacted] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) [redacted]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) [redacted] AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [redacted] Additional documentation (C-1) [redacted] ((F) [redacted]. AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers , and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth [redacted] (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport [redacted] (P-1) social security account number [redacted] (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference [redacted] (F) [redacted] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[redacted] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference [redacted] (F)).

[redacted] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, [redacted] (P), 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in [redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] (C-1)

(C-1)

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

[redacted] FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and (C-1) as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # P-1 On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[redacted] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference (F) In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference (F). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference (F) (F) AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[redacted] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[redacted] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, (P), owner of (P), advised that (P) had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[redacted] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P)

[redacted] (P), was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference [redacted] (F) A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

[redacted] [redacted] (C-1) reference [redacted] (F)

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[redacted] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[redacted] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

[redacted] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[redacted] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[redacted] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's." (P)

[redacted] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[redacted] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'" AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[redacted] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[redacted] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles. BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[redacted] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[redacted] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[redacted] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[redacted] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[redacted] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate (D) When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference (F)

[redacted] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment (P)) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[redacted] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[redacted] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and

AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P) (P) however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. (P)

(P)

[redacted] (P)

(P)

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

TO	**PHONE #**	**DATE**	**TIME**
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)			

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between (P) telephone

number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/[redacted] 1998. After which, for almost (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [redacted] the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [redacted] In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate ((F) [redacted]).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ((F) (F) [redacted]

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) [redacted]. In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F) [redacted]. In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [redacted] The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his

post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1) (O-1)

> (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1), reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) (F) Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: Saudi Arabia
SOC: (P-1)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: O
Middle: A
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (G)

LEAD(s):

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to process (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G) (S)

International Operations **Attn:** [redacted] (G)

Riyadh **Attn:** [redacted] (G)

San Diego **Attn:** [redacted] (S)

New York **Attn:** [redacted] (S)

From: New York
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: [redacted] (F)-OPERATION ENCORE, (F).

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[redacted] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple (A)(G)(J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F)). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial [redacted]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from (C-1)

(C-1)
[redacted] ((F). AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F). According to the closing EC (F) (F) and supplemental closing EC (F) (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

([redacted]) Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A),(G),(J-1),(D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/[redacted] 1998. After which, for almost (A), (G), (J-1), (D) the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ((F)).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. (A), (G), (J-1), (D) During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F).

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ((F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F) (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted]

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1) (O-1)

> "(O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

"(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A),(G),(J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [redacted]

[redacted] Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment**: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ((F) (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] The (G) is requested to process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) (G) (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Intelligence Directorate **Attn:**
Attn:

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH (A)(G)(J-1)
[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To open captioned Full Investigation, document transmission of (G) and request a (G) (G)

(G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] (1)the electronic (F)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details: [redacted] New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

[redacted] By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A)(G)(J-1) AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F)

[redacted] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) (F). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [redacted]

(A)(G)(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # (F). Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ((F)). Additional documentation from the (C-1) ((F)). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ((F)).

[redacted] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ((F)) and supplemental closing EC (F) (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F)). (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/[redacted]1998. After which, for almost (D), (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ((F) .

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D) During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ((F)).

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F) (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. (O-1) (O-1)

> (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) (A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[redacted] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([redacted] (F)).

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

[redacted] Not Applicable

(G)

Number of Subjects: 1

(G) Code:

(G)

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-JARRAH
First:	MUSAED
Middle:	A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1960
POB:	Saudi Arabia
Phone #:	Previous - 202-342-3700, 202-944-3192, (P)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

Current -
(P-1)

Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) (A), (G), (J-1)
E-mail Addresses: (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[redacted] Not Applicable

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Coordinate [redacted] (G) as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) [redacted] (G) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 10/27/2009

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) (G) [redacted] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G): Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Read and clear.

◆◆

deral Bureau of Investigation
(G)
(G)
February 22, 2010

[redacted]

OPERATION ENCORE/ (A),(G),(J-1)

(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)

(J-3)
Adel Mohammed Al-Sadhan

(J-3)
Mutaib A A Al-Sudiary

1999-2001 employed by Islamic Affairs Office at the Saudi Arabian Embassy; listed al-Jarrah as Supervisor

Currently in Malaysia

(J-3)
Musaid Al-Jarrah

1991-2005 Director of Islamic Affairs responsible for management and control of Imams sent to the US by Saudi Arabia

circa 2005-current

Cultural Affairs Office Saudi Arabian Embassy In Malaysia

Saudi Arabian Embassy Washington D.C. Islamic Affairs Office

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

15 DEC 1998-20 JAN 1999 visited while in Los Angeles

JUL/ AUG 1999 Traveled to San Diego for 5-6weeks and were looked after by al-Bayoumi

JAN/FEB 2000 5 phone calls around the time when the hijackers were with Al Bayoumi

late JAN/early FEB 2000 communication with Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington D.C. begins

Late JAN 2000 moved to San Diego where Al Bayoumi assisted them

Currently in Saudi Arabia
(J-3)
Fa[redacted]ry
Imam at King Fahad Mosque in Los Angeles, CA

DEC 1999-JAN 2000 numerous phone calls

Currently in Saudi Arabia
(J-3)
Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi formerly based in San Diego, CA

associates

Currently in Yemen

Anwar Nasser Aulaqi
1995-2000 Imam of Al-Ribat Mosque in San Diego,CA
JAN 2001-MAR 2002 Imam of Dar al Hijra Mosque in Falls Church VA

2 of the 19 9/11 Hijackers

Nawaf M Al-Hazmi
DECEASED



Khalid bin Muhammad Abdullah Al-Mihdhar
DECEASED

(A),(G),(J-1),(D)

attended Al-Ribat Mosque while in San Diego

15 JAN 2000 Arrive in Los Angeles, CA travel to KFM and met Thumairy

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Encore (A),(G),(J-1) Overview

Although (A), (J-1), (G) Operation Encore are separate investigations, understanding the links between the two cases is important to the overall strategy of (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) This paper will lay out (A),(G),(J-1) key players, associations, communications, and provide an overview of Op Encore. This paper will also explain how the key players, communications, and logistics from both (A),(G),(J-1) Op Encore overlap. Finally, this paper will provide an outlook on (A) (G) (J-1) and briefly cover the strategy moving forward.

(A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) centers on two Saudi nationals Adel al-Sadhan (F) (F) and Mutaib al-Sudairy (F) (J-3) (J-3) Al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy previously visited San Diego, California for approximately six weeks in the summer of 1999 and were hosted by Omar al-Bayoumi[2]—and are assessed to be part of a network of individuals connected to the facilitation of two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. (J-3) (J-3)

[redacted] Based on their activity patterns in 1999 and 2000, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy possibly served in the capacity of an advance intelligence team involved in laying the groundwork for 9/11 hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, before their arrival in Southern California in early 2000. There is no indication al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy had direct contact with the hijackers, however similar associations, communications, and logistics mirror those of the hijackers upon their arrival.

- ([redacted] According to the US State Department Office of Foreign Missions, al-Sudairy worked as an administrative officer from June 1999 to April 2001 and al-Sadhan worked at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in Washington, DC; both working under Musaid al-Jarrah.[3]
- [redacted] (J-3)

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[1] (G)

[2] [redacted] Al-Bayoumi (F) attended multiple graduate schools in California between 1995 and 2000 and performed administrative duties as the Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara, aka Kurdish Community Islamic Center of Greater San Diego. Al-Bayoumi left San Diego in fall 2000 to attend Aston University in Birmingham, England. He relocated to Saudi Arabia (KSA) in August 2002 where he is currently located.

[3] [redacted] Al-Jarrah (F) former Director of the Islamic Affairs Department in the Saudi Arabian Embassy who left his post in 2005—is currently working in the Cultural Affairs Office in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Malaysia. While in the US, (O-1) he was responsible for placing Saudi Imams around the US and was purposefully selecting extremists for the positions. (O-1) al-Jarrah was funding and controlling al-Thumairy's southern California network.

[redacted]

Operation Encore

[redacted] Operation Encore, opened in October 2007, is an investigation to determine how two of the 9/11 hijackers—Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—integrated into and were supported by the local Muslim community where they lived in southern California in 2000.[i] Fahad al-Thumairy[4] and Omar al-Bayoumi were key figures in assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi after their arrival in southern California. Analysis of al-Bayoumi and al-Thumairy's call activity indicates that the assistance provided to the hijackers likely involved a network of people including al-Bayoumi, al-Thumairy, Anwar Aulaqi and an individual at the EKSA in Washington D.C.; however, it is unclear if any of the individuals involved had pre-knowledge of 9/11 or of al-Mihdhar's and al Hazmi's role in 9/11.

- [redacted] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi did not speak English and were not familiar with Western culture which made them reliant on individuals for assistance while in the US.
- [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1), (P) was tasked by al-Thumairy to pick up al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi from the airport and to take care of them while they were in Los Angeles.[ii] However, in FBI interviews with Johar, he never admitted to directly being tasked by al-Thumairy but he did admit to spending time with and assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with various things during their time in Los Angeles.[iii]
- [redacted] During an FBI interview with (P), he admitted to being instructed by al-Bayoumi to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during their stay in San Diego. Al-Bayoumi also told (P) that he, al-Bayoumi, was responsible for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar.[iv]
- [redacted] According to a proffer interview of Mohdar Mohammad al-Mohdar Zeid, aka Mohdar Mohammed Abdullah, he was tasked by al-Bayoumi to look after al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi during their time in San Diego.[v] It remains unclear as to why Mohdar or (P) were chosen by al-Bayoumi.

Common Associates

- [redacted] Al-Mihdhar and al Hazmi stayed in Los Angles for approximately one to two weeks after their arrival in the US.[vi] Several days after their arrival at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on 15 January 2000, al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi went to the King Fahad Mosque where they met with al Thumairy for five to ten minutes.[vii] (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) (G), (J-3) (G), (J-3)
- [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1), al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy met with and received help finding lodging from al-Bayoumi in San Diego in 1999. For approximately six weeks while they were in San Diego, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy lived at a Lemon Grove residence with an individual (A),(G),(J-1) also later hosted hijackers al Hazmi and al-Mihdhar when they were in San Diego.

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[4] [redacted] Al-Thumairy (F) was Imam at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, CA and is described in a US State Department document as Administrative Officer at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA in 1999.

[5] (O-1)

- [redacted] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi first met with al-Bayoumi around the beginning of February at a Mediterranean restaurant in Culver City, California.[viii] Shortly after this meeting, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi relocated to San Diego, California around February 4, 2000. Upon their arrival in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with establishing living arrangements and opening a bank account. Mohdar Abdullah also reported that al-Bayoumi tasked him with assisting the two with their daily affairs.

Phone links

- (A),(G),(J-1),(D)
- (G),(D)
- [redacted] Between 31 January 2000 and 3 February 2000, al-Bayoumi calls the EKSA seven times.[x] *Note: Musaid al-Jarrah and Mutaib al-Sudairy were working at the embassy during this time.*
- [redacted] On 4 February 2000, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi establish a Bank of America account at approximately 1:30pm. (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

Outlook

[redacted] (O-1) [redacted] (G).

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) surround al-Sadhan and Al-Sudairy's nexus to al-Qa'ida and their activities since departing from the US in 2001. Beyond their suspicious activity patterns involving the hijackers' southern California support network before 9/11 and their questionable associates, there is no independent (A), (G), (J-1) information that they were working at the behest of a terrorist network.

- [redacted] The only identified direct link to al-Qa'ida or any other terrorist group beyond the San Diego network is through Ziyad Khaleel, a former naturalized US citizen who was killed in Saudi Arabia in 2002 and supplied Usama bin Laden with satellite phone equipment in the mid-1990s.

- [redacted] During the summer of 2000, al-Sudairy moved to Columbus, Missouri where he lived with Ziyad Khaleel for approximately four months. Khaleel and al-Sudairy met twice in Saudi Arabia after October 2001, however the FBI has no information about the context of Khaleel and al-Sadhan's relationship.

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i [redacted] FBI Communication [redacted] (F)

ii [redacted] (F)

iii [redacted] (F)

iv [redacted] (F)

v [redacted] (F) - [redacted]

vi [redacted] (F)

vii [redacted] (F)

viii [redacted] (F)

ix [redacted] FBI Telephone Applications

x [redacted] FBI Telephone Applications

(Rev. 06-04-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE **Date:** 09/28/2010

To: [redacted] (G) **Attn:** [redacted] (S)
International Operations **Attn:** [redacted] (G)
Counterterrorism **Attn:**
Attn: [redacted] (S)
Oklahoma City **Attn:**
Indianapolis **Attn:**
New York **Attn:**

From: Counterterrorism
[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
ADEL MOHAMMAD A AL-SADHAN
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
MUTAIB A A AL-SUDAIRY
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/28/2010
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

[redacted] DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE OFFICIAL DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONS (G)
(G)

Synopsis: [redacted] (S), (G) provides authority to disseminate the enclosed (G) tearline to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities.

(G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: [redacted] Pursuant to Attorney General Guidelines, for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom), Part VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in the interest of national security of the United States. The information is relevant to the recipient's authorized responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the National Security interests of the United States, and the FBI has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.

[redacted] (G) has reviewed the information contained in the enclosed communication. Passage of this information is consistent with the standards for dissemination of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign authorities as authorized in the AGG-Dom.

[redacted] The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to ensure that any intelligence information that the FBI disseminates to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities pursuant to this authorization is not and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under Executive Order 12333 or torture, as defined in U.S. criminal law. To this end, the FBI shall take the following actions:

1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the information in this document is for intelligence and lead purposes only. The information in this document may not be used in any legal proceedings or disseminated to any other agency within the recipient's government without the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct

contact with the subject) based on the information in this communication without first coordinating with the FBI;

2. As required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (O-1) (O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI MOU, (O-1) (O-1)

3. Legat shall report to CTD and OIO any indication that the recipient agency to whom this information has been provided did not honor the caveat regarding use or dissemination of this information, or used the information for either assassination or torture.

Details: [redacted] Legat (G) has requested CTD provide (A), (G), (J-1) authority to disseminate (G) derived information to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities to provide information regarding captioned subject Ahmed Mosa Alzahrani's (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI NY investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[redacted] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[redacted] Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy previously came to the US in June 1999 as employees of the Islamic Affairs Office at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

[redacted] (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) FBI (G) [redacted] initiated (A), (J-1), (G) to investigate both subjects’ (J-3) The FBI subsequently requested and received approved (J-3), (O-1) The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to (A), (G), (J-1)

Background on Operation Encore

[redacted] According to I-94 information, Adil Alsadhan (believed to be identifiable with Adel Al Sadhan) entered Los Angeles on 15 December 1998 (J-3) (J-3). His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his I-94 that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) in Culver (O-1) The purpose for Al Sadhan’s visit in 1998 is unknown, though it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy’s subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

[redacted] Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight (J-3) (O-1)

[redacted] Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. (O-1) Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time. (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

[redacted] NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. (A), (G), (J-1) the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. (A), (G), (J-1) he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of (A), (G), (J-1) tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

[redacted] In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, (A), (G), (J-1) provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. (A), (G), (J-1) for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

[redacted] In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

[redacted] On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles, CA via LAX airport on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

[redacted] Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[redacted] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in order and a “welcoming party” for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[redacted] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed via LAX on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[redacted] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[redacted] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulaqi was now the Imam.

[redacted] In May 2001, two additional hijackers arrived in the US - Ahmed Al-Ghambi and Majed Moqed. The four drove to Connecticut where they checked into a Fairfield Inn and then immediately drove to Patterson, NJ to look for a place to live. Within 3 days, they began renting rooms at a house in Patterson. Al-Mihdhar also arrived at the Patterson location in May. All of the hijackers stayed at this Patterson location until days before 11 September 2001.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

[redacted] After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

[redacted] In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulaqi.

[redacted] Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

[redacted] While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

[redacted] Al Sadhan was previously the subject of (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) This investigation was opened based on (O-1) that Al Sadhan worked under (A), (G), (J-1) Musaed Al-Jarrah (F) t the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC helping Al-Jarrah coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the US. Al Sadhan reportedly helped Al-Jarrah support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. Al Sadhan was (O-1) as a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafism and reportedly traveled frequently within the United States. However, because records checks indicated Al Sadhan left the US on 25 October 2001 and had not returned, the (G) case was closed in 2004.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (J-1), (G), (D)
(A), (J-1), (G), (D)

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/28/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] FBIHQ notifies Legat (G) that DIDO authority has been granted to disseminate the enclosed CTD approved tearline to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities.

-------------------------Begin Tearline---------------------

[redacted]

[redacted] (F)

(F)

[redacted] The following individuals are subjects of a pending FBI counterterrorism investigation:

Adel Mohammed A. Al Sadhan
Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1973
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (P-1)

Mutaib A.A. Al Sudairy
Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1971
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (P-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: (A), (G), (J-1)
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[redacted] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[redacted] (O-1) in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

[redacted] (J-3) The FBI then began to investigate both subjects' return to the US.

[redacted] The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to the US will provide a unique opportunity to collect intelligence on their activities and contacts while in the US, potentially including unknown US-based individuals tied to terrorism.

Background on Operation Encore

[redacted] According to US travel information Adel Al Sadhan entered Los Angeles, California on 15 December 1998 on [redacted] (J-3) His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his travel documents that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. The purpose for Al Sadhan's visit in 1998 is unknown, though it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy's subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

[redacted] Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight [redacted] (J-3)

[redacted] Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. Sources reported that Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time. [redacted] (J-3) He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

[redacted] NOTE: During interviews with detained al-Qaeda member Ali Mohammed, Mohammed stated that in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. Mohammed stated that the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. Mohammed claimed that he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of Mohammed's tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

[redacted] In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

[redacted]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F) 09/28/2010

[redacted] In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

[redacted] On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

[redacted] Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[redacted] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[redacted] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in

[redacted]

order and a "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[redacted] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed the US on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[redacted] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[redacted] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulaqi was now the Imam.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

[redacted] After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

[redacted] In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulaqi. Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

[redacted] While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

Current Travel to the US

[redacted] Recent information obtained by the FBI revealed that [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3)

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/28/2010
(J-3)
(P-1).

Background on Al-Zahrani

[redacted] The FBI initiated an investigation of Saudi Arabia-based Ahmed Mosa Al-Zahrani after determining he was an associate and possible student of Al Sudairy. Al-Zahrani previously applied to attend English classes at Ball State University in Indiana around the same time (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) We have not identified any familial relation between Al-Zahrani and Al Sudairy, and have no indication that Al Sudairy is providing (A), (G), (J-1) to any other individuals.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

Al Sudairy's Interest in (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

Request for Meeting

[redacted] The FBI respectfully requests a meeting with your service to provide an in-depth briefing regarding all aspects of this FBI investigation. Please coordinate with the Legal Attache to determine a time and place suitable for your service.

[redacted] As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We welcome any additional information your Government has developed regarding this matter.

[redacted]

--------------------------End Tearline-----------------------

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/28/2010

[redacted] Questions regarding this communication should be directed to SSA (S), IA (S) (S), or SOS (S).

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [redacted] (F), 09/28/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

(G)

(G)

[redacted] (G) requests (G) to pass the attached tearline to the appropriate (G) authorities. Please report any non-compliance with the tearline caveat, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Administrative Section of the EC. Legat is also requested to coordinate a meeting between FBI NY, CTD, and representatives of (G) regarding this investigation.

[redacted] As required by the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning (O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (MOU), (O-1)

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Read and clear.

◆◆

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 12/28/2009

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G), (S)

New York: Attn: (S)

From: New York
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
[redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH
[redacted] IYAD MAHMUD MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AL RABABAH

Synopsis: Disseminate working document outlining the aforementioned investigations. Request (G) disseminate document to (A),(G),(J-1)

(G)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** 08/28/2007

Details: [redacted] Documented below is the contents of a working document outlining the results of the captioned investigations. It is important to note that this is a document that is currently being worked on by investigators and analytical staff and should be viewed currently as a incomplete document.

For Background

[redacted] On 06/28/2007, a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation was opened by NYO to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, NYO opined that certain Al Qaeda (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, the NYO was interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Operation Encore (FI) was eventually opened in New York to fully investigate the emerging network uncovered during the initial investigation conducted under PENTBOM.

[redacted] Further, full investigations were initiated to investigate Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah, due to their association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. There is a significant amount of information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews that suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States, preparing for the 9/11 attacks. They are suspected of providing the hijackers with financial assistance, obtaining drivers licenses and living quarters, spiritual guidance, and locating flight schools.

[redacted] Logical investigation conducted through Operation Encore, Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and separately Musaed Al-Jarrah, it has been uncovered that Musaed Al Jarrah may have played a leadership role in the overall coordination of logistics support for 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. This was possible through Al-Jarrah's position as Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. Al-Jarrah oversaw the handling of the hijackers through his subordinates Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi and by personal contact with the hijackers on numerous occasions.

[redacted] It has come to the attention of the NYO that Musaed Al-Jarrah currently holds the position of Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was further uncovered that Al-Jarrah has concentrated his attention on the assistance of Youth Groups during his tenure at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, Kuala Lumpur.

[redacted] Operation Encore has identified Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy as facilitators to the 9/11/2001 hijackers. [redacted] (J-3) (J-3)

Working Document

[redacted] On or about April 3, 1999, NAWAF ALHAZMI was issued a B-2 visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His intended address was Sheraton, LA, CA (I94 Form Record #I9449747518).

[redacted] On or about May 6, 1999, KHALID ALMIHDHAR was issued Saudi passport #B721156, and on or about April 7, 1999, was issued a B-1/B-2 visa [redacted] (F) note: wouldn't the passport need to be issued before the visa? - this info should be confirmed).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [redacted] (G)
[redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH was allegedly an accountant at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. since 1991. However, [redacted] (O-1), he was actually the head of the Islamic Affairs Section. He coordinated the activity of Saudi Salafi imams in the U.S., including FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY. AL-JARRAH left the U.S. in 2006.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
(S) (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On December 12, 1999, ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN arrived at 0742 per (O-1). According to I-94 record (P-1) he arrived at port of entry New York, intended address Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, (J-3) (J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [redacted] (G)
[redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On December 20, 1999, BAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA along with ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN. They checked in at 10:43 and checked out the next day at 13:22 (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) ALJRAITHEN's travel documents indicated he traveled by air to New York on December 12, 1999 on [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) He is a Saudi Arabian citizen and resident. He listed his intended address as Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, CA (per I-94 record [redacted] (P-1) .

[redacted] On or about January 4, 2000, ALMIHDHAR left for KL (need citation)

[redacted] From about January 4, 2000 through about January 8, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR met with other UBL associates in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia and in Bangkok, Thailand. Their associates included "KHALLAD" (WALID BIN ATTASH), planner of the U.S.S. Cole bombing (October 12, 2000).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
(S) (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 5, 2000, ALMIHDHAR arrived in KL (from Yemen, via Dubai)

(A),(G),(J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 8, 2000, NAWAF ALHAZMI AND KHALID ALMIDHAR arrived in Bangkok.

[redacted] On January 9, 2000, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA, and checked out about 20 minutes later (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, (F) (F) When registering he utilized the address (P) San Diego, CA (his old address). On the same date, apparently after having gone to the wrong hotel, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Half Moon Hotel, 3958 South Sepulveda Blvd., Culver City, CA. No check-in time was noted on the receipt. When registering he utilized the address (P) San Diego, CA.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 13, 2000, On January 15, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR arrived at Los Angeles International Airport at 13:27 on United Airlines flight 2 (a connecting flight from Bangkok).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted]
From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] 01/15/2010

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] (deposited at bank with ABA# [redacted] received one check in the amount of $300 from ALTHUMAIRY which cleared on 02/02/2000. (Analyst note: Records for Wells Fargo Bank account number [redacted] for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 were reviewed. The account was held in the name FAHAD AL THUMAIRY, ALBER ACCOUNT. The address [redacted] Los Angeles; note that [redacted] recently wrote a letter, indicating extremist views, to [redacted] [redacted] - maybe [redacted] knows him, timing of the payment interesting, there weren't typically such small payments from this account).

[redacted] (ALSUDAIRY worked at the embassy and was a visitor to San Diego who stayed at ABDUSATTAR SHAIKH's house).

[redacted] On or about February 1, 2000, OMAR ALBAYOUMI and [redacted] traveled to Los Angeles, ostensibly for ALBAYOUMI to deal with passport issues at the Saudi Consulate.

[redacted] Also on [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [redacted] (G)
[redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

[redacted] On or about February 3, 2000, an unknown male and OMAR ALBAYOUMI assisted NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR in obtaining a lease at the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego, CA. The next day, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR attempted to pay for the apartment with cash, but were advised by the rental office that they would need to use a cashier's check. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] According to an interview of [redacted] (P) (FD-302 dated 8/16/2002): "Initially, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office of the Parkwood Apartment Complex with an unknown middle eastern male, looking for a two-bedroom apartment sometime during the end of January 2000 or beginning of February 2000. Because Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not speak English well they needed someone to interpret for them. [redacted] (P) believed that this unknown male was employed by Alliant University in San Diego, California, as an aide or counselor in the International Studies Department. This unknown male was described as being approximately in his 30's or 40's, 5'9"-5'11", skull cap." Additionally, "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar wanted to move into an apartment the same day that they walked into the rental office, however [redacted] (P) advised them that they needed a co-signer/guarantor and a bank statement showing that they had enough assets to pay for the rent." Since "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have a credit history, and according to Al-Bayoumi they were staying with him because they just came into the country, he would be the co-signer and act as the guarantor. Al-Bayoumi emphasized that they needed to get an apartment right away. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office on three different days prior to actually moving into the apartment on February 5, 2000." "On the second occasion when Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office they had a 'wad of cash' to pay for the first month's rent, deposit and insurance. [redacted] (P) re-advised them that they had to have a bank account statement to show that they can pay for the rent since they did not have any employment or credit history. Additionally, they were told that [redacted] (P) could not accept cash on the first payment and would need a certified check, cashier's check or money order." "It was on February 4, 2000, that Al-Hazmi and Al-

Mihdhar came into the office with a bank statement and cash." "On February 5, 2002 [sic], Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the Parkwood office however, they did not have enough cash with them to pay for the apartment. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar left and returned with Al-Bayoumi, who filled out the section on the rental agreement as the co-signer and guarantor. Since Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have enough cash nor did they have a cashier's check, money order or certified check, Al-Bayoumi left and returned with a cashier's check, in his name, made payable to the Parkwood Apartments in the amount of $1,558.00."

According to an interview of [redacted] (P) (FD-302 dated 9/18/2001), [redacted] (P) "remembers renting an apartment to two Middle Eastern men in approximately January to March 2000." [redacted] (P) reported that there was "another male individual who acted as a translator on approximately four occasions for Almihdar and Alhazmi. He was described as a light-complected Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'6", 160 pounds, 27-28 years of age, wore glasses and a jewish yamaka (sic)."

[redacted] On February 4, 2000, Bayoumi obtained a cashier's check payable to the Parkwood Apartments for $1,558 and deposited the same amount in cash to his Bank of America account [redacted] (P) reportedly was in the bank with Khalid and Nawaf around 1:30-1:40pm ([redacted] (F)).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
(S) (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [redacted] LAFI H. ALHARBI. ALHARBI was a Lieutenant in the Saudi Arabian Navy at the time, and was in San Diego attending training (O-1) (O-1).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) OMAR ALBAYOUMI's phone also had interesting activity on this day.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
(G) (S) (S)
(S) From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G) (S)
(G) (S)
(S) From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] Is respectfully requested that (G) (G) disseminate this document to (A), (G), (J-1).

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 2/18/2010

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (S)

New York: Attn: (S)
Oklahoma City: Attn:
SSA (S) SA (S)

From: New York
(G)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
MUSAED AL-JARRAH
IYAD MAHMUD MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AL RABABAH
(A), (J-1), (G)

Synopsis: [redacted] Summary of investigative findings regarding Operation ENCORE (A), (G), (J-1) subjects Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy. (A), (J-1), (G) .

(G)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F) 02/18/2010

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: [redacted] New York is working under the operational hypothesis that Saudi nationals Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy, are possibly connected to the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks.

[redacted] (J-3) (J-3) The NYO believes that this is an opportunity to collect information about any possible terrorism related connections that these two Saudi nationals may have.

Background:

[redacted] On 06/28/2007, a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation was opened by NYO to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value.

[redacted] Specifically, the NYO was interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Operation Encore (FI) was eventually opened in New York to fully investigate the emerging network uncovered during the initial investigation conducted under PENTBOM.

[redacted] Further, full investigations were initiated to investigate Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah, due to their association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. There is a significant amount of information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews that suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States, preparing for the 9/11 attacks. They are suspected of providing the hijackers with financial assistance, obtaining drivers licenses and living quarters, spiritual guidance, and locating flight schools.

[redacted] Logical investigation conducted through Operation Encore, Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and separately Musaed Al-Jarrah, it has been uncovered that Musaed Al Jarrah may have played a leadership role in the overall coordination of logistics support for 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. This was possible through Al-Jarrah's position as Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. Al-Jarrah oversaw the handling of the hijackers through his subordinates Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi and by personal contact with the hijackers on numerous occasions.

Timeline:

[redacted] On or about April 3, 1999, NAWAF ALHAZMI was issued a B-2 visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His intended address was Sheraton, LA, CA (I94 Form Record #I9449747518).

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(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F) 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On December 12, 1999, ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN arrived at 0742 per (O-1) According to I-94 record (P-1) he arrived at port of entry New York, intended address Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, (J-3) (J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

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[redacted] On December 20, 1999, BAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA along with ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN. They checked in at 10:43 and checked out the next day at 13:22 (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, (F), serial (F) ALJRAITHEN's travel documents indicated he traveled by air to New York on December 12, 1999 (J-3) [redacted]. He is a Saudi Arabian citizen and resident. He listed his intended address as Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, CA (per I-94 record (P-1)

[redacted] On or about January 4, 2000, ALMIHDHAR left for KL (need citation)

[redacted] From about January 4, 2000 through about January 8, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR met with other UBL associates in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia and in Bangkok, Thailand. Their associates included "KHALLAD" (WALID BIN ATTASH), planner of the U.S.S. Cole bombing (October 12, 2000).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

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(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

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(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 13, 2000, On January 15, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR arrived at Los Angeles International Airport at 13:27 on United Airlines flight 2 (a connecting flight from Bangkok).

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (D) note that (P) recently wrote a letter, indicating extremist views, to (A), (G), (J-1) (P) - maybe (P) knows him, timing of the payment interesting, there weren't typically such small payments from this account).

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[redacted] On or about February 1, 2000, OMAR ALBAYOUMI and BIN DON traveled to Los Angeles, ostensibly for ALBAYOUMI to deal with passport issues at the Saudi Consulate.

[redacted] (D) ; (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On or about February 3, 2000, an unknown male and OMAR ALBAYOUMI assisted NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR in obtaining a lease at the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego, CA. The next day, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR attempted to pay for the apartment with cash, but were advised by the rental office that they would need to use a cashier's check. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

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[redacted] According to an interview of (P) (FD-302 dated 8/16/2002): "Initially, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office of the Parkwood Apartment Complex with an unknown middle eastern male, looking for a two-bedroom apartment sometime during the end of January 2000 or beginning of February 2000. Because Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not speak English well they needed someone to interpret for them. (P) believed that this unknown male was employed by Alliant University in San Diego, California, as an aide or counselor in the International Studies Department. This unknown male was described as being approximately in his 30's or 40's, 5'9"-5'11", skull cap." Additionally, "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar wanted to move into an apartment the same day that they walked into the rental office, however (P) advised them that they needed a co-signer/guarantor and a bank statement showing that they had enough assets to pay for the rent." Since "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have a credit history, and according to Al-Bayoumi they were staying with him because they just came into the country, he would be the co-signer and act as the guarantor. Al-Bayoumi emphasized that they needed to get an apartment right away. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office on three different days prior to actually moving into the apartment on February 5, 2000." "On the second occasion when Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office they had a 'wad of cash' to pay for the first month's rent, deposit and insurance. (P) re-advised them that they had to have a bank account statement to show that they can pay for the rent since they did not have any employment or credit history. Additionally, they were told that (P) could not accept cash on the first payment and would need a certified check, cashier's check or money order." "It was on February 4, 2000, that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the office with a bank statement and cash." "On February 5, 2002 [sic], Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the Parkwood office however, they did not have enough cash with them to pay for the apartment. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar left and returned with Al-Bayoumi, who filled out the section on the rental agreement as the co-signer and guarantor. Since Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have enough cash nor did they have a cashier's check, money order or certified check, Al-Bayoumi left and returned with a cashier's check, in his name, made payable to the Parkwood Apartments in the amount of $1,558.00."

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[redacted] On February 4, 2000, Bayoumi obtained a cashier's check payable to the Parkwood Apartments for $1,558 and deposited the same amount in cash to his Bank of America account (D), (P-1) reportedly was in the bank with Khalid and Nawaf around 1:30-1:40pm ((F)).

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1 LAFI H. ALHARBI. ALHARBI was a (O-1) in the Saudi Arabian

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) reporting indicated that in November 2009, Omar Al-Bayoumi had wired $6000.00 to a flight school located in the Philippines who specialize in small aircraft (Cessna) flight training. Al-Bayoumi had provided a list of identifiers for this monetary transaction, to include, a P.O. Box located in Saudi Arabia, as well as, two Saudi telephone numbers. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] According to FBI San Diego, (P) The (P) located in San Diego, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) is in contact with Al-Sudairy and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted], (P) a Medical Doctor who cared for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and an unidentified Saudi, have been having private meetings within the library of (P) Mosque.

[redacted] (O-1)

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
[redacted] Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(O-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] It has come to the attention of the NYO that Musaed Al-Jarrah currently holds the position of Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was further uncovered that Al-Jarrah has concentrated his attention on the assistance of Youth Groups during his tenure at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, Kuala Lumpur.

[redacted] The two Saudi nationals, Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy, were associated with individuals who had direct contact with Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi in southern California. Although there is no indication that Al-Sadhan or Al-Sudairy had direct contact with the hijackers, Al-Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person approximately a year before the hijackers arrived in the US. Moreover, Al-Sadhan and Al-Sudairy received assistance from Al-Bayoumi during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of the hijackers. This, paired with telephonic communication between Al-Bayoumi and Al-Sudairy on significant dates, suggests that Al-Sudairy and Al-Sadhan may have assisted the hijackers during their time in southern California.

(J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
(G)   Re: [redacted] (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] Read and Clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

(G)

FM FBI WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT
[redacted]
CITE: (G)
PASS:

SUBJECT: [redacted] INEXORABLE/POSTDILUVIAN - TO REPORT INFORMATION ON OPERATION ENCORE.

DEATILS: [redacted] ON 24 FEBRUARY 2010, THE FBI BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES FROM CTC/GJ AT LANGLEY REGARDING OPERATION ENCORE (J-3) (J-3) THE BELOW INFORMATION SERVES TO SUMMARIZE THIS BRIEFING.

[redacted] ON 28 JUNE 2007, A SUBFILE UNDER THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO CONTAIN INFORMATION GARNERED FROM THE PLANNED EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE TARGETS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION. THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION FUNCTIONED AS BOTH A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION INTO THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED INDIVIDUALS WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF CONNECTIVITY TO THE 9/11 HIJACKERS WHOM COULD BE FURTHER EXPLOITED FOR ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE. BY REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION, THE FBI BELIEVED THAT CERTAIN AL-QAEDA TACTICS AND TRADECRAFT COULD BE REVEALED.

[redacted] SPECIFICALLY, THE FBI WAS INTERESTED IN GAINING A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI'S PAST INTERACTION WITH AND CONNECTIVITY TO THE LOCAL (SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAN) MUSLIM COMMUNITY. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD ASSIST IN EXPLAINING THE APPARENT EASE WITH WHICH AL-MIHDHAR AND AL-HAZMI EXPLOITED THAT COMMUNITY TO GAIN ASSISTANCE AND SAFE HARBOR.

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE WAS EVENTUALLY OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO FULLY INVESTIGATE THE NETWORK UNCOVERED DURING THE INITIAL

INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER PENTBOM.

[redacted] ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WERE INITIATED ON FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, AND MUSAED AL-JARRAH DUE TO THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH 9/11 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF INFORMATION UNCOVERED THROUGH PHONE ANALYSIS, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, AND NUMEROUS INTERVIEWS THAT SUGGESTS THE AFOREMENTIONED SUBJECTS ASSISTED THE HIJACKERS IN A SUPPORT/LOGISTICS ROLE WHILE THEY WERE IN THE U.S. THEY ARE SUSPECTED OF PROVIDING THE HIJACKERS WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, OBTAINING DRIVERS LICENSES AND LIVING QUARTERS, PROVIDING SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE, AND LOCATING FLIGHT SCHOOLS.

[redacted] DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION IT WAS REVEALED THAT TWO ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS WITH LINKS TO AL-THUMAIRY, AL-BAYOUMI, AND AL-JARRAH - [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) ALTHOUGH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE 9/11 HIJACKERS, AL SADHAN LIKELY MET WITH AL-THUMAIRY IN PERSON IN 1998, APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE THE HIJACKERS ARRIVED IN THE US, AND BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MET WITH AL-BAYOUMI IN 1999 WHO ASSISTED THEM DURING THEIR SIX WEEK STAY IN SAN DIEGO APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. THIS CONTACT, PAIRED WITH ANALYSIS OF CALL RECORDS AND TRAVEL PATTERNS DURING THE TIME THE TWO HIJACKERS WERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INDICATES AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY HAVE SERVED AS AN ADVANCE TEAM WHO HELPED TO ARRANGE PEOPLE TO ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR DURING THEIR TIME IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

[redacted] FOR BACKGROUND, PRIOR TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES IN JANUARY 2000, A SERIES OF EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN THE US TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A NETWORK THAT WOULD SOON PROVIDE THEM LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE.

[redacted] ACCORDING TO I-94 INFORMATION, ADIL ALSADHAN (BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ADEL AL SADHAN) ENTERED LOS ANGELES ON 15 DECEMBER 1998 ON [redacted] (J-3) [redacted] (J-3) HIS INTENDED ADDRESS WAS THE HILTON HOTEL, LOS ANGELES AND HE LISTED A CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER ON HIS I-94 THAT WAS SUBSCRIBED TO FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA. THE PURPOSE FOR AL SADHAN'S VISIT IN 1998 IS UNKNOWN, THOUGH IT ESTABLISHES THE FIRST KNOWN CONTACT BETWEEN AL SADHAN AND AL-THUMAIRY. INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE HIS

VISIT WAS TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR AL- THUMAIRY'S SUBSEQUENT ASSISTANCE TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. AL SADHAN DEPARTED LOS ANGELES ON 20 JANUARY 1999.

[redacted] AL SADHAN RETURNED TO THE US ON 13 JUNE 1999, THIS TIME ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSOCIATE, MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY. BOTH MEN ENTERED VIA WASHINGTON, DC ON THE SAME FLIGHT AND (J-3)

[redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH, THEN DIRECTOR OF THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY HAVE MANAGED THE NETWORK THAT WOULD ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR, THOUGH HE NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS. AL-JARRAH WAS STATIONED IN WASHINGTON, DC FROM 1991 TO 2005. AL-JARRAH'S OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO MANAGE AND CONTROL ALL ASSIGNMENTS OF SAUDI IMAMS IN THE U.S. AND FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC VISAS. SOURCES REPORTED THAT AL-JARRAH MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BRING OTHER SAUDI SUNNI SALAFI EXTREMISTS INTO THE U.S. THROUGH HIS POSITION AT THE EMBASSY. IT WAS AL-JARRAH WHO DETERMINED AL-THUMAIRY'S ASSIGNMENT, PLACING HIM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE DURING THIS TIME. AL-THUMAIRY WAS IN THE US ON A DIPLOMATIC VISA AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE HAD A REPUTATION FOR BEING A "SALAFI FANATIC" AND AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MOTIVATION FOR VIOLENT OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) IN 1992 OR 1994 HE WAS TASKED BY USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) TO GET A LIST OF ALL SAUDI EMBASSY EMPLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES. (A), (G), (J-1) THE REASON FOR THIS WAS TO FIND AND RECRUIT A SYMPATHIZER WITHIN THE SAUDI EMBASSY. (A), (G), (J-1) HE WENT TO A LOCAL LIBRARY AND PHOTOCOPIED A LIST OF EMBASSY EMPLOYEES FROM A BOOK IN THE REFERENCE SECTION AND HAND-DELIVERED THE LIST TO UBL. AL-JARRAH BEGAN WORKING AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC IN 1991. DURING THE TIME FRAME OF (A), (G), (J-1) TASKING FROM UBL, AL-JARRAH WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE PHOTOCOPIED LIST.

[redacted] IN 1999, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY TRAVELED TO SAN DIEGO WHERE THEY STAYED FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 WEEKS (APPROXIMATELY JULY 1999 TO AUGUST 1999) AND MET WITH OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, A SAUDI STUDENT WHO HAD RESIDED IN SAN DIEGO SINCE 1995. AL-BAYOUMI

(O-1) AND, ACCORDING TO (A),(G),(J-1) PROVIDED A PLACE TO LIVE AND LOOKED AFTER THEM. FBI INVESTIGATION INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI MAY HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH A CELL PHONE. (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) ALSO INDICATES THAT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY LIVED AT THE SAME ADDRESS IN SAN DIEGO WHERE AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR WOULD LATER STAY.

[redacted] THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF AL-THUMAIRY, AL-JARRAH, AND AL-BAYOUMI IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000 IS TELLING. SPECIFICALLY, IN DECEMBER 1999 THERE WAS A UNIQUE PATTERN OF TELEPHONIC CONTACT THAT OPERATION ENCORE INVESTIGATORS REFER TO AS "THE SET-UP CALLS" CALLS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LATER PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSISTING THE HIJACKERS. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] ON 12 DECEMBER 1999 ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, A SAUDI RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR, ENTERED THE US IN NEW YORK AND CONTINUED TO LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. (NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL HOTEL REGISTRATION WAS FOUND AT THIS SAME TRAVELODGE FOR ABDULLAH ALGHAMDI WHO STAYED AT THE HOTEL FROM 8 MAY 2001 TO 15 MAY 2001. AHMED ALGHAMDI AND HAZMA ALGHAMDI WERE TWO OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 AND SAEED ALGHAMDI WAS ONE OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93.) AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO THIS SAME TRAVELODGE HOTEL AGAIN ON 9 JANUARY 2000, THE NEXT MONTH, ABOUT A WEEK PRIOR TO THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL. AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED IN AND THEN CHECKED OUT AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES. HE THEN CHECKED INTO THE HALF-MOON HOTEL FOR ONE NIGHT. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEEMS TO IMPLY HE CONFUSED THE HOTELS. (A), (G), (J-1), (D) WHICH INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI WAS EITHER CHECKING THE MINUTES THAT WERE UNUSED ON THE CARDS OR LEARNING HOW TO USE THEM BY LISTENING TO THE AUTOMATED PROMPTS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR LANDED IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000. THE FIRST PLACE THEY VISITED WAS THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA WHERE AL-THUMAIRY WAS THE IMAM. IN LATE JANUARY 2000, THEY MET OMAR AL-BAYOUMI IN LOS ANGELES AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER MOVED TO SAN DIEGO, WHERE AL-BAYOUMI RESIDED. AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED A RENTAL LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS IN SAN DIEGO AND ASSISTED THEM IN SETTING UP BANK ACCOUNTS. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] TELEPHONE RECORDS SHOW THAT AL-BAYOUMI CALLED MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY FIVE TIMES SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING THE HIJACKERS IN LOS ANGELES. THE DATES OF THE CALLS ARE SIGNIFICANT. THE FIRST SET OF CALLS OCCURRED ON 24 JANUARY, 26 JANUARY, AND 30 JANUARY 2000 ON THESE PARTICULAR DAYS AL-BAYOUMI MET THE HIJACKERS IN CULVER CITY, CA AND TALKED TO THEM ABOUT COMING TO SAN DIEGO. THE NEXT CALL OCCURRED ON 2 FEBRUARY 2000. ON 4 FEBRUARY 2000 AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED THE LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS' APARTMENT AND BROUGHT THEM TO A BANK OF AMERICA TO ASSIST IN OPENING A BANK ACCOUNT. THE LAST CALL OCCURRED ON 7 FEBRUARY 2000. BY THIS DATE, ALL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S AFFAIRS WERE IN ORDER.

[redacted] SOMETIME IN 2000, AL SADHAN MOVED TO LAWRENCE, KANSAS AND AL SUDAIRY MOVED TO COLUMBUS, MISSOURI. WHILE IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY LIVED WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL FOR ABOUT FOUR MONTHS IN 2000. KHALEEL WAS A KNOWN KEY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICER FOR UBL AND PROVIDED SATELLITE PHONES USED IN THE 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN AFRICA. DURING HIS TIME IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI - COLUMBIA'S INTENSIVE ENGLISH PROGRAM. ACCORDING TO (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) FACULTY MEMBERS WERE SUSPICIOUS OF HIM SINCE HE DIDN'T APPEAR INTERESTED IN LEARNING ENGLISH AND HIS PEERS BELIEVED HE WAS A SAUDI ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICER.

[redacted] ON 12/8/2000, A THIRD HIJACKER, HANI HANJOUR, ARRIVED IN SAN DIEGO AND LEFT WITH AL-HAZMI FOR PHOENIX, ARIZONA.

[redacted] IN EARLY APRIL OF 2001, AL-HAZMI AND HANJOUR ARRIVED IN FALLS CHURCH, VA. THEY ATTENDED THE DAR AL HIJRA MOSQUE, WHERE

ANWAR AULAQI WAS NOW THE IMAM. ALSO IN APRIL OF 2001, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY WERE TERMINATED FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT AT THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY (NFI). THE TWO MEN, AT THIS POINT, WERE LIVING IN WASHINGTON, DC. FBI HAS NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT AL SADHAN AND/OR AL SUDAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS OR AULAQI DURING THIS TIME. AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY BOTH LEFT THE UNITED STATES AND RETURNED TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 10/25/2001.

RECENT INFORMATION/INVESTIGATION

(J-3)

[redacted] BECAUSE THE FBI ASSESSES THAT AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY STILL MAINTAIN TIES TO AL-QAEDA AND MAY BE (J-3) [redacted] FOR FACILITATION OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PURPOSES ON BEHALF OF AL-QAEDA, (J-3), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) SURROUND AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S CURRENT NEXUS TO AL-QAEDA AND THEIR ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTING THE US IN 2001. BEYOND THEIR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PATTERNS PRIOR TO 9/11, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] INFORMATION THAT THEY WERE WORKING AT THE BEHEST OF AL-QAEDA. THE ONLY IDENTIFIED DIRECT LINK TO AL- QAEDA BEYOND THE OPERATION ENCORE NETWORK IS THROUGH AL SUAIDRY'S ASSOCIATION WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL, WHO WAS KILLED IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2002. SUBSEQUENT TO AL SUDAIRY'S DEPARTURE FROM THE US IN 2001, HE MET WITH KHALEEL TWICE IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (J-3) (J-3) (J-3) (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) HE HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO THE US BEFORE.

[redacted] IN ADDITION, [redacted] (O-1) REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN NOVEMBER 2009, AL-BAYOUMI WIRED $6,000.00 TO A FLIGHT SCHOOL LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SPECIALIZES IN SMALL AIRCRAFT (CESSNA) FLIGHT TRAINING. AL-BAYOUMI PROVIDED A LIST OF IDENTIFIERS FOR THIS MONETARY TRANSACTION, TO INCLUDE A P.O. BOX LOCATED IN SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS TWO SAUDI TELEPHONE NUMBERS. ONE OF THESE NUMBERS APPEARS TO BE LINKED TO A CIVIL AVIATION AGENCY IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHOM AL-BAYOUMI MAY WORK FOR. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM A CURRENT LINK BETWEEN AL-BAYOUMI AND AL SADHAN OR AL SUDAIRY, THE ABOVE INFORMATION REMAINS OF CONCERN TO OUR BUREAU.

[redacted] THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION OUTLINES [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S PREVIOUS VISIT TO THE US, IN WHICH THEY VISITED VIRGINIA, CALIFORNIA, AND KANSAS/MISSOURI. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3) (J-3) THE FBI BELIEVES THAT TO BE AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO, AND THAT BOTH SUBJECTS WILL LIKELY OBTAIN (J-3) HOUSING. REGARDLESS, WHEN SUBJECTS ESTABLISH A RESIDENCE, (A),(G),(J-1)

HUMINT

[redacted] FBI (A), (G), (J-1) (J-3) TO FUNCTION AS AN EXTENSION OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAMS.

[redacted] FBI (G) SOURCE COVERAGE WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SUBJECTS UPON ARRIVAL, E.G. IF THEY ATTEND MOSQUE AND WHAT HUMINT COVERAGE IS ALREADY IN PLACE IN THAT LOCATION. CURRENT (A),(G),(J-1) WILL BE QUERIED.

[redacted] ADDITIONALLY, (G) IS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION TO LOOK FOR CONTACTS AND LOCATIONS FREQUENTED DURING THE TIME HE SPENT IN (G)

ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS

[redacted] GIVEN THE SUBJECTS' SUSPECTED HISTORY OF FACILITATION, THE FBI ANTICIPATES OPENING ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS BASED ON ANY US-BASED ASSOCIATES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED BY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE.

(A), (G), (J-1)

CONCLUSION

[redacted] THE FBI ASSESSES THAT [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] THE FBI APPRECIATES YOUR AGENCY'S ASSISTANCE IN THIS ONGOING INVESTIGATION AND WELCOMES ANY INFORMATION YOUR AGENCY MAY HAVE IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECTS OF OPERATION ENCORE.

[redacted] THE FBI IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO YOUR AGENCY FOR LEAD PURPOSES. AUTHORIZATION FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION TO OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND/OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS MUST BE PROVIDED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS.

[redacted] POC FOR THIS MATTER AT THE FBI IS IA [redacted] (S) AT [redacted] (S) OR SSA [redacted] (G),(S) [redacted] (G)

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/16/2010

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** [redacted] (G), (S)

New York **Attn:**

Oklahoma City **Attn:**

San Diego **Attn:**

Washington Field Attn:

From: San Diego
Squad [redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID
aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 06/16/2010

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
ADIL ALSADHAN
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
MUTAIB A A ALSUDAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Additional information regarding ABDULLAH A S ALJRAITHEN.

(G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[redacted] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by (S) (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on (F) ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers 325 0877 and C (cell) 55154240. (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[redacted] ECF searches on "3250877" and "55154240" both yielded a hit on [redacted] (F) [redacted] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN 3250877 and cell 55154240. An IDW search on 3250877 yielded additional other government service information [redacted] (O-1) "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN 3250877" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] According to a [redacted] (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: [redacted] (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[redacted] Also according to the [redacted] (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. [redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] KHUDAIR appears to have at least indirect links to ABU ZUBAYDAH via AL QAEDA in IRAQ (AQI) member Abu Muhammad AL-NAJRANI. NAJRANI was reportedly an instructor at Al Qaeda's Camp Khaldan (ZUBAYDAH indicated he was trained by NAJRANI) and later became KHUDAIR's student [redacted] (F)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 06/16/2010

[redacted] A UNI search on the name variant ALJUAYTHIN yielded a hit on DR. ABD ALLAH B ALI AL-JU'AYTHIN in (F) (F) subject (P) Virginia Jihad member) regarding intercepted emails being submitted to the file (NFI).

[redacted] It is worth noting that another name on the seized laminated card along with ALJAYTHAN's was SALMAN BIN FAHD AL-AWDA. AWDA is a well-known Salafi cleric who has been identified in the past as a terrorism supporter. AWDA openly criticized USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) a few years ago, apparently supporting a less violent type of jihad. An extensive amount of information about AL-AWDA is available in (G). AWDA has a relatively recent connection to OP ENCORE subject FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY and his associate MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA (F) as described below.

[redacted] According to (F) as of late May 2009, SHAYKH SALMAN ODEH, VARIANT DR. SALMAN AL-AWDAH, was the shaykh of Saudi-based Salafi extremists MOHAMMAD AL-MUHANNA and FAHD AL-THUMAIRY, AKA FAHD AL-THUMAIRI. ODEH was a MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) leader who was detained by Saudi Arabian authorities for plotting against the Royal Family (NFI).

(O-1)

[redacted] Analyst note: The Imam University referred to above is likely Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University, which was attended by OP ENCORE subject THUMAIRY, as well as (A), (G), (J-1) subject ADEL ALSADHAN and possibly MUTAIB ALSUDAIRY. The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) (F) (F) was a subsidiary of this university. (J-2)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 06/16/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] For information.

♦♦

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY **Date:** 11/26/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S)

From: San (G)
(S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB; (A), (J-1), (G)

: [redacted] San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (J-1), (G)

Details: [redacted] Request Of Bureau:

[redacted] Bureau is requested (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

[redacted] On (A), (G) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1), advised that Omar Mohamed of San Diego as selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January

25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community [redacted]ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this matter.

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC.

[redacted] FBIHQ is requested (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for credit informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of birth, (P-1) 1960, SSAN (P-1), (P-1) La Mesa, CA. 91941

◆◆

(01/26/1998)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/16/2001

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S) (G)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, aka
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1) for toll records for captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

[redacted] Bureau is requested to direct responses to (F)

Details: [redacted] Request of the Bureau:

[redacted] Bureau is requested to (A), (G), (J-1) requests for telephone toll records for the following telephone numbers and associated addresses for the period of 09/01/2000 to the present:

1. (P)
   Subject's residence: (P)
   La Mesa, CA. 91941

2. (P)
   Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA) 4979 University Avenue, Suite C, San Diego, CA. 92105. Subject is the Director of WESRA.

[redacted]

3. (P)
Somali and East African Youth Center,
4979 University Avenue, Suite D, San Diego
CA. 92105. Subject is President of the
Youth Center.

[redacted] **NOTE:** (A), (G), (J-1) and public source information indicates that KHADIB is in charge of both WESRA and the Youth Center. The request should include language which would request tolls for any and all telephone lines at the above addresses in anticipation of other telephone numbers being present at the addresses.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the above numbers should be directed to :

(P)

[redacted] Khadib's pager number is (P) (A), (G), (J-1) request for the pager number records from 09/01/2000 to the present should be directed to:

(P)

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Is (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) AIAI raises large amount ited States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1)

(C-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ's assistance in this matter.

♦♦

[redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Investigative Summary: (G) G, advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on (P-1), in Mogadishu, Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was ((P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P). On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] AIAI is an international terrorist organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[redacted] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G), has reported that

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[redacted]

AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[redacted] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on (A), (G), (J-1) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

(C-1)

[redacted] UBL purchased shares in the Al-Barakat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AHMAD GASSIM (OR QASIM), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and SHAYKH MUHAMMAD UTHAM, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

(O-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB and (P) (P) among others attende he meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB was a close associate of (P) A), (G), (J-1) advised that (P) sponsored MOHAMED when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an

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[redacted]

enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) advised that a prominent Somali community leader, (P) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing fin support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must

(O-1)

(C-1)

[redacted] In (O-1) (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[redacted] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[redacted] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year

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in places such as Mecca and Nairo Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[redacted] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

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[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) advised that KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown to (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1) [redacted] has indicated that KHADIB closed the Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] Investigation at San Die determined that MOHAMED has a wife and child in Australia. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) the possible name of MOHAMED's wife as Reisa Bannerman. During a recent interview with MOHAMED, he admitted to having family in Australia. MOHAMED also stated that he often traveled to Australia, and most recently, used Australia as a stop-over point while he applied for travel Visa's to Africa. (MOHAMED did not state which African countries he was attempting to visit.)

[redacted] Financial investigation into any possible financial transactions between MOHAMED and Australia are currently ongoing and have not been fully analyzed.

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	(P-1)
INS A#:	(P-1)
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Black
Residence:	(P) La Mesa, CA 91941 (P)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[redacted]

[redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 1-31-2003)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA: **PRECEDENCE:**
CLASSIFICATION:

SAMNET **IMMEDIATE** [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted]
NEPTUNE [redacted] **PRIORITY** [redacted]
IIR SENT VIA ACS **ROUTINE**
CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted]

F T O

PAGE 1 OF 6

Date 12/20/2004

Approved by: **Case ID #/Serial:**
Original Filename:

********* FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY *********

Time Received **SAMNET filename:**
Time of Transmission **MRI/JUL/ISN**
DTG

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/
LEGAT LONDON/PRIORITY/
LEGAT CANBERRA/PRIORITY/
INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
LEGAT RIYADH/PRIORITY/
LEGAT CAIRO/PRIORITY/
LEGAT NAIROBI/PRIORITY/
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC//COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION// PRIORITY/
DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/
DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC//OI//PRIORITY/
FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/
HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
NGA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

[redacted]

[redacted]

NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//F3//PRIORITY/
NRO WASHINGTON DC//OS-HCO//PRIORITY/
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY LONDON/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY RIYADH/PRIORITY/
TTIC WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/ BT
[redacted]
SERIAL: (F)
COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SA);SOMALIA (SO);UNITED STATES (US);ETHIOPIA (ET).
IPSP: IFC2400.
SUBJ: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COM ITY [redacted]
WARNING: (S) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(G)

SOURCE: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. [redacted] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE SUPPORTED THE KING FAHD MOSQUE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. POSSIBLE SAUDI SUPPORT OF THE SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN DIEGO HAD BEEN PROVIDED THROUGH A FORMER LOCAL LEADER OF AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI).
--------------------   --------------
[redacted]

WARNING: (S) THIS INFORMATION IS BEING RELEASED TO (G) ONLY. IT MAY NOT TO BE SHARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSENT OF THE FBI.
SERIAL: (F)

[redacted]

SUBJ: [redacted] SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COMMUNITY
DATE: 20041220.
COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SAU);SOMALIA (SOM);UNITED STATES (USA);
ETHIOPIA (ETH) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. [redacted] THE EMIR OF THE KING FAHD MOSQUE THERN CALIFORNIA, DR. KHALIL KHALIL, (O-1) (O-1) (NFI) AND PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA. ALTHOUGH KHALIL OCCASIONALLY VISITED THE UNITED STATES, HE CONTINUED TO OVERSEE MANY ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF RUNNING THE MOSQUE. (A), (G), (J-1) KHALIL WAS A SECULAR LEADER MORE INVOLVED WITH THE OPERATIONS OF THE MOSQUE THAN IN SPREADING ISLAM.) KHALIL'S PROTEGE IN THE MOSQUE WAS U.S. PERSON, (P) WITH WHOM HE WORKED VERY CLOSELY. TOGETHER THEY WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN FINDING A LOCATION AND SECURING FUNDING FROM THE PRINCE TO BUILD KING FAHD MOSQUE. WHEN THE PRINCE TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES, (P) AND KHALIL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE PRINCE'S LODGING AND TRAVEL. AS OF OCTOBER 2004, KHALIL AND (P) CONTINUED TO SECURE FUNDS FOR THE MOSQUE FROM THE PRINCE. KHALIL AND (P) WERE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS (IFTA). (FBI COMMENT. (P) WAS BORN IN (P) AND ALLEGEDLY HELPED MUSLIMS WHO WERE DEDICATING THEMSELVES TO JIHAD TRAVEL INTO SAUDI ARABIA OR YEMEN FOR ADVANCED INDOCTRINATION.)

2. [redacted] SPIRITUAL ACTIVITIES FOR THE KING FAHD MOSQUE PREVIOUSLY WERE DIRECTED BY ITS IMAM, IBRAHIM AL-HIBER, WHO WORKED FOR IFTA. AL-HIBER ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES CIRCA 1997 AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELED OUTSIDE THE LOS ANGELES AREA TO COORDINATE DONATING KORANS AND ISLAMIC LITERATURE TO SMALLER MOSQUES. AL-HIBER ALSO WAS ACTIVE IN COORDINATING THE VISITS OF SAUDI ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO AREA MOSQUES. AFTER BEING REPLACED BY FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, AL-HIBER WORKED FOR THE IFTA OFFICE IN ETHIOPIA (NFI). (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]

AL-HIBER WAS AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVIST WHO WAS VERY POLITICALLY ADEPT AND EXCELLENT AT MAKING SPEECHES. AL-HIBER SUPPORTED THE SPREAD OF RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM.)

3. [redacted] AL-THUMAIRY ALSO WORKED FOR THE IFTA AS IMAM AT KING FAHD MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY DISLIKED AL-HIBER, KHALIL, AND (P) CONSIDERING AL-HIBER TOO POLITICAL FOR A RELIGIOUS OFFICE. RARELY DID AL-THUMAIRY ALLOW HIS IFTA RESPONSIBILITIES TO TAKE HIM OUT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. ALTHOUGH AL-THUMAIRY ASSOCIATED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS, HE DID NOT SHARE THEIR ISLAMIC VIEWS NOR WAS HE EVER HEARD TO PREACH JIHAD OR ANTI-WESTERN SERMONS. IT WAS DUE TO LEADERSHIP ISSUES WITH KHALIL AND (P), RATHER THAN BEING CONSIDERED AN EXTREMIST, THAT AL-THUMAIRY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXPELLED FROM KING FAHD MOSQUE. (A), (G), (J-1) AL-THUMAIRY WAS VERY FUNDAMENTALIST (STRICT SALAFI) IN HIS BELIEFS, BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE RADICAL OR EXTREMIST.)

4. [redacted] AL-THUMAIRY AND OMAR AL-BAYOUMI DISLIKED EACH OTHER BECAUSE AS WITH THE DISAGREEMENT WITH KHALIL AND (P), AL-BAYOUMI WAS NOT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAUDI IFTA OFFICE. AL-BAYOUMI REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT PART OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT (NFI). AL BAYOUMI FOUGHT WITH AL-THUMAIRY BECAUSE AL-BAYOUMI WANTED TO BE THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISBURSING IFTA MONEY TO MOSQUES.

5. [redacted] AL-THUMAIRY REPRESENTED IFTA, AND KHALIL AND (P) REPRESENTED THE PRINCE. THIS RESULTED IN CONFLICTS REGARDING WHICH SEGMENT OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTROL KING FAHD MOSQUE. A BREAKING POINT CAME WHEN KHALIL AND (P) BANNED SOME MUSLIMS FROM WORSHIPING AT THE MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY BELIEVED IT WAS COMPLETELY UN-ISLAMIC TO PROHIBIT BELIEVERS FROM WORSHIPING REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS. ALTHOUGH KHALIL AND (P) BANNED AL-THUMAIRY FROM THE MOSQUE, THEY ALLOWED HIM TO GIVE THE FRIDAY WORSHIP SERMONS. AFTER BEING BANNED FROM THE MOSQUE, AL-THUMAIRY JOINED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS AND STARTED ANOTHER U.S. MOSQUE, DAR AL QUARAN (HOUSE OF KORAN), AKA OVERLAND MOSQUE. ((A), (G), (J-1) THE ONLY THING AL-THUMAIRY HAD IN COMMON WITH THE EXTREMISTS AT DAR AL QUARAN WAS A DISLIKE OF THE LEADERSHIP AT KING FAHD MOSQUE.)

6. [redacted] (FBI COMMENT. IN AUGUST 2002, AL-THUMAIRY WAS ASSOCIATED WITH DAR AL QUARAN WHERE HE PROMULGATED ISLAMIC EXTREMIST VIEWS TO THE FOLLOWERS. THE BELIEF THAT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE LEADERSHIP MISMANAGED FUNDS LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DAR AL QUARAN.)

7. [redacted] AL-THUMAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH U.S. PERSON, OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB (NFI). WHEN THE PRINCE OPENED KING FAHD MOSQUE, MOHAMED PETITIONED THE PRINCE AND WAS GRANTED ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA FOR A SOMALI OUTREACH PROGRAM. MOHAMED MADE HIMSELF THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISTRIBUTING THE ASSISTANCE IN

8. [redacted] (FBI COMMENT. MOHAMED ESTABLISHED THE WESTERN SOMALI RELIEF AGENCY (WSRA), A U.S. ORGANIZATION AND AN ALLEGED HUMANITARIAN AID FOUNDATION FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, AND PARTS OF KENYA. WSRA RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE GLOBAL RELIEF FOUNDATION, AN ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. MOHAMED WAS A FORMER LEA -ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI.)

9. [redacted] (FBI COMMENT. AL-THUMAIRY WAS LINKED TO OMAR AL-BAYOUMI WHO UNWITTINGLY HELPED AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR SETTLE IN SAN DIEGO.)

[redacted]

--------------- --- END TEAR LINE ---------------------

COMMENTS: 1. [redacted] FBI COMMENTS. SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECO

2. [redacted] THE PRECEDING TEARLINE HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE TO (G).

3. [redacted] CITE (F) FOR MORE INFORMATION ON FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY AND USPER 2.

4. [redacted] THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE PROVIDED FOR INDEXING PURPOSES: DR. KHALIL ((KHALIL)); PRINCE ABDUL AZIZ BIN ((FAHD)); FAHAD

[redacted]

((AL-THUMAIRY)); OMAR ((AL-BAYOUMI)); NAWAF ((AL-HAZMI)); KHALID
((AL-MIHDHAR)); AND IMAM IBRAHIM ((AL-HIBER))
INSTR: U.S. YES. CO
PREP: [redacted] POC [redacted] (S).
ACQ: [redacted] (G).
DISSEM: FIELD: NONE
WARNING: [redacted] (F)
[redacted] (G)

BT
////

[redacted] **ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:**

(F)

[redacted]

[redacted] THE RAW INTELLIGENCE SET FORTH IN THIS IIR IS BEING PUBLISHED AS A RESULT OF AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES. UPON REVIEW, THIS PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED INFORMATION, THOUGH NOT CONSIDERED CURRENT, WAS DEEMED PERTINENT AND RELEVANT FOR THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. NO OVERT THREAT HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INFORMATION.

[redacted] S COMMUNICATION WAS APPROVED BY [redacted] (G), (S) (S) [redacted] PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION. THIS COMMUNICATION WAS REVIEWED

(A), (G), (J-1), (F), (S)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: IIR: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY THERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COMMUNITY [redacted]

[redacted]

FIELD OFF E: [redacted]
COUNTRY: [redacted] ETHIOPIA (ET);SAUDI ARABIA (SA);SOMALIA (SO);UNITED STATES (US).

(A) (G) (J-1) [redacted]

THREAT: NO
AGENT: SA [redacted] (S)
TERRORIST D AL-ISLAMI (AIAI)
SERIAL: [redacted] (F)
LIAISON: [redacted] (G)
DRAFTED BY: [redacted] (S)
COPY DESIGNATIONS:
(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S), (G)

[redacted]

COPY RECEIVED WITHOUT ADMINISTRATIVE TICKLER:

(S), (G)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/17/2002

To: General Counsel **Attn:** (S), (G)

San Diego

Los Angeles

From: San Diego

(S)

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB; (A) (G) (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Instituted:** (A) (G) (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Enclosed for Los Angeles is an original and a copy of a letter dated 01/17/2002, addressed to (P) Regulatory Compliance, Experian, 505 City Parkway West, Orange,

[redacted]

California, requesting consumer identifying information limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment and the names and addresses of all financial institutions at which the subject maintains or has maintained an account.

Details: [redacted] A full international terrorism investigation of subject, a U.S. person, was authorized in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines because subject was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. The AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization closely linked to Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.

(C-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/17/2002

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] The consumer identifying information and identity of financial institutions information are being requested to determine subject's associates at current and former places of employment and determine subject's financial activity and his link to other terrorism subjects in the United States and overseas.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] A representative of the Los Angeles office who has liaison with the consumer reporting agency should deliver (A), (G), (J-1) to (P)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Los Angeles should remind Experian that, (G) (G) it is prohibited from disclosing that the FBI has made this request. In addition, Experian is prohibited from including in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the FBI has sought or obtained such information.

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F) 01/17/2002

[redacted] Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide the records personally to a representative of your office. Experian should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.

[redacted] Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.

[redacted] Any questions regarding the above can be directed to San Diego Division, Attention: [redacted] (S).

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

Los Angeles Division

AT SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

[redacted] Deliver the attached (G) as indicated above. Upon receipt of information from the carrier, Los Angeles Division is requested to submit results to San Diego Division.

Set Lead 2:

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G)

♦♦

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/05/2002

To: San Diego

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR KHADIB; (A), (G), (J-1)
Synopsis: [redacted] Asset reporting on Khadib and other radical Islamic fundamentalists.

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1) .

Details: [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, (A), (G), (J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) provided the following information:

[redacted] In (A), (G), (J-1) , 2002, an old Algerian male stayed at a shelter on 48th Street in San Diego run by Attiqullah Ahmadi. The Algerian male stayed at the shelter for 3-4 days and appeared to have very little money. He did not appear to be a religious leader. He was driven to LAX in early morning, then departed the country. Asset did not know the male's name and had no indication that he was a radical Muslim. Ahmadi appears to house 5-7 males at any one time at the shelter. Asset is not sure where Ahmadi gets the money to run the shelter. (A), (G), (J-1) Ahmadi had recently shaved his beard.

[redacted]

[redacted] Asset advised that Dr. Abusattar Shaikh has been depressed lately. He thinks the FBI is following him. Dr. Shaikh's home served as a residence for the hijackers Al Hazmi and Al Midhar during most of 2000.

[redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, (P) and (P) visited (P) on El Cajon Blvd., in San Diego. (P) was seeking (P) assistance to obtain welfare benefits for himself and his family since his employment was terminated when the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) was shut down. (P) advised that (P) (A), (G), (J-1). (P) is a close friend of (P) and worked as (P) for HLF prior to its closure.

[redacted] Asset advised that (P) wife is pregnant. (P) has a very radical mind and looks down at the leadership of other mosques in the San Diego area because they are corrupted by Western influences. On (G) 2002, asset advised that (P) was a very close friend of Mohamad Zaky (A), (G), (J-1) who was killed by the Russians in Chechnya). Zaky was responsible for bringing (P) into the U.S.

[redacted] (P) is Imam of the Somali mosque at 4014 Winona Ave., San Diego. (P) is a (P) national and received his religious training in Pakistan. Leaders of the mosque have been raising money to pay off a $200,000.00 bank note used to purchase the mosque.

[redacted] Asset advised that the Somali-based terrorist group Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) is not very prevalent in the current Somali government; however, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has a very strong presence in the current government. Asset advised that the Bush administration is relying too much on the Ethiopian government for information on Somalia. Ethiopia has a vested interest in keeping Somalia weak and ineffective as a country.

[redacted] Omar Khadib has been very quiet lately and asset does not know the reason for the change in behavior. (P) an elderly male, has served as (P) for Khadib to overseas destinations. Another good friend of Khadib is a taxi driver named (P) allegedly has been interviewed by the FBI. One of Khadib's employees at the Somali Youth Center is a male teacher, name unknown, who has received asylum in the U.S. He is from Djibouti, but actually may be from Somalia. He studied extensively in Saudi Arabia where he received a Sharia degree. He

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 06/05/2002

has been asked to teach at the mosque, but has declined because he wants to keep a low profile.

◆◆

[redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 1-31-2003)

TEMPLATE (NEW 7-04).wpd

SBX001S0.184

IIR

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

[redacted]

TRANSMIT VIA: **PRECEDENCE:**

[redacted]

[redacted] **MNET** [redacted] **IMMEDIATE** [redacted]

[redacted]

NEPTUNE **PRIORITY** [redacted]

07/XX/04

IIR SENT VIA ACS **ROUTINE**

1 OF 7

[redacted]

[redacted]

F T O

Date

[redacted]

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/

Approved by:

Case ID #/Serial:
Original Filename:

INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/

********* FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY**

****

Time Received
Time of Transmission

SAMNET filename:
MRI/JUL/ISN
DTG

CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/
DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY XXXXXX/PRIORITY/
AMCONSUL XXXXXX/PRIORITY/
AFIAA AMHS BOLLING AFB DC/PRIORITY/
CDR902DMIGP FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-OP-CM//PRIORITY/
CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOP-OR-HCM//PRIORITY/
CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/PRIORITY/
CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL/PRIORITY/
CIFA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
COMBINED INTEL AND FUSION CENTER PETERSON AFB CO//CIFCC//PRIORITY/
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC/PRIORITY/
DA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-C-ACIC/PRIORITY/
DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//22A/NAVATAC-22A4//PRIORITY/
FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/

[redacted]

[redacted]

HQ AFOSI ANDREWS AFB MD/PRIORITY/
HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOCOM INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USPACOM HONONLULU/PRIORITY/
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK/PRIORITY/
JFIC NORFOLK VA/PRIORITY/
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//J3DDAT-FP/PRIORITY/
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//F3//PRIORITY/
ONI WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
SSO DA//DAMI-CDC/PRIORITY/
TTIC WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CS551//PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/

BT
[redacted] (G)

SERIAL: [redacted] **IIR XXXYYY**
COUNTRY: [redacted] **UNITED STATES (US);CANADA (CA);SOMALIA (SO);ETHIOPIA (ET);YE**
IPSP: [redacted] [redacted] (G)
SUBJ: **1. INFORMATION ON SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN DIEGO** [redacted]
[redacted] (F)

REPORT CLASSIFIED [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted] (G)

[redacted]

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. [redacted] **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON CURRENT ACTIVITIE**
MOHDAR ABDULLAH, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (P)

2. [redacted] WHEN OMAR ABDI ((MOHAMED)), AKA OMAR KHADIB, LIVED IN CANADA, HE WAS AN OUTSPOKEN PROPONENT OF JIHAD AGAINST NON-MUSLIM MOVEMENTS IN SOMALIA. (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED LIVED IN CANADA FROM 1990 TO 1995.) SPECIFICALLY, MOHAMED SUPPORTED ARMED ACTIONS AGAINST ETHIOPIA AND CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS IN SOMALIA. MOHAMED BELIEVED JIHAD WAS THE ONLY WAY TO UNITE SOMALIS BEHIND FORMING A UNIFIED ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT.

3. [redacted] AFTER MOVING TO SAN DIEGO IN 1995, MOHAMED BRAGGED TO THE CITY'S SOMALI COMMUNITY ABOUT WORKING FOR THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (SOURCE COMMENT: WORKING FOR THE MINISTRY WAS PRESTIGIOUS BECAUSE ONE WAS PAID DIRECTLY BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, AS OPPOSED TO INDIRECTLY THROUGH SAUDI-SUPPORTED CHARITIES. IN ORDER TO WORK FOR THE MINISTRY ONE HAD TO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN A SAUDI-SUPPORTED MADRASSA AND RECOMMENDED BY AN INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC SCHOLAR. THE MINISTRY ALLOWED ONE TO CHOOSE THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH TO WORK. IN THE UNITED STATES, MINISTRY WORKERS REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.)

4. [redacted] MOHAMED'S POINT OF CONTACT AT THE MINISTRY WAS KHALED ((AL-SOWA)). AL-SO
OF ABOUT [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) PEOPLE. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

6. [redacted] (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED WAS ARRESTED ON 20 JANUARY 2004 FOR IMMIGRATION FRAUD. MOHAMED ORIGINALLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS AGENCY IN 2000 WHEN HE WAS IDENTIFIED BY [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) RELIABLE SOURCES AS A LEADER OF THE AL-ITTIHAD AL ISLAMIA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS LATER REMOVED FROM THIS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE WAS VIEWED BY OTHER MEMBERS AS TOO RADICAL.)

[redacted]

7. [redacted] A NON-USPER IN SAN DIEGO WAS ALSO PAID BY THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: THIS INDIVIDUAL IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE SUBJECT OF AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION.) THE NON-USPER IS A SOMALI WHO WAS BORN IN THE OGADEN REGION OF ETHIOPIA. HIS FATHER IS A PROMINENT ISLAMIC SCHOLAR IN DJIBOUTI, AND HE STUDIED ISLAM IN A MADRASSA IN SAUDI ARABIA. HE CAME TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER 2001 AND REQUESTED POLITICAL ASYLUM. A LAWYER, FNU ((JABREEL)), HELPED HIM TO FILL OUT HIS ASYLUM CLAIM AND CONVINCED HIM TO CLAIM THAT HE WAS FROM DJIBOUTI, NOT ETHIOPIA. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOMALI COMMUNITY THAT THE NON-USPER IS ACTUALLY FROM ETHIOPIA. JABREEL HAS SINCE BEEN DEPORTED FROM THE US.
8. [redacted] THE NON-USPER USED TO REPORT TO A SAUDI MINISTRY OFFICER NAMED FAHAD ((ALTHUMAIRY)). ALTHUMAIRY WORKED OUT OF THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, AND OVERSAW THE DISBURSEMENT OF SAUDI MONEY TO SAUDI RELIGIOUS WORKERS IN SAN DIEGO. AT ONE POINT ALTHUMAIRY BECAME ANGRY WITH THE NON-USPER BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD A JOB, IN ADDITION TO BEING PAID BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. ALTHUMAIRY BELIEVED THAT THE NON-USPER SHOULD ONLY WORK FOR THE MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: ALTHUMAIRY LEFT THE UNITED STATES FOR SAUDI ARABIA IN FEBRUARY 2003. IN MAY 2003 HE ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENTER THE UNITED STATES BUT WAS DENIED ENTRY.)

9. [redacted] MOHDAR ((ABDULLAH)) WAS DEPORTED TO YEMEN. (FBI COMMENT: MOHDAR [redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(G) (P) WAS AN ASSOCIATE OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID ((AL-MIDHAR)) AND NAWAF ((AL-HAZMI)) WHEN THEY LIVED IN SAN DIEGO. (P) MOHDAR HAD RENTED AN APARTMENT FROM (P) (P) WHEN HE WAS LIVING IN SAN DIEGO. MOHDAR CALLED (P) SEVERAL TIMES AT HIS HOME AND ON HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE. HE WANTED (P) TO JOIN HIM AS A PARTNER IN AN IMPORT/EXPORT BUSINESS. (P) WAS VERY ANGRY THAT MOHDAR KEPT TRYING TO CONTACT (P) AND FORBID (P) TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM. ((G) COMMENT: MANY PEOPLE IN THE SAN DIEGO MUSLIM COMMUNITY FEEL THAT MOHDAR IS NOTHING BUT TROUBLE AND SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE.)

10. [redacted] (P) IS RUNNING A CHARITY CALLED (P) HE WANTED TO CLOSE THE CHARITY DOWN, BUT WAS URGED BY (P) (P) TO KEEP IT OPERATIONAL. (P) HIMSELF HAD BEEN DENIED HIS APPLICATION TO OPEN A TAX EXEMPT NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION AND WANTED TO USE (P) AND (P)

[redacted]

AS HIS PERSONAL FUND RAISING ORGANIZATION. (P) WAS RESISTANT TO THE IDEA OF BEING (P) PUPPET BUT (P) CONVINCED HIS FATHER TO KEEP (P) OPEN FOR (P) BECAUS (P) WORKED FOR (P) AT HIS (P) AND THOUGHT (P) WAS A GOOD GUY. (SOURCE COMMENT: (P) IS VERY INVOLVED IN FUND RAISING AND CHARITABLE CAUSES, BUT HE IS NOT A RADICAL. HE IS VERY NAIVE AND EASILY MANIPULATED OUT OF HIS DESIRE TO HELP POOR AND NEEDY MUSLIMS WORLDWIDE.)

COMMENTS: 1. [redacted] FBI COMMENTS: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED IS THE SUBJECT OF (F) (P), (A), (G), (J-1) (P).

2. [redacted] FBI COMMENTS. (G)

INST: US YES. CONTACT FBIHQ POC FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
PREP: FBIHQ POC (S)
(S)

(G)

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:
[redacted] THIS COMMUNICATION WAS COORDINATED WITH [redacted]
(A), (F), (G), (J-1), (S)
[redacted]

DRAFTED BY: (S) [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] **IIR: XXX.**
FIELD OFFICE: **SAN DIEGO.**
COUNTRY: [redacted] **UNITED STATES (US);CANADA (CA);SOMALIA (SO);ETHIOPIA (ET);YEMEN (YM).**
AGENT: (S) [redacted]
HQ OPERATIONAL UNIT: (G) [redacted]
(A) (G) (J-1)
[redacted]

THE IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONS IS PLACED HERE FOR RECORD KEEPING PURPOSES AND MUST BE HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL AGENCY PRIVACY REGULATIONS. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF U.S. PERSON IDENTITY OR IDENTIFIERS MUST BE APPROVED BY FBIHQ.
US PERSON: (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
NON-US PERSON: ABDIMAGID MOHAMED ((OMAR)), (A)(G)(J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]. HIS NAME APPEARED ON THE LIST OF FIFTY CLERICS FUNDED BY SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC, THAT WAS OBTAINED BY THE FBI IN (A)(G)(J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

TERRORIST GROUP: **AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMIA**
SERIAL: **XXXXXXXXX**
THREAT: **NO**
LIAISON: **NONE**

COPY DESIGNATIONS:
(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(A)(F)(G)(J-1)

[redacted]

BT
////

[redacted]

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/09/2002

To: San Diego

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA,
OMAR KHADIB;
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

(F)

Synopsis: [redacted] Information obtained as the result of asset interview conducted on (A), (G), (J-1), 2002. (G) [redacted]

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Field Investigation Instituted:** (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: [redacted] On (A)(G)(J-1) 2002, (A), (G), (J-1) stated that (P) was at the Balboa Mosque (Islamic Center of San Diego) on Friday, July 5. (P) translates official documents (marriage certificates, birth certificates, etc.) from Somali to English. (P) used to be an Imam at the (P) (P) was discharged from his position at (P) Mosque because he (P) (P) (P) is very good friends with (P) (P) is very radical and anti-United States. (P) is pro-Palestinian.

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) 08/09/2002

(P) travels to Riverside, Orange County, Los Angeles and Chicago. He travels to those locations to preach Muslim radical fundamentalism.

[redacted] (P) prepared the declarations for Mihdar, the Arab man who posed as a Somali (Mohdar Mohamed ABDULLAH). The Arab man paid (P) (A)(G)(J-1) for his services. (P) paid (P) (A)(G)(J-1) for (P) to stamp and sign the false declaration for the Arab man. (P) was at the La Mesa Mosque (Masjid Al-Ribat Al-Islami) on Friday, July 12.

[redacted] The asset observed (P-1) at the Afrique Restaurant. The Afrique Restaurant is located at 50th and University..

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) has a brother named Ahmed. Ahmed is also known as (A), (G), (J-1) Ahmed came to the United States from the United Kingdom. Ahmed used to work as a translator for the (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] "SHEIK HASSAN" and Hassan Turki , located in Somalia, are now working with AL QAIDA. Hassan Turki frequently travels to Ethiopia. Hassan Turki also has connections with Saudi Arabia. Hassan Turki received money from AL QAIDA. "SHEIK HASSAN" is now located in Mogadishu.

[redacted] "JAMALE," owner of (A), (G), (J-1) has moved all of his equipment and weapons from Mogadishu. "JAMALE" did so because he fears an American invasion. "JAMALE" moved the equipment and weapons North of Obbia. Obbia is a small seaport East of Mogadishu.

[redacted] Five men are Imams at the Al Ansar Mosque (Masjid Omar). "KHADAR," "FARAH," SHEIK ALI ABDI, "RASHID" and "SHEIK ALI BUUL." "SHEIK ALI BUUL" is very good friends with (P) (A), (J-1), (G).,

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/30/2005

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (S) (G)

San Diego **Attn:** (G) (S)

From: San Diego
(S)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Interview and debrief of (A), (G), (J-1), hereinafter Asset, on (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** (A), (G), (J-1)

(F)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 08/30/2005

(F)

Details: [redacted] An Asset, (A)(G)(J-1) voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] As previously reported, (P) (P), (F), made an inquiry with individuals at the Masjid Ar Ribat regarding serving in a position as Prison Imam at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, MCC, in downtown San Diego, California. (P) indicated that the project was urgent on his, (P) agenda.

[redacted] It is known that the Prison Chaplain's Office at MCC may be hostile towards Muslim Imam's and may not be in favor of having a Muslim Imam in the local jails and prisons. (P) (P) previously identified, has made comments of going to the Chaplain's Office at MCC to complain. Additionally, several members of the Masjid Ar Ribat and the Islamic Center of San Diego would be writing letters in support of the Imam position. (P) project has received support from the two prior Prison Imam's, (P) (P) (A), (G), (J-1), and (P) (P) telephone number was (P) NFI.

[redacted] Muslim prayer services at the Metropolitan Correctional Center have been taking place. The Friday service prayer served as a meet and greet type sessions and Islamic service for the Inmates. Approximately, seven of the seventeen current Muslim inmates attend prayer service. Omar Mohammad, has been acting as an Imam for some time and was possibly an Imam before being incarcerated at MCC. Omar is originally from Africa and is fluent in the Arabic language. (San Diego believes Omar mentioned above to be San Diego Full Field Subject, Omar Abdi Mohammad, (F). Friday prayer service, also called Juma, are held in the chapel area at MCC without a prison guard present.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] [redacted] (F), 08/30/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] For information only.

◆◆

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 03/06/2006

To: San Diego

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID, aka
Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
[redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMMAD
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Claiming statistical accomplishments.

[redacted] (G)

Details: [redacted] Case agent met with and debriefed (A), (G), (J-1), hereinafter Asset, on (A), (G), (J-1)/2005.

[redacted] Asset provided intelligence information and reported on the activities of Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah, (P) (P) and Omar Abdi Mohammad.

[redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F), 03/06/2006

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: (G)
ITU: (G)
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (G)
Squad: (G)

Number: 1
Type: (G)
ITU: (G)
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (S)
Squad: (G)

◆◆

[redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
March 1, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

(A) (G) (J-1)

[redacted] On January 20, 2004, Omar Abdi Mohamed was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA). WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[redacted] Mohamed was identified by (A), (G), (J-1) reliable (A), (G), (J-1) sources as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[redacted] A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[redacted] Mohamed has maintained a low profile since the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) closed down the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) in Chicago, Illinois. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office,

letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

[redacted] These documents were subsequently translated. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[redacted] These Ministry letters to Muslim "Propagators" in General, and "Propagator Mohamed" in specific, document requests dating in the mid 1990's from the Saudi Government Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance for information collection on Muslims and the Muslim community in Canada, America, and the Carribean. The seized documents do not indicate the end use of the information collected by the Ministry.

[redacted] For the purposes of captioned investigation, Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 USD a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[redacted] One letter from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance that was addressed to Mohamed indicated that a housing and travel ticket allowance and a salary was to be paid to those Propagators working under contract outside their countries of origin. The Propagators would loose their housing and travel benefits if they became citizens of the country in which they were working. In several different letters, the Ministry indicates that Mohamed's "contract will be renewed" and provides him with raises or bonuses to "encourage you to double your effort and propagation related activities." One such letter from the Ministry had an enclosed check "as a financial award granted by his Royal Highness Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation, which he (ALSAUD) has authorized for all propagators belonging to this office" (Dawa office in America). This letter provided contact email addresses of ifta@resa.org, www.islamicpage.org, and www.islam.org.sa. The letters were signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] An indication of the extent of Saudi control over their Propagators is given in a letter from the Ministry dated November 18, 1996. The letter was issued by the Ministry “affirming that no propagator should leave his post or take leave without first obtaining a written authorization from the relevant authority. Whoever violates this guideline will be subject to disciplinary action to include termination of service.” The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about Muslim converts in the Islamic community: an undated and unsigned letter noted that the Director of Dawa activities conducted abroad received information that "during the past few years a number of Christian clerics and well known personalities have converted to Islam. The Director of Dawa is requesting that you provide him with the names of individuals who have converted to Islam in you locality." The letter requests the Muslim converts previous name, occupation and social status; the Islamic name that the person has acquired and the personal attributes of the individual that may be conducive to using him in propagation activities; the type of services that the individual has received and the party that provided the services; the languages in which the individual is proficient; the address of the individual where he can be reached; (the Propagators) impression about how to deal with the individuals who have converted to Islam and what services might benefit them.

[redacted] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] Another Letter dated November 22, 1995, from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance addressed to "Propagator: Omar Abdo Al-Khatib" requests that Mohamed comply with the Ministry's solicitation of information regarding "certain parties and communities." According to the letter, the Ministry was interested in the Somali and Arab communities of Canada and San Diego. The request was signed by Khalid bin Ibrahim Al-Suwaylim. According to the letter, the report should cover the following points:

1-Description of Community and it's size.
2-History of the community and its areas of presence.
3-Reason why the community immigrated.
4-The leaders of the community and its well known figures.
5-Religious dogma of the community.
6-Organizational structure of the community.
7-Financial condition of the community.

[redacted]

8-Literacy rate and educational level of the community.
9-Schools and mosques of the community.
10-Organizations established by the community.
11-Organizations that cooperate with the community.
12-Influence that the community has in its locality.
13-Other observations about the community

[redacted] In one undated letter from the Ministry to Propagators the conversion of non-Muslims is stressed. According to the letter, "Conversion of non-Muslims who are living in non-Muslim countries into the faith takes on critical importance since they are the inhabitants of the land. Among them is the doctor, the engineer, and the pilot, as well as others. By having these people convert to Islam, the effort to propagate the faith gains a tremendous boost in the country where this activity is being conducted."

[redacted] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about the activities of local mosques, a letter dated March 20, 1996, and addressed to "all Propagators in America, Canada and the Islands of the Carribean Sea" states "due to the fact that a number of Islamic magazines are being published by Islamic centers that you are working with, and in order to strengthen the relation with these centers and to become acquainted with all the various Islamic activities that you are engaged in, we are requesting that you provide us with all the various publications or magazines or newsletters that are being published by the Islamic center or Association that you are working with." The requested material was asked to be sent to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Affairs, IFTA Office, 601 new Hampshire Avenue N.W., Washington DC 20037. The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[redacted] A second letter written in February 22, 1997, and also signed by AlSuwaylim, requested that all Propagators in America and the Carribean, "provide the Ministry with everything that is being published in your locality about Islam and Muslims in general and about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, such as books, research papers, articles and media programs."

[redacted] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[redacted] In a letter from the Ministry dated December 17, 1996, from Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim, an advisory was sent to all

Propagators in America and the Islands of the Caribbean Sea. This letter advised that the Ministry "approved the absence of Sheik Fahd bin Ali AlSuwaylim to study English. Sheik Abdulrahman bin Mohammad AlBalihi has been designated to address matters relating to propagation and the propagators. He can be reached at his private telephone number (P) or through the switchboard number (202) 342-3700, extension (P) and extension (P)"

[redacted] (C-1) (C-1) Raisah Douglas. ICE records indicate that Douglas, born (P-1), was admitted into the United State on March 22, 2001, until May 21, 2001. Douglas' port of entry was Los Angeles, California, and she arrived on American Airlines flight 7365. Douglas' passport number was (P-1). Asset reporting placed Douglas with Mohamed in San Diego, California, during that time frame.

[redacted] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel.

[redacted] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	(P-1)
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	(P-1)
INS A#:	(P-1)
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Black
Residence:	(P) La Mesa, CA 91941 (P)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Ave. Suite D San Diego, CA 92105 Telephone: (619) 282-0711

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/18/2004

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
(S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] San Diego portion of lead 21.1 covered
[redacted] (G)

Reference: [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Reference above captioned case and serial which set forth lead to advise (G) of action pertaining to identified Saudi government supported propagators in San Diego division.

[redacted] (G) identified Omar Abdi Mohamed, (P) (P) and Abdimagid M. Omar, as three Saudi supported propagators living in San Diego Division. Investigative updates for mentioned propagators follows:

(P)

[redacted] (P) is currently (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) (P) (P) had been, through his fund raising activities for (P),

[redacted]

actively participating in the financial and material support of Hamas in violation of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (P) had been a paid fund raiser for (P) traveling throughout the U.S. for this purpose. The (P) was shut down by the USG on 12/04/2001 due to its Hamas fund-raising connections.

[redacted] The FBI Los Angeles division is investigating source allegations that the King Fahd Mosque and/or some of its leaders received UBL money, then sent the money to San Diego, including to (P). These funds were distributed through LA subject Fahd Al Thumairy. Financial records for (P)'s personal and business accounts have been requested, received and analyzed, to determine the money trail of these funds. Financial information has been uploaded (G)

[redacted] The financial analysis of the (P) personal and business bank records has indicated at least one source of funds from Saudi Arabia, and a lead to Riyadh was sent to identify the originator individual or organization. The analysis also revealed funds received by (P) from LA subject Al Thumairy, referenced above.

[redacted] SD is awaiting response from leads sent to Riyadh and to LA to follow up on the source of the Saudi funds, and the veracity of the original LA source allegation regarding the involvement of UBL money funneled through LA subject Al Thumairy and the Kind Fahd Mosque.

Omar Abdi Mohamed

[redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed is the current subject of a San Diego FFI. This FFI was initiated on information that (A), (G), (J-1) reliable (A), (G), (J-1) sources identified Mohamed as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[redacted] On January 20, 2004, Mohamed was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by San Diego JTTF determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA). WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US

Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[redacted] Referenced EC accurately reflected Mohamed's known association with the Saudi Arabian IFTA office.

[redacted] All of Mohamed's known bank accounts have been subpoenaed and final financial analysis is being completed by FBI and ICE financial analysts. Investigative financial leads pertaining to final analysis of bank records will be set as appropriate.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Mohamed remains in federal custody and has shown no inclination to communicate with the prosecution.

Abdimagid Mohamed Omar

[redacted] Omar was not previously known to be a recipient IFTA funding. San Diego is (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) to fully identify Omar. It is probable that San Diego will (A), (G), (J-1) Omar to attempt to determine his ties to the San Diego Muslim community and to the Saudi Arabian government.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 06/18/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] Read and Clear.

♦♦

[redacted]

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/16/2001

Investigation on 10/12/01 at San Diego, California

File # (S), (F) Date dictated 10/16/01

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

On (G) 2001, (G) (G), (G), California was interviewed by Special Agents (SAs) (S) and (S) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (G) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. (G) advised as follows:

(G) recalled that Mohdar Abdullah was anxious to find an interpreter who could help him convince an INS official that he (Mohdar) is Somali and therefore entitled to refugee status. Mohdar sought advice from Omar Khadib on where to find an interpreter with unknown results. Mohdar was so desperate to find a cooperative interpreter that he offered (G) to (P), (G), an INS interpreter, if he would assist in the INS process but (P) declined the offer. Mohdar made a similar offer to Imam Anwar. (G) noted that he heard that Mohdar's girlfriend is (P), a Yemeni/Somali emigree residing in Lemon Grove, California.

(G) advised that (P) is an Afghan taxi driver who resides in La Mesa, California. He is loyal to an extreme radical group of Afghan warlords called Hekmatyar.

LEAD CONTROL NUMBER SD [redacted]

The following investigation was conducted by Investigative Analyst [redacted] on November 6, 2001, in San Diego, California:

[redacted]

Computerized searches of IIIA revealed the following information:

Telephone [redacted] is associated with [redacted]

[redacted] computerized search of Telephone Applications for [redacted] was listed to Omar A. Mohamed, [redacted], La Mesa, California. Telephone [redacted] is listed to Omar Albayoumi, [redacted], San Diego.

A computerized search of ChoicePoint Online revealed the following information regarding Albayoumi:

Omar Ahmed Albayoumi, date of birth [redacted] 1957, Social Security Number [redacted] other names used are listed as Omar Ahmed AlBayoumi, Omar Ahmen Al-Bayoumi, Omar A. Bayoumi, Radwan Lachhab, California driver's license [redacted] as a male. AlBayoumi is also listed with a date of birth of 1919, with the same California driver's license number.

A computerized search of Anywho.Com revealed [redacted] [redacted] to be listed to Omar Albayoumi, with telephone number [redacted].

A computerized search of ChoicePoint Online revealed the following information regarding Omar Mohamed:

Omar Mohamed, date of birth [redacted] 1960, Social Security Number [redacted] [redacted] La Mesa, California, 91941 (as of July, 2001), male, California driver's license [redacted].

A computerized search of public source databases as well as FBI databases for the name Omar Khatib were inconclusive due to the commonality of the name and variations of spellings.

A computerized search of FBI databases for Al-Bayoumi ated him in numerous documents, one being (F) (F) wherein he is associated with Hanjour and Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. He was a known associate with these three and appeared on their apartment lease and frequently paid their rent.

A computerized search of FBI databases for Omar Abdi Mohamed revealed numerous references and (F) serial (F) and (F) serials (F) A search of Telephone Applications for Mohamed is referenced above.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 10/23/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)
(S)

(G) **Attn:** (G)
(S)

(G) **Attn:** (G)

Riyadh **Attn:** (G)

Sanaa **Attn:** (G)

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ottawa **Attn:** [redacted] (G)

San Diego **Attn:** [redacted] (S)

Los Angeles **Attn:** [redacted] (S)

Washington Field **Attn:** [redacted] (G)

New York **Attn:** [redacted] (G)

From: New [redacted] (G)

ct: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the below-described group.

[redacted] [redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] 1 - Opening LHM
1 - [redacted] (G) submitted under separate cover

[redacted]

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007

Reference: [redacted] [redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.

[redacted] Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[redacted] Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[redacted] Results: Over the past two months, writers interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[redacted] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple San Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, as the above sources described, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[redacted] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in (F) AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F). Additional documentation (C-1) (F). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) According to the closing EC (F) and supplemental closing EC (F), the FI was closed due to: (A), (G), (J-1) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[redacted] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[redacted] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D) [redacted]

[redacted] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with [redacted] (P) (main subject of [redacted] (F) [redacted] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from [redacted] (P) to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a [redacted] (P) student living in San Diego would [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[redacted] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between [redacted] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[redacted] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL- YOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([redacted] (F).

[redacted] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the

Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. (A),(G),(J-1),)(D) During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F) [redacted].

[redacted] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ((F). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[redacted] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1) (O-1)

> "(O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1) AL-JARRAH

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) (O-1)

[redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" [redacted] (F). The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" [redacted] (F) [redacted] During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and the [redacted] (P) owned by [redacted] (P) received [redacted] (P) from AL-THUMARY. [redacted] (P) also the president of [redacted] (P) [redacted], had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's [redacted] (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed [redacted] (P) business card with the phone number [redacted] (P) on his person.

[redacted] [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 [redacted] (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a [redacted] (G) terrorist group on the FBI's [redacted] (G) MOHAMMED, [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) received a stipend of approximately [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs [redacted] (F) Based on some of the above [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

[redacted] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) interviewed on [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government [redacted] (A)(G)(J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" [redacted] (F).

[redacted] Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number [redacted] (P-1) is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[redacted] The significance of this (A), (G), (J-1), (D) remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[redacted] **Recruitment:** AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment.

[redacted] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

[redacted] **Newly Identified Additional Individuals:** Through the intelligence collection effort under the (G) (F) as well as additional analysis of telephone and financial activity and source reporting, some additional individuals, who's involvement with the above described group is still not fully understood, have been identified:

[redacted] **MOHAMMED BIN SULEIMAN AL-MUHANNA** (F) (F) - POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1974 or (P-1) 1974; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUHANNA was previously a Consular Official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with AL-THUMARY, the KFM. [redacted] (O-1) "AL-MUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" (F). AL-MUHANNA had numerous phone connections with AL-THUMARY, as would be expected, and with AL-JARRAH. In late March, 2003, FBI Los Angeles was directed to (A)(G)(J-1) plan (A)(G)(J-1)(D) (A)(G)(J-1)(D) (A)(G)(J-1)(D) he and his family left the United States for gland. (C-1) (C-1) (F) .

[redacted] **FAISAL AL-MUHANNA** (F) - POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1976; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. FAISAL AL-MUHANNA is the brother of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA. (A)(G)(J-1)(D)

Predication for the Investigation

[redacted] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into" what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

[redacted] A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1971
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle:
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

(A)(G)(J-1) (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	OMAR
Middle:	AHMED MUSTAFA
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1957
POB:	(P-1)
PNO:	
SOC:	
Phone #:	(P)
(P)	
Miscellaneous -	Subject is a non-USPER.
(A)(G)(J-1)	(A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-MUHANNA
First:	MOHAMMED
Middle:	BIN SULEIMAN
Race:	W
Sex:	
DOB:	(P-1) 1974, (P-1) 1974
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-MOHANNA
Middle:	S.
Phone #:	(P)
(P)	
Miscellaneous -	Subject is a non-USPER and brother of FAISAL AL-MUHANNA (A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)	

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Name -	
Last:	AL-MUHANNA
First:	FAISAL
Middle:	A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1)
POB:	(P-1)
PNO:	
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-MOHANNA, ALMUHALKA
Phone #:	(P)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER and
(A)(G)(J-1) UHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case # (F)

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: (P)
First:
Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: (P-1)
PNO:

SOC:
Address(es) -
House #: (P-1)
Street Name:
City:
State:
Postal Code: (P-1)
Country: Canada
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous - Subject is an USPER.

[redacted] Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1960

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

POB: (P-1)
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous - (A)(G)(J-1) Subject is a non-USPER. (A)(G)(J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] (G) Coordinate (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[redacted] The (G) is requested to process the (G) which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at (G) case to the (G) and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

[redacted]

FD-542 (Rev. 06-13-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 12/4/2007

To: Counterterrorism **Attn:** (G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

From: New (G)
ct: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) (Pending)

Title: [redacted] (A) (G) (J-1) ORE

Synopsis: [redacted] FBI New York requests (G) conduct baseboard traces on MUSAED AL-JARRAH

[redacted] (G)

Details: [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE is an FBI New York Full investigation which includes MUSAED AL-JARRAH. FBI New York requests financial traces be conducted on this subject.

[redacted] Background: On 06/28/2007, writers opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further

[redacted]

exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

(S//NF,OC) Another individual of interest is MUSAED AL-JARRAH. AL-JARRAH worked for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (203A-WF-226050, serial 217). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

> "(O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

> "(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

[redacted] (O-1)

([redacted] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of [redacted] (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to king in the state of California" [redacted] (F).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] AL-JARRAH appears to have been the sole distributor of funds in California.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[redacted] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

[redacted] A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein, were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Descriptive Data:

[redacted] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-JARRAH
First:	MUSAED
Middle:	A.
Race:	W
Sex:	
DOB:	(P-1)/1960
POB:	Saudi Arabia
Phone #:	202-342-3700, (P) (P)
Miscellaneous -	Subject is a non-USPER.
Prior Case#:	(F)

(S) Questions r atter should be directed to (S) or (S)

[redacted]

To: om: New York
Re: (F) 12/4/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU: (G)
Claimed By:
    SSN: (P-1), (S)
    Name: (S)
    Squad: (G)

    SSN: (P-1), (S)
    Name: (S)
    Squad: (G)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: C om: New York
Re: (F) 12/4/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] Conduct baseboard traces on MUSAED AL-JARRAH.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

[redacted] Read and clear.

◆◆

[redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 07/02/2004

To: San Diego

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka, Et Al;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (G) Reporting

[redacted] (G)

Details: [redacted] On July 1, 2004, San Diego FBI SA (S) met with (A), (G), (J-1) (G). (G) provided the following information:

[redacted] When Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khaib, lived in Canada he was an outspoken proponent of jihad against non-Muslim movements taking place in Somalia. Specifically, Mohamed supported armed actions against Ethiopia and Christian organizations that operated humanitarian missions in Somalia. Mohamed believed in jihad as the only way to unite Somali's to form a unified Islamic government.

[redacted] Mohamed bragged to the Somali community in San Diego about working for the Saudi Ministry of Dawa and Islamic Affairs. Working for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs was prestigious because you were being paid directly by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

[redacted]

Other workers received their payments from the Saudi Government indirectly through Saudi supported charities. To work for the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, one had to be trained in a Saudi supported madrassa and, more importantly, you had to be recommended by an influential Islamic Scholar. The Ministry allowed you to choose the community where you wanted to work.

[redacted] In the United States, Ministry workers reported directly to the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C. Mohamed's point of contact at the Saudi Ministry of Islamic affairs was Khaled al-Sowailem. Al-Sowailem visited San Diego one time with a group of about 9 other people. Al-Sowailem met with Mohamed, [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P), and an unidentified business associate of [redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) was another person paid by Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (San Diego believes [redacted] (P) to be [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) is a Somali born [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) father is a prominent Islamic scholar [redacted] (P) studied Islam in a madrassa in Saudi Arabia. After studying in Saudi Arabia he returned to Africa and requested political asylum in the United States. [redacted] (P) had a lawyer named [redacted] (P) who helped him fill out his asylum claim. [redacted] (P) convinced [redacted] (P) to fill out the asylum request claiming that [redacted] (P). It is common knowledge in the Somali community that [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) has since been deported from the US.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) used to report to a Saudi Ministry officer named Fahd Althumairy. Althumairy worked out of the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California, and oversaw the disbursement of Saudi money to Saudi religious workers in San Diego. At one point Althumairy became angry with [redacted] (P) because [redacted] (P) was holding a job at [redacted] (P) in addition to being paid by the Saudi government. Althumairy believed that [redacted] (P) was supposed to be dedicated to working for Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs since they were giving him money. Althumairy had since left the United States.

[redacted] Mohdar Abdullah had been deported to Yemen. [redacted] (A), (G), [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohdar rented an apartment from [redacted] (P) when Mohdar was living in San Diego. Mohdar called [redacted] (P) several times at home and on his cellular telephone. Mohdar wanted [redacted] (P) to join him as a partner in an import/export business. [redacted] (P) was very angry that Mohdar kept trying to contact [redacted] (P) and forbid

(P) to communicate with Mohdar. Many people in the San Diego Muslim community feel that Mohdar is nothing but trouble and should be left alone.

[redacted] (P) is also running a charity called (P) (P) (P) wanted to close the charity down, but was urged by a San Diego (P) to keep it operational. (P) himself had been denied his application to open a tax exempt non-profit organization. Because (P) was denied, he wanted to use (P) and (P) as his personal fund raising organization. (P) was resistant to the idea of being (P) puppet. But, (P) convinced (P) open for (P) because (P) worked for (P) at his (P) and thought (P) was a good guy.

[redacted] (P) is very involved in fund raising and charitable causes, but he is not a radical. He is very naive and easily manipulated out of his desire to help poor and needy Muslims worldwide.

◆◆

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 11/22/2005

To: San Diego **Attn:** (G)
(S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1);

[redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,
aka, Omar AlKhatib;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (G) debrief (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G)

(F)

Details: [redacted] On November 29, 2005, SA (S) and SA (S) met with (A), (G), (J-1) (G). (G) provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted] (G) described Mohdar Abdullah as a brilliant, articulate, and manipulative man who could easily transition between being a traditional Muslim and a modern westerner. (G) believed Abdullah spoke Arabic with a Yemeni accent. (G) did not know how Abdullah learned English, but (G) was impressed with Abdullah's English proficiency.

[redacted] A Somali taxi cab driver named (P) prepared Abdullah's original asylum request for (G) When Abdullah approached (P) to be his translator for the subsequent asylum interview, (P) again requested (G) Abdullah did not have the money to pay another (G) for the asylum interview, so Abdullah went to Omar Abdi Mohamed (F). Mohamed did not want to help Abdullah, so Mohamed referred him to (P). Abdullah met (P) approximately one week before Abdullah's immigration hearing in Anaheim, California, in 1999, at (P) (P) San Diego, California. (G) believed that Abdullah portrayed himself as having a Somali mother and a Yemeni father. According to (G), there is a significant Yemeni population in Somalia. Most Yemeni's in Somalia are wealthy merchants, and it's not uncommon for Somali females to marry rich Yemeni men. Abdullah wrote on his immigration paperwork that he spoke a dialect of Somali and Arabic.

[redacted] (P) Abdullah drove to Anaheim for Abdullah's asylum interview. (A), (G), (J-1) Abdullah was interviewed by a Hispanic immigration agent who did not ask in depth questions with regards to Abdullah's alleged tribal history and the history of Somalia. (A), (G), (J-1) Abdullah was lucky because some immigration agents ask probing questions about tribal history, and if the questions aren't answered appropriately the asylum application is denied. (P) and Abdullah spoke to each other in Arabic during the immigration interview. When the immigration agent asked why the were speaking Arabic, (P) explained that he did not understand the Somali dialect that Abdullah noted on his asylum application. (P) didn't know Abdullah spoke fluent English until much later. (A), (G), (J-1) since the immigration interview is one of the final steps in the asylum process, he believed the asylum process had already vetted Abdullah as being a legitimate asylee.

[redacted] After Abdullah was arrested, and while he was being held in immigration custody, he used (P) as a go between to deliver messages requesting (P) to find (P) Abdullah believed (P) could help him win his immigration case.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) saw [redacted] (P) at the Starbucks on University and Fairmont around mid 2004. According to [redacted] (G), not many Somali's are named [redacted] (P) because [redacted] (P) is usually an Arabic name.

[redacted] [redacted] (G) believed that the San Diego Police Officer named [redacted] (S) knows [redacted] (P) and would be able to set up an interview.

[redacted] After Abdullah was granted conditional asylum, he returned to the [redacted] (P) and asked [redacted] (P) to fill out his work authorization permit and green card. [redacted] (P) referred Abdullah to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) office on 30th Street.

[redacted] Abdullah introduced Samir Abdoun to [redacted] (P) Abdoun was Algerian. Everyone in the Muslim community liked Abdoun, and many San Diego Muslims blamed Abdullah for getting Abdoun arrested and subsequently deported.

[redacted] [redacted] (A) (G) (J-1)

[redacted] Abdullah met [redacted] (P) twice after September 11, 2001. One time at the Living Room coffee house and the second time Denny's on Alvarado Road and Highway 8. Abdullah took Samir Abdoun to both meetings.

[redacted] After Abdullah was deported he called [redacted] (P) two times. [redacted] (P) was angry that Abdullah was calling his house and trying to contact his son [redacted] (P). [redacted] (P) forbid [redacted] (P) from talking to Abdullah. Abdullah is currently in Yemen, but he is trying to immigrate to England.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) is very intelligent and well studied in Islam. [redacted] (G) believes that he will be a future leader of the San Diego Muslim community. [redacted] (P) has a dedicated youth following but he has not yet reached the age to which Islamic elders would value his leadership skills and input. [redacted] (P) respects Dr. Waleed Basyouni, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), and [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] San Diego notes that on [redacted] (P) was charged by the Federal Grand Jury [redacted] (P) with a superceding [redacted] (P) indictment alleging that [redacted] (P)

[redacted] (P)

In [redacted] (P) trial was argued, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts on [redacted] (P)

[redacted] [redacted] (P) family is trying to arrange a marriage between [redacted] (P) and a Libyan woman who is living in Canada.

[redacted] [redacted] (P) is currently married to a Libyan woman. The marriage was arranged through family members who were living in Libya. [redacted] (P) pays a lot of alimony and child support to his Libyan ex-wife. (San Diego believes this ex-wife to be [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P).) [redacted] (P) wanted [redacted] (P) to return to Libya, but she refused. [redacted] (P) got very angry when [redacted] (P) Islamicaly married an individual named [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) frequently attends the masjid Ar-Ribat.

[redacted] [redacted] (A) (G) (J-1) [redacted] (P) runs the Ar-Ribat mosque like a dictator. The Ar-Ribat mosque was founded by several Saudi's and funded by Jameel Faqeih, aka Jamil Faqih. The Ar-Ribat has had several radical extremist leaders including Mohamed Zaky, who was killed fighting in Chechnya, Kifa Jayousi, who was rabidly anti-American, and Jameel Faqeih, who fought in Afghanistan in the early 90's and is currently married to an American living in Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (P) was very involved with the mosque leadership when Zaky, Jayousi, and Faqeih were in attendance.

[redacted] Nothing goes on in the Ar-Ribat without [redacted] (P) knowledge. [redacted] (G) did not believe that Nawaf AlHazmi, Khalid AlMihdar, and Anwar Aulaqi could be meeting regularly in the library or upstairs rooms of the Ar-Ribat without [redacted] (P) knowledge. [redacted] (A) (G) (J-1) [redacted] (P) keeps the key to the upstairs on his person so that people who want access to the library or any upstairs room have to ask him for it. [redacted] (P) stays involved with the lectures that the Imams give and with inviting guest speakers or fund raisers to the mosque.

[redacted] Abdusattar Shaikh was a Saudiphile who strived to be included in Arabian society. Shaikh had a love/hate relationship with Omar Albayoumi. He liked being around Albayoumi because he was Saudi, but he didn't like Albayoumi as a person. Albayoumi didn't like Shaikh because Shaikh wouldn't help Albayoumi get a green card. Well before September 11, 2001, Shaikh spoke about two strange house guests that were brought to him by Albayoumi. According to Shaikh, the two men were Saudi who had no money, often used the internet, never used the home phone, and often made telephone calls from payphones. In particular, Shaikh spoke about it being strange that the pair never had any money. Shaikh also asked about how to get the pair enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. In retrospect, (G) believes the two house guests were Khalid AlMihdar and Nawaf AlHazmi two hijackers who flew a plane into the Pentagon. Shaikh was always suspicious of Mohdar Abdullah because Abdullah brought people by Shaikh's house when they needed a place to stay.

♦♦

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 02/03/2006

To: San Diego **Attn:** (G) (S)

From: San Diego
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (G) debrief (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (G)

(F)

Details: [redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2006, (A), (G), (J-1), (G) provided the following information:

[redacted] (G) has not heard of Anwar Aulaqi attempting to contact anyone in San Diego. (G) believes that many people in

[redacted]

the San Diego community are wary about being associated with Aulaqi because of his publicized ties to the 9/11 terrorists.

[redacted] (G) understands that Mohdar Abdullah is still in Yemen and has not yet traveled to England. (G) believes that Abdullah wants to go to England because he enjoys living in the West more than the Middle East. According to (G) many people who have been deported from the United States make an effort to immigrate to England or Australia.

[redacted] One Somali named Ahmed Murshid, was deported from San Diego in the late 1990's and moved to England. Murshid was of Somali/Yemeni descent and his father was a well known Somali pilot.

[redacted] The Somali community in San Diego recently collected money for the wife of Omar Abdi Mohamed. If Mohamed is deported, (G) believes that he will attempt to immigrate to Kenya, or more likely, the United Arab Emirate. (G) believes that Mohamed's San Diego wife will leave the country to follow Mohamed if he is deported. Mohamed's Australian wife will probably also leave Australia to follow Mohamed. Almost all of the Somali community believe that Mohamed still has access to the $350,000 he received from Global Relief Fund.

♦♦

(Rev. 06-04-2007)

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** (G)

To: Counterterrorism Attn: (S)

(G) Attn: (S)

Los Angeles Attn: (S)
San Diego Attn:

New York Attn:

From: Los Angeles
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] To document interview of (G),
DOB (G) (G)

[redacted] (G)

[redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** (A) (G) (J-1)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) (G)

Enclosure(s): [redacted] Document provided to the agents by Attorney (G) (G) with the concurrence of (G) at the time of interview.

Details: [redacted] Investigation of (G) has determined that Benomrane was reportedly associated with, Mohdar Abdullah, (G), a well known subject of the 9/11 investigation who was an admitted associate of two hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. Benomrane was said to have witnessed, along with Mohdar Abdullah, an Islamic Marriage ceremony performed by Fahad Al Thumairy, Imam, between two individuals at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California. The couple was identified as (P) and (P), (A), (G), (J-1), who worked with Mohdar Abdullah at the same Texaco Gas Station in La Mesa, California where Nawaf Al-Hazmi was briefly employed while Al-Hazmi resided in San Diego, California.

[redacted] On (G) 2008, writer and SA (S) to the Law Office of (G) located at (G) (G), San Diego, California, 92108, telephone (G) (G) to conduct a pre-scheduled interview of (G) client, (G) (G) After advising both men of the identity of the law enforcement officers, writer and SA (S) initiated an interview of (G) (G) in the presence of his Attorney, (G) (G) (G) provided the following contact information: (G)

[redacted] (G) was shown an unmarked photograph of (G) Oualid Benomrane. (G) did not recognize the man depicted in the photograph. (G) was shown a photograph of (P) (P). (G) recognized the man depicted in the photograph as (P) (P) (P) the Texaco gas station located in La Mesa, California, (G) (G). Al Assal was also shown an unmarked photograph of (P) whom he recognized (G) (P) (G) employee of the Texaco gas station mentioned above.
(G) was shown an unmarked photograph of Mohdar Abdullah, in which he recognized the man in the photo as Mohdar, who was (G) (G) at the La Mesa Texaco gas station.
[redacted] Investigators asked about the (G) (G) and whether it was possible that (P) participated in an Islamic Marriage ceremony with (P) at any

time during the year 2000 or 2001 time period. (G) demeanor indicated to the agents that he was surprised and shocked by the assertion and replied quite certainly that it was impossible for this alleged marriage ceremony to have occurred, for several reasons. (G) reasons in ed that (P) was a very nice man and (G) he would never have that kind of relationship with (P) (G) observed a situation in the past in which a (G) (P) (G) he would never get involved (G) because he was married. Another reason for his disbelief was that (P) and (P) were both married to their respective spouses during that time period. An Imam would not perform a marriage ceremony knowing that the participants were already married. (G) (G) suggested we contact the Mosque where the ceremony occurred for verification.

(G) began to provide information related to (G) (G) (P) when he was interrupted by (G) who provided a document to (G) in order to refresh (G) memory. (G) stated that he and his client have been working on the document together for the past three years and that the events and dates depicted in the document would be the most accurate. (G) then provided a copy of the document to agents after getting the concurrence from (G). The document was addressed to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, specifically I-751 Adjudications. (This document is enclosed with this EC).

(G) provided that he met (P) in (G) 1999. (G) was employed (G) businesses at the time to include (G) (G) typically (G) (P-1), (G) (G) only remembered attending the Masjid Abu Baker, San Diego, California, on one occasion either in the year 2000 or 2001. This Mosque was where he saw Mohdar and the guys, meaning Mohdar's friends. (G) (G)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) 04/17/2008

(G)
(G) Investigators asked if (G) influenced (P) to convert to Islam in which his response was negative. When asked who would have influenced her, (G) surmised that Mohdar Abdullah and the guys may have influenced her to convert (G)

[redacted] (G)
(P-1), (G)

[redacted] (G) was shown an unmarked photograph of Nawaf Al Hazmi. (G) recognized Al Hazmi as a person who used to work in the car wash at the Texaco gas station. (G) also learned, after 9/11, that he was one of the 9/11 hijacker's. (G) stated that he met Nawaf on four occasions. (G) drove his car through the car wash at the Texaco gas station on three occasions. (G) exchanged greetings with Nawaf as he tipped Nawaf for wiping his (G)
(G)

(G)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [redacted], 04/17/2008

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] did not recognize an unmarked photograph of Khalid Al-Mihdhar. [redacted] did not recognize a still photograph taken from a video depicting an unknown individual, aka UNSUB, taken at the LAX airport in the year 2000. [redacted] did not recognize an unmarked photograph of Omar Al Bayoumi.

[redacted] [redacted] listed the people he knew [redacted]

Nawaf Al-Hazmi
Mohdar Abdullah
Omar Bakerbashat

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] could not remember anything that he witnessed back in 2000 or 2001 that he felt now was related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, except for a particular situation that occurred sometime after 9/11. [redacted] It took a little while for [redacted] to realize that the photograph Mohdar was pointing at was Nawaf Al Hazmi. [redacted] realized at that point that one of the hijacker's in the n s r was the same man who had previously worked at the Texaco car wash. Until that moment, [redacted] did not realize that Nawaf was involved in the 9/11 attacks.

[redacted]

(G)

(G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[redacted] For information only.

♦♦

REDACTION KEY

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).

O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.

P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.

S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed.
All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] To administratively close case **Date:** 05/27/2021

CC: (S), (G)

From: NEW YORK
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F) [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE -

(F)

Synopsis: [redacted] To administratively close case

(G)

Details:

[redacted]

[redacted] Case Background

[redacted] On 11 September 2001 four coordinated suicide attacks occurred in the United States in New York City and the Washington D.C. area. 19 terrorists from the Islamist militant group, al-Qaeda (AQ), hijacked four passenger jets and intentionally crashed two planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Hijackers crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth jet, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers attempted to take control before it could reach the hijacker's intended target in Washington D.C.

[redacted] The FBI investigation into the attacks, internally named PENTTBOM, which included the cooperation of local, state, and other federal agencies, identified the 19 hijackers and linked the hijackers to AQ. Subsequently, in a number of publicized video, audio, interview, and printed statements, senior members of AQ asserted responsibility for organizing the September 11 attacks. Ultimately, the core investigation revealed that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) each played critical roles in the 9/11 attack plot.

[redacted] In June 2007, the FBI’s New York field office (NYO) opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation file to organize information obtained from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets that were previously identified throughout the PENTTBOM investigation. Specifically, the NYO sought to obtain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi's (Hazmi) and Khalid al-Mihdhar's (Mihdhar) past interaction with and connectivity to the Southern California Muslim community in an attempt to explain how they may have gained assistance after their arrival in Los Angeles in January 2000.

[redacted] In October 2007, the NYO administratively moved the aforementioned subfile to its own separate NYO investigation casefile named “Operation Encore.” The predication of the investigation had the same purpose as the original PENTTBOM subfile investigation in that it served as an enterprise counterterrorism investigation into a possible network of individuals who were suspected of providing assistance to the hijackers and as an intelligence gathering operation into AQ’s tactics and tradecraft. Specifically the named main subjects, Fahad Al-Thumairy (Thumairy), Omar Al-Bayoumi (Bayoumi), and Musaed Al-Jarrah (Al-Jarrah), allegedly provided (or directed others to provide) Hazmi and Mihdhar with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters and assistance with assimilating into Southern California. The investigation sought to determine whether these three subjects wittingly provided such assistance with the knowledge that Hazmi and Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Additionally, separate full investigations on other associated individuals from other field offices, some of which were opened before and after Operation Encore, were also administratively consolidated under the Operation Encore casefile. *Refer to* [redacted] (F) *Serial* [redacted] (F)

[redacted]_[redacted] (G)

[redacted] Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah, all NON-USPERs, remain OCONUS, and are believed to live in Saudi Arabia. [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1)

[redacted] **Investigation Summary**

[redacted] The investigation was predicated upon the theory that Al-Jarrah used his position as the Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. to oversee and direct the facilitation of the hijackers through his subordinates, Thumairy and Bayoumi, as well as, his own personal contact with the hijackers.

[redacted] *Al-Jarrah*

[redacted] Al-Jarrah, a Saudi national, was listed as an accountant for the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

[redacted] A (O-1) CHS reported in March 2003 that Al-Jarrah was the director of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. beginning in February 1991 and his official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Arabian Imams who were assigned to the United States through this process reported to Al-Jarrah and he served as the coordinator of their activity while they were inside the United States. He reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position.

[redacted] (O-1) Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1) Al-Jarrah was heavily connected to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of Mohammed al-Muhannah (Muhannah) and Thumairy. Lastly, (O-1) Al-Jarrah was a controlling, guiding, and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and had been directing, controlling and funding Muhannah and Thumairy since their arrival in the United States.

[redacted] The investigation into Al-Jarrah (A),(G),(J-1),(D) (A),(G),(J-1),(D) however, No additional information was revealed outside of the CHS reporting and telephone information.

[redacted] Al-Jarrah was also the subject of an FBI (A),(G),(J-1) investigation opened in January 2003 predicated upon information (A),(G),(J-1) He was interviewed twice by the FBI in 2004 in connection with that investigation. Al-Jarrah permanently departed the United States in July 2006 (J-3) (J-3). While Al-Jarrah maintained regular contact with the Saudi Embassy after leaving the United States, he was no longer employed there. The investigation was closed in July 2007.

[redacted] *Thumairy*

[redacted] Thumairy, a Saudi national, was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in United States State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California. (C-1)

[redacted] Prior to Operation Encore, Thumairy was a main subject of a Los Angeles full investigation based on his phone connectivity with Bayoumi and his potential association to Hazmi and Mihdhar. Furthermore (A), (G), (J-1) reported that he was a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the KFM appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[redacted] Lastly, a review of Thumairy's financial transactions revealed connections with a Saudi individual, Jarallah Al-Jarallah, which were believed to be linked to a Saudi based money laundering scheme to move money around the Middle East region. FBI Los Angeles opened a full investigation into those transactions in April 2005 and closed it in

April 2006.

[redacted] Operation Encore also looked into the activity associated with Yemen-based number +9671200578. This phone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after the attacks on the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 07 August 1998. Khaled Rasheed Daoud Al-Owhali (Al-Owhali), one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. Al-Owhali was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack. Al-Owhali identified the telephone number as belonging to a close friend, Ahmad Al-Hada (Al-Hada), with whom he fought along side of in Afghanistan. Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and was subscribed to by Al-Hada. It was later reported that one of his daughters was married to Khalid al-Mihdhar and another to Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi, a known AQ member and former Guantanamo Bay Detainee.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1),(D)

[redacted] The investigation to determine Thumairy's association with the 9/11 hijackers was closed in December 2008 due to the following:

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1)

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) [redacted] (A),(G),(J-1) Thumairy was also interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport on 08 May 2003. He was refused entry into the United States and was returned to Saudi Arabia. He was re-interviewed in February 2004 by FBI agents at [redacted] (C-1) No new information was garnered as a result of either of these interviews.

iii.) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute Thumairy at such time.

[redacted] *Bayoumi*

[redacted] Bayoumi, a Saudi national, arrived in the United States in June 1995 on [redacted] (J-3) to study and also worked for the Saudi aviation company, Dallah AVCO.

[redacted] (O-1)

[redacted] Bayoumi co-signed the Parkwood apartment lease agreement for

Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego, California in February 2000 because the hijackers did not have the necessary credit history for the rental application and also because the leasing company did not permit cash payments. In the fall of 2000, Bayoumi moved to Birmingham, England, where he resided with his family and attended Aston University. Bayoumi was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) [redacted] (C-1) [redacted] (C-1)

[redacted] In a 2003 interview in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Bayoumi stated he received a salary from his employer, Dallah AVCO, and a stipend to cover tuition fees, housing, and other living expenses while he attended school in the United States.

[redacted] According to Telephone Application (TA) there was telephone connectivity between Bayoumi and Thumairy beginning in December 1998 and then sporadically until Bayoumi left the country in the fall of 2000. Connection periods included periods of time when Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas; however the nature and/or content of those discussions were not revealed as part of the investigation efforts.

[redacted] **Investigative Evidence**

[redacted] As part of the investigation that spanned from 2007 to 2016, the case team reviewed financial records, telecommunication records, travel records, conducted hundreds of interviews relating to the main subjects in addition to known associates (voluntarily [redacted] (D), conducted search warrants of various residences in Southern California, including a review of materials collected by New Scotland Yard via search warrant, [redacted] (A),(G), (J-1) and coordinated efforts with foreign partners, in order to determine if the Southern California Muslim community had a pre-existing support network in place with advanced knowledge that the hijackers, Hazmi and Mihdhar, were in the United States to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Additionally, during 2019 and 2020, the FBI re-examined the Operation Encore case file to identify any missed leads, opportunities, or investigative actions which may advance the case, including the summarization ECs serials in [redacted] (F) Serials [redacted] (F) documented in April 2016. Various CONUS based persons of interest were re-interviewed; no additional information was obtained as part of those interviews and no material contradicting statements were made as compared to the initial interviews.

[redacted] **AQ Tradecraft**

[redacted] Consent statements from various AQ members, including KSM, Abdul Rahim Abdu Al Nashiri, Walid Muhammad Salih Khallad Bin Attash, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Abd Al Aziz Ali Ali aka Ammar Al Baluchi, and Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi, regarding the operational planning of AQ's larger scale terrorist attacks, 9/11 and USS Cole, indicated that the AQ leadership compartmentalized the attack groups and roles within the operation. They did not make the attack plans known in advance to others for fear the nature of the attack would be discovered, which is consistent with the FBI's assessment of the last two decades of large scale AQ-related attacks. Specifically, in relation to the 9/11 attacks, the hijackers knew there was a martyrdom operation, but did not know about the nature of the operation until shortly before the attack for operational security reasons. *Refer to* [redacted] (F) *Serials* [redacted] (F)

[redacted] This information corroborated that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-

Jarrah did not knowingly conspire to assist the AQ hijackers in furtherance of the 9/11 attack.

[redacted] **Material Support to Terrorism**

[redacted] For federal criminal charges of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists to be filed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2339B, the totality of evidence from the investigation needed to establish that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah each had "knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization...that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity...or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (section 6603(c)(2))."

[redacted] As further explained in United States vs Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d 1005 (D.Minn. 2008), "under the plain language of 2339B...the government must prove that the defendant 'knowingly provides material support or resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO]', rather than to individuals who happen to be FTO members...In other words, even where a donor's contribution to an individual FTO member confers some benefit upon the terrorist organization, the prosecution must prove that the donor knew the intended recipient of his contribution was a designated FTO...Whether the donor knew the recipient was a member of a FTO could, of course, be relevant to a determination that the donor ultimately intended the contribution to go to the FTO itself. Nonetheless, the prosecution must prove that the donor knowingly provided material support or resources to the FTO."

[redacted] Based on the the totality of these investigative efforts and in coordination with the Assistant United States Attorneys of the Southern District of New York, it was jointly determined, that insufficient evidence existed to prosecute Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah for wittingly conspiring to assist the AQ hijackers in furtherance of the 9/11 attack. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern

District of New York (USAO-SDNY) was consulted regarding FBI-NYO’s intent on closing this investigation. USAO-SDNY had no objection to the closing of this investigation.

[redacted] **Conclusion**

[redacted] After nearly twenty years after the attack, the FBI has not identified additional groups or individuals responsible for the attack other than those currently charged, which is consistent with the final conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report which stated that "no new information to date that would alter the original findings of the 9/11 Commission regarding the individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks or for supporting those responsible for the attacks."

[redacted] The NYO completed all logical and reasonable investigative steps in accordance with established CTD guidance. No potential criminal violations or priority threats to national security warranting further investigation were identified. All leads have been completed. The NYO is closing captioned matter. In the event additional derogatory information is discovered regarding the captioned subjects, NYO will consider re-opening this investigation.

[redacted] Lastly, the SDNY concurs with the closing of the investigation; SDNY is willing to re-engage investigative measures if new information comes to light which may bear investigation.

♦♦

[redacted]

OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: [redacted] Addendum to Operation Encore Closing Electronic Communication **Date:** 09/08/2021

From: NEW YORK
(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F) [redacted] OPERATION ENCORE –

Synopsis: [redacted] To modify two statements that were written in the Operation Encore Closing EC (F)

(G)

Details:

[redacted] On 27 May 2021, the closing Electronic Communication (EC) for (G) also referred to Operation Encore, was serialized to Sentinel. Upon further review of that EC two statements included in that document required modification. They were as follows:

1. [redacted] In paragraph one of the "Investigation Summary" sub-section, the statement about the predication of the case being based on Musaed Al-Jarrah's (Al-Jarrah) personal contacts with the hijackers.

- "[redacted] The investigation was predicated upon the theory that Al-Jarrah used his position as the Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. to oversee and direct the facilitation of the hijackers through his subordinates, Thumairy and Bayoumi, as well as, his own personal contact with the hijackers."

[redacted]

[redacted] Upon further inspection of Sentinel, there was no source documentation to support the statement that Al-Jarrah had any personal contact directly with hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi (Hazmi) or Khalid al-Mihdhar (Mihdhar).

[redacted] Additionally, searches of FBI Telephone Databases, (G) (G) which are the FBI's central repositories for telephone records, (G) of the telephone numbers (P) a US-based cellular telephone number associated with Hazmi and (P) a US-based cellular telephone number associated with Mihdhar, did not reveal any contact with Al-Jarrah. Known Al-Jarrah telephone numbers prior to 9/11 included the following:

- (P) - Al-Jarrah Residence Landline
- Al-Jarrah Cellular Phone

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] In light of the lack of evidentiary support, the following language, "as well as, his own personal contact with the hijackers," should be removed from the closing EC.

2. [redacted] In paragraph one of the "Investigative Evidence" sub-section, the statement about hundreds of interview reports on subjects of Operation Encore

- [redacted] As part of the investigation that spanned from 2007 to 2016, the case team reviewed financial records, telecommunication records, travel records, conducted hundreds of interviews relating to the main subjects in addition to known associates (voluntarily and via Grand Jury)."

[redacted] On 01 July 2012, the FBI replaced its older record management system, ACS, with its current record management system, Sentinel, which offered case managers the ability to electronically filter for specific types of files such as FD-302, FD-1057, etc. As documents were migrated from ACS to Sentinel, the text of documents that were entered into the ACS system were usually, but not always, available in Sentinel, and were all classified as “legacy” documents. This migration, however, did not allow any electronic filtering of specific types of files, such as what was offered via Sentinel.

[redacted] A manual re-review of the Operation Encore case file to quantify the number of interviews conducted to include both FD-302s, which are most commonly used for interviews, and the ACS legacy files, showed that approximately 60 interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2016 as it related to the case's main subjects and associates, and not hundreds as previously stated.

[redacted] Therefore, the statement should be modified in the closing EC to state that the FBI conducted approximately 60 interviews between 2007 to 2016 relating to the main subjects in addition to known associates (voluntarily and via Grand Jury).

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DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

March 15, 2022

Today, in carrying out Executive Order 14040, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released documents from the FBI's investigation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and other investigations that are responsive to sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Executive Order. Many of these documents included passages containing analysis of banking, financial, credit, and communication records that were or may have been obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoena. This information could not be released prior to receiving court authorization, which was granted on March 2, 2022.

This release amounts to over 100 declassified documents, totaling over 700 pages. With today's release, the U.S. Government has now declassified and released more than 800 documents, totaling more than 3,400 pages, in furtherance of the Executive Order's directive to maximize transparency.

Included in today's release is the FBI-CIA Joint Assessment, which was responsive to section 2(b) of the Executive Order, and was released in part in November 2021 (EO14040-000488–491). This document was subject to further declassification review by other U.S. government agencies and departments. That process has concluded, and the FBI is able to provide the results of the declassification review.

DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

March 29, 2022

Today, in carrying out Executive Order 14040, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released additional documents from the FBI's investigation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and other investigations that are responsive to sections 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) of the Executive Order. With today's release, the U.S. Government has now declassified and released more than 900 documents, totaling almost 4,000 pages, in furtherance of the Executive Order's directive to maximize transparency.

Over the past four weeks, the FBI has updated more than 70 documents that were previously released on November 2 and December 30, 2021, lifting further redactions. Today's release and the releases on March 15, 18, and 23, 2022, reflect those updates. These updated versions include the results of the U.S. Government's coordination with over two dozen foreign governments. Many of these documents also include passages containing analysis of banking, financial, credit, communication, business, or education records that were or may have been obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoena. This information could not be released prior to receiving court authorization, which was granted in two separate orders on March 2 and 22, 2022.

This release note also updates the information contained in prior release notes to accurately reflect, as of today, the number of documents that remain withheld in full and the reason for each withholding. Specifically, the following release notes detailed that the FBI had identified a total of 44 documents that were withheld from public disclosure under redaction code C-1, for "INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION":

Documents Responsive to Executive Order 14040 Section 2(b) Release Note 1

Documents Responsive to Executive Order 14040 2(c) Release Note 2

Documents Responsive to Executive Order 14040 2(d) Release Note 3

Following the required consultations, the FBI has released a subset of these documents. Currently, there are 33 documents that remain withheld under the C-1 redaction code. This includes 8 documents responsive to Section 2(b) and 25 documents responsive to Section 2(c).

DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

April 29, 2022

Today, in carrying out Executive Order 14040, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released additional documents from the FBI's investigation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and other investigations that are responsive to sections 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) of the Executive Order. With today's release, the U.S. Government has now declassified and released more than 900 documents, totaling over 4,000 pages, in furtherance of the Executive Order's directive to maximize transparency.

Over the past four weeks, the FBI has lifted additional redactions to more than 30 documents that were previously released pursuant to the Executive Order. Today's release and the release on April 15, 2022, reflect those updates. These updated versions include the results of the U.S. Government's coordination with additional foreign governments.

This release note also updates the information contained in prior release notes to accurately reflect, as of today, the number of documents that remain withheld in full and the reason for each withholding. As of the March 29, 2022 Release Update, the FBI had identified a total of 33 documents that were withheld from public disclosure under redaction code C-1, for "INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION." Following the required consultations, the FBI has released a subset of these documents today and on April 15, 2022. Currently, 3 documents responsive to Section 2(b) and 11 documents responsive to Section 2(c) totaling 14 documents remain withheld under the C-1 redaction code.

Absent additional concurrences, the FBI does not anticipate any future releases.

RESULTS OF DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 2(b) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

November 2, 2021

The FBI has identified nine (9) documents that are withheld from public disclosure at this time. These documents are withheld in the entirety under following redaction code:

C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).

RESULTS OF DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 2(b) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040

November 2, 2021

The FBI has identified one document that pertains to a classified method or technique and is withheld in the entirety from public disclosure under the following redaction codes:

A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.

G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.

J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).